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Investment treaties have come under fire in the past few years in Europe. The critics are 
arguing that investment treaties constitute a threat to the policy autonomy of 'host' states as 
they allow foreign investors to challenge domestic regulatory measures adopted in 
sensitive areas of public policy, such as protection of the environment and public health. 
Investment treaties provide access to ad hoc arbitration where private arbitrators determine 
whether legislative, administrative and judicial acts of the host state comply with 
investment protection standards and whether the claimant investor is entitled to 
compensation. Thus far, investors have raised more than 800 known claims against more 
than hundred states, with tribunals awarding hundreds of millions of dollars in 
compensation to investors in a number of high-profile cases. For the critics, the ability of 
private arbitrators to determine the appropriateness of a wide range of domestic policy 
measures (coupled with their ability to award compensation) constitutes an illegitimate 
intervention in the domestic political process. On the other side of the argument, the 
proponents of investment treaties argue that the critique is based on misunderstandings and 
hyperbole, with arbitral tribunals showing a high measure of deference to the public 
interest of host states when reviewing measures that investors have challenged. More 
generally, the proponents argue that investment treaties protect the fundamental rights of 
investors against arbitrary exercises of public power, promote the international rule of law, 
and increase investor confidence by guaranteeing a more stable regulatory framework for 
transnational economic activity.  
 
Alongside this heated debate, there is another related debate that concerns the relationship 
of EU law and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of EU member states. In this more 
technical debate, the EU Commission argues that BITs concluded between two member 
states (intra-EU BITs) are incompatible with EU law and have to be terminated. The 
Commission argues that arbitration under intra-EU BITs breaches the principle of non-
discrimination and the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to 
provide authoritative interpretations of EU law. These arguments form the basis of the 
pending infringement proceedings against five member states, and the Commission has 
raised the same arguments in a number of arbitrations where EU investors have brought 
claims against member states under intra-EU BITs. Arbitral tribunals have not, however, 
 V 
concurred with the Commission. In their view, intra-EU BITs protect the fundamental 
rights of investors and are fully compatible with EU law. As investment treaties provide 
broader and more effective protection to investors than EU law and national laws of the 
member states, they form a complementary remedy for investors within the internal 
market.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to combine and provide an analysis of these two seemingly 
distinct debates concerning the future of investment treaties in Europe. Existing 
scholarship has provided less than in-depth analyses of the Commission's arguments on the 
relationship of EU law and member state BITs. Hence, as a first matter, I provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the arguments that intra-EU BITs breach the principle of non-
discrimination and the autonomy of the EU legal order. The analysis shows that the case 
law of the ECJ provides no watertight answers, and that the Court could go either way 
depending on which of the relevant cases it chooses as its frame of reference. I suggest, 
however, that the future of intra-EU BITs should not be decided on the basis of the 
Commission's formal arguments, but on the basis of an analysis of the general arguments 
for and against investment treaties outlined above. As noted, the proponents are arguing, 
for example, that investment treaties are akin to human rights treaties and promote the 
international rule of law, whereas the critics argue that the treaties promote narrow 
corporate interests at the expense of the public interest and undermine the regulatory 
autonomy of host states. 
 
To understand the plausibility of these opposing arguments, I analyze both the assumptions 
that undergird them as well as the materials on which they rely. The analysis shows that 
the opposing arguments are based on anecdotal evidence and unverified assumptions, 
rather than on empirically proven hypotheses or on detailed analyses of the case law that 
arbitral tribunals have hitherto produced. I argue that the critics and proponents entertain 
simplified assumptions about the purposes and implications of investment treaties, with 
both sides ignoring countervailing evidence. My discussion also shows that the 
disagreement between the opposing sides is inherently political, as the opposing arguments 
rely on contrasting understandings about how state-market relations should be arranged in 
the global economy. In other words, the disagreement is not about the level of deference 
that arbitral tribunals should give to domestic policy, but about the allocation of power 
between domestic and international institutions. This suggests that whichever way the ECJ 
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goes in its upcoming judgment concerning intra-EU BITs, it will necessarily send a 
political message to the various stakeholders involved in investment law debates in 
Europe. If the Court finds that the treaties are compatible with EU law, the critics will see 
it as a capitulation to transnational economic forces and as reflecting the technocratic 
nature and ethos of the European project, whereas the proponents will see it as a 
responsible exercise of judicial discretion which understands the importance of investor 
confidence for the future prosperity of Europe. Conversely, if the Court finds that intra-EU 
BITs are incompatible with EU law, the critics will see it as a symbolic victory in the 
broader battle against further trade and investment liberalization, whereas the proponents 
will view it as a naïve attempt to placate some of the anti-globalization sentiment that is 
alive and well in certain segments of the European body politic. The broad argument of the 
thesis is simple. The relationship of EU law and investment treaties should not be 
discussed in the current technocratic and legalistic register but in a register that 
acknowledges the political nature of the relationship and foregrounds the different political 
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In December 2013, the Micula tribunal rendered its final award and ordered Romania to 
pay around 85 million euros (plus substantial interest) in damages to a group of investors 
for breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard of the bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT) between Romania and Sweden.1 At the heart of the dispute was a set of investment 
incentives designed to facilitate economic development in Romania's 'disfavored' regions. 
Romania had adopted the incentives in the late 1990s, and during its EU accession talks it 
became evident that the incentives constituted illegal state aid under EU law. As a result of 
the EU Commission's gentle arm-twisting, most of the incentives were revoked in 2005, 
some two years before Romania acceded to the EU. This led the investors to claim that 
their rights under the BIT had been violated, and while the award has many interesting 
features,2 the tribunal, in essence, concurred with the argument that the revocation had 
breached the investors' 'legitimate expectations' and therewith the fair and equitable 
treatment standard.3 As a response, the Commission issued a suspension injunction,4 which 
debarred Romania from paying the award pending the Commission’s decision on the 
compatibility of such payment with EU state aid rules. In March 2015, the Commission 
made a formal decision that Romania's compliance with the award constitutes illegal state 
aid and obligated Romania to collect the amounts which the claimants had succeeded in 
recovering.5 The Micula claimants, in turn, challenged both the injunction and the state aid 
                                                
1 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, 11 December 2013. 
2 One of them being that the principal claimants, the Micula brothers, were born and raised in Romania, had 
migrated to Sweden in the 1980s and then acquired Swedish nationality in mid-1990s (and simultaneously 
renounced their Romanian nationality), after which they had mostly lived and worked in Romania. The 
Swedish government argued that the brothers had not demonstrated that they had Swedish nationality or, 
alternatively, that they had no effective link to Sweden, but the tribunal dismissed these arguments and 
concluded that the brothers ‘are and have been Swedish nationals at all times relevant to the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction in this dispute.’ See Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. 
and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 24 September 2008, para. 106. 
3 More specifically, the tribunal saw that the claimants' investment decision was made in reliance on 
Romania's promise to hold the incentives in force for a period of ten years. See Micula award, supra note 1, 
pp. 181-195. 
4 The decision was taken under Art. 11(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides detailed 
rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (now Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (hereinafter TFEU). See Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 
laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, pp. 1-9. 
5 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015 on State aid, OJ L 232, 4.9.2015, pp. 43-70. 
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decision before the General Court6 and continue to seek the award's enforcement in a 
number of EU and non-EU jurisdictions with the aim of seizing and liquidating Romanian 
assets located therein.7 In parallel with these public proceedings, Romania sought to annul 
the award under the applicable arbitration rules, but its petition was rejected in February 
2016.8  
 
Micula embodies the complexities in the relationship of EU law and EU member state 
BITs. State aid is just one area where BIT provisions or decisions of arbitral tribunals can 
conflict with EU law, and both extra-EU' BITs (i.e. treaties with third states) and 'intra-EU' 
BITs (treaties between two EU member states) can trigger such conflicts. In the Micula 
proceedings the EU Commission argued that if the tribunal finds in the claimants' favor, 
the award will be unenforceable under EU law as it conflicts with EU state aid rules, but 
the tribunal held that it was 'inappropriate' for it 'to base its decisions…on matters of EU 
law that may come to apply after the Award has been rendered'.9 Conversely, in the state 
aid proceedings one question was whether EU law protects the claimants' right to receive 
compensation under the BIT, but the Commission held that EU state aid rules applied fully 
to the Micula award.10 These opposing arguments and outcomes reflect how the EU 
institutions and arbitral tribunals apply different legal rules to resolve conflict arguments in 
a way that gives priority to the treaty under which they were created. This suggests that 
treaty regimes are inclined to have a 'ghetto mentality', with each regime defending its turf 
from intrusions by rival regimes.11  
 
Situations where a member state's EU law obligations come in the way of complying with 
its obligations under a BIT are just one aspect of the problematique of member state BITs. 
The Commission has pressed the member states to terminate their mutual BITs, including 
                                                
6 Case T-646/14, Micula e.a. v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:135 (the case, which concerned the request to 
annul the Commission's suspension injunction decision was discontinued in February 2016 at the request of 
the applicants); Case T-694/15, Micula e.a. v Commission, OJ C 68, 22.2.2016, pp. 30-32 (this latter case is 
pending and concerns the annulment of the Commission's state aid decision). 
7 For some information on the status of the enforcement proceedings, see Clovis Trevino, ‘As tribunal is 
finalized for second Micula v. Romania ICSID arbitration, new developments come in relation to earlier 
award’, IAReporter News Service, 1 May 2015. 
8 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award on Annulment, 26 February 2016. The official title of the 
ICSID Convention is Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 575 UNTS 159. 
9 Micula award, supra note 1, para. 340. 
10 Micula state aid decision, supra note 5, para. 127. 
11 The phrase 'ghetto mentality' is from David Kennedy, 'The Mystery of Global Governance', 34 Ohio 
Northern University Law Review (2008), pp. 827-860, at 828. 
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the Romania-Sweden BIT, on a number of grounds. In the Commission's view, intra-EU 
BITs amount to an 'anomaly within the EU internal market'12 as EU law provides adequate 
or similar type of protection to EU investors. In legal terms the Commission has raised two 
main arguments. First, intra-EU BITs breach the principle of non-discrimination as they 
provide protection only to the nationals of the contracting states (to the exclusion of 
nationals of other member states), and, second, intra-EU BITs breach the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)13 to interpret EU law under Article 344 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),14 as arbitral tribunals 
may have to interpret EU law without the ECJ's involvement, which threatens the uniform 
interpretation and autonomy of EU law.15 However, the bulk of member states disagrees 
with the Commission and has refused to take any action, which prompted the latter to start 
infringement proceedings against five member states in June 2015, and similar proceedings 
are being planned against other member states as well.16 The Commission's approach has 
received its share of criticism. One commentator noted that the termination of intra-EU 
BITs 'as demanded by the EU Commission would…deprive EU citizens of subjective 
rights…[and] would be an unparalleled occurrence as regards fundamental principles of 
the European Union'.17 This view is fueled by the perception that a number of member 
states suffer from administrative incapacity and corruption and do not necessarily have 
'independent courts that decide cases in accordance with pre-established rules of law'.18 
Under such circumstances, the argument proceeds, investment arbitration may provide the 
                                                
12 The quote is from the Commission's amicus curiae submission to the Eureko tribunal. See Eureko v.Slovak 
Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26 October 2010, 
para. 177. 
13 Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, that the 
'Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised 
courts'. Hence, it is more appropriate to continue to abbreviate the Court of Justice as ECJ instead of CJEU. 
14 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 
47-390 
15 See e.g. ibid., paras. 175-196. The question whether arbitral tribunals are 'ordinary courts' in the meaning 
of Article 267 TFEU (i.e. whether they can submit preliminary questions to the ECJ) is addressed below in 
Chapter 5. 
16 See European Commission press release, ‘Commission asks member states to terminate their intra-EU 
bilateral investment treaties’, IP/15/5198, 18 June 2015. 
17 See Christian Tietje, 'Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties between EU Member States (Intra-EU BITs) 
as a Challenge in the Multi-Level Legal System, in Christian Tietje, Gerhard Kraft and Mathias Lehmann 
(eds.), Beiträge zum Translationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, No. 104 (2011, CL-146), p. 19. 
18 See Charles N. Brower and Stephan W. Schill, 'Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law?', 9 Chicago Journal of International Law (2009), pp. 471-498, at 479. 
Similarly, Tietje notes that intra-EU BITs 'contribute to the elevation and intensification of the legal 
protection of economic operators in the Internal Market. Similar to international investment law, intra-EU 
BITs stabilize and strengthen the rule of law in the Internal Market'. See Christian Tietje, 'Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Between EU Member States (Intra-EU BITs) - Challenges in the Multilevel System of 
Law', 10 Transnational Dispute Management (2013/Issue 2), p. 23. 
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only (effective) remedy against arbitrary exercises of public power. More generally, the 
proponents argue that investment treaties and arbitration are akin to human rights treaties 
and adjudication, with arbitral tribunals 'relying on and developing human rights 
jurisprudence' when deciding investment disputes.19  
 
These arguments suggest that conflicts between EU law and member state BITs should be 
resolved on the basis of the values that underpin the EU constitutional order, rather than on 
the basis of specific primary law rules, such as the principle of equal treatment. The ECJ 
has implied that the 'EU constitutional order consists of some core principles which may 
prevail over provisions of the [founding] Treaties,20 and among these 'principles' are the 
foundational values of the EU, which are now listed in Article 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union, namely, 'respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights'.21 The idea that values should determine how treaty conflicts 
are resolved foregrounds the final aspect of the problematique of member state BITs.22 
Although arbitration clauses have been a standard part of BITs from the 1980s onward, 
investment arbitration has faced an avalanche of criticism within the EU only in the past 
few years, in particular in the context of the transatlantic free trade negotiations. Across 
Europe, the public and political debate on investment treaties has followed a similar script. 
The critics argue that the inclusion of an investment chapter in the transatlantic trade 
agreements provides unnecessary special privileges to foreign investors and undermines 
the ability of governments to regulate in the public interest. In their view, arbitral tribunals 
focus solely on the economic impact that host state measures have on investments and 
downplay or ignore the attendant public interest, such as public health and the protection of 
the environment. Moreover, arbitral tribunals may award sizeable compensation to 
investors for measures that enjoy widespread legitimacy among domestic constituencies. 
As a prominent critic put it, 'investment arbitration has become an instrument of protection 
for foreign investment to the exclusion of other interests such as the environment, health, 
access to essentials like medicines, electricity and water, positive discrimination to 
                                                
19 Charles N. Brower and Sadie Blanchard, 'What's in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration: 
Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States', 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
(2014), pp. 689-777, at 689-690 and 757. 
20 See Allan Rosas and Lorna Armati, EU Constitutional Law. An Introduction (Hart, 2012), p. 54.  
21 Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union provides that the 'Union is founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities.' 
22 The idea that values should determine how treaty conflicts are resolved is one of the themes in Jan 
Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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advantage underprivileged groups and human rights'.23 This view stands in stark contrast to 
the above narrative according to which investment treaties protect fundamental rights and 
are in line with the EU's foundational values. But how plausible are these two opposing 
perceptions to begin with? Is it possible to find common ground over the values and 
interests that investment treaties seek to promote or is this, unavoidably, a perspectival 
matter? And how should the question of values and interests affect the resolution of 












                                                
23 M. Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in International in the International Law on Foreign Investment 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 392. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The Substantive Context of the Study 
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. The first purpose is to provide an analysis of the 
formal conflict scenarios that member state BITs and EU law may give rise to.24 
Schematically speaking, the relevant conflict scenarios can be divided into two broad 
categories. The first category is composed of 'primary conflicts', which refers to the 
argument that arbitration under member state BITs is 'inherently' incompatible with EU 
law. This understanding is at the heart of the Commission's main arguments on intra-EU 
BITs, namely, that they breach both the autonomy of the EU legal order and the principle 
of non-discrimination as established under primary EU law and in the case law of the 
ECJ.25 The second category is composed of 'regulatory conflicts', which refers to potential 
conflicts stemming from domestic implementation of EU legal acts and other decisions of 
national authorities related to the requirements of EU law, which an investor challenges 
before an arbitral tribunal. Regulatory conflict arguments are not premised on a conflict 
between BIT arbitration clauses and EU law, but on conflicts between one or more 
substantive BIT provisions and specific emanations of the droit communautaire dérivé. 
Yet the two conflict categories are in part intertwined; if and when an investor raises a 
claim against a member state measure that relates to an EU act, the latter may raise that EU 
act in the arbitral proceedings, which breaches, in the Commission's view at least, the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ and threatens the autonomy of the EU legal order. 
 
Put differently, regulatory conflict scenarios are part of the evidence which is relevant for 
determining whether investment arbitration breaches the autonomy of EU law. Given this, 
as well as the breadth of potential conflict scenarios between secondary EU law and BIT 
protection standards, I will subsume my discussion on regularly conflicts into the 
discussion on primary conflicts. Providing an extensive discussion on regulatory conflicts 
                                                
24 I will use the term EU law regardless of the time period to which the discussion relates. Terms such as 
'Community law' and 'EC law' will only appear in citations. I have incorporated materials that were available 
before 15 September 2017, and materials that became available after this date receive only a few incidental 
remarks. 
25 Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, that the 
'Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised 
courts.' Hence, it is more appropriate to continue to abbreviate the Court of Justice as ECJ instead of CJEU. 
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 13-390 
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would inflate the length of the thesis well above the faculty guidelines, so my purpose is to 
point out the main rules and principles that come into play, rather than to elaborate on the 
substantive areas of secondary law where regulatory conflicts may arise. As a whole, the 
questions that the analysis seeks to answer include the following: do BIT arbitration 
clauses breach the EU law principles of non-discrimination and/or the autonomy of the EU 
legal order? In which ways can BIT protection standards conflict with secondary EU law? 
If the existence of primary or regulatory conflicts is established, what are the applicable 
conflict rules under EU law and international law? Micula shows that it is necessary to 
analyze the scenarios from the perspectives of EU law and international (investment) law, 
and Chapters 3 to 5 will take these two perspectives. 
 
As noted, these are technical questions in the sense that their resolution does not require 
taking a stand either on the critique of investment treaties and arbitration or on the 
arguments with which they are defended. One might also argue that the two issues should 
be addressed separately because the substantive questions are distinct: the conflict 
arguments are the stuff of legal dogmatics, whereas the pros and cons of investment 
treaties are predominantly a matter of politics, at least until the relevant issues are settled in 
law. But, clearly, the critique is both legal and political in the sense that the procedural and 
substantive rules that apply in investment arbitration (together with the background of 
many arbitrators in private sector legal practice) are perceived as resulting in a pro-investor 
bias in the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals, which constrains the regulatory autonomy of 
host states. Generally speaking, discussing the treaty conflict scenarios in isolation of 
broader institutional questions and the interests and values that undergird the critical 
debate not only lacks ambition but makes it difficult to take sides with respect to the 
conflicts' resolution. Hence, the second purpose of the thesis is to combine the doctrinal 
debate on treaty conflicts with the contentious debate on the pros and cons of the 
investment treaty regime. What the linking of the two debates strives to achieve is to, first, 
create an understanding of the values and interests that investment treaties are understood 
as promoting, and, second, to provide a critical analysis of the assumptions and evidence 
upon which the arguments depend. To give an example, the Commission has argued that 
intra-EU BITs breach the principle of non-discrimination, which renders them inapplicable 
as a matter of EU law. Another, more general argument is that intra-EU BITs are 
unnecessary within the internal market because EU law provides similar type of 
protections. The first argument focuses on equal treatment, whereas the second asserts that 
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investors receive adequate protection within the internal market. Neither argument is based 
on an analysis of the alleged pros and cons of investment treaties, as they either prioritize a 
third value (equal treatment) or assume that investment treaties protect the fundamental 
rights of investors and nothing else. By ignoring the critical debate on investment treaties, 
the Commission’s approach looks overly technocratic and problematic from the 
perspective of the foundational values of the EU. My general goal is to get a grasp of the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the opposing arguments raised in the critical debate. 
This should not only allow situating the answers of the formal legal analysis (the first 
purpose of the thesis) over the relationship of member state BITs and EU law into a 
broader context, but also say something about the future of investment treaties in Europe; 
are they as useful and necessary as the proponents claim, or do they pose a threat to the 
foundational values of the EU as the critics claim, or is the truth somewhere in between. 
Answering this large question is no doubt a difficult task, but also critically important for 
the legitimacy of the EU's future investment policy as it should illustrate to what extent the 
idea of the EU as a constitutional order, grounded on fundamental values, holds water in 
this particular context. 
 
To my knowledge, no book-length contributions on the relationship of EU law and 
member state BITs have been written. Existing scholarship consists of articles and 
monograph chapters focusing on specific aspects of the relationship, and given the 
shortness of such texts they can only scratch the surface of this multifaceted and complex 
topic. Hence, many of the formal questions raised above have not received in-depth 
analysis, and in many cases the conclusions of commentators turn out to be tentative upon 
closer scrutiny. For example, the case law of the ECJ is crucial to understanding whether 
BIT arbitration clauses breach the principle of non-discrimination as a matter of EU law. 
Many commentators rely on that case law when inferring that the clauses are either 
compatible or incompatible with EU law, but these conclusions are often less than 
plausible as the cases and their context are presented in a summary fashion, raising the 
question of whether they are relevant in the BIT context in the first place.26 Put differently, 
                                                
26 Representative works include Angelos Dimopoulos, 'The Validity and Applicability of International 
Investment Agreements between EU Member States under EU and International Law', 48 Common Market 
Law Review (2011), pp. 63-93; Thomas Eilmansberger, 'Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law', 46 
Common Market Law Review (2009), pp. 383-429; Steffen Hindelang, 'Circumventing Primacy of EU Law 
and the CJEU’s Judicial Monopoly by Resorting to  Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Provided for in Inter-se 
treaties? The Case of Intra-EU Investment Arbitration', 39 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2012), pp. 
179-206; August Reinisch, 'Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties in Action: 
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existing scholarship does not answer conclusively to what extent the case law of the ECJ is 
relevant and (if it is relevant) what implications it has for member state BITs as a matter of 
EU law and international law. Another observation is that none of the existing 
contributions connect the doctrinal debate on the different conflict scenarios with the 
critical debate on the purposes and implications of investment treaties, which is a central 
objective of this thesis. 
1.2. Structure of the Thesis 
With the above in mind, the structure of the work is as follows. Chapter 2 starts with a 
general introduction to the central elements of treaty conflicts, in particular to the alleged 
conflicts between EU law and member state BITs. The topics under discussion include: 
how are treaty conflicts defined in doctrine and what is their relevance in the present 
context, what are the main conflict rules and principles under EU law and international 
law, what is the relevance of the distinction between intra-EU and extra-EU BITs, and 
what role can courts and tribunals play in the resolution of treaty conflicts. As to the last of 
these, I discuss a number of structural and ad hoc factors that explain why courts and 
tribunals are more likely to reject conflict arguments than to uphold them. I also provide a 
few introductory remarks on the (EU law) question of competence, as it highlights how EU 
law imposes constraints on the treaty-making capacity of the member states. Chapter 3 
discusses arbitration cases where the Commission and respondent EU member states have 
raised primary conflict arguments to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals. 
Their basic argument is that intra-EU BITs breach the principle of non-discrimination and 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ to interpret EU law, with the consequence that the 
clauses have become inapplicable under the lex posterior rule enshrined in Articles 30(3) 
and 59(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Arbitral tribunals 
have rejected these conflict arguments on a number of grounds. They have held, for 
example, that EU law and BITs are 'complementary' legal frameworks which can continue 
to co-exist as before, and in their view the problem of discrimination is resolved by 
extending BIT privileges to all EU investors. The final part of Chapter 3 provides an 
                                                                                                                                              
The Decision on Jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar and Eureko Investment Arbitrations', 39 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration (2012), pp. 157-177; Tietje, 'Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties between EU 
Member States, supra note 17; Hanno Wehland, 'Schiedsverfahren auf der Grundlage bilateraler 
Investitionsschutzabkommen zwischen EU-Mitgliedstaaten und die Einwendung des entgegenstehenden 
Gemeinschaftsrechts', 6 SchiedsVZ - Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren (2008), pp. 222-234. 
 10 
introductory analysis of the tribunals' findings and here many of the topics discussed in 
Chapter 2 will resurface. The final section also provides some preliminary remarks on the 
type of value and interest claims that undergird the tribunals' conclusions, a topic which 
will re-emerge in Chapter 7.  
 
The discussion in Chapter 3 is a prelude to Chapters 4 and 5 where I provide a thorough 
analysis of the argument that BIT arbitration clauses breach the principle of non-
discrimination and autonomy of the EU legal order as a matter of EU law. The case law of 
the ECJ is at the heart of the discussion, and the analysis focuses on cases raised in 
scholarship and in some of the arbitrations discussed in Chapter 3. One conclusion is that 
commentators and arbitral tribunals have often provide a less than comprehensive analysis 
of the cases by not paying adequate attention to their specific context, which has led, 
arguably, to false analogies between the cases and the relevant BITs. As to discrimination, 
the main conclusion is that BIT arbitration clauses appear to breach the principle of non-
discrimination, although the Court's case law provides some support to the opposing 
conclusion as well. If member state BITs constitute prohibited discrimination, the central 
question is what implications such finding carries both as a matter of EU law and 
international law. Should, for example, the scope of member state BITs be extended so as 
to cover all EU investors, or, conversely, should the member states terminate intra-EU 
BITs? Or should the treaties be allowed to remain in force on the assumption that they 
protect the fundamental rights of investors? And is discrimination an internal EU law 
problem, having no impact on the status of member state BITs as a matter of international 
law?  
 
On autonomy, the central conclusion is that the ECJ could go either way depending on the 
message it wants to send to the member states. The Court has construed the autonomy 
doctrine in a piecemeal fashion, and some of its central dicta are expressed in abstract 
language, which makes it difficult to understand the scope of the findings and their 
relevance for member state BITs. I start the analysis by looking at a number of arbitrations 
where the parties have invoked specific EU law instruments. These cases are directly 
relevant to the analysis as they show how arbitral tribunals have engaged with EU law in 
their deliberations. Some of these cases are also relevant because they raise the prospect of 
regulatory conflicts; when an investor has challenged a measure, which was adopted so as 
to comply with an EU act, there is a potential conflict between the respondent member 
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state's obligation to implement the EU act as a matter of EU law and its obligation to treat 
the investment in a certain way under the relevant BIT. I will provide an outline of the 
main rules and principles in respect of regulatory conflicts and look at the basic approaches 
that arbitral tribunals and the EU institutions have taken or are likely to take.27 As to my 
conclusion on autonomy, the analysis shows that a strict reading of the Court's reasoning 
implies that arbitral tribunals have engaged with EU law (and potentially will continue to 
do so) in ways that may be problematic from the perspective of the autonomy of the EU 
legal order. But this potential 'threat' can be resolved in a number of ways and I will look at 
a number of issues that either support or undermine the argument that investment 
arbitration breaches the autonomy of EU law. One such issue is WTO jurisprudence which 
contains a number of cases where the Dispute Settlement Body has held that specific EU 
law instruments breach WTO law, but this has not given rise to concerns in respect of the 
autonomy of EU law. Does this mean, by analogy, that arbitral tribunals too can interpret 
EU law without threatening the autonomy of EU law or are the two contexts different in 
some crucial respect?  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 change perspective and provide a general account of the arguments for 
and against investment treaties. The primary focus of existing scholarship is naturally on 
the technical and legal aspects of the critique, which relate to the way in which arbitrators 
are appointed,28 or to the problem of 'double hatting',29 or to forum-shopping, or to lack of 
consistency in the decisions of arbitral tribunals, or to how awards are not subject to 
normal appellate review, or to lack of transparency in respect of proceedings and case 
documentation. Each of these questions is undoubtedly important and would merit a 
separate discussion, and, arguably, the concerns they reflect could for the most part be 
resolved through treaty reform, with the Commission's proposal for an investment court 
system representing one authoritative solution. The relevant scholarship is burgeoning, but 
                                                
27 While the discussion on regulatory conflicts is not directly relevant for the autonomy analysis, its inclusion 
is warranted by its practical relevance; such conflicts are likely to arise in arbitral practice in the future as 
well. 
28 For a comprehensive discussion of the matter in respect of the ICSID Convention, see Maria Nicole Cleis, 
The Independence and Impartiality of ICSID Arbitrators. Current Case Law, Alternative Approaches, and 
Improvement Suggestions (Brill, 2017). 
29 A recent article provides an interesting empirical analysis of the 'normative concerns over double hatting 
by determining the extent to which it occurs and whether the practice has eased or worsened over time' on the 
basis of '1039 investment arbitration cases (including ICSID annulments) and the relationships between the 
3910 known individuals that form' the investment arbitration community. See Malcolm Langford, Daniel 
Behn and Runar Hilleren Lie, 'The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration', 20 Journal of 
International Economic Law (2017), pp. 1-28. 
 12 
my own main interest in respect of the critique lies elsewhere, and starts from the premise 
that the resolution of the above issues would not placate the most ardent critics or address 
their central concern and neither would treaty reform promote their political agenda. Put 
differently, if the critique is understood in the above technical or legalistic sense, and if 
academic lawyers set the terms of the debate, many critics will think that the fox is 
guarding the henhouse. The point is not that academic lawyers would not be able to 
provide impeccable analyses of the technical concerns and propose convincing solutions, 
but that because the critique is at heart political, no amount of treaty reform can address its 
core. I will elaborate on this approach (and provide justifications to it) in the next section.     
 
What Chapters 6 and 7 strive to do is to look at the plausibility of the general assumptions 
that undergird the arguments for and against investment treaties. The analysis will provide 
a summary of the relevant empirical evidence as well as of the other reference points (such 
as individual awards) on which the different arguments are grounded. As noted in the 
previous section, this analysis paves the way for understanding how the critical debate 
should be taken account of in the context of member state BITs. I should point out already 
here that the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 relies on 'impressionistic' materials in addition 
to academic sources. The most vocal critics of the investment treaty regime come from 
non-academic quarters, such as NGOs, who tend to argue in a completely different register 
than academics. I will nonetheless discuss their arguments in Chapter 6 as they are much 
more open about their political goals than neutrality-driven academic commentators, 
although I am certain that some of the latter secretly hold similarly passionate views.  
 
The critics rely on a handful of headline-making cases where the conflict between investor 
interests and the public interest is evident, with the focus being on the 'legitimacy' of the 
challenged measure and individual case outcomes. These cases are then argued as 
reflecting a more general trend in arbitral jurisprudence where tribunals protect narrow 
corporate interests at the expense of the public interest. The next step in the critics' causal 
chain associates the investment treaty regime with the downsides and symbols of economic 
globalization, such as environmental degradation, erosion of faith in the domestic political 
process and greedy multinationals. I suggest that the critics are not naïve in the sense that 
they would be unaware of how simplified their account of the investment treaty regime is. 
In my mind, the purpose of the critique is not to provide neutral, scientific evidence that 
corroborates the above storyline, but to mobilize political opposition so as to compel 
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policy-makers, government officials and politicians to share the basic view that investment 
arbitration constitutes an illegitimate intrusion into the domestic political process. 
However, it is necessary to problematize this basic storyline and to further flesh out its 
basic premises. I provide an analysis of two arbitrations that the critics have raised to show 
how arbitral tribunals either ignore or downplay the public interest of host states. In both 
cases, political opposition against the claimants' investment played a significant role in the 
decisions that led the investors to bring claims under the relevant investment treaty. I 
suggest that the cases can be framed in a number of ways and that the critical framing is 
not necessarily the most compelling one. I also look at two general arguments that 
academic commentators have raised to criticize the investment treaty regime. The first 
argument makes an association between the regime and neoliberalist ideas and policies, 
and the second argument asserts that investment treaties and arbitration compel states to 
refrain from legitimate public interest measures for fear of costly litigation - a phenomenon 
commonly referred to as 'regulatory chill'. 
 
Chapter 7 analyzes four general arguments for the investment treaty regime. The first of 
these argues that investment treaties bear similarities to human rights treaties in that they 
protect foreign investors from the arbitrary exercise of public power. The proponents refer 
to a number of cases where foreign investors have suffered injustice and hardship at the 
hands of host states to highlight the ethical underpinnings of international investment law. 
Contrary to the critics, the proponents argue that there is still too much state sovereignty 
around, as government interventions in the marketplace are often arbitrary, discriminatory 
and/or make no economic sense. I look at the empirical evidence on the treatment of 
foreign investors as well as analyze the other reference points with which the proponents 
defend the human rights analogy. If the critics share a worldview where the investment 
treaty regime takes the side of the bad guys, the proponents share a worldview where 
foreign investors are the underdogs facing arbitrary treatment in host states. The 
proponents' view of economic globalization is generally positive, with investment treaties 
providing a benchmark for what is acceptable government conduct in the global economy. 
By opening their doors to transnational economic activity, host states have made a bargain 
under which they concede parts of their sovereignty against the benefits of trade and 
investment liberalization. While host states are free to adopt policy measures according to 
their preferences, arbitral tribunals ensure that they give adequate consideration to the 
interests of foreign investors. In such view, that arbitral tribunals review all types of 
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domestic measures is a natural corollary of the underlying bargain and of the perception 
where arbitrators are akin to human rights judges enforcing international protection 
standards.  
 
The second general argument is based on the perception that investment treaties and 
arbitration promote the rule of law. As a number of arbitral tribunals have held that the fair 
and equitable treatment standard entails basic due process requirements, the assumption is 
that host states will engage in institutional reform so as to avoid future claims and liability 
under investment treaties. While it is easy to create the impression that the investment 
treaty regime promotes the rule of law, there is no empirical evidence that would support 
the argument. On the contrary, some of the evidence suggests that investment treaties may 
decrease the incentives of domestic institutions to engage in reform if and when investment 
disputes are taken away from domestic courts. More generally, rule of law rhetoric is easy, 
although far-reaching institutional reform is hard and slow and requires not only financial 
but plenty of human and political capital. The last two arguments for the investment treaty 
regime are intertwined and focus on the economic impact of investment treaties. The broad 
contention here is that investment treaties increase investment flows, which in turn 
contributes to economic growth and development. As to the first element, the evidence 
provides some support to the argument that investment treaties may increase investment 
flows between certain country pairs, but it also shows that other FDI determinants - market 
size, labor costs and tax breaks - play a more central role in investment decisions. The 
alleged correlation between FDI and economic development, in turn, is a gross 
simplification, with the central conclusion being that the impact of FDI depends entirely on 
country- and investment-specific conditions.  
 
One conclusion that comes from Chapters 6 and 7 is that both sides rely on anecdotal 
evidence to substantiate their arguments. Another conclusion is that the opposing sides 
endorse completely different views on the appropriate model of state-market relations. The 
proponents see that further investment and trade liberalization is not only unavoidable but 
normatively desirable because of the benefits it brings, with investment treaties ensuring 
that governments refrain from protectionist and arbitrary regulation. The critics see that 
investment treaties threaten domestic regulatory autonomy and the protection of public 
goods. Their proposal is that states should exit the investment treaty regime so as to loosen 
the stranglehold that transnational economic actors have over the domestic political 
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process. I suggest that instead of hanging on to their pet arguments, the opposing sides 
should acknowledge and defend the different political visions they put forward with more 
analytic rigor, as they will otherwise continue to talk past each other. Chapter 8 provides a 
short discussion of these competing political visions and draws some general conclusions 
on the basis of the previous chapters. I discuss what implications my understanding of the 
critical debate should have for the future of the EU's investment policy, including member 
state BITs. A useful reference point is provided by the previous debates concerning the 
legitimacy of the WTO. The essence of the critique of the investment treaty regime is 
remarkably similar to the critique of the WTO, and the political agenda of the investment 
treaty critics is strikingly similar to the agenda of the global justice movement that made 
headlines from the 1999 Seattle protests onward. Relying on Andrew Lang's book, World 
Trade Law after Neoliberalism, I give a short summary of the debates concerning the 
world trade system around the turn of the millennium and attempt to show how the 
reactions to the critique of investment arbitration follow a similar type of pattern as the 
reactions to the critique of the WTO. In both cases, the critique led (or is about to lead) to 
technical and procedural reforms, which hides from sight the competing political visions 
that the critics were and are trying to articulate, which in turn obscures the attendant 
political stakes. 
1.3. The Argument and Some Words on Methodology 
In light of the above, the argument that this thesis strives to put forward is relatively easy 
to articulate. My general objective is to combine the doctrinal debate on treaty conflicts 
with the critical debate on the purposes and implications of the investment treaty regime. 
The doctrinal analysis finds that member state BITs are problematic from the perspectives 
of non-discrimination and the autonomy of the EU legal order, although the Court's 
previous case law does not provide entirely conclusive answers. The analysis of the critical 
debate shows that taking sides in the debate necessarily requires endorsing a particular 
(albeit abstract) vision of how state-market relations should be arranged in the global 
economy. In this light, whichever way the ECJ goes in its assessment of member state 
BITs, it will necessarily send a political signal to various stakeholders involved in the 
investment law debates. At the end of the thesis, I also provide some comments on the 
Commission's proposal for an investment court system, which is understood as 
safeguarding the right to regulate and as addressing the other procedural and substantive 
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concerns raised in the critical debate. While the investment court system no doubt 
remedies some of the structural flaws of old-fashioned BITs, the argumentation of the 
Commission is highly technocratic as it defends the reform proposals through rhetorical 
one-liners that find no support in existing evidence. This suggests that the idea that the 
Commission's proposal comes more than halfway to meet the critics' concerns is 
misplaced, because it assumes that investment protection - as part of the broader 
investment and trade liberalization agenda - is in the interest of all EU citizens. The 
inability of the Commission to articulate and defend the investment court system against 
the backcloth of a political vision based on a notion of collective purpose may signal a 
broader gap between the mindset of the EU institutions and segments of the European 
body politic. I will refrain myself from making practical proposals on how the Commission 
should defend or modify its approach, but hopefully the analysis in the following chapters 
demonstrates why many critics will fail to understand the wisdom of the proposed 
investment court system, and why the relevant debates should become much more political 
and much less legal. That said, it is useful to provide some comments on the nature of the 
analysis and discussion carried out in the following chapters.  
 
My 'method' - if you can label it as such - reflects the less than novel idea that legal 
scholars should not isolate their research from the broader political and economic 
phenomena to which their research relates, but, rather, embrace and accommodate the 
'living political matrix'30 so as to increase understanding of the role that law plays in 
politics and economic governance. The discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 in particular 
embraces the living political matrix of international investment law by foregrounding the 
material and normative outcomes that investment treaties and arbitration are understood as 
producing on a global scale. While the following chapters refer to a number of economic 
studies and political science literature, this thesis is by no means an interdisciplinary study. 
I only focus on some of the conclusions of economic literature when they pertain directly 
to the general arguments on the pros and cons of investment treaties and arbitration, and 
the political science works I use seek to explain some of the reasons that drove states to 
conclude investment treaties in the first place. In this, my 'method' reflects the 
commonsense idea that academic lawyers will benefit from having a basic understanding 
                                                
30 This phrase is from Joseph Weiler,'The Transformation of Europe', 100 Yale Law Journal (1991), pp. 
2403-2483, at 2409.  
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of neighbouring disciplines, or, more generally, from being 'broad-minded' as Klabbers put 
it.31 
 
The discussion in the following chapters also relate to the debate on the fragmentation of 
international law, at the center of which is the description and analysis of specialized 
normative 'regimes', such as the 'trade law regime' and the 'human rights regime'. Regimes 
promote different type of interests and values, and when two or more regimes come into 
contact and claim jurisdiction and authority over the same subject-matter, the question is 
which regime should prevail and on what grounds. In other words, how should such 
'regime collisions' be dealt with.32 Given that there is no established hierarchy of norms 
under international law, no regime can 'normatively trump the other', which may 'lead to 
irreconcilably different outcomes in judicial or arbitral procedures',33 as each regime is 
bound to apply its own rules and principles to an issue over which other regimes have a 
direct interest as well.34 Some of the arguments discussed below suggest that EU law and 
the investment treaty regime are on a collision course. For example, the Commission's 
arguments on intra-EU BITs seek to exclude the investment treaty regime from having 
jurisdiction over a range of disputes that also fall under the jurisdiction of member state 
courts and the two EU courts, whereas the arguments for investment treaties claim that the 
two regimes have distinct spheres of application and can continue to co-exist as before. 
                                                
31 Jan Klabbers, 'The Relative Autonomy of International Law or the Forgotten Politics of Interdisciplinarity', 
1 Journal of International Law and International Relations (2004-2005), pp. 35-48, at 35. 
32 The pioneering work in this regard is Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, 'Regime-Collisions: 
The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law', 25 Michigan Journal of International 
Law (2004), pp. 999-1046, which was expanded to monograph length two years later. See Andreas Fischer-
Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen: Zur Fragmentierung des Globalen Rechts (Suhrkamp, 
2006).   
33 Kerstin Blome et al., 'Contested Collisions. An Introduction', in Kerstin Blome et al. (eds.), Contested 
Regime Collisions. Norm Fragmentation in World Society (Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 1-17, at 
3. 
34 Initially, the proliferation of specialized normative regimes gave rise to formal concerns about the unity 
and coherence of the international legal order, particularly among practitioners and scholars with an interest 
in the traditional institutions of general international law, namely, the International Court of Justice and the 
'diplomatic law' that governs the activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Their fear was 
not only that specialized courts and tribunals provide inconsistent interpretations of general international law, 
but that fragmentation undermines the (presumed) authority of the institutions they represent and hold dear. 
See Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino,' Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties', 15 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2002), pp. 553-579. This formal concern had little chance of containing 
fragmentation, and as many commentators have noted, it is much more important to understand and highlight 
the 'conflicting societal goals and interest[s]' that undergird regime collisions, rather than to propose formal 
solutions to them. This last quote is from Blome et al., 'Contested Collisions', supra note 34, at 3-4. For an 
extensive proposal on how to approach fragmentation as a formal legal problem, see International Law 
Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (finalized 
by Martti Koskenniemi), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006 (hereinafter 'Fragmentation report'). 
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These arguments also reflect idea that regimes have an Eigenrationalität which they seek 
to universalize at the expense of other regimes.35 Distinguishing between regime 
rationalities is relatively easy if the underlying goals of two regimes are clearly opposite, 
but identifying the 'rationality' of EU law or the investment treaty regime is much more 
difficult for a number of reasons. Both regimes relate to broader economic, legal and 
political arrangements that shape the general orientation of normative and distributive 
outcomes in the global economy. It seems commonsensical that both EU law and 
investment treaties promote, for example, welfare in the sense that they relate to broader 
economic governance structures that produce stability, resources and prosperity to 
(segments of) certain populations. At the same time, however, being part of such structures 
automatically implicates both in the social and economic inequality that prevails in large 
swaths of the planet. Put differently, and in more abstract and critical terms, the functional 
orientation of regimes toward a specific objective 'does not at all signify that they would 
work in view of a globally defined common good'. Rather, such functional labels may only 
refer 'to their quality as mechanized producers of outcomes that are internally validated by 
their embedded hierarchies of preference - their structural biases'.36 In yet other words, 
regimes are 'functional for themselves',37 rather than for the normative goals they profess 
to. However, this is not to say that regimes would not promote and protect certain values, 
but that it is important to understand that regime labels are no substitute for critical 
analysis. 
 
To return to the question of method, the following chapters do not rely on a specific 
theoretical approach, apart from endorsing the 'living political matrix' of the investment 
treaty regime. On the one hand, the analysis of the conflict arguments in Chapters 3 and 4 
is largely doctrinal or dogmatic as the chapters examine formal legal arguments presented 
before arbitral tribunals and the ECJ, and their attendant reasoning, as well as the legal 
texts from which the arguments stem. However, I do not aim to systematize the materials 
or propose doctrinal solutions to specific interpretive questions beyond the context of 
member state BITs, although some such proposals may emerge as a byproduct of the 
discussion. The main purpose is to explain and understand the background of the conflict 
arguments as well as the reasoning of arbitral tribunals and the ECJ to the extent they 
                                                
35 Blome et al., 'Contested Collisions', supra note 33, p. 3. 
36 Martti Koskenniemi, 'Hegemonic Regimes', in Margaret Young, Regime Interaction in International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 305-324, at 317. 
37 Idem. 
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pertain to the relationship of EU law and member state BITs. On the other hand, parts of 
the discussion in Chapters 3 to 5, and in particular the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 is 
clearly 'non-dogmatic', as the analyses go beyond the relevant legal materials and strive to 
understand the type of value claims that undergird not only those materials but the 
arguments for and against the investment treaty regime. For example, the proponents argue 
that investment treaties and arbitration stabilize domestic institutional conditions by 
protecting cross-border economic activity from arbitrary exercises of public power. Social 
constructivists would say that this argument is based on a subjective construction of social 
reality, as the human and institutional activities to which it refers have no objective and 
identifiable essence. Rather, the 'nature' of those activities depends on the subjective 
meanings we assign to them.38 While in some respect I agree with this basic idea, I resist 
its categorical tone. Clearly, the purposes and implications of the investment treaty regime 
are socially construed through the medium of language, but it is still possible to identify, 
describe and analyze the regime's imprint on the real world in a way that captures at least 
some aspects of its 'essence' (or 'essences' to be more precise). In this, I strive to employ 
the method of what the classical scholar Richard Bentley called ratio et res ipsa - reason 
confronting the thing itself.  
 
In the previous section I noted that in my view the critique of the investment treaty regime 
is essentially political, and that the reform proposals of the Commission are bound to leave 
many unimpressed. This view requires some explanation. In an article where they claim to 
tell the 'truth' about investment arbitration, two proponents of the investment treaty regime 
argue that the 'current discourse on international investment law is replete with 
inaccuracies and hypothetical fears'.39 The argument that the critics do not really 
understand what they are talking about is a familiar one, and I will address the proponents' 
more detailed arguments in the following chapters, but what I again suggest is that the 
proponents and the critics are talking past (or misunderstanding) each other precisely 
because they fail to foreground the political nature of their disagreement. The proponents 
look at the world and point to the benefits of investment and trade liberalization, with 
investment treaties and arbitration guaranteeing a stable regulatory framework for 
transnational economic activity, which continues to produce positive spillover effects on a 
                                                
38 See e.g. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: a Treatise 
in the Sociology of Knowledge (Penguin, 1971). 
39 Brower and Blanchard, 'The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration', supra note 19, at 689. 
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global scale - a rising tide lifting all boats. The critics, in turn, look at the world and see an 
unsustainable global economy that promotes inequality, environmental degradation, and 
narrow corporate interests at the expense of the global commons and other public values. 
Both sides make sweeping associations between individual investment disputes and the 
investment treaty regime as a whole, and between the regime and the costs and benefits of 
economic globalization. Both also endorse a particular (though highly general) model of 
state-market relations, with the critics aiming to rein in transnational economic forces by 
removing investment treaties and arbitration from the domestic policy equation. The 
proponents, in turn, preach the gospel of economic liberalism, with the investment treaty 
regime ensuring that protectionist and arbitrary exercises of public power are kept in 
check.  
 
Between the somewhat schematic groups of 'critics' and 'proponents' stand a large, 
dispassionate majority, which holds more moderate views on the pros and cons of the 
regime. The majority of academic lawyers interested in the critique, for example, would 
probably acknowledge that the regime needs some type of reform, and most would 
acknowledge that the broader political concerns that animate the critique are urgent and 
important and require immediate attention domestically and internationally. At the same 
time, however, they understand that addressing these concerns falls outside their job 
description, as their resolution is understood to depend on and as requiring the input of 
openly political actors and other legal regimes and institutions - including economists, 
human rights lawyers and domestic political parties. To give an example of this logic, 
reforming the investment treaty regime may be perceived as broadening the regulatory 
autonomy of host states, but whether or not the reforms actually promote the normative 
goals of the critics (such as sustainable and more inclusive development and protection of 
the environment) is not the concern of academic lawyers who focus on debating the 'merits' 
of the critique and proposing treaty reforms. The complexity of the broader political 
concerns that fuels the critique is of course evident - how does one promote sustainable 
development, for example - and the role of investment law scholarship may seem entirely 
marginal in the bigger scheme of things. I suggest that this helps explain, at least partly, 
why legal scholarship tends to focus on doctrinal work even when the relevant doctrines 
pertain to a hotly politicized topic such as international investment law. Studying the 
content of legal rules and principles, and placing those rules and principles in a systematic 
order, is usually the only conceptual universe that academic lawyers are familiar with. 
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Going outside this 'comfort zone 'will create feelings of ambiguity and incompetence, as 
the broader political and economic questions that, for example, the critics of investment 
treaties invoke are not amenable to doctrinal analysis. 
 
There is also sense that it is naïve (or overly ambitious) to think that the global problems 
that animate the critique are amenable to political resolution in the first place. If one 
wishes to do something about, say, environmental degradation, it is much wiser to exit 
academia or to donate money or to change one's diet to a more carbon-neutral direction, 
rather than to focus on the more systemic concerns that, say, NGOs raise when criticizing 
investment treaties and arbitration. However, the purpose of the discussion in Chapters 6 
and 7 is not to propose solutions to the broader political concerns of the critics, nor to lay a 
guilt trip on academic investment lawyers who focus on case law analysis and doctrinal 
evolution. Rather, the purpose is to understand better the assumptions of both the critics 
and the proponents, and to assess whether those assumptions hold water. Another purpose 
is to foreground the broad political visions of the opposing sides, and to demonstrate that 
taking sides in the debate will necessarily entail a choice between the two competing 
visions, even if those visions are expressed in very abstract terms. These questions are 
driven by my own interest in understanding better the critical debate and the underlying 
political stakes, rather than by an ambition to change the world. I am not naïve about the 
motives of the opposing sides in the sense that the critics do not necessarily represent 
progressive forces, and the proponents are not just privileged and reactionary conservatives 
seeking to entrench the unjust status quo. I share the broad political concerns of the critics, 
but I simultaneously recognize that those concerns escape my conceptual capabilities, and 
as Chapters 6 and 7 have been written in a 'research chamber', armchair scholarship is 
perhaps the term that best describes the discussion therein; the point being that although I 
am fully aware that the worlds of politics and business have their share of bad faith actors 
who utilize and promote investment treaties for personal gain, I cannot base my analysis on 
what I do not know. 
 
As a final matter, it is useful to say a few words on the basic approach I take with respect 
to EU law. There is an ongoing debate on the relationship of EU law and international law. 
One central question in this debate is whether EU law is part of international law or 
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whether it has a 'non-international legal nature',40 given that the founding treaties and the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ have created a 'specified interstate governmental structure defined 
by a constitutional charter and constitutional principles'.41 Whether the EU is a 
constitutional order or not and what its relationship to international law is are interesting 
questions, but they will appear only incidentally in the following chapters. For example, 
the relationship of EU law and international law is discussed in the context of EU law rules 
which relate to treaties that member states have concluded between themselves and with 
third states. As to the constitutional idea, Weiler has noted that 'in critical aspects the 
Community has evolved and behaves as if its founding instrument were not a treaty 
governed by international law but, to use the language of the European Court, a 
constitutional charter governed by a form of constitutional law'.42 Again, I am not 
interested in pondering whether the EU is a constitutional order, but in understanding what 
type of interests and values its rules and principles, and the actions of its institutions, are 
argued as promoting in the present context. The discussion will touch on some aspects of 
the constitutionalism debate, but I will not foreground it at any point. I also have to confess 
that my knowledge of EU law is very limited. While the analysis of EU law rules and 
principles that are directly relevant aims to be rigorous, I have very little knowledge about 
the scope and content of secondary law in most policy areas, as I do about the precise 
division of competences between the EU and its member states. The central purpose is to 
understand how the relationship of EU law and member state BITs should be resolved in 
light of the case law of the ECJ on the one hand, and in light of the critical debate on the 





                                                
40 Bruno de Witte, 'European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?', 65 Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht (2010), pp. 141-155, at 147. 
41 Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe', supra note 30, p. 2407. 
42 Joseph Weiler, 'The Reformation of European Constitutionalism', 35 Journal of Common Market Studies 
(1997), pp. 97-131, at 97. 
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2. Treaty Conflicts, Intra-EU and Extra-EU BITs, 
and the Limits of Formal Dispute Settlement 
2.1. Introduction  
An 'extremely difficult problem'43, these words of an eminent international lawyer, 
expressed during the final stages of the drafting process of the VCLT, reflect the 
complexity of the topic of treaty conflict. Reading the reports of the Special Rapporteurs 
and the transcripts of the ILC meetings, or later academic contributions, testify that entire 
careers could be spent analyzing treaty conflicts in their varied dimensions. The ILC, faced 
with the Herculean task of drafting a general convention on the law of treaties, struggled to 
establish some basic rules in respect of treaty conflicts between identical (AB:AB) and 
non-identical parties (AB:AC).44 The more difficult issues, such as providing a typology of 
treaty conflicts and taking account of the variables that undergird different scenarios, never 
entered the analytical process. For present purposes, it is necessary to address those aspects 
of this 'extremely difficult problem' which pertain to the conflict scenarios under 
discussion. Section 2.2. provides a 'technical' account of treaty conflicts by discussing how 
doctrine has defined treaty conflicts as well as the relevance that these definitions have to 
the conflict arguments discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Section 2.3. focuses on the 
distinction between extra-EU and intra-EU BITs and on the basic rules and principles that 
govern treaty conflicts under EU law and international law. The discussion highlights how, 
on the one hand, EU law requires member states to eliminate conflicting treaty obligations, 
and the many obstacles that the application of this 'requirement' faces in an international 
law context. Section 2.4. focuses on a number of issues. First, I provide some observations 
on the role that courts and tribunals can have in the resolution of treaty conflicts. Treaties 
are created by states and, as many commentators have noted, courts and tribunals are 
reluctant to become treaty 'destroyers' when conflict arguments are raised before them. I 
discuss the general reasons that lead courts and tribunals either to circumvent or reject 
conflict arguments, and one of these reasons is related to the values and interests that 
typically undergird treaty conflict arguments. After this, I focus on party intent, which is a 
                                                
43 Statement by Paul Reuter, representative of France, at the 857th meeting. See Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (1966/Vol. I, part 2), p. 97 (para. 28). 
44 AB:AB conflicts refers to a situation where states A and B conclude two successive treaties containing 
incompatible provisions, whereas AB:AC conflicts refers to situations where one of the parties to the earlier 
treaty (A) concludes a later conflicting treaty with state C (and possibly with states D, E and F as well).  
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central element of treaty interpretation, but its actual role in the resolution of treaty 
conflicts remains in part a mystery. I will also sketch some preliminary remarks on the role 
of party intent in the application of specific conflict rules. As a final matter, I provide an 
introductory comment on the issue of competence and how it affects the dynamics of treaty 
conflict in the EU context. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU now has 
exclusive competence over foreign direct investment. The question is at what point in time 
did member state BITs, extra-EU BITs in particular, come within the scope of EU law and 
what implications this should have had on the member states' ability to maintain the 
treaties in force. While this may seem a moot point in light of the transitional regime 
established for extra-EU BITs, it nonetheless highlights how EU law limits member states' 
general treaty-making capabilities even in areas where the EU has no (exclusive) 
competences. Such general 'pre-emption' reduces the likelihood of treaty conflict, but 
simultaneously creates uncertainty for third states which have concluded treaties with 
member states. 
 
Generally speaking, the following discussion shows that conflict rules are empty vessels in 
terms of values and interests, although their application in individual cases can signal an 
implicit preference for one value or interest over another. The primacy of EU law, for 
example, means that EU law trumps, without exception, conflicting national laws and 
treaty obligations in intra-EU relations. In this sense, primacy of EU law applies 
'automatically' and prevents a contextual analysis of the prudence of its application. As a 
related matter, and as noted, I discuss why international courts and tribunals are not 
necessarily receptive of the primacy of EU law or of the obligation of member states to 
eliminate conflicting treaty obligations under the principle of sincere cooperation and 
Article 351 TFEU.45 This discussion acts as a lead-in to the more general analysis of the 
cases where the arbitral tribunals rejected a number of conflict arguments raised by the 
respondent member states and the EU Commission (which is carried out in Chapter 3).  
                                                
45 The principle of sincere cooperation is found in Article 4(3) TEU, which reads as follows: 'Pursuant to the 
principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each 
other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate 
measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting 
from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.' 
As Advocate General Maduro put it, Article 351 TFEU, to which I referred already, is a specific expression 
of the principle of sincere cooperation. See Case C-05/06, Commission v Austria, Opinion of Advocate 
General Maduro, ECLI:EU:C:2008:391, para. 33. 
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2.2. Defining Treaty Conflicts 
To schematize matters, treaty conflicts are defined in two basic ways in scholarship. Jenks 
speaks of conflicts arising 'only where a party to the two treaties cannot simultaneously 
comply with its obligations under both treaties', which he calls a conflict ‘in the strict sense 
of direct incompatibility'.46 A number of later writers have endorsed this approach, for 
example, Karl noted that in technical terms 'there is a conflict between treaties when two 
(or more) treaty instruments contain obligations which cannot be complied with 
simultaneously'.47 The second group of definitions are much broader and their length can 
range from single sentences to highly analytical expositions. For example, Metz provides 
an elaborate classification where conflicts are arranged by gradation and she speaks of 
(e.g.) 'Pflichtenkollisionen’, ‘Zielkollisionen’ and ‘politische Konflikte',48 whereas Aufricht 
is content with noting that conflict arises between successive treaties when 'both deal with 
the same subject matter in a different manner'.49 A sub-group within this second group 
focuses more on the undergirding purposes of treaties and less on the content of individual 
treaty provisions. For example, the 2006 report of the Study Group on the Fragmentation 
of International Law (the ILC Report) argues that a 'treaty may sometimes frustrate the 
goals of another treaty without there being any strict incompatibility between their 
provisions', and this is referred to as a 'looser' understanding of treaty conflict.50 In a 
similar vein, Borgen argues that conflict can arise 'when one treaty... frustrate[s] the 
purpose of another treaty',51 whereas Ranganathan asks whether a state's conduct that 
breaches the object and purpose of a treaty may breach 'a more general obligation of good 
faith', as 'spelt out in VCLT Articles 18, 26 and 31'?52 
                                                
46 Wilfred Jenks, ‘Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, 30 British Yearbook of International Law (1953), pp. 
401-453, at 426. 
47 Wolfram Karl, 'Conflicts Between Treaties', in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Volume 7 (North-Holland, 1984), pp. 467-472, at 468. For additional references, see Joost 
Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law. How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 167 
48 Nele Matz, Wege zur Koordinierung völkerrechtlicher Verträge. Völkervertragsrechtliche und 
institutionelle Ansätze (Berlin: Springer, 2005) pp. 8-18.  
49 Hans Aufricht, 'Supersession of Treaties in International Law', 37 Cornell Law Quarterly (1952), pp. 655-
700, at 655-656. For additional references, see Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, supra note 47, pp. 167-169. 
50 See 'Fragmentation report, supra note 34, para. 24. 
51 For similar descriptions see e.g. Christopher J. Borgen, 'Treaty Conflicts and Normative Fragmentation', in 
Duncan B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 448-471, at 455-
456. See also Surabhi Ranganathan, Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts and the Politics of International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 53 (pondering the question whether Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which contains the lex posterior conflict rule, covers situations ‘where 
one treaty impairs the object and purpose of another without breaching any specific obligation'.). 
52 Ranganathan, Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts, supra note 51, p. 54. 
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Generally speaking, the following discussion will relate to and contain elements from both 
types of definitions. For example, the argument that BIT arbitration clauses breach the 
autonomy of the EU legal order is premised on a direct incompatibility between the clauses 
and Article 344 TFEU (discussed below), but the principle of autonomy is also built on the 
back of a number of other primary law provisions and their underlying purposes, and the 
CJEU's relevant dicta strive to safeguard its exclusive jurisdiction and guarantee the 
uniform interpretation of EU law. Such objectives have a connection to specific primary 
law provisions, but they also stem from the Court's own perception of the EU legal order 
and of its role within that order. In this way, an alleged conflict between BIT arbitration 
clauses and the autonomy of the EU legal order stems in part from the purposes of the EU 
founding treaties, as interpreted by the ECJ, and not only from a direct conflict with 
specific primary law provisions. Regulatory conflicts, in turn, are 'simpler' in this respect 
as they stem from alleged conflicts between one or more BIT protection standards (such as 
fair and equitable treatment) and particular acts of the EU institutions, which member 
states then implement, and in this way they are conflicts in the 'strict sense of direct 
incompatibility', as Jenks put it. In other words, in regulatory conflict scenarios a member 
state has an obligation to implement or comply with an EU act (regulation, directive, 
decision), which allegedly breaches its obligation to provide certain kind of treatment 
under a BIT.  
 
The relevant case law of arbitral tribunals and the ECJ contain only a few general remarks 
on the nature of the alleged treaty conflicts, which suggests that the matter was considered 
as requiring no elaboration or as being clear on the basis of the parties' arguments. But the 
above remarks leave many questions open about the nature of primary and regulatory 
conflicts. For example, are primary conflict arguments based, similarly to regulatory 
conflicts, on 'mutually exclusive obligations'?53 Assuming that BIT arbitration clauses 
breach the autonomy of the EU legal order or the principle of non-discrimination, to whom 
are the obligations to safeguard the autonomy of EU law and to provide equal treatment 
owed? It seems plausible to argue that such obligations could be owed to any of the 
following three candidates: other member states, nationals of other member states, or even 
the EU, given its much-emphasized sui generis nature. And, related, what is the nature of 
                                                
53 The quote is from Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, supra note 47, p. 167. 
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the rights that BITs create and who are the bearers of those rights? That is to say, are 
investors enforcing their own rights or the rights of their home state (as party to the BIT) 
when raising a claim under a BIT? If investors are viewed as direct bearers of BIT rights, 
this can strengthen the perception that investment treaties are akin to human rights treaties, 
which in turn can affect the way in which conflict arguments are perceived, as will be 
discussed below. In other words, if investment treaties are not merely inter-state exchanges 
of mutual rights and obligations, but endow individuals with rights, then clearly any 
argument that seeks to invalidate such rights must be critically analyzed. As noted in the 
introduction, however, the alleged conflicts between EU law and BITs are not necessarily 
based on opposing values per se, but on different levels of protection that the two regimes 
provide to investors. 
  
Once a treaty conflict is established, the next logical question is which conflict rule should 
apply. General international law includes a number of conflict rules - including lex priori, 
lex specialis and lex superior - and the VCLT gives much authority to the lex posterior 
rule, which is the only conflict rule included in its provisions. Primary EU law, on the 
other hand, has a single provision dealing with the status of member states' treaties, but the 
relevance of Article 351 TFEU is limited. It only covers treaties concluded between 
member states and third states before the former acceded to the EU. Hence, Article 351 
TFEU is irrelevant in respect of treaties concluded after EU accession, as it is with respect 
to treaties concluded between two or more member states. As to the contents of Article 351 
TFEU, it allows member states to honor their pre-accession treaty obligations owed to 
third states, but simultaneously requires that they take 'appropriate steps' to eliminate 
incompatibilities from such treaties so as to ensure compliance with EU law.54 When it 
comes to member state treaties that fall outside the scope of Article 351 TFEU, the case 
law of the ECJ sends a similar and clear enough message: here too member states are to 
ensure that EU law ultimately prevails over conflicting treaty obligations, regardless of the 
time of the conclusion of the conflicting treaty and regardless of whether the relevant 
                                                
54 As the Commission once put it, 'Article 234 of the Treaty [i.e. Article 351 TFEU] does not establish that 
public international law obligations prevail over Community law, but rather the reverse. It points out that the 
second paragraph of that article provides that the Member States concerned are to take all appropriate steps to 
eliminate the incompatibilities established, which may include repudiating the public international law 
obligation at issue.' See Case T-3/99, Banatrading, ECLI:EU:T:2001:187, para. 63. 
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obligation is owed to another member state or a third state.55 The following sections will 
put more flesh on the bones of these basic principles.  
2.3. The Distinction between Intra-EU and Extra-EU BITs 
2.3.1. Extra-EU BITs 
This brings us to the distinction between intra-EU and extra-EU BITs. The latter are 
concluded between a member state and a third state. The basic rule here is that conflicts 
between EU law and extra-EU BITs have no impact on the legal status of the latter as a 
matter of international law. Under international law, two basic principles govern the 
position of third states in situations where a treaty party has or assumes conflicting 
obligations under another treaty to which the former is not party: the res inter alios acta 
principle provides that treaties only bind their parties and remain valid as between them, 
and the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle provides that 'no treaty may create 
obligations' for a third state 'without its consent'.56 As will be shown, and schematically 
speaking, EU law recognizes these principles, in particular in the form of Article 351 
TFEU, but simultaneously requires that member states take action so as to eliminate their 
conflicting treaty obligations. Put differently, if a conflict exists between EU law and an 
extra-EU BIT, member states are obligated to eliminate the conflict in favor of EU law, but 
only as a matter of EU law, as the res inter alios acta maxim applies fully under 
international law.57 In yet other words, if an extra-EU BIT is in conflict with EU law, the 
third state (and its investors) can continue to demand that the member state party complies 
with its obligations under the BIT.  
 
However, the EU's newly acquired competences over FDI have also affected the EU law 
status of extra-EU BITs. The so called Grandfathering regulation58 has created a 
                                                
55 The best discussion on this admittedly large and complex issue (and on the relevant case law of the ECJ) is 
in Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union, supra note 22 (chapters 6, 8 and 9). 
56 The quote is from Ranganathan, Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts, supra note 51, p. 56.  
57 This maxim is also found in Article 30(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), and 
its application is without prejudice to the responsibility of the state that concludes conflicting treaties with 
non-identical parties. This is recognized in Article 30(5) VCLT, which provides that Article 30(4) is without 
prejudice 'to any question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of 
a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another 
treaty.' See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331. 
58 Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and Third 
Countries (hereinafter Grandfathering Regulation), OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, pp. 40-46. 
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transitional regime for extra-EU BITs, which allows their continued existence on a number 
of conditions until the EU has concluded equivalent investment protection treaties with the 
respective third states.59 The regulation expressly states that extra-EU BITs 'remain 
binding on the Member States under public international law',60 but simultaneously 
requires that member states 'take the necessary measures to eliminate incompatibilities, 
where they exist, with Union law, contained in bilateral investment agreements concluded 
between them and third countries'.61 Member states have to notify the extra-EU BITs they 
wish to maintain in force and the Commission is to screen the notified treaties for their 
compatibility with EU law.62 Technically speaking, a regulation cannot trump primary law 
provisions, which implies that if extra-EU BITs breach the principle of non-discrimination, 
for example, member states are under an obligation to eliminate that incompatibility, and 
this is of course what the regulation requires as well. Generally speaking, the 
discrimination and autonomy concerns are equally relevant in respect of extra-EU and 
intra-EU BITs, but it seems unlikely that the Commission will raise the matter through 
infringement proceedings or before arbitral tribunals established under extra-EU BITs for a 
number of reasons.  
 
A 2014 study found that 1160 extra-EU BITs were in force63 and the capital-exporting 
member states continue to place a high premium on the treaties. Not only are the treaties 
perceived as important for generating (and protecting) inward and outward investment 
flows, but a number of governments actively sought to retain their capacity to conclude 
new BITs pending the conclusion of investment treaties by the Union, which capacity is 
now explicitly recognized in the Grandfathering regulation (under certain conditions).64 It 
is noteworthy that the Grandfathering regulation sets a deadline for the Commission to 
report on its application by January 10th 2020,65 which reflects the complexity and time-
consuming nature of the assessment process, and the high number of extra-EU BITs 
suggests that many of them will continue to remain in force even after 2020. What is more, 
                                                
59 Already in 1976, the ECJ had held that even in areas of exclusive competence member states can be 
authorized to maintain in force their existing treaties until they are replaced by EU-level treaties. See Case 
41/76, Suzanne Criel v Procureur de la République, ECLI:EU:C:1976:182, para. 32. 
60 Grandfathering Regulation, supra note 58, recital, para. 5. 
61 Ibid., recital, para. 11. 
62 The applicable 'screening' rules vary in accordance with the time of conclusion of the notified extra-EU 
BITs. See ibid., Articles 2 to 9. 
63 UNCTAD, 'Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Information Note on the United States and the European 
Union', IIA Issues Note, 2/2014, p. 3. 
64 Grandfathering Regulation, supra note 58, Articles 7 to 11. 
65 Ibid., Article 15(1). 
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in May 2017, the ECJ published Opinion 2/15 where it held that matters related to FDI fall 
within the exclusive competence of the EU, apart from investment protection (to the extent 
it relates to non-direct investments) and investment arbitration, which fall within a 
competence shared between the EU and the member states.66 This effectively gives a veto 
right to member state parliaments over any EU trade agreement containing an investment 
protection chapter, which creates uncertainty over the EU's investment protection policy as 
well as over the future of extra-EU BITs. In September 2017, the Belgian federal 
government submitted a request for an opinion from the ECJ on the compatibility of the 
Investment Court System (ICS) established in Chapter Eight of CETA with the founding 
treaties. The Court's opinion will not only determine the future of the ICS but also have an 
impact on the future of extra-EU BITs. In sum, while much of the discussion in Chapters 3 
to 5 will focus on intra-EU BITs, I will provide some remarks on extra-EU BITs as well.  
2.3.2. Intra-EU BITs and the 'Limits' of Primacy of EU Law 
Intra-EU BITs are concluded between two EU member states and, as noted, the ECJ has 
held that EU law prevails over member states' mutual treaty obligations in case of 
conflict,67 but the application of primacy of EU law outside the EU legal order is not 
evident. International courts and tribunals may, for a number of reasons, either apply a 
different conflict rule or conclude that the other treaty and EU law are fully compatible, 
whatever the EU institutions think of the matter.68 This is particularly the case if the ECJ 
has not rule on the relationship of EU law and a given intra-EU treaty. More generally, the 
blindness with which primacy applies as a matter of EU law does not fit well to an 
international law context. As a first matter, primacy of EU law provides a technical, value-
neutral solution to treaty conflicts, and its mechanical application overlooks the interests 
and values that the conflicting (non-EU) treaty promotes. In other words, primacy is blind 
to the context. Second, and from the opposite perspective, there are many practical reasons 
                                                
66 There were some additional FDI issues that remain an area of shared competence, but it is not necessary to 
discuss these in the present context. See Opinion 2/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, para. 305. 
67 See e.g. Case C-3/91, Exportur, ECLI:EU:C:1992:420, para. 8 (where the Court held that 'it should be 
observed that the national court rightly considered that the provisions of a convention concluded after 1 
January 1958 by a Member State with another State could not, from the accession of the latter State to the 
Community, apply in the relations between those States if they were found to be contrary to the rules of the 
Treaty.'). 
68 Binder makes the point that when the same parties conclude a later treaty, which conflicts with an earlier 
treaty they have concluded, no treaty conflict can exist because the parties in question have given their 
'consent to the termination or modification…of the earlier treaty'. However, in many cases states conclude 
treaties without any awareness over their potential implications for obligations assumed under earlier treaties, 
and this holds true in the present context as well. See Guyora Binder, Treaty Conflict and Political 
Contradiction. The Dialectic of Duplicity (Praeger, 1988), pp. 7-8.  
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that support and justify the application of primacy of EU law. If the member states were 
free to contract out of their EU law obligations, in however limited fashion, the uniform 
interpretation of EU law would become impossible to achieve, gradually derailing the 
entire European project. In this light, primacy of EU law makes much practical sense, as 
does the more general obligation of member states to eliminate conflicting treaty 
obligations.  
 
Third, and related, primacy of EU law could also be defended with reference to the 
foundational values of the EU and the provisions of the Fundamental Rights Charter 
(Charter).69 If EU acts are presumed to reflect values such as the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, and if they have to comply with the provisions of the Charter, then clearly 
none of the affected parties need to worry when EU law occupies a given field and requires 
the member states to eliminate conflicting treaty obligations. However, many investment 
disputes raised under member state BITs have no connection to EU law as they concern 
purely domestic measures. While such measures have to comply with the internal market 
freedoms and the principle of non-discrimination, their contents may constitute a breach of 
investment protection standards even if they comply with EU law. As will be shown, many 
of the cases discussed in Chapter 3 related to policy measures that could not be challenged 
under EU law. As to the fundamental values of the EU, which should guide its actions and 
shape the imprint it has on the real world, they are a perspectival matter, and the 
protections of the Charter are modest in comparison to typical investment protection 
standards. Likewise, what the EU stands for depends also on on what exactly is considered 
to constitute the EU.  
 
Is the EU responsible for the social costs of the austerity measures imposed on Greece, 
regardless of the Eurozone's more limited membership and the involvement of non-EU 
financial institutions in the conclusion of the successive austerity packages? As the editors 
of the Common Market Law Review noted, 'there is a widespread resentment against 
austerity measures forced upon citizens with barely any meaningful consent by their own 
countries' legislatures'.70 Similarly, does the EU bear responsibilitiy for the situation in 
Western Sahara? The Polisario Front has argued that because the EU-Morocco association 
                                                
69 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 391-407. 
70 Editorial Comments, 'Debt and Democracy: "United States then, Europe now"?', 49 Common Market Law 
Review (2012), pp. 1833-1840, at 1833. See also Paul Kirchhof, 'Verfassungsnot!', Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 12 July 2012.  
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agreement applies in the area of Western Sahara, the EU is actively supporting Morocco's 
illegal occupation.71 And is the EU's mandatory policy for the relocation of asylum seekers 
a breach of the principle of representative democracy, as argued by the Slovak Republic, 
because that policy was adopted without the input of national parliaments?72 Certainly, 
millions of people across Europe think that the EU is to be blamed for an endless list of 
'ills faring their lands',73 although such perceptions may often be based on misguided, 
disorganized and even delusional assumptions. The point of these disparate examples is 
that the application of EU law over member states' conflicting treaty obligations is not 
necessarily a sign of progress in the eyes of those whose treaty rights are affected as a 
result. Similarly, from the perspective of an international court or tribunal, the primacy of 
EU law is not necessarily equated with the foundational values of the EU, and the practical 
reasons supporting the primacy (or general superiority) of EU law remain extraneous to an 
international law context.  
 
Generally speaking, BIT protections are broader and more effective than remedies 
available under EU law and national laws of the member states,74 although any comparison 
of the respective remedies will reveal that the comparison is not necessarily a simple 
task.75 One reason that explains the 'generosity' of BIT remedies is that the bulk of member 
state BITs follow the 'European template'. Although the treaties contain no liberalization  
commitments, most of them are 'old-fashioned' in that the protection standards are written 
in vague and highly general language, with no reference made to the contracting states' 
right to regulate. The treaties allow investors to challenge any domestic regulatory measure 
adopted by the three branches of government, with liability depending on two factors - 
attribution and breach of a BIT obligation - whereas under domestic laws and EU law the 
criteria of liability are stricter (I discuss this issue further in Chapter 4). The Commission 
                                                
71 See Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953 and Case C-104/16 P, Council v 
Front Polisario, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973. The General Court held not only that the Front Polisario had legal 
standing to bring a claim against the EU Council's decision regarding the conclusion of the trade agreement, 
but also annulled the decision. The ECJ, in turn, quashed the General Court's decision on the ground that the 
Front Polisario had no locus standi. 
72 See Case C-643/15, Slovak Republic v. Council of the European Union, Opinion of Advocate General Bot, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:618, paras. 49-50. 
73 This is taken from Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land (Penguin Books, 2010). 
74 For a discussion of this issue, see e.g. Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award 
on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension (hereinafter Eureko award), 26 October 2010, paras. 250-262; 
Mavluda Sattorova, 'Investor Rights under EU Law and International Investment Law', 17 Journal of World 
Investment & Trade (2016), pp. 895-918. 
75 For a useful discussion in this respect, see Martins Paparinskis, 'Investors' Remedies under EU Law and 
International Investment Law', 17 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2016), pp. 919-941. 
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has also argued that arbitration under intra-EU BITs breaches the principle of mutual trust, 
because investment arbitration in intra-EU relations signals a mistrust in the ability of 
member state courts to act in accordance with the foundational values of the EU when they 
implement EU law.76 Again, this argument is based on contested assumptions. While the 
idea that member state courts and other domestic institutions respect the foundational 
values of the EU is understandable from the perspective of EU integration, its realization is 
a different matter. For example, Hungary's recent law, which sanctions mandatory 
detention of all asylum seekers, breaches the Reception Conditions Directive, and the 
Dublin Regulation expressly recognizes the possibility that some member states may have 
'systemic flaws' in their 'asylum procedure and in the reception conditions' for asylum 
seekers.77 Likewise, the Commission's 2017 reports on the steps that Romania and 
Bulgaria have taken in the past ten years in the fields of judicial reform and the fight 
against corruption and organized crime note, inter alia, that the 'overall institutional set-up 
to fight corruption in Bulgaria remains fragmented and…largely ineffective',78 and 
'implementation of court decisions by state institutions and public administration' in 
Romania remain a concern, which the European Court of Human Rights has characterized 
as a 'structural deficiency'.79 Poland's recent legislation on its judiciary has been described 
as a 'systemic threat to the rule of law', and the EU's subsequent response is based in part 
on Article 7 TEU, which provides a mechanism to protect the EU's foundational values.80   
                                                
76 This argument was raised in a letter to the Swedish government concerning the termination of the 
Romania-Sweden BIT. See Europeiska Kommissionen, Formell underrätelse - Överträdelse nummer 
2013/2207 (hereinafter Commisision letter), C(2015) 4215 final, Brussels, 19.6.2015, p. 14. The letter is not 
public but I manage to a get a copy of it. See also Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paras. 168, 191 and 194 (where the Court argued, inter alia, that the EU 'legal 
structure is based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member 
States, and recognizes that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated 
in Article 2 TEU. That premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States 
that those values will be recognized and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be 
respected', see para. 168). 
77 See Lizzie Dearden, 'Hungarian parliament approves law allowing all asylum seekers to be detained', 
Independent, 7 March 2017. See also Article 3(2) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection 
(recast), OJ, 29.6.2013, L180, pp. 60-95; Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ, 29.6.2013, L180, pp. 31-59. 
78 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, On Progress in Bulgaria under 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, Brussels, 25 January 2017, COM(2017) 24 final, p. 6. 
79 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, On Progress in Romania under 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, Brussels, 25 January 2017, COM(2017) 44 final, p. 6. 
80 See EU Commission, 'European Commission launches infringement against Poland over measures 
affecting the judiciary', Brussels, 29 July 2017; EU Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to 
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While these examples do not constitute proof that foreign investments are treated 
arbitrarily, they fuel perceptions that investment treaties are necessary to protect the 
fundamental rights of investors in certain member states. As a member of the European 
Parliament put it when trying to convince her constituency about the virtues of CETA:  
 
'[i]nvestment protection is needed to guarantee the terms of the agreement, 
especially with countries where the rule of law is not a given. With Canada, that is 
not the chief concern, although international treaties are not automatically 
transposed into Canadian law and therefore cannot always be used in a Canadian 
courtroom. On the other hand, the Canadians are not so much worried about the 
Netherlands or Germany, but they are worried about the rule of law and legal 
systems in some other member states. That cannot be very surprising, since 
companies in those member states are often also worried about the legal systems in 
their country, speed of legal processes and impartiality of judges. In fact, European 
companies often use investment protection clauses of investment treaties between 
EU member states, for example in cases of expropriation.'81 
 
This statement cuts corners in many respects, but the point about the need of investment 
protection due to 'some other member states' reflects how the EU membership remains at 
different levels of economic, legal and political development, which then creates more 
general assumptions about how this should be taken into account in the policy-making of 
the EU institutions. In this way, the Commission's conflict arguments on intra-EU BITs 
disregard its own concerns about the quality of domestic governance in certain member 
states, which provides a basis for the argument that the termination of intra-EU BITs 
would 'deprive EU citizens of subjective rights…[which] would be an unparalleled 
occurrence as regards fundamental principles of the European Union'.82 Chapter 3 will 
show arbitral tribunals have used similar type of logic in their reasoning on the relationship 
of the relevant BITs and EU law, and this logic relies in part on the general perception that 
intra-EU BITs continue to serve a useful purpose within the internal market. Similarly, and 
as noted, many of the arbitrations discussed in Chapter 3 were unrelated to EU law as they 
                                                                                                                                              
the European Parliament and the Council: A New EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law', Brussels, 
19 March 2014, COM(2014) 158 final/2. 
81 Marietje Schaake, 'Ten questions on CETA', 8 February 2017, available at 
https://marietjeschaake.eu/en/ten-questions-on-ceta. 
82 Tietje, 'Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties between EU Member States, supra note 17, p. 19. 
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were based on domestic measures that could not be challenged under EU law. The mutual 
trust argument, for example, ignores this aspect of intra-EU BITs as it assumes that all 
intra-EU investment disputes come within the scope of EU law in a broader sense.  
 
In sum, the application of primacy of EU law faces many obstacles outside the EU legal 
order, and the Commission's approach to intra-EU BITs is problematic in light of the rule 
of law concerns outlined above. Since many investment disputes are outside the scope of 
EU law in that the challenged measures raise no concerns as a matter of EU law, the 
question is why the member states should not be free to provide additional remedies to EU 
investors. Whether these rule of law concerns are plausible is addressed in Chapter 7, and 
the question whether intra-EU BITs constitute discrimination and threaten the autonomy of 
EU law is addressed in Chapters 4 and 5.   
2.4. The Roles of Party Intent and of Courts and Tribunals 
in the Resolution of Treaty Conflicts, and Some 
Remarks on the Question of Competence  
The previous sections have provided an outline of the basic rules and principles that 
govern conflicts between EU law and member state BITs. One central question is what role 
party intent should play in their application? Party intent is central to treaty interpretation, 
but in respect of treaty conflict arguments it cannot be the only interpretive criterion, as the 
parties typically disagree about the content of their (past and present) intent over the 
relevant treaties. To elaborate, and schematically speaking, treaty conflict presumes that 
the parties' present intent points in different directions, and the same is necessarily true 
with respect to their past intention: if the parties' intentions on the relationship of the 
relevant treaties converge, no treaty conflict arises. In yet other words, if the relevant 
treaties contain no conflict clauses (expressing the parties' intention), and if the parties 
were not aware of potential conflicts upon the conclusion of the second treaty, the question 
becomes what the treaty texts and other relevant legal and factual materials say about party 
intent. Relying on party intent alone would mean that a court would have to uphold one 
party's intention and overrule the other's, and no court will resolve a treaty conflict with 
such simplistic method, if only because choosing one intent over another will always have 
to be justified with reference to some other ground than the intent itself. Put differently, the 
construction of party intent is necessarily premised on other relevant factual and legal 
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considerations, such as the object and purpose of the treaties, subsequent practice, previous 
case law dealing with conflict arguments, and the circumstances surrounding the treaties' 
conclusion. The same applies the other way around. Treaty texts and case law are often 
drafted in vague language, which brings party intent back to the equation: when legal texts 
can be interpreted in a number of ways, the parties' intentions become central in construing 
a specific meaning to a legal text, but the presiding body cannot rely only on the intent of 
the parties as expressed during the proceedings, because these will point in different 
directions. 
 
But one might object and argue that some treaty conflicts should be resolved independently 
of the parties' intentions on the basis of the relevant treaty texts and case law. One might 
argue, for example, that the question of whether intra-EU BITs breach the principle of non-
discrimination in no way depends on the intention of the BIT parties. It is up to the ECJ to 
determine whether a given arrangement constitutes prohibited discrimination, and 
whatever the parties thought about the arrangement's compatibility with EU law remains 
irrelevant to the Court's analysis. To rebut this argument, one could refer to the member 
states' consent to be bound by the ECJ's case law, which they expressed by signing and 
ratifying the treaties that govern EU accession. The point is that party intent will always 
play a role in an analysis of treaty conflict arguments, but its role varies to a considerable 
degree depending on the institutional context, the content of the applicable law and other 
case specific circumstances.  
 
A final matter relates to the relationship of party intent and the application of specific 
conflict rules. In one of the arbitrations to be discussed in Chapter 3, the tribunal held that 
Article 30(3) VCLT 'requires no proof of the States Parties' intention to terminate a 
particular provision', as its application depends solely on the existence of incompatibility 
between the relevant treaties.83 In light of the above, this statement is less correct than 
incorrect. Firstly, the tribunal should have footnoted the dictum so as to remind the reader 
that states have consented to the application of the lex posterior rule by signing and 
ratifying the VCLT and/or by acquiescing to its application as a matter of customary 
international law. Secondly, the intent to become bound by the VCLT indicates that states 
cannot argue that the lex posterior rule is not relevant, but they can argue that its 
                                                
83 European American Investment Bank AG (Austria) v. The Slovak Republic (hereinafter EURAM award), 
PCA Case No. 2010-17, Award on Jurisdiction, 22 October 2012, para. 240. 
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application is not warranted in the circumstances of the case. Thirdly, in the arbitration 
where the tribunal rejected the relevance of intent, it nonetheless repeatedly referred to 
party intent when rejecting the conflict arguments (for example, by noting that it was not 
the intention of the drafters of Article 344 TFEU, or the member states, to grant to the ECJ 
an exclusive jurisdiction that is unexceptional or absolute). Again, the relevant point is that 
courts and tribunals cannot resolve treaty conflicts by relying solely on the VCLT's lex 
posterior rule or party intent. Both are part and parcel of the analysis alongside other legal 
and factual considerations relevant in the circumstances of a case. This holds true in 
respect of other conflict rules as well. In this sense, Jenks' prediction in 1953 that conflict 
rules would eventually 'reach a more developed stage of maturity',84 allowing a more 
precise delineation of their respective scopes of application remains a distant pipedream, 
and not only for dearth of relevant practice.   
 
But what role do (or can) courts and tribunals have in the resolution of treaty conflicts in 
the first place?85 In principle, they have two options when a conflict of treaties is 
established. The court can either 'disapply' one of the treaties or declare it invalid. In 
practice, however, courts and tribunals are disinclined to do either. Declaring a treaty null 
and void on the basis of a conflict with another treaty has never happened (to my 
knowledge) in practice, and it is difficult to come up with a scenario where this might 
happen, if we set aside the hypothetical situation where an international court of unlimited 
jurisdiction faces a conflict argument concerning the relationship of the Genocide 
Convention and a treaty in which the parties pledge to commit genocide.86 Put differently, 
when conflict arguments relate to treaties regulating 'standard' inter-state affairs, there is 
little room for invalidity arguments, also because the alleged conflicts usually stem not 
from malevolent intent but from events unforeseen at the time of the conclusion of the 
relevant treaties. In yet other words, treaty conflict arguments typically relate to situations 
where one of the treaties contravenes with the other party's present political or economic 
interests, rather than to situations where one of the parties entertains Machiavellian 
sentiments upon the conclusion of the later treaty or at a later time. As will be shown 
below, this was exactly the case with member state BITs. The member states and the 
                                                
84 Jenks, 'The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties', supra note 46, p. 453. 
85 My discussion on this topic owes a debt to Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union, supra note 
22, and Binder, Treaty Conflict and Political Contradiction, supra note 68. 
86 The point here is that treaty conflict arguments do not usually relate to alleged conflicts between treaties 
containing jus cogens norms and treaties regulating less fundamental matters.  
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Commission either assumed that the treaties were not a problem from the perspective of 
EU law or then failed to register the matter altogether both when the BITs were concluded 
and during the accession negotiations preceding the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds. 
 
As noted, it is possible, hypothetically speaking, for a court to declare a treaty invalid or 
inapplicable, but this is an unlikely event for a number of additional reasons. First, in a 
typical case, the presiding body only has jurisdiction over one of the relevant treaties, 
which denotes that it is not competent to make declarations on the treaty falling outside its 
jurisdiction.87 This applies with respect to the ECJ as well; it cannot declare a conflicting 
member state treaty invalid or inapplicable as a matter of international law, but only hold 
that the primacy of EU law applies and that the member state has to comply with the 
relevant EU law provisions. Second, when treaty conflict arguments are raised before a 
court, this suggests that the parties have failed to find a political solution to the matter, but 
it also means that the parties are (in principle at least) obligated to accept the subsequent 
judgment as final and binding. Given that courts and tribunals are not in the position to 
take account of and balance the divergent interests of the disputing parties (because the 
applicable law tends to disallow this), a finding of conflict could aggravate the political 
situation, with the winning party becoming uncompromising and demanding compliance 
with the court's decision. As to the values and interests that undergird conflict arguments, 
their transformation into legal arguments is not easy, and a court's ability to review 
measures for their compatibility with the fundamental values and principles of the body of 
law over which it presides usually require that its mandate is of the 'constitutional' type. 
The mandates of arbitral tribunals and the ECJ are clearly different, but their ability to 
tackle 'constitutional' questions depends in large part on the cause of action and the 
arguments of the parties. The ECJ, for example, cannot base its analysis directly on the 
foundational values of the EU in the pending Achmea case,88 which deals with the 
compatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU law, but arbitral tribunals have relied on the 
underlying (and value-laden) purposes of investment treaties in their reasoning on the 
conflict arguments. The following chapters will discuss this issue from a number of 
perspectives. 
                                                
87 These remarks apply with similar force in respect of treaties containing identical and non-identical parties. 
Although, if one of the relevant treaties has third states as parties, and those states are not taking part in the 
proceedings, the presiding court will be even more inclined to keep its distance from the treaty over which it 
has no jurisdiction. 
88 Case C-284/16, Achmea (pending). This case relates to an arbitration between a Dutch investor and the 
Slovak Republic and will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Case specific circumstances may also weaken the force of conflict arguments, and, again, 
member state BITs provide a good example of this. In the arbitrations discussed in Chapter 
3, the respondent member states had not raised the issue of treaty conflict prior to drafting 
their statements of defense for submission to the tribunals. That is to say, the respondent 
states had not contacted the other BIT party or taken any other steps to achieve the 
disapplication or termination of the relevant BITs before raising the matter at the start of 
the arbitral proceedings.89 Under such circumstances conflict arguments come out of the 
blue, so to speak, and are unlikely to convince the presiding body unless supported by 
other factual and legal evidence pointing to the existence of conflict. Moreover, a central 
canon of treaty interpretation is that states enter into treaties in good faith without 
intending to defeat the object and purpose of previous treaties to which they are parties. If 
the parties have concluded the relevant treaties without addressing their mutual 
relationship, and if their validity has not been challenged at any point, the presumption can 
only be that they continue to apply normally in their respective spheres of application. 
These points indicate that in most cases it is not only politically wiser but also more 
plausible in legal terms for a court to make a finding of compatibility and to allow the 
Herren der Verträge to settle the matter as they please. As Klabbers put it with respect to 
what he calls 'classical' treaty conflict cases, international courts and tribunals 'generally 
have accepted the co-existence of conflicting treaties as valid instruments within their own 
sphere. No treaty has ever been declared invalid due to conflict with either an earlier or 
later treaty.'90 
 
It is noteworthy that the treaty conflict arguments raised in the arbitrations discussed in 
Chapter 3 have taken the form of jurisdictional challenges. The respondent states have 
argued that the tribunals lacked jurisdiction over the cases because the relevant BIT had 
been superseded by EU law as of the respondent state's EU accession. Such arguments 
differ from conflict arguments related to the merits of a case in that the presiding body is 
competent to address jurisdictional challenges even though it has no jurisdiction over the 
other relevant treaty (here, the EU founding treaties). Such power stems from the 
                                                
89 Apart from an e-mail that the Slovak Republic sent in 2004 to the diplomatic missions of a number of EU 
member states in Bratislava. That e-mail asked for the recipient states' 'unofficial opinion' on the status of 
BITs concluded between the Slovak Republic and those other member states. Although some of the 
diplomatic missions replied to the e-mail, no formal action was taken at any time on the basis of the 
correspondence, nor did the Slovak Republic seek to terminate its intra-EU BITs by other means. The e-mail 
was discussed in the Eureko arbitration. See Eureko award, supra note 74, paras. 90-91. 
90 Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union, supra note 22, p. 61. 
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competence-competence doctrine, under which a court or an arbitral tribunal has the 
competence to decide its own jurisdiction. While arbitral tribunals have no competence to 
declare on the validity or alleged breaches of (primary or secondary) EU law, they are 
competent to rule on whether the BIT is still valid and/or applicable due to the 'influence' 
of EU law, and this influence could mean, for example, that the BIT parties implicitly 
consented to the disapplication of the BIT after both of them had acceded to the EU.91 In 
sum, while international courts and tribunals could make a finding of non-jurisdiction on 
the basis of EU law, the above suggests that such finding is highly unlikely.  
 
There is one more issue that requires some preliminary remarks. That issue is the division 
of competences between the EU and its member states over foreign investment related 
matters. The question of competence has import with respect to extra-EU BITs in 
particular, whereas it is less relevant in the context of intra-EU BITs, as the discussion in 
Chapters 4 and 5 will show. The general principles governing competence are 
unambiguous, but these principles are relatively unhelpful in determining the precise 
division of competences between the EU and its member states in a number of policy 
areas. EU law provides that when a matter remains within the competence of the member 
states, they are free to legislate in that area, both domestically and with third states, but 
they nonetheless have to comply with EU law when doing so. In areas of shared 
competence, both the EU and the member states are free to legislate, but if the EU takes 
action, member states may use their competence only to the extent that the EU has not used 
its own competence.92 In areas of exclusive EU competence, 'only the Union may legislate 
and adopt legally binding acts', and member state action is limited to situations where the 
EU empowers them to act 'or for the implementation of Union acts.'93  
 
Extra-EU BITs were concluded between the 1950s and the 2010s, during which time the 
EU's competences over foreign investment have changed radically, with foreign direct 
investment becoming an exclusive EU competence with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty. The basic question is what impact the evolution of EU competences has had for the 
                                                
91 Another related question is whether a court is competent to interpret a treaty over which it has no 
jurisdiction. In our case, the question is whether the EU courts can interpret BITs and whether arbitral 
tribunals can interpret EU law either in the context of conflict arguments or when deciding a case on the 
merits. Generally speaking, both institutions have such competence, but there are important distinctions and 
variations in this regard, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
92 See Article 2(2) TFEU. 
93 See Article 2(1) TFEU. 
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status of extra-EU BITs as a matter of EU law? Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had 
adopted some sector-specific legislation related to third country companies (i.e. foreign 
investors) and also had some relevant competences (e.g. over trade in services), but the EU 
had no express competences over FDI or investment protection.94 Hence, it is somewhat 
unclear whether extra-EU BITs came within the scope of EU law already before the 
Lisbon Treaty in the sense that the treaties were subject to, for example, the EU non-
discrimination rules. While this question is largely academic, given the Grandfathering 
regulation and the uncertainties over investment protection in the context EU trade 
agreements, I will speculate a bit on this issue in Chapter 4, if only because much of the 
debate on competences is shrouded in ambiguity. It should be remembered, however, that 
the question of competence has no direct impact on the status of extra-EU and intra-EU 
BITs as a matter of international law. Member states may be obligated to amend or 
terminate treaties due to a transfer of competences to the EU, but outside the EU legal 
order the treaties remain fully valid. 
2.5. Conclusion  
The above discussion showed how treaty conflicts have been defined in doctrine, and how 
those definitions related to the conflict scenarios between EU law and member state BITs. 
As to specific conflict rules, it is relatively easy to identify the relevant rules and 
principles, but the discussion showed why the internal requirements of EU law (primacy of 
EU law, Article 351 TFEU and the principle of sincere cooperation) may receive a hostile 
reception in an international law context. Since those requirements are blind to the context, 
international courts and tribunals may apply a rule that prioritizes the non-EU treaty or 
make a finding of compatibility against, say, the arguments of the Commission. Related to 
this, and more generally, section 2.4. strived to show why courts and tribunals are unlikely 
to establish the existence of treaty conflicts. This reluctance stems from a number of 
factors. First, the competence of courts and tribunals is typically limited to one of the 
relevant treaties; second, treaty conflicts are typically undergirded by economic and 
political interests, which the presiding body is unable to take into account; and third, case 
specific circumstances may undermine conflict arguments, particularly if the treaty parties 
had not raised the prospect of conflict prior to the relevant proceedings. I also made some 
                                                
94 See Frank Hoffmeister and Günes Ünüvar, 'From BITS and Pieces towards European Investment 
Agreements, in Marc Bungenberg, August Reinisch and Christian Tietje (eds.), EU and Investment 
Agreements: Open Questions and Remaining Challenges (Nomos, 2013), pp. 57-85. 
 42 
comments on the role of party intent. A central observation was that party intent is always 
important for an analysis of conflict arguments, but that it cannot be the only criterion 
against which conflict arguments are settled. Since the intent of the disputing parties points 
in different directions, the presiding body has to rely on other factual and legal materials to 
establish the intent of the parties and to resolve the conflict arguments. 
 
All of these issues have an impact on the resolution of conflicts between EU law and 
member state BITs, and they will be discussed in the following chapters through and 
through. Chapter 3 discusses arbitral cases where the Commission and member states have 
argued that arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs breach EU law. Their argument has been 
that the clauses have become inapplicable as of the EU accession of the 'new' member 
states in 2004 and 2007 under the lex posterior rule enshrined in Articles 30(3) and 59 
VCLT. Arbitral tribunals have rejected these arguments on a number of grounds, and it is 
in this context that many of the issues discussed in this chapter will resurface and help 










3. Harmonious Co-existence: Primary Conflict 
Arguments in Arbitral Practice  
3.1. The Political Context of Primary Conflict Arguments  
Since the relevant arbitral cases were raised under intra-EU BITs, it is important to say a 
few words on the background of these treaties. Apart from the Germany-Greece and 
Germany-Portugal BITs, intra-EU BITs were 'born' with the accession of the formerly 
socialist states to the EU in 2004 and 2007, which changed the status of around two 
hundred investment treaties from extra-EU to intra-EU BITs.95 Most of the treaties were 
concluded in the 1990s in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and they played 
a small part in the political transition from state-planned to market-based economies, 
signaling to western investors that new markets were open and safe for business. The 
formerly socialist states had also signed EU association agreements in the 1990s, each of 
which included a 'referential' provision on investment protection. For example, Article 64 
of the EU-Romania association agreement provided that one of the aims of cooperation on 
investment promotion should be the 'conclusion by the Member States and Romania of 
Agreements for the promotion and protection of investment'.96 In other words, the 
association agreements explicitly encouraged the candidate states to conclude BITs with 
existing member states. Against this backcloth, one might assume that the Commission, as 
the principal author of the association agreements, was aware of the potential problems 
that the parallel application of EU law and what later became intra-EU BITs might bring 
about after the formerly socialist states had acceded to the EU. Yet it appears that this was 
not the case. While the Commission expressed some concerns with respect to BITs that the 
candidate states had concluded with the United States,97 there is some evidence that the 
                                                
95 The Germany-Greece and Germany-Portugal BITs were concluded in 1961 and 1980 respectively (i.e. 
prior to the EU accession of the latter parties). The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), to which both the EU and 
its member states are parties, also provides for arbitration between EU investors and member states, but as 
the ECT is a so called mixed agreement I will not discuss in what follows, apart from few incidental remarks. 
See Energy Charter Treaty, 2080 UNTS 95. 
96 See Article 64 of the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Romania, of the other part, OJ L 357, 
31.12.1994, pp. 2-173. 
97 These concerns related, above all, to the privileged treatment that EU investors were entitled to within the 
internal market, and the Commission sought to ensure that US investors could not invoke the BITs' national 
treatment and most-favored nation treatment obligations so as to demand similar treatment as EU investors in 
the post-2004 member states with which the US had concluded BITs. See Understanding Concerning 
Certain U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, signed by the U.S., the European Commission, and acceding and 
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problem of intra-EU BITs remained under the radar until investors from the old member 
states started to bring claims against the newly acceded states. 
 
A letter sent by the Commission to the Czech Republic in connection with the Eastern 
Sugar arbitration supports this perception. The Commission letter, dated 13 January 2006, 
was a reply to a letter of the Czech Ministry of Finance concerning the possible effects of 
EU law on intra-EU BITs, and the Commission noted that 'the complexity of the questions 
raised has required the input and analysis by various Commission services'.98 This suggests 
that the questions posed in the Czech letter took the Commission by surprise, which also 
explains that it took some seven months for the Commission to send the reply.99 For now, 
it is unnecessary to go into the details of the letter, suffices it to note that the Commission 
saw, first, that EU law prevails over intra-EU BITs in case of conflict and, second, that the 
termination of intra-EU BITs 'would take effect according to the respective provisions of 
each such BIT'. Hence, the Commission recognized that intra-EU BITs remained valid and 
in force as a matter of international law, with investors being able to 'continue to rely on' 
the BITs' arbitration clauses. The Commission also noted that arbitral tribunals should give 
primacy to EU law in case of conflict with an intra-EU BIT, but simultaneously 
acknowledged that the tribunals might arrive 'at a different conclusion'. What also provides 
a backdrop to the letter is the Czech Republic's track record of intra-EU BITs before 2006. 
In 2003, for example, the CME tribunal had awarded the claimant investor around $270 
million (plus ten percent in interest to be paid retroactively for a period of three years) in 
damages for a string of the Czech Republic's regulatory decisions, which had caused the 
claimant to divest itself of the relevant investment.100 It is noteworthy that the 
compensation equaled roughly the Czech Republic's health-care budget,101 which suggests 
that what prompted the letter was not simply the formal legal concerns about the 
compatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU law, but the fear that investment arbitration might 
impose an unbearable burden on the Czech Republic's finances. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
candidate countries for accession to the European Union (September 22, 2003). Available at 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/2003/44366.htm (accessed 12 July 2016). 
98 Letter by Mr. Schaub of EC Internal Market and Services, 13 January 2006, sent to Mr. Zelinka, the Czech 
Deputy Minister of Finance. The letter is quoted in Eastern Sugar B.V.(Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, 
SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award (hereinafter Eastern Sugar award), 27 March 2007, para. 119. 
99 The author of the letter expressly 'apologize[d] for the delayed reply' after which the letter referred to the 
complexity of the Slovak Republic's questions. See idem. 
100 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 14 March 2003. 
101 See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 7. 
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Another relevant matter was discussed in the EURAM arbitration. The tribunal noted that 
the Slovak Republic had sent letters to the member states with which it had concluded a 
BIT, asking whether they were willing to 'terminate [the BITs] mutually'.102 The letters 
were sent, apparently, around the time of the Slovak Republic's EU accession,103 but it 
appears that they had not led to any formal bilateral or unilateral action. Whether the letters 
were the product of legal analysis or a political reaction to the threat of BIT claims is 
unknown,104 but in legal terms inquiring about mutual termination is clearly different from 
raising treaty conflict arguments, and the EURAM tribunal noted that both the Slovak 
Republic and Austria (the claimant's home state) still listed the BIT 'as one of the 
international treaties to which they are' parties.105 A third relevant fact for assessing the 
politics surrounding primary conflict arguments in the context of intra-EU BITs was raised 
in a 2008 report of the Economic and Financial Committee for the EU Council, which 
observed that most member states 'did not share the Commission’s concern in respect of 
arbitration risks and discriminatory treatment of investors and a clear majority of Member 
States preferred to maintain the existing agreements [i.e. intra-EU BITs]'.106 In other 
words, most member states consider that intra-EU BITs were compatible with EU law and 
that investors could continue to rely on their protections as before.  
 
In sum, and apart from the two letters referred to, member states had not taken any action 
to terminate their mutual BITs before primary conflict arguments were raised before 
arbitral tribunals.107 The particulars of the arbitral cases where primary conflicts have been 
                                                
102 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 201. 
103 The date of the letter is uncertain. On the one hand, the tribunal noted (idem.) that 'upon accession to the 
EU, the Slovak Republic had sent a note requesting its BIT partners that were EU Member States to accept a 
mutual termination.' On the other hand, a footnote (at para. 201, footnote 220) gives the appearance that the 
letter was sent only in 2011. 
104 Prior to its EU accession, the Slovak Republic had faced only one BIT claim, and the second claim against 
it was raised only in 2006, which suggests that the letters were not sent because of an increasing number of 
BIT claims (assuming that the letters were sent around the time of its EU accession). Assuming that the letter 
was sent only in 2011, the Slovak Republic had faced 6 BIT claims by then, and the Commission was also 
aware of the potential conflicts between EU law and member state BITs by then. This case information was 
derived from an UNCTAD database, see at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (accessed 12 June 
2016). 
105 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 202. 
106 Economic and Financial Committee, Annual EFC Report to the Commission and the Council on the 
Movement of Capital and the Freedom of Payments (ECFIN/CEFCPE(2008)REP/55806), 21 November 
2008, para. 17. Available at http:// register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17363.en08.pdf (accessed 6 
June, 2015). 
107 As the Binder tribunal put it with respect to the Czech-German BIT, 'the…BIT has not been terminated 
pursuant to the provision in Article 13(2) of the BIT. Nor would it seem that the Czech Republic and 
Germany have agreed in any other way that the BIT should be terminated or cease to be operative.' See 
Binder v. Czech Republic, Award on Jurisdiction (hereinafter Binder award), 6 June 2007, para. 60. 
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raised vary considerably and the available documentation is limited to the final awards, 
which means that the following discussion relies on the tribunals' expositions of the parties' 
conflict arguments.108 The number of relevant cases where documents are available count 
around ten and the cases involve just three new EU member states, though in few cases a 
number of old member states took part in the proceedings (as claimant investors' home 
states) on the invitation of the tribunals. 
3.2. Primary Conflict Arguments under Articles 30(3)  
and 59 VCLT 
In each of the arbitrations, the relevant BIT had entered into force before the relevant EU 
accession treaty. This meant that the accession treaty was the later treaty in temporal terms, 
and this timeline had direct relevance for the application of Articles 30(3) and 59(1) 
VCLT. These two articles deal with successive treaties 'relating to the same subject-
matter', and outline a number of rules regarding the validity, primacy and parallel 
application of treaties falling under their scope. Both articles endorse the lex posterior rule 
by giving priority to the later treaty. In essence, the Commission and the respondent 
member states argued that the arbitral tribunals lacked jurisdiction, because intra-EU BITs 
were superseded by EU law as of the EU accession of the new member states, which had 
led to the automatic termination of intra-EU BITs. An alternative argument was that 
arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs were superseded by EU law and had become 
inapplicable upon the EU accession of the new member states. In other words, since the 
intra-EU BIT parties were also parties to the later accession treaties, the latter took priority 
under the VCLT's lex posterior rule if and when the BITs were in conflict with EU law.  
 
Primary conflict arguments raised under Articles 30(3) and 59(1) VCLT have been very 
similar, although the criteria and implications of the two articles are quite different. Under 
Article 59(1) the earlier treaty is terminated if the conditions for its application are met, 
whereas under Article 30(3) the conflicting provisions of the earlier treaty become 
inapplicable. Article 59 VCLT is titled Termination or Suspension of the Operation of a 
Treaty Implied by Conclusion of a Later Treaty', and its first paragraph reads as follows:  
 
                                                
108 A short note on quotation in this regard. Sometimes the quotes are from the respondent's own submissions 
and sometimes they are tribunal’s own phrasings of the respondent's original submissions, but I refer 
similarly to both. 
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'A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later 
treaty relating to the same subject-matter and: (a) it appears from the later treaty 
or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter should be 
governed by that treaty; or (b) the provisions of the later treaty are so far 
incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of 
being applied at the same time.' 
 
Article 30 VCLT is titled 'Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-
matter'. Only paragraph 3 is relevant and it reads as follows: 
  
'When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but 
the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, 
the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible 
with those of the later treaty.'  
 
The question over the meaning of the phrase 'relating to the same subject-matter', which is 
found in both articles, received much attention in the argumentation of the disputing 
parties and the tribunals. Their shared premise was that the phrase is an independent 
precondition of application that has to be met before the other criteria are considered. In 
other words, if two successive treaties between identical parties do not relate to the 'same 
subject-matter', Articles 30(3) and 59 VCLT are inapplicable even if the other conditions 
for their application are met. As the Oostergetel & Laurentius tribunal put it, since 'the EC 
Treaty and the BIT do not cover the same subject matter, they cannot be considered 
successive treaties pursuant to Article 30 [VCLT]. Therefore, Article 30…bears no 
relevance to the present case'.109 Both the EU Commission and respondent member states 
have argued that EU law and intra-EU BITs relate to the same subject-matter in the 
meaning of the two VCLT articles,110 whereas arbitral tribunals have come to an opposite 
conclusion.111  
                                                
109 See Jan Oostergetel & Theodora Laurentius v. The Slovak Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction (hereinafter 
Oostergetel & Laurentius award), 30 April 2010, para. 104. 
110 For these views, see Eureko award, supra note 74, paras. 65-77 and 191; Eastern Sugar award, supra note 
98, para. 101; Binder award, supra note 107, paras. 13-15; Oostergetel & Laurentius award, supra note 109, 
para. 66; EURAM award, supra note 83, paras. 85-92; WNC Factoring LTD v. The Czech Republic, PCA 
Case No 2014-34, Award (hereinafter WNC award), 22 February 2017, para. 295. 
111 See Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, paras. 159-165; Oostergetel & Laurentius award, supra note 109, 
paras. 74-79; Eureko award, supra note 74, paras. 239-267; EURAM award, supra note 83, paras. 165-185; 
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For now, it is unnecessary to discuss which of these two interpretations is more plausible, 
or whether both sides have misunderstood the meaning of the phrase. Clearly, determining 
whether BITs and EU law relate to the subject-matter does not answer whether the two 
treaties are in conflict. Lex posterior is but one conflict rule among many, and it is more 
useful to first examine whether the alleged conflicts exist before discussing which conflict 
rules different institutions should or are likely to apply. Logically speaking, the conclusion 
that BITs and EU law do not 'relate to the same subject-matter' implies that Articles 30(3) 
and 59 VCLT (and the lex posterior rule) are inapplicable, with other conflict rules 
becoming relevant. However, most tribunals have not recognized this, as they have 
proceeded to analyze primary conflict arguments against the other criteria of the two 
VCLT articles. This approach is understandable in light of the fact that the tribunals 
concluded that EU law and intra-EU BITs are compatible, and on the ground that their 
jurisdiction was challenged on the basis of the two VCLT articles alone. Likewise, 
excluding an analysis of the conflict arguments on the basis of the 'same subject-matter' 
phrase alone would have seemed overly formalistic and as reflecting a reluctance on the 
tribunals' part to address the conflict arguments head on.   
3.3. Article 59(1) VCLT and the ‘Intention and 
‘Incompatibility’ Tests in Arbitral Practice 
3.3.1. The 'Intention' Test 
The first of the two alternate conditions under Article 59(1) VCLT provides that an earlier 
treaty 'shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty 
relating to the same subject-matter' and if it 'appears from the later treaty or is otherwise 
established that the parties intended that the matter should be governed by that treaty' 
(emphasis added). The application of this clause does not require that a conflict exists 
between two treaties, but it may be applied in such situations as well. Leaving the issue of 
same subject-matter aside, the only relevant question is whether the parties intended that 
the earlier treaty is terminated upon the conclusion of the later treaty. There is some 
variation in the legal sources that the respondent member states have invoked to prove the 
existence of such intention, but usually the accession treaties, the overall legal framework 
                                                                                                                                              
I.P. Busta & J.P. Busta v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case V 2015/014, Final Award (hereinafter Busta 
award), 10 March 2017, paras. 115-116; WNC award, supra note 110, paras. 296-308. 
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and purpose of the internal market, and the primacy nd direct effect of EU law have been 
argued as entailing or implying that there is a mutual understanding between EU member 
states that their bilateral treaty arrangements relating to the internal market are superseded 
by the acquis as of EU accession.112 In some cases, primacy and direct effect of EU law 
were invoked to emphasize that the termination of the BIT had taken place ex lege, 
requiring no formal communication between the contracting states.113  
 
These arguments on intention failed to convince the tribunals, and quite rightly so. None of 
the treaties governing EU accession said anything explicit about the status of what were to 
become intra-EU BITs, and the provisions invoked by the respondent member states were 
far too vague to constitute the intention of the parties in the meaning of Article 59(1) 
VCLT.114 For example, in Eastern Sugar, the Czech Republic relied on Article 118 of the 
Czech-EU Association Agreement, according to which rights under pre-accession 
agreements (such as BITs) are not affected 'until equivalent rights' have been achieved 
through the EU integration process. The argument was that with EU accession investors 
had 'achieved' BIT equivalent rights, but the tribunal held that the text of the article 
contained no intention to terminate the relevant BIT.115 Similarly, the Eureko tribunal 
concluded that 'no clear intention that the BIT should be terminated' was found in the text 
                                                
112 See Binder award, supra note 107, para. 19; Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, para. 102; EURAM 
award, supra note 83, paras., 94-96; Eureko award, supra note 74, paras. 86-93; Anglia Auto Accessories 
Limited v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case V 2014/181, Final Award (hereinafter Anglia Auto award, 10 
March 2017, para. 102; Busta award, supra note 111, para. 102. The Czech government raised the 'intra-EU 
BIT jurisdictional objection' also in two other arbitrations argument also in the Nepolsky v. Czech Republic 
arbitration, but these proceedings were discontinued at an early stage before the tribunal had made a decision 
on its jurisdiction. The Nepolsky case materials are not publicly available. See Luke Eric Peterson, 'Water 
extraction claim dries up in absence of funds; claimant ordered to cover half of state’s expenses in 
UNCITRAL arbitration’, IAReporter News, 16 June 2010. Likewise, the Czech Republic raised the 'intra-EU 
BIT jurisdictional objection' also in the A11Y Ltd v. Czech Republic arbitration, which the tribunal rejected. 
The tribunal's decision is not publicly available, but some information on its contents is found in Luke Eric 
Peterson, 'Narrow investor-state clause bars investor from pursuing FET claim vs Czech Republic, but intra-
EU BIT objection is rejected and expro claim will go forward', IAReporter News, 14 February 2017.  
113 See e.g. Eureko award, supra note 74, paras. 92-93. A related question is whether the treaty termination 
procedure under Article 65 VCLT would have to be resorted to in order to effectuate termination under 
Article 59. Only the Eureko tribunal explicitly dealt with this matter and held that since the Slovak Republic 
had not followed the procedure laid out in Article 65 VCLT, it could not invoke Article 59 even if the 
substantive requirements for its application had been met. See Eureko award, supra note 74, paras. 234-238. 
114 See e.g. EURAM award, supra note 83, paras. 186-210. 
115 See Article 118 of the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Czech Republic, of the other part, OJ L 360, 31.12.1994, 
pp. 2-210; Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, paras. 102, 143 and 147. It is noteworthy that the Czech 
Republic had adopted domestic investment law which included identical substantive protection standards as 
those found in BITs. The only difference was that the domestic law did not contain a provision on investor-
state arbitration. This matter appears from a letter of the Czech Ministry for Finance, quoted in Eastern Sugar 
award, supra note 98, para. 127 (at p. 29). 
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of the 'Association Agreement, the Accession Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty'.116 Moreover, in 
two arbitrations the home states of the claimant investors were invited to express their 
views on the validity of the relevant BITs. In EURAM, for example, the Netherlands 
argued that the Dutch-Slovak BIT 'continues to be fully in force', with EU law having no 
impact on the tribunal's jurisdiction either.117 In a similar vein, the Eastern Sugar tribunal 
quoted a Commission letter which expressly recognized that intra-EU BITs could only be 
terminated by following 'the relevant procedure provided' in the BITs,118 and in Eureko the 
Commission recognized that the 2003 Act of Accession contained no 'intention of the 
parties to abrogate earlier intra-EU BITs' and neither was the Dutch-Slovak BIT 'implicitly 
terminated or suspended by virtue' of Article 59(1).119 Hence, even if Article 59(1) would 
provide for ex lege termination, such effect could only be achieved when the contracting 
states agree over its applicability, which implies that the party that relies on the article 
would at least have had to consult the other party so as to ensure that a mutual intention to 
terminate exists. In some cases (e.g. in Binder) the argument about implied termination 
also failed to recognize that the claimant’s cause of action related to events that preceded 
the respondent state's EU accession. BITs typically contain so called ‘sunset clauses’, 
which stipulate that the treaties' provisions continue to be effective in respect of 
investments made before the date of termination for a further specified period (usually ten 
or fifteen years).120 Assuming that EU accession had miraculously terminated intra-EU 
BITs, such termination could not extend to sunset clauses without explicit agreement of the 
contracting states. To terminate sunset clauses with immediate effect, the contracting states 
would need to expressly agree on this; the 'general' application of Article 59 (1) cannot, 
surely, create such effect. 
 
                                                
116 Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 244. In Binder, the tribunal noted that 'the status of the Czech-German 
BIT was not regulated in connection with that [Accession] Treaty, and there is no indication that it was 
discussed during the negotiations on the Czech Republic's accession to the EU.' See Binder award, supra note 
107, para. 59. See also Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, paras. 143-147.  
117 See EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 125 (submissions of the Austrian government); Eureko award, 
supra note 74, paras. 155-166 (submissions of the government of the Netherlands), the quote is from para. 
161. Similarly, in Binder, the tribunal referred to a letter of the German Ministry for Economics and 
Technology, which provided that the accession of both Contracting States to the EU does not, in our opinion, 
bring about an automatic termination of the [Czech-German] BIT, since these agreements provide to the 
favoured parties other rights than those of the EC Treaty’. See Binder award, supra note 107, para. 61. 
118 Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, para. 119. 
119 Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 187. 
120 See e.g. Article 13.3 of the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments 
between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, which reads as 
follows: 'In respect of investments made before the date of termination of the present Agreement the 
foregoing Articles there of shall continue to be effective for a further period of fifteen years from that date'.  
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3.3.2. The 'Incompatibility' Test 
The second alternate criterion under Article 59(1) VCLT, existence of incompatibilities 
between member state BITs and EU law is a more complex issue. On the assumption that 
two successive treaties relate to the same subject matter, the incompatibility test requires 
that provisions of the later treaty 'are so far incompatible' with the earlier treaty that the 
two 'are not capable of being applied at the same time'. The respondent member states have 
argued that the entry into force of the accession treaties (at which point the acquis became 
binding on them) necessarily triggered such 'large' incompatibility, and the list of relevant 
provisions include the following: the respondent member states have argued that BIT 
provisions on free transfer of payments conflict with EU law provisions, which allow the 
imposition of restrictions on free movement of capital on public policy grounds;121 BIT 
expropriation clauses conflict with EU law, because EU law imposes certain requirements 
on member states' expropriation laws, and the criteria of lawful expropriations are different 
under BITs, on the one hand, and under EU law and national laws, on the other hand;122 
BIT arbitration clauses breach Article 344 TFEU, which grants the ECJ exclusive 
jurisdiction over EU law related disputes involving member states;123 and, finally, BIT 
arbitration clauses create a situation of 'direct discrimination on the basis of nationality 
between investors' from different member states, because only the nationals of the 
contracting states may resort to arbitration.124 In sum, the extent of incompatibility 
between intra-EU BITs and EU law meets the threshold set in Article 59(1)(b) VCLT. 
 
Arbitral tribunals have rejected this basic argument, but their analyses have varied greatly 
in terms of length and depth, in part because the arguments of the respondent member 
states appear to have varied to a similar extent. Some of the tribunals have also addressed 
some components of the incompatibility argument in relation to Article 30(3) VCLT, 
which will be discussed in the following section. What is interesting is that the analyses 
have been heavily influenced by the tribunals' understanding of the subject-matter of EU 
                                                
121 See e.g. Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 110. 
122 Ibid., para. 111 (the Slovak Republic argued that 'the expropriation clause in Article 5 of the BIT is 
incompatible with the regulation of expropriation and damages under EU law, which is derived largely from 
the ECHR. This is because EU law enables possible restrictions on proprietary rights "necessary for the 
general interest" which could cause a breach of Article 5 of the BIT', footnote omitted). 
123 EURAM award, supra note, 83, paras. 98 and 101. 
124 The quote is from the EU Commission’s amicus curiae brief in US Steel Global Holdings I B.V. (The 
Netherlands) v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-6, Brussels, 15 May 2014, para. 31. See also 
Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 113 and EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 101; WNC award, supra note 
110, para. 295. In Eastern Sugar, the Czech Republic argued more generally that the ‘application of the BIT 
would breach the principle of non-discrimination’ (see Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, at para. 106). 
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law, on the one hand, and the subject-matter of BITs, on the other hand. As noted, the two 
VCLT articles speak of successive treaties that 'relate to the same subject-matter', and both 
the disputing parties and the arbitral tribunals have understood that the phrase constitutes 
an independent precondition of application. I will first outline the way in which the 
tribunals discussed the conflict arguments in the context of Articles 59(1)(b) and 30(3) 
VCLT, and will address the subject-matter issue in the last section of Chapter 3, also 
because it already touches on the underlying values and interests with which investment 
treaties are associated.  
 
The Binder tribunal's reasoning on the Czech Republic's conflict arguments was 
impressively short; it simply concluded that no incompatibility exists between the relevant 
provisions of the two treaties without providing any analysis.125 The Eastern Sugar 
tribunal, in turn, held that the Dutch-Czech BIT and EU law are not incompatible, but 
'complementary things', and if the BIT gives more rights to Dutch investors than other EU 
investors, 'it will be for those other… investors to claim their equal rights….[but] the fact 
that these rights are unequal does not make them incompatible'.126 In other words, the 
tribunal saw that the 'source' of discrimination is not the BIT but the non-discrimination 
rules of EU law, and that procedures exist through which EU investors can claim those 
rights. The Oostergetel & Laurentius tribunal simply quoted this reasoning of the Eastern 
Sugar tribunal when reaching the conclusion that the applicable BIT and EU law were 
compatible.127  
 
The Eureko tribunal's analysis was more elaborate. In essence, the tribunal held that the 
relevant BIT and EU law were not in conflict in the meaning of Article 59(1)(b) VCLT, 
because the BIT provided broader protections than EU law. For the tribunal, the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, the expropriation provision, and the full security and 
protection provision enabled bringing claims that could not be raised under EU law.128 
Equally, the possibility to resort to arbitration was a more effective remedy than remedies 
available under EU law or Slovak law.129 In other words, the BIT provided broader rights 
                                                
125 Binder award, supra note 107, paras. 63-66.  
126 Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, paras. 169-170 (emphasis in original). The tribunal did not take issue 
with other potential incompatibilities, and as the publicly available case documentation is limited to the final 
award it is unknown whether the Czech Republic raised other primary conflict arguments. 
127 Oostergetel & Laurentius award, supra note 109, paras. 86-87. 
128 Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 263.  
129 Ibid., para. 264. 
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to investors and there was 'no reason why those rights should not be fulfilled and upheld in 
addition to the rights protected by EU law'.130 The Eureko tribunal acknowledged that 
broader BIT rights 'may violate EU law prohibitions on discrimination’ but this was ‘not a 
reason for cancelling' them.131 Rather, and similarly to the Eastern Sugar award, member 
states were encouraged to extend BIT protections to all EU investors.132 In one way, the 
argument that the obligation of EU member states to provide equal treatment could have an 
impact on the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is less than plausible. For one thing, the 
argument is not premised on a material conflict between EU law and BITs, but on the idea 
that certain treaty rights are reserved only for some actors to the exclusion of others. I will 
discuss this matter further in Chapter 4. The Eureko also discussed the relationship of 
Article 344 TFEU and investment arbitration, but did so only in respect of Article 30(3) 
VCLT, so I will discuss the tribunal's relevant reasoning in the following section. 
  
The EURAM tribunal noted that its analysis with respect to Article 59(1)(b) VCLT is 
hypothetical as the BIT and EU law did not relate to the same subject matter in the 
meaning of the two VCLT articles. The tribunal first addressed the 'theoretical' question of 
'what does it mean to say that two treaties are incompatible?'133 The Slovak Republic's 
argument that conflict arises when one treaty frustrates the goals of another treaty was 
referred to, but the tribunal provided no analysis of the argument. Rather, the tribunal 
provided its own construction of incompatibility, which was based on the ordinary 
meaning of Article 59(1)(b) VCLT. The tribunal interpreted the phrase, 'two treaties cannot 
be applied at the same time', to mean that conflict occurs when 'one treaty requires what 
the other treaty prohibits' or 'when compliance with one treaty necessarily causes a breach 
of the other treaty'.134 However, these definitions were not put into use as the tribunal next 
                                                
130 Ibid., para. 263. 
131 Ibid., para. 266. 
132 Ibid., para. 267. 
133 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 213. 
134 Ibid., para. 216. The tribunal also made a somewhat confusing statement that it 'does not consider that 
incompatibility extends to a situation where something that is forbidden under the BIT is merely permitted by 
EU law, or vice versa', which was followed by the dictum that the tribunal 'does not consider that two treaties 
are incompatible when they point in the same direction or when the rules they adopt are similar' (see para. 
217). This was also what the Eureko tribunal was implying, although in equally vague terms (see Eureko 
award, supra note 74, paras. 253-254). It appears that the EURAM tribunal referred to a situation where 
member states are free to adopt certain measures as a matter of EU law, typically in an area over which they 
have exclusive competence, but which measures may still breach e.g. the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. But this seems to be premised on a logical error: while in the implied situation there is no conflict 
between the BIT and EU law to the extent that the latter sanctions the measure, the argument that BIT 
arbitration clauses breach EU law are premised precisely on the idea that EU law 'forbids' something that the 
BIT 'permits'. 
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held that 'far from being necessarily incompatible', the BIT and EU law 'can be 
cumulatively applied'.135 To support this conclusion, the tribunal relied on the distinction 
between pre- and post-establishment treatment of investments, and saw that EU law is 
focused on the pre-establishment phase whereas BITs protect investments once they are 
made.136 I will return to this distinction below in section 3.5. The tribunal also relied on a 
number of cases from different contexts to make the point that nothing prevents the 
'cumulative' application of two treaties even if they deal with the same subject-matter. The 
referred cases included an ICSID case where the tribunal held that two tribunals could 
exercise concurrent jurisdiction 'with respect to the same parties, the same facts and the 
same cause of action', because 'there is no rule of international law which prevents either 
tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction'.137 By analogy, that investors can obtain remedies 
under both EU law and the BIT 'does not render them incompatible', but in fact does the 
reverse, as those remedies 'must be considered as parallel since they enhance the protection 
of the investor'.138 Another case referred to was a case brought before the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in which the tribunal first held that two treaties applied to 
the dispute and then argued that such 'parallelism of treaties, both in their substantive 
content and in their provisions for settlement of disputes' is not an infrequent 
phenomenon.139 The point of these separate sources was to substantiate the conclusion that 
the BIT and EU law 'are not so incompatible that…[they] cannot be applied at the same 
time'.140  
 
In sum, the EURAM tribunal held that the relevant BIT and EU law are complementary 
legal frameworks whose parallel application does not create a treaty conflict in the 
meaning of Article 59(1)(b) VCLT. The discussion traveled at a fairly abstract level and 
excluded an analysis of the alleged conflicts between specific provisions of the BIT and 
EU law. However, the tribunal did analyze a number of more specific conflict arguments, 
                                                
135 Ibid., para. 228. For the Slovak Republic's conflict arguments related to Article 59(1)(b) VCLT, see paras. 
98-104. 
136 Ibid., para. 180. 
137 The tribunal was quoting Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, First Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 November 1985, paras. 28 and 30. 
138 EURAM award, supra note 83, paras. 229-230. The tribunal referred to one academic source as well, and 
the author in question had argued, inter alia, that 'bilateral investment protection treaties are "added" legal 
guarantees for investors', which 'help to increase and enhance the overall level of legal protection of 
economic subjects in the internal market'. Ibid., para. 232. This quote is from Tietje, 'Bilateral Investment 
Protection Treaties between EU Member States', supra note 17, p. 19. 
139 Ibid., para. 231. The quote is from Southern Bluefin Tuna case (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan), 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 August 2000, UNRIAA vol. XXIII (2004), p. 23, para. 52. 
140 Ibid., para. 234. 
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but this analysis was carried out only in relation to Article 30(3) VCLT, to which I now 
turn. 
3.4. Article 30(3) VCLT in Arbitral Practice 
The conflict arguments in the context of Article 30(3) VCLT have been identical to the 
arguments raised under Article 59(1)(b) VCLT, so there is little point in repeating them in 
detail.141 The most common argument is that intra-EU BIT arbitration clauses breach, first, 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ to preside over disputes involving questions of EU 
law, and, second, that the clauses breach the principle of non-discrimination as the 
nationals of the contracting states alone are able to bring claims under BITs. Another 
central component of these two arguments was that the EU accession of the new member 
states triggered the conflicts and that it was the tribunals' obligation to decline jurisdiction 
under the lex posterior rule. Given the tribunals' previous dismissal of similar arguments in 
relation to Article 59 VCLT, it was predictable that most tribunals quickly rejected 
arguments based on Article 30(3) VCLT.142 The Eureko and EURAM awards contain 
lengthier analyses of the conflict arguments on Article 30(3) VCLT, and it is useful to 
discuss them in more detail, as this will pave the way for the discussion in Chapter 4 which 
adopts the perspective of EU law. The Eureko arbitration is also interesting because the 
Slovak Republic appealed the tribunal's decisions before German courts, and in March 
2016 the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) decided to submit preliminary questions to the ECJ on 
the Dutch-Slovak BIT's compatibility with EU law. 
 
As already noted, in respect of discrimination, the Eureko tribunal repeated the advice that 
the solution is to extend the applicability of the arbitration clause (and presumably the 
                                                
141 For references, see above footnotes 121-124.  
142 Article 30(3) was not discussed in the Binder award and since the award is the only available document it 
is unknown whether the respondent invoked it in the first place. In Eastern Sugar, the tribunal noted that the 
Slovak Republic had made an argument under Article 30(3) VCLT, but no substantial analysis of the 
argument followed (see Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, paras. 178-180). The Oostergetel & Laurentius 
tribunal held that Article 30(3) VCLT was irrelevant because the general requirement that two successive 
treaties must relate to the subject matter was not satisfied (see Oostergetel & Laurentius award, supra note 
109, para. 104). The WNC Factoring tribunal followed endorsed the Eastern Sugar tribunal's approach by 
noting that the 'fact that the BIT affords certain rights not available to other EU investors does not make the 
BIT discriminatory; there is nothing in the BIT that prevents investors of other states claiming equal rights 
under the BIT.' See WNC award, supra note 110, para. 309. Finally, the Anglia Auto and Busta tribunals held 
that the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ is not threatened when the tribunals decide the disputes brought 
before them, because the latter interpret and apply the relevant BITs and not the articles of the TFEU. See 
Anglia Auto award, supra note 112, para. 127 and Busta award, supra note 111, para. 127. 
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protection standards) to cover all EU investors.143 The tribunal also referred to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ (under Article 344 TFEU) over disputes between member 
states concerning the interpretation and application of EU law, but held that this article has 
no relevance for disputes between private parties and member states.144 More generally, 
the tribunal held that 'no rule of EU law prohibits' arbitration under member state BITs; on 
the contrary, investor-state arbitration and other types of arbitration are prevalent across 
the EU, with the ECJ having rendered judgments on how arbitral tribunals should take 
account of EU law.145 As a conclusion, there was no incompatibility in the meaning of 
Article 30(3) VCLT. The Slovak Republic challenged the tribunal's decision on 
jurisdiction before German courts.146 After an unsuccessful appeal before Frankfurt's 
Oberlandesgericht,147 the Slovak Republic seized the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), but as the 
Eureko tribunal had rendered its final award prior to the BGH proceedings, the latter held 
that Slovakia’s request for relief had become inadmissible.148 The Slovak Republic 
challenged the final award on similar grounds before the Court of Appeal, but the 
Oberlandesgericht rejected Slovakia’s arguments on broadly similar grounds as in the 
previous decision.149 Again, the Slovak Republic appealed and in March 2016 the BGH 
decided to submit preliminary questions to the ECJ on the compatibility of the Dutch-
Slovak BIT's arbitration clause with EU law.150  
 
                                                
143 Eureko award, supra note 74, paras. 266-267. 
144 Ibid., paras. 276 and 282. The Electrabel tribunal made a similar point (see Electrabel S.A. v. The 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability 
(hereinafter Electrabel award, 30 November 2012, paras. 4.150-4.151). 
145 Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 274. The tribunal referred to Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time 
Ltd v. Benetton International NV, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
146 Frankfurt was the seat of the Eureko arbitration and German law constituted the lex loci arbitri. 
147 See decision of the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, 26 SchH 11/10, 10 May 2012. Available (in 
German) at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0931.pdf (accessed 14 January 
2017). In a nutshell, the Court of Appeal found that investor-state arbitration did not come within the scope 
of Article 344 TFEU; that national courts can review the EU law compatibility of the decisions of arbitral 
tribunals and, when necessary, submit preliminary questions to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU (in other 
words, the court held that decisions of arbitral tribunals do not escape the preliminary ruling procedure, at 
least in Eureko like circumstances); that the arbitration clause may violate Article 18 TFEU (i.e. the principle 
of non-discrimination), but such finding does not invalidate the BIT’s arbitration provision, but obliges the 
contracting states to extend BIT protections to all EU investors; Article 30(3) VCLT was also irrelevant 
because EU law does not prohibit investor-state arbitration and thus no incompatibility in the meaning of 
Article 30(3) exists (see pp. 15-25 of the judgment). 
148 See decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, III ZB 37/12, 19 September 2013, para. 8. The decision is 
available (in German) at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1606.pdf (accessed 
14 January 2017). 
149 See decision of the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, 26 SchH 3/13, 18 December 2014. The 
decision is available (in German) at http://www.lareda.hessenrecht.hessen.de (accessed 14 January 2017). 
150 Bundesgerichtshof, Beschluss I ZB 2/15 vom 3. März 2016 in dem Verfahren auf Aufhebung eines 
inländischen Schiedsspruchs (hereinafter Eureko referral). 
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More specifically, the BGH asked whether 'eine Schiedsklausel in einem unionsinternen 
BIT mit dem Unionsrecht und insbesondere mit Art. 344, 267 und 18 AEUV vereinbar 
ist.'151 The BGH noted that the ECJ's existing case law does not provide sufficient certainty 
on the matter, but in the decision concerning the submission of the preliminary questions, 
the BGH came to endorse the approach of the arbitral tribunals. I will discuss the BGH's 
decision in detail in Chapter 4, so at this point it suffices to summarize some of its main 
arguments. As to the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ under Article 344 TFEU, the BGH 
argued that it does not affect arbitration under intra-EU BITs, in particular because 
investors have no similar right to demand compensation from member states under EU 
law.152 This implies that the BGH views the arbitration clause as complementing EU 
remedies, which is analogous to the reasoning of (e.g.) the Eastern Sugar tribunal. As to 
the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article 267 TFEU, the BGH rejected the 
argument that the inability of arbitral tribunals to submit preliminary questions to the ECJ 
threatens the uniform interpretation of EU law (which is the object and purpose of Article 
267 TFEU). The BGH reasoned that member state courts can ensure that arbitral awards 
are compatible with EU law at the enforcement stage by reviewing the award by 
themselves or by using the preliminary ruling mechanism. The BGH drew an analogy 
between commercial and investor-state arbitration. The ECJ has held that the effectiveness 
of commercial arbitration requires that arbitral awards are assessed only to a limited extent 
to ensure their compatibility with EU law and that arbitral awards should be annulled only 
in exceptional circumstances. For the BGH, the same basic principles should apply in 
respect of investor-state arbitration as well.153 On Article 18 TFEU, the BGH noted that 
                                                
151 This and the following quotes are from the press release which summarizes the preliminary questions and 
the BGH's stance on them. See Bundesgerichtshof, Mitteilung der Pressestelle, 'Bundesgerichtshof legt 
Europäischem Gerichtshof Fragen zur Wirksamkeit von Schiedsvereinbarungen in 
Investitionsschutzabkommen vor', Nr. 81/2016 (10.5.2016), Beschluss vom 3. März 2016 - I ZB 2/15. The 
press release is available at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de (accessed 14 January 2017). 
152 The BGH reasoned: 'Das an die Mitgliedstaaten gerichtete Gebot des Art. 344 AEUV, Streitigkeiten über 
die Auslegung und Anwendung der Unionsverträge allein durch die dort vorgesehenen Verfahren zu regeln, 
schließt nach Auffassung des Bundesgerichtshofs nicht aus, eine Streitigkeit zwischen einem Unternehmen 
und einem Mitgliedstaat vor einem Schiedsgericht auszutragen. Insbesondere sehen die Unionsverträge kein 
gerichtliches Verfahren vor, in dem ein Investor Schadensersatzansprüche geltend machen kann, die ihm aus 
einem unionsinternen BIT gegen einen Mitgliedstaat erwachsen.' 
153 According to the BGH: 'Die einheitliche Auslegung des Unionsrechts, die Art. 267 AEUV gewährleisten 
soll, kann im Schiedsverfahren dadurch sichergestellt werden, dass vor einer Vollstreckung das staatliche 
Gericht die Vereinbarkeit des Schiedsspruchs mit dem Unionsrecht überprüft und bei Zweifeln über die 
Auslegung einer unionsrechtlichen Vorschrift die Sache dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union vorlegt. 
Diese Prüfungsbefugnis besteht zwar nur bei grundlegenden Bestimmungen des Unionsrechts, die für die 
Erfüllung der Aufgaben der Union und insbesondere für das Funktionieren des Binnenmarkts unerlässlich 
sind, und deshalb zur öffentlichen Ordnung (ordre public) zählen. Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union 
hat dies jedoch bei Schiedssprüchen in Streitigkeiten zwischen Privaten als zulässig angesehen, weil die 
Erfordernisse der Effizienz des Schiedsverfahrens es rechtfertigten, Schiedssprüche nur in beschränktem 
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arbitration clauses may constitute prohibited discrimination, but the solution is not 
necessarily their inapplicability, but the extension of their scope of application to cover all 
EU investors; again, this is very much in line with the arbitral tribunals' view on the 
matter.154 In sum, the BGH did imply that in case of conflict EU law would prevail over 
the BIT, but it also saw that the two treaties did not relate to the same subject-matter 
(without, of course, referring to the VCLT), and that there is no reason to treat investor-
state arbitration differently from commercial arbitration, with the ECJ having ruled that the 
latter is clearly compatible with its own jurisdiction. Chapter 4 will address the analogy 
between commercial and investment arbitration, and will also analyze the other central 
arguments of the BGH.  
 
In EURAM, the tribunal first analyzed whether BIT arbitration clauses breach the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the ECJ as provided for in Article 344 TFEU. Perhaps it is useful to quote 
the full text of the article at this point, and it reads as follows:  
 
'Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those 
provided for therein.' 
 
The tribunal maintained that Article 344 TFEU 'does not provide for an absolute monopoly 
of the ECJ over the interpretation and application of EU law'.155 Given its plain wording, 
the tribunal reasoned, investment arbitration does not come within its scope and neither 
does EU law contain any other provisions that would either prohibit or conflict with BIT 
arbitration clauses.156 The argument that the ECJ's interpretive monopoly is not absolute 
was propped by a number of factual and legal considerations. First, the tribunal noted that 
                                                                                                                                              
Umfang auf die Vereinbarkeit mit Unionsrecht zu überprüfen und die Aufhebung eines Schiedsspruchs oder 
die Versagung seiner Anerkennung nur in außergewöhnlichen Fällen vorzusehen. Der Bundesgerichtshof 
möchte bei Schiedsverfahren zwischen einem privaten Unternehmen und einem Mitgliedstaat keine anderen 
Maßstäbe anwenden.' 
154 In the words of the BGH: 'Allerdings könnte die Schiedsklausel des BIT gegenüber Investoren anderer 
Mitgliedstaaten, die kein Schiedsgericht anrufen können, eine Diskriminierung im Sinne von Art. 18 Abs. 1 
AEUV darstellen. Das hätte aber nicht zwangsläufig zur Folge, dass sich die Antragsgegnerin nicht auf die 
Schiedsklausel berufen könnte. Nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Union wird 
eine Dritte diskriminierende Vorteilsgewährung regelmäßig dadurch beseitigt, dass die benachteiligten 
Personen Anspruch auf die gleiche Behandlung wie die begünstigten Personen haben. Diesen Dritten müsste 
also gegebenenfalls bei Streitigkeiten mit der Antragstellerin in gleicher Weise Zugang zu einem 
Schiedsgericht gewährt werden.' 
155 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 248. 
156 Ibid., paras. 255-259 
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courts and tribunals operating outside the Union regularly interpret and apply EU law, for 
example in commercial disputes, and the ECJ has no means to ensure that these 
interpretations conform with its case law.157 Second, although member state courts are 
either authorized or obliged to submit questions to the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU, they 
retain some element of discretion as to whether to resort to the preliminary ruling 
mechanism, which creates the possibility of misinterpretation and misapplication of EU 
law.158 Third, commercial arbitration is a commonplace within the EU, and the ECJ is 
excluded from reviewing arbitral awards when the parties comply with an award or when 
the competent national court considers it unnecessary to submit preliminary questions.159 
Fourth, when arbitral proceedings take place within the EU, the ECJ has repeatedly held 
that commercial arbitral tribunals have an obligation to apply 'fundamental' EU law 
(therewith sanctioning their existence), and the central case to which the tribunal referred 
concerned a commercial arbitration, the seat of which was in the Netherlands.160 Moreover, 
as the EURAM tribunal's seat was Stockholm, the parties could appeal its decisions before 
Swedish courts, which in turn could seek preliminary ruling from the ECJ on relevant 
questions of EU law. The tribunal also noted that if member states' courts were to enforce 
arbitral awards that violate EU law, the Commission may start infringement proceedings 
under Article 258 TFEU, which ensures the integrity of the EU legal order in all possible 
scenarios.161 As a last point, the tribunal noted that investor-state tribunals have regularly 
interpreted and applied EU law 'without [this] raising any problems', and the Maffezini 
arbitration was referred to as an example.162  
 
                                                
157 Ibid., para. 251. The tribunal used the example of a commercial dispute between a European and 
Argentinian company brought before an Argentinian court. See also Electrabel award, supra note 144, para. 
4.149. 
158 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 252; for a similar point, see Electrabel award, supra note 144, para. 
4.148. According to the settled case law of the ECJ 'it is solely for the national courts…to determine in the 
light of the particular facts of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to 
deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court '. See Case C-373/95, 
Gazzetta et al., ECLI:EU:C:1997:348, para. 26. 
159 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 256. 
160 Idem., footnote 263 (as in Eureko, the tribunal referred to the Eco Swiss case, see supra note 145). 
161 Ibid., para. 264. 
162 Ibid., para. 266. See Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, 13 November 
2000, para. 69. The claimant investor argued that he was entitled to be compensated for the costs of an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) made in connection with a construction project. The EIA was 
mandated by an EEC directive and by Spain's national law, and the tribunal held that the claimant was well 
aware that he was obligated to carry out an EIA prior to commencing the project. Hence, the tribunal treated 
the Directive as evidence (i.e. as a fact) only and not as part of applicable law. Chapter 4 discusses 
extensively the 'roles' that EU law may have in investment arbitration. 
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To sum up, the tribunal held that the ECJ has no power to control all contexts where EU 
law is interpreted and applied, but there is always a way to involve the Court at the post-
award stage, ultimately through the Commission if the latter finds that compliance with an 
award violates EU law. It is useful to note that, as the EURAM tribunal pointed out, there 
are instances where member state courts and the ECJ are excluded from reviewing how 
arbitral tribunals have interpreted and applied EU law. To give an example, national courts 
cannot (in principle) review the contents of ICSID awards or submit related preliminary 
questions to the ECJ, and as the Eureko tribunal observed, the ECJ cannot become 
involved in arbitrations taking place and enforcements of awards transpiring outside the 
EU. If in such cases a member state refuses to comply with an award and the investor 
seeks enforcement within the EU, national courts have limited possibilities to review the 
award or refer preliminary questions concerning the tribunal's treatment of EU law, and 
this topic is addressed in Chapter 5. It is also noteworthy that neither the parties nor the 
EURAM tribunal addressed directly the autonomy of the EU legal order, but focused solely 
on the BIT's compatibility with Articles 258 and 267 TFEU. These articles relate to 
specific cases where national courts and the Commission can seize the ECJ to ensure that 
EU law is interpreted correctly and that member states comply with EU law. The more 
principled question of whether arbitration clauses breach the autonomy of the EU legal 
order as a matter of EU law is not, arguably, addressed exhaustively through a discussion 
of these two articles. As to Article 344 TFEU, the EURAM tribunal held that it has no 
relevance for member state BITs as it only relates to disputes between member states. 
Conversely, the Commission has argued that Article 344 TFEU reflects a more general 
principle under which member states are not authorized to conclude treaties, which create 
dispute settlement mechanisms under which questions of EU law may be raised. Chapter 5 
will address the scope of Article 344 TFEU. 
 
In its discussion on discrimination, the EURAM tribunal relied heavily on the claimant's 
expert whose point of departure was that discrimination 'is an internal EU law problem and 
not an issue of treaty compatibility'.163 The logic was that even if intra-EU BITs 
discriminate between EU investors, this cannot affect the applicability of the arbitration 
clause, because it is up to the Commission to take action against the discriminating 
member states.164 The tribunal also cited the Eastern Sugar and Eureko awards when 
                                                
163 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 270 (quoting the opinion of Reinisch). 
164 Idem. 
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instructing EU investors to 'seek enforcement' of the BIT rights they are not entitled to.165 
Another suggestion was that EU investors are able to utilize the relevant BIT by 
structuring their investments so as to qualify as investors under it. After all, investors enjoy 
freedom of establishment within the EU internal market.166 The tribunal also drew 
inspiration from the D v Inspecteur case, which concerned the Dutch-Belgium double 
taxation treaty, and claimed that the judgment is relevant in the intra-EU BIT context.167 
The D v Inspecteur case concerned a Dutch wealth tax allowance granted to non-resident 
Belgian citizens in the Dutch-Belgium treaty, which the claimant, a German citizen 
owning property in the Netherlands, was not entitled to utilize. The ECJ held that Mr. D 
was not in a situation equivalent to non-resident Belgian citizens, which meant that the 
different treatment resulting from the bilateral tax treaty was not discriminatory. By 
analogy, the EURAM tribunal claimed that EU investors from other member states are not 
in the same situation as the BIT parties' investors and that the arbitration clause is thus 
non-discriminatory.168 The D v Inspecteur case and other findings of the tribunal will be 
discussed extensively in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
To summarize, arbitral tribunals have produced a jurisprudence constant, under which 
intra-EU BITs are compatible with EU law. Some tribunals have recognized that 
arbitration clauses may breach the principle of non-discrimination, but this problem is 
resolved by extending their scope of application to cover all EU investors. Such solution 
finds some support in the case law of the ECJ, and in Chapter 4 I discuss whether its 
application is plausible in the BIT context. As to the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ, the 
tribunals saw that the Court's jurisdiction is not absolute but subject to (de jure and de 
facto) exceptions, with the Court's jurisprudence on commercial arbitration applying with 
equal force in respect of investment arbitration. What also undercuts the 'exclusive 
jurisdiction' argument, though the tribunals did not refer to this, is that in most cases EU 
law had no bearing on the investors' causes of action. For example, in IP Busta, the 
question was whether the actions of the Czech Police breached the fair and equitable 
treatment standard of the Czech-UK BIT. The claimants were UK citizens who had formed 
a joint venture with a Czech company, and the latter had moved (or stolen) certain goods 
owned by the claimants, which the local police later seized and returned to Messrs. Busta 
                                                
165 Ibid., paras. 270-272. 
166 Ibid., para. 273. 
167 Case C-376/03, D v Inspecteur, ECLI:EU:C:2005:424.  
168 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 278. 
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and Busta. The claimants alleged that the police had not returned all of the goods and had 
also failed to make an itemized list of the goods 'as required by Czech law'.169 This 
allegedly breached the BIT's protection standards and the claimants sought compensation 
in the amount of 2.4 million euros. In WNC Factoring, the claimant argued that the Czech 
Republic had, inter alia, provided 'misleading and inaccurate information' about a state-
owned company, which the claimant had acquired through a public tender process.170 The 
investment turned out to be a disaster, and the claimant argued that Czech authorities had 
withheld vital information during the due diligence process preceding the acquisition.  
 
In neither case was any question of EU law raised on the merits, and the short case 
descriptions available at UNCTAD's database testify that the same holds true with a high 
number of other claims raised under intra-EU BITs. This indicates that in many intra-EU 
arbitrations the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ (or the uniform interpretation of EU law) 
are not under threat, and conflict arguments that rely on Article 344 TFEU will appear 
immaterial in such circumstances. Of course, the member states have to respect the internal 
market freedoms and the principle of non-discrimination even in areas that are not subject 
to EU harmonization, but domestic policy may comply with these cornerstones of EU law 
and still breach BIT standards as the above case examples testify. Similarly, in each case 
the tribunal's seat was in a member state, which supported the argument that the tribunals' 
decisions were subject to (however limited) review by member state courts and the ECJ. 
3.5. Conclusion and a Prelude to the Question of Values 
and Interests 
In retrospect, the conflict arguments had little chance of convincing the tribunals as the 
surrounding political and legal landscape pointed in the opposite direction. The 
Commission recognized that EU accession had had no effect on the validity or 
applicability of intra-EU BITs and neither had the Commission raised the matter at any 
point on its own initiative, 171with the Czech government's 2006 letter taking the 
                                                
169 Busta award, supra note 111, para. 6. 
170 WNC award, supra note 110, para. 101. 
171 For this view, see Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 187 (the Commission noted that EU member states 
'should terminate' intra-EU BITs, but also acknowledged 'that neither party appears to have taken any 
decisive step formally to terminate this BIT.' Further, the Commission acknowledged that the 2003 Act of 
Accession did not contain 'any intention of the parties to abrogate earlier intra-EU BITs', which meant that in 
the Commission's eyes the Dutch-Slovak BIT was not 'implicitly terminated or suspended by virtue of Article 
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Commission staff by surprise. A related point raised by some tribunals was that the ECJ 
had not rendered a relevant judgment on intra-EU BITs;172 for example, having rejected 
the conflict arguments, the WNC Factoring tribunal noted that the ECJ might eventually 
adopt a 'different view' on the matter.173 The respondent states' failure to take formal action 
to terminate the relevant BITs also spoke in volumes against the argument that the parties 
had entertained a relevant intent (implied or express) over the relationship of the treaties 
prior to or upon their EU accession. That the treaties governing EU accession provided no 
such evidence on party intent either, further supported this conclusion.  
 
The political context of the conflict arguments was expressly referred to in most awards. 
For example, the Binder tribunal noted that the question 'whether measures should be 
envisaged to terminate intra-EU BITs…has given rise to some debate within the EU but 
has not been finally settled even as a policy matter to this date.'174 In Eastern Sugar, the 
tribunal observed that the Commission had not started 'infringement proceedings against 
the Netherlands and the Czech Republic', or against other member states for failing to 
terminate their mutual BITs.175 Similarly, the Oostergetel & Laurentius tribunal noted that 
the Slovak Republic 'has not implied that at any point in time there had been an effort on 
either part of Slovakia and the Netherlands to terminate or re-negotiate the BIT'.176 The 
view of old member states that intra-EU BITs cause no problems for EU law was also 
invoked a number of times, so as to accentuate the 'weakness' of the respondents' conflict 
                                                                                                                                              
59(1)' of the VCLT.); the EU Commission’s amicus curiae brief in US Steel, supra note 124, para. 19 (the 
Commission noted that it 'is common ground that no provision of the Europe Agreement, the Treaty on 
Accession or the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly terminates or suspends the operation of the [Dutch-Slovak] 
BIT.'). However, in the state aid decision concerning the Micula award, the Commission argued that intra-EU 
BITs 'are contrary to Union law, incompatible with provisions of the Union Treaties and should therefore be 
considered invalid'. This, of course, is an internal EU law argument and is explained by its context. See 
Micula state aid decision, supra note 5, para. 128. 
172 The Oostergetel & Laurentius tribunal noted that the 'Dutch-Slovak BIT was not terminated upon 
Respondent's accession to the EU and therefore the EC Treaty is not an obstacle for this Tribunal to settle the 
present dispute under the applicable BIT. This is especially so considering the absence of any conclusive 
position of the EC or the ECJ on this question' (emphasis added). Oostergetel & Laurentius award, supra 
note 109, para. 109 
173 WNC award, supra note 110, para. 311. 
174 Binder award, supra note 107, para. 64. 
175 Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, para. 121. The tribunal also noted (in para. 122) that 'neither the 
Czech Republic nor the Netherlands, nor anybody else, did file a complaint to the European Commission 
against the Netherlands and the Czech Republic and other members in similar position, concerning their 
failure to comply with EU Law by leaving their BITs in place'. Likewise, in para. 155, the tribunal noted that 
'the Netherlands and the Czech Republic still list their BIT as one of the international treaties to which they 
are a Party'.  
176 Oostergetel & Laurentius award, supra note 109, para. 84. See also Anglia Auto award, supra note 112, 
para. 116 ('the Tribunal notes that the parties to the BIT, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom [have] 
never sought to terminate the BIT following the procedures set out by that instrument.'). 
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arguments.177 The Commission also took part in some of the proceedings on the invitation 
of the tribunals, and some of its observations were not necessarily conducive to the 
argument it was making. In Eureko, for example, the Commission noted that the 
'arguments in favour of maintaining an investor-State arbitration mechanism for intra-EU 
BITs are not persuasive from an internal EU law perspective.'178 This amounts to 
recognizing that such internal perspective is by and large immaterial in an international law 
context, and some of the respondent member states were less than impressed by the 
Commission's intervention.179 Of course, the Commission did start infringement 
proceedings in respect of intra-EU BITs, but only in 2015, and such proceedings do not 
necessarily change the position of arbitral tribunals vis-à-vis conflict arguments. As the 
Eastern Sugar tribunal put it, 'the answer to the [conflict] questions raised must be given 
by judicial authorities, which clearly excludes the European Commission'.180 
 
On top of these considerations, the disputing parties, the Commission and hence the 
tribunals used much energy on the question of whether BITs and EU law relate to the same 
subject-matter in the meaning of Articles 30 and 59 VCLT. While it is unnecessary to go 
into the details of the matter, it is important to note that the question of subject-matter is 
closely tied to the question of treaty conflict. If EU law and BITs are understood as relating 
to different subject-matters, then it is intuitively more plausible to find that there is no 
conflict between them either. For the tribunals, a central distinguishing factor between 
BITs and EU law was the ability of investors to bring claims against the host state. This 
fact was raised again and again by the tribunals both in their analysis of the question of 
subject-matter and the question of treaty conflict. Such remedy, they reminded, is not 
available under EU law, and the fact that the EU has not legislated in the area of 
investment protection (in part for want of competence) also supported the perception that 
BITs and EU law are distinct species. The tribunals emphasized that the BIT's arbitration 
clause 'is the best guarantee that the investment will be protected against potential undue 
infringements by the host state', with EU law not providing 'such a guarantee'.181 This fact 
alone was 'sufficient to reject the…argument' that EU law and BITs relate to the same 
                                                
177 See e.g. Oostergetel & Laurentius award, supra note 109, para. 108. 
178 Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 179.  
179 The Slovak Republic (as respondent) politely noted that 'the Commission did not examine in depth the 
question of incompatibility of the BIT and EU law [in its written observations]'. Ibid., para. 200. 
180 Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, para. 124. 
181 Ibid., para. 165. 
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subject-matter.182 Here are some other relevant excerpts: 'there is at least one fundamental 
distinction between' BITs and EU law which renders 'them incomparable: the EC Treaty 
provides no equivalent to one of, if not the most important feature of the BIT regime, 
namely, the dispute settlement mechanism providing for investor-State arbitration';183 'the 
TFEU does not address' investment protection 'at all' , and the tribunal 'is not convinced' 
that the…TFEU provisions are substantive equivalents of the provisions of the BIT, in 
particular in light of the absence of an important substantive protection in the TFEU, that 
of investors' access to an international and neutral dispute resolution forum in the form of 
international arbitration'.184 These descriptions are premised on a mental image where the 
relevant treaties are seen as operating in isolation of each other, with each treaty having a 
distinct sphere of application. 
 
Another distinguishing factor raised by a number of tribunals relates to the distinction 
between pre-establishment and post-establishment treatment of investments. The EURAM 
tribunal noted that the two treaties have 'a generally different approach', with EU law 
'being more focused on the pre-establishment period, and the BIT on the post-
establishment period'.185 The WNC Factoring tribunal, in turn, endorsed the idea that EU 
law is concerned with 'capital inflows and outflows', whereas BITs afford protection 'to 
investments whilst operating',186 and the Eastern Sugar tribunal echoed this by remarking 
that the relevant BIT provided protection 'during the investor's investment', while EU law 
'guarantees the free movement of capital'.187 In other words, in the tribunals' view EU law 
focuses on keeping member state borders open but is less interested in what happens 
within those borders as long as the member states comply with the principle of non-
discrimination and the internal market freedoms.188 EU investors are free to choose where 
to invest and choose the form of establishment (primary or secondary) according to their 
preferences, but post-establishment treatment of intra-EU investments is not similarly 
regulated under EU law. This is not to say that the internal market is not subject to dense 
regulation, but as the discussion in section 3.4. pointed out, many claims raised under 
                                                
182 Ibid., para. 180. See also WNC award, supra note 110 (paras. 298-300) where the tribunal quoted the 
Eastern Sugar and other tribunals with respect to the distinctiveness of BIT arbitration clauses. 
183 Oostergetel & Laurentius award, supra note 109, para. 77. 
184 Anglia Auto award, supra note 112, para. 116. 
185 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 180. 
186 WNC award, supra note 110, para. 305.  
187 Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, paras. 163-164. 
188 See WNC award, supra note 110, para. 305; Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, paras. 161, 163-164; 
EURAM award, supra note 83, paras. 180-182. 
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intra-EU BITs relate to purely domestic 'misconduct', and the scope and influence of EU 
law does not always extend to the quotidian practices of member state institutions. 
 
In sum, these differences support the perception that EU law and BITs operate in different 
ways and at different stages of the life-span of investments, have different subject-matter, 
and also differ in terms of the 'depth' of the protections they provide. Clearly, if EU law 
and BITs have different content and foci, and have no formal institutional relationship 
either, a commonsense corollary is that they are not in conflict either. It is also quite 
interesting that some of the tribunals confused the issues of subject-matter and treaty 
conflict,189 which backs the perception that analyzing the subject-matter of two treaties will 
influence the analysis of the attendant conflict arguments. As noted, the possibility of 
arbitration was described as a guarantee against undue interferences by the host state, and 
the tribunals emphasized that such neutral and effective remedy is not available under EU 
law or the domestic laws of the member states. Generally speaking, these characterizations 
create the impression that the tribunals understood BITs as being premised on similar type 
of considerations as international human rights treaties, with investors largely seen as the 
underdogs facing the risk of arbitrary behavior on the part of the host state once the 
investment is made. If human rights treaties strive to affect structural inequalities between 
individuals and state institutions, BITs strive to counterweigh such inequalities between 
investors and host states.190 As Judge Schwebel put it, the ability of the investor to bring 
direct claims should be seen against the fact that host states have 
 
'many means, legal and not, for bringing pressure to bear upon the foreign 
investor. The government has not only the police power; it has the police. It 
can bring the weight of its bureaucracy, and its politicians, to bear. It can 
prescribe, delay, decree, tax, incite, and strangle.'191 
 
Arbitrators are subject to various background influences which shape their view on the 
relative weight of different type of arguments. As human rights talk has become 
ubiquitous, it seems plausible to assume that the larger post-1945 idea concerning the 
                                                
189 This is a problem that plagued in particular the analysis of the Eureko tribunal. See Eureko award, supra 
note 74, paras. 231-277. 
190 This is the argument of Brower and Schill, although they do not refer expressly to human rights when 
making it. See Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law', supra note 18, p. 478 
191 Stephen M. Schwebel, 'The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral Investment treaties', 32 Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review (2009), pp. 263-269, at 268. 
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relationship of the state and the individual has affected the understanding that arbitrators 
have of BITs, alongside other similar background influences. To argue that investment 
protection has a link to the ideational continuum whose origins stretch back to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, if not much further back in time, may be a 
provocative statement, but the point is that in many situations foreign investors have to 
operate in an unpredictable political environment where the risk of interference by public 
authorities is real, and this resembles the situation of individuals facing arbitrary treatment 
at the hands of state authorities. Likewise, as is the case with a number of human rights 
courts, the state is invariably the respondent and never the claimant in investment 
arbitration, and the state's behavior is assessed solely in light of international legal 
standards as provided by the applicable BIT. Property rights are also an integral part of 
what is commonly referred to as first-generation human rights, and in many investment 
arbitrations the claimant has argued either that the host state's actions violated other core 
human rights such as the right to a fair trial, or constituted a political witch hunt aimed at 
ousting the investor from the host state. For example, in Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, the 
tribunal's analysis of the claimant's fair and equitable treatment argument 'relied 
extensively - and almost exclusively' - on international human rights law, in particular on 
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights dealing with the right 
to a fair trial.192 In Biloune v. Ghana the claimant investor had been detained, held in 
remand without charge, and later on exiled, whereas in Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of 
the Congo the claimant's business premises were raided, documents were confiscated, and 
some of his employees imprisoned.193  
 
These cases provide support to the argument (or perception) that small- and medium-sized 
investors 'make up a large part of the claimants in contemporary investment-treaty 
arbitration'.194 Many of the arbitrations where conflict arguments were raised also supports 
this argument as the claimant investors ranged from Mr. Binder, a German national who 
had formed a Czech company to provide forwarding services, to a Dutch couple who had 
invested in a Slovak Bank through a public tender offer, and to brothers Busta (UK 
                                                
192 See Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. The Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Final Award, 
15 December 2014. The quote is from Lorenzo Cotula, 'Human Rights and Investor Obligations in Investor-
State Arbitration', 17 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2016), pp. 148-157. 
193 Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v. Ghana, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 27 
October 1989; Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Award, 9 
February 2004. 
194 Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law', supra note 18, p. 481. 
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citizens) who owned a wholesale business of automobile parts and accessories in the Czech 
Republic. While investing in a foreign country is not equivalent to setting up a small 
business in one's native country, the argument about small- and medium-sized investors 
strives to draw a parallel between the rationale of human rights treaties and investment 
treaties. As Brower and Schill note, BITs are important in particular for small- and 
medium-sized investors who, unlike large multinationals, lack the 'necessary market 
strength and bargaining power to negotiate [BIT-]comparable protection mechanisms'.195 If 
the human rights movement strives to protect those who lack a basic social and economic 
safety-net, BITs strive to protect those economic actors who fall to the cracks of local 
remedies and whose cause their home state refuse to take up in the form of diplomatic 
protection (a much weaker remedy to begin with).  
 
The human rights analogy and other arguments for investment treaties and arbitration are 
analyzed in Chapter 6. The following two chapters look at the conflict arguments from the 
perspective of EU law and strive to answer, inter alia, the following questions: are BIT 
arbitration clauses compatible with the principle of non-discrimination? Do they breach the 
autonomy of the EU legal order? What is the relevance of Article 344 TFEU and the ECJ's 
case law on commercial arbitration in this regard? I also provide some preliminary remarks 






                                                
195 Idem. 
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4. The Principle of Non-Discrimination: Treaty 
Conflict or an Internal EU Law Problem?  
4.1. General Remarks 
In June 2015, the Commission started infringement proceedings against five member states 
because of their refusal to terminate their mutual BITs.196 The Commission threatened to 
start similar proceedings against the other member states as well, and in the press release 
concerning the proceedings, the Commission argued that by conferring 'rights on a bilateral 
basis to investors from some Member States only', intra-EU BITs lead to nationality-based 
discrimination which is prohibited under EU law.197 Conversely, as Chapter 3 discussed, 
arbitral tribunals have either rejected the discrimination argument or suggested that 
                                                
196 These states are Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden. As regards these proceedings, 
the only publicly available document is the Commission’s letter (see supra note 77) to the Swedish 
Government and the latter's response, parts of which will be discussed in the following. In September 2016, 
the Commission informed that it had sent formal requests (i.e. reasoned opinions under Article 258 TFEU) to 
the five member states, requesting them to terminate their intra-EU BITs. Out of the member states that have 
concluded a large number of intra-EU BITs, Italy is the only one to have terminated its existing treaties. For 
background information on this, see Jarrod Hepburn and Luke Eric Peterson, 'Italy is the EU's model citizen, 
when it comes to following the European Commission demands to terminate intra-EU investment treaties', 
IAReporter News, 2 June 2015. There have been some other notable developments as well. In April 2016, 
Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands issued a Non-Paper, in which they proposed the 
conclusion of an investment protection agreement between all EU member states, which agreement would 
replace all pre-existing intra-EU BITs. See 'Intra-EU Investment Treaties. Non-paper from Austria, Finland, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands', submitted to the Trade Policy Committee, 7 April 2016. However, the 
proposal has little chance of success, also because a number of member states have expressly stated that they 
plan to terminate intra-EU BITs. For example, in September 2016, the President of Romania submitted a 
draft legislation to the Romanian parliament under which Romania's 22 intra-EU BITs are terminated, and in 
March 2017, the Romanian parliament adopted a bill which 'cancelled' these treaties. It is unclear whether 
this latter development implies that Romania has sent notifications to the other parties to the effect that 
Romania wishes to terminate the BITs in accordance with the procedure they outline (or whether it means 
something else). See Markus Burgstaller and Agnieszka Zarowna, 'Romania to terminate its intra-EU 
Bilateral Investment Treaties', Hogan Lovells ARBlog, 29 September 2016. Available at 
http://www.hlarbitrationlaw.com/2016/09/romania-to-terminate-its-intra-eu-bilateral-investment-treaties/ 
(accessed 14 January 2017). See also 'Indepth: Where we are in the intra-EU BIT saga', Borderlex news 
portal, 5 April 2017. Available at http://borderlex.eu/in-depth-where-we-are-in-intra-eu-bit-saga/ (accessed 
16 May 2017, requires subscription). Likewise, in February 2016, Poland announced that it plans to 
terminate its intra-EU BITs because it 'has reached a "level of democracy" that guarantees its courts are free 
from political influence'. See Marta Waldoch and Maciej Onoszko, 'Poland plans to cancel bilateral 
investment treaties with EU', Bloomberg Markets, 26 February 2016. Available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-25/poland-seeks-to-end-bilateral-investment-deals-with-
eu-members (accessed 14 January 2017). Finally, in 2016 the Czech Republic and Romania made official 
notifications to Poland in respect of their mutual BITs. As a consequence, the two BITs were terminated with 
immediate effect and without the application of sunset clauses. See Marcin Orecki, 'Bye-bye BITs? Poland 
reviews its investment policy', Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 31 January 2017. Available at 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/01/31/bye-bye-bits-poland-reviews-investment-policy/ (accessed 1 
February 2017). 
197 EU Commission press release, ‘Commission asks member states to terminate their intra-EU bilateral 
investment treaties’, IP/15/5198, 18 June 2015. 
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discrimination is remedied by extending BIT rights to all EU investors. The matter is of 
course more complex than these two general arguments imply.  
 
The first question is what form of discrimination member state BITs bring about - who 
discriminates against who - and the second what legal consequences flow from a finding of 
discrimination as a matter of EU law and international law. The discrimination articles in 
primary EU law are highly general, which means that the case law of the ECJ is central to 
understanding the scope of the non-discrimination principle and the forms of remedy that 
may come into play under EU law. What might complicate matters is that the scope and 
content of the non-discrimination principle varies to an extent from one fundamental 
freedom to the next, and the findings of the ECJ may only be relevant in relation to a 
particular freedom or in the specific circumstances of the case. BITs relate to the free 
movement of capital, freedom of establishment, and freedom to provide services, but it 
suffices that they fail to pass the discrimination test in relation to just one of these. In other 
words, when an EU investor has made an investment in another member state, he has 
utilized the fundamental freedoms and is entitled to equal treatment in that member state. 
The purpose of the following discussion is to look at the general building blocks of the EU 
non-discrimination regime and to analyze cases that commentators and arbitral tribunals 
have invoked in the context of member state BITs.  
4.1.1. Primary Law Provisions 
Article 18 TFEU stipulates that 'any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited'. This general rule is supplemented by a number of provisions in sections 
dealing with the fundamental freedoms. For example, Article 45(2) TFEU states that 
freedom of movement for workers 'shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of the Member States'. The general prohibition of 
discrimination extends to all four fundamental freedoms even though some of the relevant 
TFEU provisions contain no explicit references to the term 'discrimination'.198 Article 18 
TFEU applies when a matter falls within the scope of EU law but there is no specific 
                                                
198 By way of an example, Article 63 TFEU, which prohibits restrictions on capital movements and 
payments, does not refer to discrimination, but non-discrimination nonetheless applies also in this area. See 
e.g. Steffen Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of 
Protection in EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 115-116; Alexander Honrath, Umfang und 
Grenzen der Freiheit des Kapitalverkehrs. Die Möglichkeiten zur Einführung einer 
Devisenzwangsbewirtschaftung in der Europäisvhen Union (Nomos, 1998), p. 64. 
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discrimination provision in primary law that could be invoked.199 One could also refer to 
Articles 20 and 21 of the Fundamental Rights Charter. The former provides that 
'[e]veryone is equal before the law', whereas Article 21 establishes a more general 
principle of non-discrimination.200  
 
At the outset, it is useful to note that BITs typically promise national treatment and most-
favored nation treatment to the contracting states' investors. When a foreign investor from 
state B invests in the territory of state A, the latter is obligated to treat the investor in the 
same manner as its own or any third country investors, and the 'best' available treatment 
applies. This means, in principle, that third state investors with which the member states 
have concluded BITs are entitled to the beneficial treatment accorded to nationals and 
companies of the member states within the internal market. To prevent this, most BITs 
contain so called Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO) clauses, which 
provide that the contracting states are not obliged to grant to investors of the other party 
‘the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege by virtue of any existing or 
future…free trade area, customs union, common market, economic and monetary union or 
regional economic integration agreement'.201 While there is variation in the content of 
REIO clauses, in most cases they effectively exclude preferential treatment based on EU 
law from the scope of BITs.202 However, this chapter is not concerned with the non-
discrimination rules of BITs, but with the relevant EU law rules and their implications for 
member state BITs.  
 
To further delimit the scope of the discussion, it is useful to say a few words on the 
TFEU's freedom of establishment provisions. Article 54 TFEU provides that companies 
established in accordance with the laws of a member state are to 'be treated in the same 
way as natural persons who are nationals of' member states. Article 55 TFEU, in turn, 
provides that member states have to grant the same treatment to nationals of other member 
                                                
199 See e.g. D v Inspecteur, supra note 167, para. 97 (footnote 52). 
200 See also Article 9 TEU under which the EU shall observe, in all its activities, the principle of the equality 
of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies'. Finally, 
equality is also one of the EU's foundational values in accordance with Article 2 TEU. 
201 See Article 7 of Agreement between the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Finland for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (SopS 18/2014). Available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3177 (accessed 24 April 2016). 
202 For some examples of REIO clauses, see Anca Radu, 'Foreign Investors in the EU - Which "Best 
Treatment"? Interactions between Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law', 14 European Law Journal 
(2008), pp. 237-260, at 247-249. 
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states 'as their own nationals as regards participation in the capital of companies or firms 
within the meaning of Article 54, without prejudice to the application of the other 
provisions of the Treaties'.203 These two provisions indicate that EU nationals can take part 
in the incorporation of a company in another member state, which is called primary 
establishment, or, alternatively, they can establish branches, agencies or subsidiaries in 
another member state, which is called secondary establishment. As to third state nationals 
(companies or individuals), Article 54 TFEU does not distinguish between companies on 
the basis of nationality of the owners. In other words, the article applies similarly to 
companies established in a member state, but which are owned by third state nationals. 
However, both the EU and the member states can provide different treatment to companies 
owned by nationals of the other member states and third states under specific primary law 
provisions.204 For example, Article 52 TFEU provides that the articles on freedom of 
establishment 'shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions…providing for special 
treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health'.205 Similarly, under EU law companies owned or controlled by third country 
nationals are often expressly excluded from receiving similar treatment as companies 
owned or controlled by nationals of member states. For example, Article 9 of the Decision 
No 1718/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council provides that 'enterprises 
which benefit from the programme shall be owned and shall continue to be owned, 
whether directly or my majority participation, by Member States and/or Member State 
nationals'.206 Similarly, participation in procedures awarding grants and contracts financed 
under EU external assistance is limited to companies of member states and companies of a 
number of other states depending on the type of financing instrument as outlined in 
Regulation 236/2014.207 Clearly, while EU law sanctions this type of discrimination, these 
                                                
203 The company's seat has the same function as nationality does for individuals, and the seat is the state (of 
incorporation) where the company has its registered office, central administration, or principal place of 
business. See e.g. Case C-330/91, Commerzbank AG, ECLI:EU:C:1993:303, para. 13. 
204 See e.g. Articles 51 and 52 TFEU. 
205 Emphasis added. Article 51 TFEU also provides that the European Parliament and the Council 'may rule 
that the freedom of establishment articles ’shall not apply to certain activities'. 
206 See Decision No 1718/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 
concerning the implementation of a programme of support for the European audiovisual sector (MEDIA 
2007), OJ L 327, 24.11.2006, pp. 12-29 (at 17, emphasis added). 
207 See Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union’s instruments for financing 
external action, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, pp. 95-108 (see esp. Arts 8-11). For other examples, see Ramon Torrent, 
'The Contradictory Overlapping of National, EU, Bilateral, and Multilateral Rules on Foreign Direct 
Investment: Who is Guilty of such a Mess?', 34 Fordham International Law Journal (2011), pp. 1377-1399, 
at 1377-1381; Radu, ‘Foreign Investors in the EU', supra note 202, at 252-253. 
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examples have no relevance to the question whether member state BITs breach the 
principle of non-discrimination as a matter of EU law.  
 
The relevant point is that when a company having its seat in member state B or third state 
C has established itself in member state A in pursuance of an investment either through 
primary or secondary establishment, and A has concluded BITs with B and C, the investors 
of B and C are entitled to treatment, which investors from other member states and third 
states are not entitled to.208 The national treatment obligation, read literally, requires that 
member states treat non-national investors on equal terms with domestic investors. To 
return to the example, since member state A grants BIT rights only to investors and 
investments originating from member state B and third state C, but not to its domestic 
investors, the BITs cannot breach the national treatment obligation. However, when 
investors of B and C have established themselves in member state A through primary 
establishment, the incorporated company is considered a national of the latter under EU 
law, while under the BIT it may qualify as an investor of B or C. From this stems the 
argument that the BITs concluded with B and C discriminate against companies 
established in member state A, which are effectively owned or controlled by investors of 
other member states and third states (assuming they have not concluded BITs with A).209 
The question is if this latter approach is the 'best' way to bring member state BITs within 
the scope of the non-discrimination rules or whether the case law of the ECJ could support 
the argument that member state A has to extend BIT privileges to nationals of other 
member states and third states established therein on the basis of a most-favored-nation 
type of obligation. 
 
Generally speaking, the ECJ has held that discrimination takes place 'when two categories 
of (corporate or natural) persons, whose legal and factual circumstances are not 
fundamentally different, are treated differently and when situations which are not 
comparable are treated in the same way'.210 The Court has also held that 'similar situations 
                                                
208 The company's seat has the same function as nationality does for individuals, and the seat is the state (of 
incorporation) where the company has its registered office, central administration, or principal place of 
business. See e.g. Case C-330/91, R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. Commerzbank AG, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:303, para. 13. 
209 See Dimopoulos, 'The Validity and Applicability of International Investment Agreements', supra note 26, 
p. 83. 
210 Case C-431/01, Philippe Mertens v Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:2002:492, para. 32. Other cases where the 
Court has expressed this general principle include Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00, Omega Air, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:161, para. 79; Joined Cases C-128/03 and C-129/03, AEM and AEM Torino, 
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shall not be treated differently unless differentiation is objectively justified'.211 In some of 
the cases discussed below, the ECJ has analyzed in detail the comparability of two 
situations, whereas in other cases the comparability of two situations has been assumed, as 
the parties or the Court have not engaged with the issue. Prima facie, the only 
distinguishing criterion in terms of enjoyment of BIT rights is the nationality of investors, 
which is strictly prohibited, but the question of whether the situation of investors 
established in a member state can be considered comparable in relation to enjoyment of 
BIT rights will be analyzed below. In terms of presentation, I will first summarize each 
case and then make some general observations about its relevance for member state BITs, 
but the more general analysis and conclusions are saved to the end.  
4.2. The Case Law 
4.2.1. Matteucci, Gottardo and Open Skies 
The Matteucci case concerned a bilateral treaty in the area of cultural cooperation between 
Belgium and Germany.212 This treaty provided for certain scholarships, the purpose of 
which was to enable Belgium and German nationals to study in the other contracting state. 
Nationals of other EU member states resident in either country were not eligible to apply 
for the scholarships. The claimant was an Italian living and working in Belgium and had 
applied for a scholarship to carry out vocational training in Berlin but was considered 
ineligible due to her nationality. In essence, the question before the Court was whether the 
provisions of the founding treaties and Regulation 1612/68, which dealt with free 
movement of workers within the EU, made Ms. Matteucci eligible to apply for the 
scholarships on similar terms as Belgium nationals. Regulation 1612/68 had specified the 
scope and content of free movement of workers. Article 7(2) stipulated that nationals of 
member states resident in another member state were to enjoy the same 'social advantages' 
as nationals of the latter.213 The Court referred to its previous judgment in which grants for 
vocational training were held as 'social advantages' in the meaning of Article 7(2), which 
                                                                                                                                              
ECLI:EU:C:2005:224, para. 58; Case C-137/00, Milk Marque, ECLI:EU:C:2003:429, para. 126. Hindelang 
notes that the Court’s approach to comparing situations is not consistent. See Hindelang, The Free Movement 
of Capital, supra note 198, p. 149.  
211 Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77, Ruckdeschel & Co. and Hansa-Lagerhaus Ströh & Co, 
ECLI:EU:C:1977:160, para. 7. 
212 Case 235/87, Matteucci v Communauté Francaise of Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1988:460. 
213 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community, OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, pp. 2-12. 
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brought the scholarships within the regulation's scope.214 The EC had no competences in 
the area of culture, which prompted the argument that 'the pursuit of legitimate objectives 
of bilateral cooperation in…[the cultural sphere] may not be frustrated by the development 
of Community law'.215 The ECJ disagreed, noting that the implementation of a cultural 
agreement between two member states cannot impede the application of EU law and, more 
specifically, that such agreement may not 'jeopardize the right of Community workers to 
equal treatment'.216 In other words, even though 'culture' was outside the scope of EU law, 
member states were not authorized to conclude bilateral cultural agreements leading to 
nationality-based discrimination of EU workers. 
 
There were two other arguments presented to the Court, which are relevant to the 
following discussion. During the national proceedings Belgian authorities had argued that 
the Regulation imposes obligations on the host member state (i.e. Belgium) 'only in respect 
of training provided in its own territory'.217 Thus, when the vocational training is carried 
out in the territory of another member state (i.e. Germany), Article 7 of the Regulation and 
the principle of equal treatment do not apply in respect Belgium.218 Likewise, the fact that 
the scholarships were awarded by a German authority on the basis of a list of candidates 
put together by Belgian authorities led to the argument that to impose obligations on 
Belgium that go beyond the treaty's scope would be unavailing, because German 
authorities remain bound by the provisions of the treaty and Ms. Matteucci does not 
qualify for the scholarship under its terms.219 In other words, even if Belgium adds Ms. 
Matteucci to the list of applicants, Germany has no choice but to disregard her application. 
As to the first argument, the ECJ held that Article 7(2) of the Regulation imposes a general 
obligation on member states to grant national treatment to workers of other member states 
established in the territory of another member state. Therefore, when a member state grants 
its national workers possibility of pursuing vocational training provided in another member 
state, 'that opportunity must be extended to Community workers established in its 
territory'.220 As to the second argument, the Italian government had made the claim that 
German authorities cannot 'refuse to respect the choice made by' Belgium authorities when 
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the latter has listed a non-Belgium applicant pursuant to Regulation 1612/68. Since the 
Regulation required Belgium to grant the same 'social advantages' to resident EU workers, 
German authorities 'may not prevent' Belgium 'from fulfilling the obligations imposed on it 
by Community law'.221 The Court concurred and saw the argument as a manifestation of 
the principle of sincere cooperation, which requires member states to 'ensure fulfillment of 
the obligations arising out of the Treaty', even when the bilateral agreement impeding the 
application of EU law concerned an area falling under the competence of the member 
states. 222 Further, in such situations member states have 'a duty to facilitate the application' 
of free movement of workers and to assist each other to that end.223 The conclusion was 
that a 'bilateral agreement which reserves the scholarships in question for nationals of the 
two Member States which are the parties to the agreement cannot prevent the application 
of the principle of equality of treatment between national and Community workers 
established in the territory of one of those two Member States'.224 
 
This construction allowed the Court to extend the national treatment obligation to cover the 
situation where a treaty between two member states provides for more favorable treatment 
of their respective nationals and where the treatment is actually accorded by the other 
member state (Germany), although the Court attributes the obligation first to Belgium and 
then to both parties. It seems incorrect to speak of national treatment when the treatment is 
not accorded by the beneficiary's home state but by the other contracting state under a 
bilateral treaty based on reciprocity. After all, if both Belgium and Germany had obligated 
themselves to grant scholarships to their respective nationals, then surely the scholarships 
given to nationals of Belgium reflect an obligation on the part of Germany to provide such 
'treatment' and vice versa. That the Court said that the scholarships flowed from the 
contracting states' mutual agreement is of course true, but such construction does little 
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justice to the reciprocal nature of the treaty. This approach creates an artificial façade over 
the original treaty configuration and creates what is in practical terms a most-favored 
nation type of obligation, though the invocation of the principles of loyalty and primacy of 
EU law enabled the Court to construe it as a national treatment issue. Translated into the 
member state BIT context, Matteucci supports the argument that member states have to 
cooperate to extend intra-EU BIT rights to all EU investors. Likewise, though member 
state A grants such benefits to investors of member state B, under the Court's construction 
the former also grants them to its own investors in member state B, bringing the benefits 
within the scope of the national treatment obligation. 
 
The Gottardo case dealt with a social security treaty concluded between Italy and 
Switzerland.225 While each member state has its own social security laws, the EU has some 
competences in the area as well.226 There was secondary legislation dealing with social 
security treaties, but its applicability to the case was unclear.227 The Court dodged the 
argument that the treaty did not become within the scope of Regulation 1408/71,228 and 
thus within the scope of EU competence, by relying directly on the principle of equal 
treatment of EU workers laid down in Article 45 TFEU. It noted that the 'question 
submitted in the present case is based on application of the principles flowing directly from 
the provisions of the Treaty',229 and then held that when member states conclude 
agreements, whether between themselves or with third states, they have to comply with 
their obligations under EU law.230 The social security treaty provided that working periods 
completed by Italian nationals in Switzerland were taken into account when their 
entitlement to Italian old-age pension was considered. Mrs. Gottardo was a French national 
resident in Italy and had worked successively in Italy, Switzerland and France. She applied 
for an Italian pension but since the periods of insurance completed in Switzerland were not 
taken into account (the Italy-Swiss treaty did not apply to her) due to her nationality, she 
did not 'achieve the minimum period of contributions required under Italian legislation for 
entitlement to an Italian pension'.231 Mrs. Gottardo argued that as a national of a member 
state resident in Italy she was entitled to a pension under the same conditions as Italian 
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nationals and that the periods of insurance completed in Switzerland had to be taken into 
account by Italian authorities.232 
 
The ECJ agreed and noted that Mrs. Gottardo was treated differently than Italian nationals 
on the sole ground of nationality and in contrast to Matteucci the Court relied, as noted, 
solely on Article 45 TFEU to find that the treatment of Mrs. Gottardo violated the principle 
of national treatment.233 Another difference with Matteucci was that the relevant treaty was 
concluded between a member state and a third country, which prompted the ECJ to 
consider the argument that the unilateral extension of the benefit to nationals of other 
member states by Italy could affect the rights and obligations of Switzerland under the 
treaty, which implied that Switzerland's consent might be necessary for the extension to 
take effect. However, the Court held that such unilateral extension created no problems in 
this regard as it would not compromise the rights of nor impose any new obligations on 
Switzerland.234  
 
Though the treatment stemmed from a bilateral treaty, it was less artificial to attribute it to 
Italy as Italian authorities granted that treatment to Italian nationals, even though this, 
presumably, hinged on a reciprocal treatment of Swiss nationals in Switzerland. Likewise, 
and similarly to Matteucci, the judgment did affect the original balance of the treaty (e.g. 
by increasing Italy's fiscal burden), but the Court held that such consequences 'cannot 
justify the Italian Republic's failure to comply with its Treaty obligations',235 also because 
the extension of the benefits to nationals of other member states did not affect the rights 
and obligations of Switzerland. In Gottardo, the Court did not dwell on the specifics of the 
question of competence, but relied directly on the free movement of workers provisions to 
bring the treaty within the scope of community law. Like Gottardo, intra-EU BITs concern 
an area of shared competence, and the treaties clearly come within the scope of the 
fundamental freedoms, even if no relevant secondary legislation exists.236 Whether 
Gottardo and Matteucci imply that BIT rights granted to third state investors in extra-EU 
BITs have to be extended to all EU investors was discussed in an analogous manner in the 
Open Skies cases, to which I now return. 
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The Open Skies cases dealt with a number of bilateral air transport agreements between the 
US and eight member states.237 The agreements provided that only carriers whose 
substantial ownership or effective control was in the hands of the member states or their 
nationals were eligible to acquire operating licenses from US authorities. The ECJ held 
that such clauses discriminated against EU carriers established in the eight member states 
but substantially owned or effectively controlled by nationals of other member states.238 As 
to the question of competence, the Court found that at least in relation to some of the 
provisions of the Open Skies treaties an external exclusive competence existed on the basis 
of specific secondary law acts, but the finding of discrimination appeared to stem, 
analogously to Gottardo, directly from primary law provisions on the freedom of 
establishment.239 As in Gottardo, the respondent governments claimed that the rights and 
obligations of the Open Skies treaties were based on reciprocity, and the air traffic rights 
granted by US authorities could not be extended to other EU carriers.240 More specifically, 
since US carriers could obtain operating licenses only in the member states with which the 
Open Skies agreements had been concluded, the extension of the beneficial treatment by 
the US to nationals of other member states would upset the balance of the treaty and the 
principle of reciprocity in particular. Another argument was that the alleged discrimination 
was attributable to the US, and not to the eight member states, since US authorities had 
exclusive jurisdiction to take decisions on the US operating licenses.241  
 
The ECJ rejected both arguments. As to the issue of reciprocity, the Court held that the 
freedom of establishment is unconditional and member states cannot maintain conflicting 
obligations, whatever their source.242 Likewise, discrimination did not originate in the 
decisions of US authorities but in the treaty provision on the ownership and control of 
carriers, which enabled them to take such decisions.243 As in Matteucci, the Court held that 
while the preferential treatment flowed from the ownership and control clauses, whose 
enforcement was in the hands of the US, that treatment was nonetheless accorded by the 
eight member states to their own nationals, bringing it within the purview of the freedom 
                                                
237 See e.g. Case C-467/98, Commission v. Denmark (Open Skies), ECLI:EU:C:2002:625.  
238 Ibid., paras. 131-132. 
239 Ibid., paras. 111-113. For an illuminating discussion on the complexity of the question of competence in 
the Open Skies cases, Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union, supra note 22, paras. 186-188. 
240 Open Skies, supra note 237, para. 119. 
241 Ibid., para. 120. 
242 Ibid., para. 134. 
243 Ibid., para. 132. 
 80 
of establishment rules.244 In contrast to Matteucci, but similarly to Gottardo, the Open 
Skies agreements were concluded with a third state so the Court could not invoke the 
principle of sincere cooperation nor rely on the primacy of EU law. Contra Gottardo, the 
unilateral extension of the treatment to all EU carriers by the concerned member states was 
not possible as its enforcement would have affected the rights and obligations of the US 
and required its acceptance and input. Thus, the Court merely held that the freedom of 
establishment had been violated and left it to the EU Commission and the concerned 
member states and the US to take necessary action.245 As in Matteucci, an obligation 
normally attributable to the 'host' state was attributed to the 'home' state, which enabled the 
invocation of the national treatment obligation.  
 
If member state BITs are discriminatory as a matter of EU law, then Open Skies is relevant 
to the extent that it introduces similar principles as Matteucci to the area of freedom of 
establishment: when a member state negotiates benefits for its own nationals in another 
state (whether in another member state as in Matteucci or in a third country as in Open 
Skies), those benefits are 'attributable' to the former even if it is only the latter that can 
effectuate them. In relation to extra-EU BITs, it is clear that member states cannot 
unilaterally extend BIT rights to other EU investors established in third states with which 
they have concluded BITs. The only option would be to engage in negotiations with the 
concerned third states. On the other hand, member states can extend BIT rights granted to 
third state investors under extra-EU BITs to EU investors established in their territories, as 
this has no impact on the rights and obligations of the third states in question. However, 
Open Skies suggests that this would not eliminate the problem of discrimination, because 
member states would still provide better treatment to their own nationals in the third states 
with which they have concluded BITs. Gottardo, Matteucci and Open Skies also 
demonstrate that although the circumstances of companies and individuals are not always 
comparable, similar non-discrimination principles may apply across the four freedoms.  
4.2.2. The Tax Cases 
Arbitral tribunals and commentators have also referred to a number of cases dealing with 
double taxation treaties in their analysis of the question of discrimination. Generally 
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speaking, direct taxation remains within the competence of the member states, although the 
EU has adopted a number of directives in the area of direct taxation. As to double taxation, 
with the exception of a single convention of limited relevance,246 the EU has not adopted 
any harmonizing measures for the elimination of double taxation. Article 293 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communities encouraged member states to conclude double 
taxation treaties, but the Lisbon Treaty repealed that provision. Yet such treaties remain 
crucially important, as the threat of double taxation creates a strong disincentive for the 
utilization of the internal market freedoms. Hence, member states are free to conclude 
double taxation treaties, and this includes the power to determine the criteria for the 
allocation of fiscal jurisdiction as between them.247 The qualification is that these 'direct 
taxation powers have to be exercised consistently with Community law'248 and any 
'discrimination by reason of nationality'249 is strictly prohibited. Taxation cases involving 
varied cross-border situations are very complex and their relevance to non-tax situations is 
not always clear, also because the question of comparability of the situation of national and 
resident taxpayers on the one hand, and resident and non-resident taxpayers on the other 
hand is more complex than the question of comparability in the above three cases. I will 
limit the discussion to those aspects of the cases that are relevant for present purposes.  
 
The EURAM tribunal invoked the hotly debated D v Inspecteur case concerning the 
relationship of EU non-discrimination rules and double taxation treaties.250 Relying on the 
ECJ's findings in that case, the EURAM tribunal claimed that EU investors established in a 
member state, but not entitled to protections under an intra-EU BIT concluded by that 
member state, are not in a comparable situation to EU investors protected by an intra-EU 
BIT and no discrimination takes place.251 This analogy requires critical analysis. D v 
Inspecteur concerned a Dutch wealth tax allowance granted to non-resident Belgian 
nationals (owning property in the Netherlands) under the Dutch-Belgium tax treaty. Dutch 
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tax legislation granted the allowance to non-residents if at least ninety percent of their 
assets were located in the Netherlands, but in the tax treaty the allowance was granted to 
all Belgians regardless of the percentage of their Dutch assets. The claimant was a German 
national not entitled to the allowance under Dutch law as his Dutch assets amounted to just 
ten percent of his combined assets. Mr. D argued that the refusal to grant the allowance to 
him constituted discrimination on the ground of nationality in respect of the provisions on 
the free movement of capital. The essential question was whether Mr. D and Belgians 
owning property in the Netherlands were in a comparable situation, both being non-
residents for the purposes of Dutch taxation and liable to similar wealth tax apart from the 
allowance.  
 
Against the suggestions of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, the Court held that Belgian and 
German non-residents having assets in the Netherlands were not in a comparable situation 
for the purposes of the tax allowance. Hence, the extension of the allowance to Mr. D was 
not called for. To understand the Court’s reasoning, the underlying framework of double 
taxation treaties requires elaboration. As noted, member states remain masters of direct 
taxation and may determine the connecting factors for the allocation of tax jurisdiction in 
double taxation treaties on various types of income. When such treaties are negotiated, the 
fiscal equilibrium established will reflect the specific features of national tax systems as 
well as the varied macroeconomic and political circumstances of the contracting states. 
Likewise, and for similar reasons, the balance of each double taxation treaty as regards the 
allocation of fiscal jurisdiction and the contents of priority of taxation rules will be 
different.252 This backdrop explains the Court’s holding that it is an 'inherent consequence' 
of bilateral double taxation treaties that the 'reciprocal rights and obligations' established in 
them 'apply only to persons resident in one of the two Contracting Member States',253 and 
the corollary that the wealth tax allowance 'cannot be regarded as a benefit separable from 
the remainder of the Convention, but is an integral part thereof and contributes to its 
overall balance'.254 From the same premise stemmed also the finding that 'a taxable person 
resident in Belgium is not in the same situation as a taxable person outside Belgium so far 
as concerns wealth tax on real property in the Netherlands'.255  
                                                
252 On this background, see Case C-374/04, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Test Claimants in Class 
IV of the ACT Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ECLI:EU:C:2006:139, paras. 94-95. 
253 D v Inspecteur, supra note 167, para. 61. 
254 Ibid., para. 62. 
255 Ibid., para. 61.  
 83 
In other words, in the absence of harmonizing taxation measures, EU law does not, as a 
rule, impose an obligation on the member states to harmonize the treatment of non-resident 
taxpayers, as this would encroach upon their competence to conclude double taxation 
treaties, which, by their very nature, entail disparities with respect to the treatment of non-
resident taxpayers.256 As this thesis was about to go to press, Advocate General Wathalet 
gave his opinion in the Achmea case.257 Similarly to the EURAM tribunal, he held that the 
Court's findings in D v Inspecteur apply, by analogy, in the intra-EU BIT context. In his 
view, 'that the reciprocal rights and obligations created by the [Dutch-Slovak] BIT apply 
only to investors from one of the two Contracting Member States is a consequence 
inherent in the bilateral nature of BITs', and from this followed the finding 'that a non-
Netherlands investor is not in the same situation as a Netherlands investor so far as an 
investment made in Slovakia is concerned'.258 Further, just as the wealth tax allowance in 
D v. Inspecteur, the arbitration clause is 'not a benefit separable from the remainder of the 
BIT, but is an integral part thereof to such an extent that a BIT without an ISDS 
mechanism would be pointless since it would not achieve its aim, which is to encourage 
and attract foreign investment'.259 Wathelet also supported the analogy by pointing to how 
double taxation treaties and BITs 'are aimed at the same economic activities, both the entry 
and the exit of capital', and that member states 'may attract the entry of foreign capital to its 
territory by affording a high level of legal protection to the investment in the context of a 
BIT and also by granting tax advantages'. Finally, he argued that similarly to double 
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taxation treaties, 'the reciprocity of the commitments given by the Member States is an 
essential ingredient of BITs'.260 
 
These comments of course assume that the purpose and contents of double taxation treaties 
are similar to investment treaties. Generally speaking, one could argue that double taxation 
treaties do not grant benefits (as BITs do), but create a web of taxation rules that allocate 
fiscal jurisdiction between the contracting states over different types of income. Likewise, 
domestic laws determine which tax breaks companies and individuals are entitled to and 
double taxation treaties simply lay out rules on which domestic law applies in a given 
scenario. Investment treaties, on the other hand, provide a prospective remedy for investors 
which allows them to challenge domestic policy measures before an arbitral tribunal. Each 
treaty may have an underlying equilibrium, but the equilibriums of double taxation treaties 
and BITs are clearly different. Moreover, had the Court decided that Mr. D was entitled to 
enjoy the allowance under the double taxation treaty, this would have created a most-
favored nation obligation in the area of direct taxation and allowed individuals and 
corporations to demand that they are entitled to treatment under a member state's double 
taxation treaty that is most favorable to them. In other words, as each member state has 
concluded a double taxation treaty with all the other member states, a most-favored nation 
obligation would effectively 'destroy' the respective equilibriums of the treaties. In 
Gottardo and Matteucci the purpose of the relevant treaties could not justify the different 
treatment, and in the latter the Court held that Italy could not justify the different treatment 
on the ground that it affected the original balance of the relevant treaty. Similarly, in 
Matteucci, for example, the treaty between Germany and Belgium was based on reciprocal 
rights and obligations, but this had no impact on the Court's finding on discrimination. 
Arguably, these two cases, or the Open Skies cases, could just as well be applied, by 
analogy, in the intra-EU BIT context.  
 
Wathelet also argued that there is no most-favored nation obligation under EU law, which 
supported his conclusion that by granting BIT rights only to Dutch investors, the Slovak 
Republic did not discriminate investors from other member states. In other words, EU law 
only requires that EU investors receive national treatment instead of treatment granted to 
nationals of other member states. Again, however, Matteucci and Open Skies suggest that 
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by concluding the BIT, the Netherlands is granting its investors BIT treatment in the 
Slovak Republic and vice versa, which implies that they are breaching the national 
treatment obligation. Similarly, D v Inspecteur implies that EU law does recognize a most-
favored nation obligation: if and when two companies are in a comparable situation, they 
have to be treated equally, and this extends to benefits granted in a treaty between two 
member states. This would also mean that it would be unnecessary to rely on the Court's 
construction in Matteucci and Open Skies where it transformed the most-favored nation 
treatment obligation into a national treatment obligation. Hence, arguably, Wathelet's 
reasoning is not entirely convincing as it ignores the Court's principal findings in the other 
relevant cases and fails to take into account the political context of D v Inspecteur. He also 
argued that a finding of discrimination would allow all EU investors to rely on intra-EU 
BITs by noting that the arbitration clause is 'not a benefit separable from the remainder of 
the BIT, but is an integral part thereof to such an extent that a BIT without an ISDS 
mechanism would be pointless since it would not achieve its aim, which is to encourage 
and attract foreign investment'. However, a finding of discrimination does not necessarily 
mean that the privileged treatment would need to be extended to all EU investors. The 
Court could simply declare that the treaties constitute discrimination without laying out 
what steps the member states should take so as to eliminate the incompatibility. 
 
There is another aspect to D v Inspecteur case that should be pointed out. In tax cases the 
distinction between resident and non-resident taxpayers is often decisive in terms of case 
outcomes. The term 'resident' refers both to nationals living in their state of origin as well 
as to non-nationals living and working in that same state. Mr. D had also claimed that even 
in the absence of the Dutch-Belgium tax treaty the wealth tax allowance had to be 
extended to him as he was entitled to similar treatment (i.e. national treatment) as Dutch 
nationals and nationals of other member states resident in the Netherlands. In other words, 
the argument was that non-resident and resident property owners were in a comparable 
situation. The Court again disagreed and held that Mr. D was not in a similar situation to 
Dutch property owners. In doing so, the Court relied on the Schumacker doctrine, which 
holds that in the area of personal income tax the situation of resident and non-resident 
taxpayers is not, as a rule, comparable.261 The rationale is that when the major part of the 
income or assets of non-residents is concentrated in their state of residence, it is the state of 
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residence which in the best position to 'assess the taxpayer’s overall ability to pay, taking 
account of his personal and family circumstances',262 which includes the granting of tax 
allowances. Conversely, in situations where non-residents receive the bulk of their taxable 
income from the state of employment, or when the bulk of their assets are located in 
another state, the state of residence 'is not in a position to grant…[them] the benefits 
resulting from the taking into account of…[their] personal and family circumstances'.263 In 
such circumstances there is no objective difference between residents and non-residents 
justifying their different treatment in relation to available tax benefits. As the property that 
Mr. D owned in the Netherlands formed just ten percent of his overall assets, the 
Schumacker doctrine applied and his situation was not comparable to Dutch property 
owners.264  
 
In contrast, in Gottardo and Matteucci the claimants were residents (though non-nationals) 
of the state from which they sought national treatment and they were entitled to that 
treatment even though its source was a bilateral treaty. In other words, the claimants were 
entitled to similar treatment as nationals because their lives were 'concentrated' in their 
state of residence, whereas Mr. D’s personal and economic interests were centered on 
Germany. The question that arises is not whether the distinction between resident and non-
resident taxpayers is transposable to the area of corporate taxation (it is) but whether the 
principle established in D v Inspecteur regarding the non-comparability of the situation of 
resident and non-resident individual taxpayers could be transposable to the situation of 
resident and non-resident companies and to non-tax situations more generally. Generally 
speaking, whether an investor opts for primary or secondary establishment is irrelevant to 
the question of whether his investment qualifies for protection under a BIT as the matter is 
resolved through other criteria.265 In both cases the investor's 'interests' may or may not be 
centered in another state than the host state, but as this distinction has no impact on the 
ability of investors to invoke a BIT, it cannot be used to make the argument that the 
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situation of investors who enjoy BIT protections and those who do not is non-comparable. 
In other words, both resident and non-resident investors can rely on BITs if they meet the 
other relevant criteria. 
 
The Test Claimants case is the second tax case raised in literature and it concerned a 
number of double taxation treaties concluded between the United Kingdom and other 
member states/third countries.266 Only some of these treaties granted a tax credit on 
dividends paid by UK companies to companies of the other contracting state. The question 
was if this different treatment of non-resident companies constituted prohibited 
discrimination in relation to the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital, 
that is to say, whether those provisions required that such treatment is extended to all EU 
companies receiving dividends from UK companies. Analogously to D v Inspecteur, the 
Court analyzed whether the 'non-resident companies concerned are in an objectively 
comparable situation',267 and its reasoning and conclusions were fundamentally similar. 
The tax credit was granted only in treaties where the dividends were liable to tax in the 
UK, but not in treaties where the dividends were not subject to a UK tax.268 Further, the 
UK tax rate varied (in particular) according to whether the tax treaty provided for a full or 
partial tax credit. Thus, there was a 'direct link' between the tax credit and the taxation of 
dividends by the UK; in other words, the tax credit was not granted when the treaties did 
not make the dividends liable to tax in the UK.269 Put differently, the balance of each 
double taxation treaty was different and reflected different ways of eliminating double 
taxation through different priority of taxation rules.  
 
After this, the Court repeated its findings in the D v Inspecteur case. The tax credit could 
not be 'regarded as a benefit separable' from the other provisions of the tax treaties as it 
was ‘an integral part’ of the treaties and contributed ‘to their overall balance’; second, the 
fact that the reciprocal rights and obligations, of which the tax credit was just one part, 
apply only to persons resident in the contracting member states 'is an inherent consequence 
of bilateral double taxation conventions'; and finally, a company resident in a member state 
which has a double taxation treaty with the UK not providing for the tax credit is not in a 
                                                
266 Case C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, ECLI:EU:C:2006:773. 
267 Ibid., para. 83. 
268 Ibid., para. 85. 
269 Ibid., para. 87. 
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similar situation to a company resident in another member state which has a double 
taxation treaty with the UK providing for the tax credit.270 As in D v Inspecteur, the non-
comparability of the situation of non-resident companies stemmed from the special 
characteristics of double taxation treaties, which implies that both cases are unfit for use in 
non-tax situations. 
 
Finally, Saint-Gobain concerned double-taxation treaties concluded by Germany with the 
Switzerland and the US respectively.271 Under the treaties, German resident companies 
were exempted from paying tax on dividends received from Swiss and US companies. 
Non-resident companies of other member states receiving such dividends through German 
branches or permanent establishments were not entitled to the exemption, placing them in 
a less favorable position in comparison to resident companies. The Finanzgericht of 
Cologne asked the ECJ if it is compatible with the freedom of establishment to not accord 
the exemption to the permanent establishment of Saint-Gobain (a French company) 
situated in Germany.272 If the two previous cases necessitated a comparison between the 
situations of non-residents, then Saint-Gobain required comparing the situation of resident 
and non-resident companies. The Court held that resident German companies and non-
resident companies having a permanent establishment in Germany were in objectively 
comparable situations because both were liable to tax in Germany in respect of the relevant 
shareholdings and dividends.273 The circumstances to be taken into account in the 
comparability assessment were thus limited to the national tax rules that applied to both 
resident and non-resident companies, which is quite different approach when compared 
with the circumstances taken account of in D v Inspecteur.  
 
The Court’s finding was similar to Commission v France where it had held that the non-
granting of certain tax benefits to French branches and agencies of companies whose seat 
was in another member state was discriminatory, because, apart from the benefits in 
question, those branches and agencies were placed on the same footing with resident 
companies for taxation purposes.274 The Court had also noted in that case that the national 
treatment obligation cannot be made 'subject to the contents of…[a double taxation] 
                                                
270 Ibid., paras. 88, 91-92. 
271 Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain v Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, ECLI:EU:C:1999:438. 
272 Ibid., para. 32. 
273 Ibid., paras. 48-49. 
274 Case 270/83, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:1986:37, para. 20. 
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agreement concluded with another member state', nor subject to 'a condition of reciprocity 
imposed for the purpose of obtaining advantages in other member states'.275 In other 
words, and in more general terms, if resident and non-resident companies are subjected to 
similar tax treatment in a member state, then that national treatment has to be extended to 
any and all tax privileges granted to resident companies, and the integrity and balance of 
double taxation treaties cannot preclude the extension of the benefits to non-resident 
companies as well. The Court’s approach in Saint-Gobain was analogous to Gottardo, as 
in both cases the treatment was provided by the home state and not by the other contracting 
state as in Matteucci and Open Skies.  
 
In Saint-Gobain, the argument was presented that if the tax exemption is extended to 
companies established in member states not parties to the double taxation treaties, the 
inherent balance of such treaties is upset. The Court held, as it had in Gottardo, that the 
'balance and reciprocity' of the treaties would not be affected by a unilateral extension of 
the exemption by Germany, 'since such an extension would not in any way affect the rights 
of the non-member countries [i.e. Switzerland and the US] which are parties to the treaties 
and would not impose any new obligation[s] on them'.276 Conversely, one can extrapolate 
that in case of intra-EU treaties such extension is required (at least in circumstances similar 
to Saint-Gobain) even if it disturbs the balance of the treaty and imposes new obligations 
on the other contracting party; as the Court noted in Matteucci, the principle of sincere 
cooperation and the primacy of EU law require that the contracting member states 
cooperate so as to provide national treatment to all EU nationals established in their 
territories. In relation to third country treaties the situation is different and member states 
would have to engage in negotiations with the third state to eradicate the discriminatory 
treatment, as was the case in the Open Skies cases, unless the discrimination can be 
eliminated by the member state without affecting the rights and obligations of the third 
country, as was the situation in Saint-Gobain. 
 
Before proceeding to analyze the implications of these cases for member state BITs, it is 
useful to repeat why the argument about the integrity of the fiscal equilibrium of double 
taxation treaties was decisive in D v Inspecteur and Test Claimants but not in Saint-
Gobain. In the former cases, it was the different treatment of non-residents of two or more 
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member states by another member state that was the crux of the matter, whereas Saint-
Gobain centered on the different treatment of resident and non-resident companies, which 
the Court found to be in a comparable situation. Further, national treatment arguments 
were raised also in D v Inspecteur and Test Claimants, and in the former national treatment 
was denied, because Mr. D was not in a similar situation to resident taxpayers. Though 
Test Claimants was a more complex case in this regard, there was no difference in the 
treatment of resident and non-resident companies in respect of the relevant dividends under 
UK tax law. Though direct taxation falls within the competence of the member states, the 
national treatment obligation applies in that area as well and cannot be made subject to the 
contents of double taxation treaties. Whatever the source from which national treatment 
flows, it has to be extended to non-residents if the latter are in a comparable situation to 
resident taxpayers. In sum, and arguably, the justifications for double taxation treaties are 
confined to the area of direct taxation.277 If double taxation treaties take account of a 
number of fiscal variables to establish an acceptable equilibrium as between the 
contracting states, the raison d'être of intra-EU BITs related to the general perception that 
investors from the old member states needed additional protection against the whims of 
domestic politics in the formerly socialist member states, which were unfamiliar with the 
economic, political and legal corollaries of the rule of law. Whether that perception holds 
true is discussed in Chapter 6. 
4.3. Implications of the Cases for the Question of 
Discrimination in the Context of Member State BITs  
Commentators have read the above cases in different ways. Tietje refers to D v Inspecteur 
and Test Claimants and argues that these constituted an outright rejection of any most-
favored nation obligation under EU law.278 Similarly, Dimopoulos makes the following 
conclusion on the basis of D v Inspecteur and Test Claimants: 'the different treatment 
provided by one Member State to nationals of other Member States as a result of the 
bilateral nature of intra-EU BITs is compatible with the principle of non-discrimination 
                                                
277 Cf. Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, 'Investment Arbitration and EU Law', 18 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies (2016), pp. 3-19, p. 9 (arguing that the ECJ has 'decided that the benefits of these 
conventions [i.e. double taxation treaties] don’t need to be extended to persons from other Member States. In 
particular, specific rules on the allocation of taxation powers cannot be regarded as a benefit separable from 
the remainder of the convention. They are integral parts thereof and contribute to their overall balance. In 
principle, a similar reasoning could be applied to BITs between Member States. Their specific benefits form 
part of an overall balance and therefore cannot be granted separately.'). 
278 Tietje, 'Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties between EU Member States', supra note 17, pp. 16-17. 
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under EU law and does not affect the validity or applicability of intra-EU BITs.'279 
Wehland also reads the cases similarly and finds that 'the fact that BITs grant advantages 
only to investors from selected Member States would not appear to be incompatible with 
EC law'.280 Conversely, Eilmansberger invokes Gottardo and Saint-Gobain, though both 
cases only dealt with national treatment, to make the sweeping statement that 'preferential 
treatment not only of own nationals but also of nationals of other Member States or third 
countries constitutes forbidden discrimination of other EU nationals'.281 
 
These statements gloss over important distinctions. Gottardo and Saint-Gobain were most 
clearly about national treatment, as the relevant treatment could have been accorded to the 
nationals of the member states in question even in the absence of the treaties. In Matteucci 
and Open Skies, the treatment was based on reciprocity and put into practice by the 
authorities of the other contracting state. However, the ECJ still held that the cases were 
about national treatment, as it attributed that treatment, in essence, to both contracting 
states. In D v Inspecteur and Test Claimants the tax benefits related to national treatment, 
but the relevant parts of the cases centered not on national treatment but on treatment 
granted in double taxation treaties to nationals of the other contracting state (but not to 
nationals of other member states which led to the MFN argument). That the ECJ did not 
require the extension of the tax benefits to nationals of other member states was not based 
on the non-existence of a most-favored nation obligation under EU law (as Dimopoulos 
and Tietje claim), but hinged on the finding that residents and non-residents were not in a 
comparable situations vis-à-vis the benefits in question, which, in turn, was premised on 
the special nature of double taxation treaties and the absence of EU legislation (and 
competence) in the area of direct taxation. In neither case did the Court address the issue of 
most-favored nation treatment head on. 
 
Perhaps it is useful to remind who is entitled to treatment flowing from a typical BIT. By 
way of example, Article 1(3) of the Finland-Bulgaria BIT holds that any natural person 
who is a national of either contracting state and any company incorporated in accordance 
with the laws of either contracting state and having its seat in the territory of the same 
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contracting state qualify as investors under the treaty and receive protection in respect of 
investments made in the territory of the other contracting state.282 If this definition is 
viewed from the perspective of Bulgaria,283 it is evident that investments made by 
investors of other member states than Finland, whether through a company incorporated in 
Bulgaria (but owned by nationals of other member states) or through secondary 
establishment, are not protected under the BIT. Leaving aside the fact that Bulgaria is party 
to a number of other intra-EU BITs, it is clear that the exclusion of other EU investors 
from the scope of BIT treatment places them in a less favorable position, as they cannot 
resort to arbitration to challenge Bulgarian measures affecting their investment. The same 
general observation applies in relation to other intra-EU BITs, although the scope of 
protected investors and investments vary to some extent from one treaty to the next.284 In 
this way, it would appear that intra-EU BITs discriminate between EU investors, both in 
relation to the freedom of establishment (some EU companies are treated more favorably 
than others) and free movement of capital (some EU capital movements are treated more 
favorably than others). To substantiate the argument that BIT protection standards 
constitute more favorable treatment than EU law treatment standards would require some 
effort, but the possibility to have recourse to arbitration clearly constitutes more favorable 
treatment.285 I will now look more closely into the above cases to see if they support this 
general finding of discrimination in relation to intra-EU and extra-EU BITs, after which I 
look at whether valid counter-arguments exist and whether the different treatment could be 
justified on other objective grounds. 
 
                                                
282 Article 1(3) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of 
the Republic of Bulgaria on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Sops 50/1999). 
283 One can raise a number of questions about the scope of this definition. If interpreted literally it would 
exclude companies incorporated and having their seat in Bulgaria, though owned by Finnish companies or 
individuals. Neither is it clear whether it covers third country investors investing in Bulgaria and operating 
through a company incorporated and having its seat in Finland. Likewise, what about Bulgarian investors 
operating through a Finnish parent company and investing in Bulgaria through a local subsidiary? For 
general analyses of such questions, see Markus Burgstaller, 'Nationality of Corporate Investors and 
International Claims against the Investor’s Own State', 7 Journal of World Investment and Trade (2006), pp. 
857-881; Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), pp. 221-236.  
284 It seems clear that the argument could be made that intra-EU BITs discriminate as between the investors 
covered under them, because the standards of protection and the arbitration options vary from one treaty to 
the next. This topic is not addressed in the discussion. 
285 Of course, if the treaties did not contain arbitration clauses they could still constitute discrimination on the 
ground that only some EU investors could invoke the (presumably more favorable) protection standards 
before national courts (though the direct effect of international agreements is subject to various conditions 
under national legal systems).  
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It is also useful to remind which state bears the obligation for providing BIT treatment. To 
use the above example, commonsense dictates that it is only Bulgaria that it is obligated to 
provide BIT treatment to qualified investments in its territory, but the Court’s creative 
reasoning in Matteucci and Open Skies points to a different conclusion. Matteucci dealt 
with free movement of workers and Open Skies freedom of establishment, but both cases 
appear, in principle, to be transposable to the BIT context. By analogy, Finland and 
Bulgaria are obligated to grant BIT treatment to all EU investors established in either 
member state on the ground of the principle of non-discrimination, and they have to assist 
each other to this end under the principles of sincere cooperation and primacy of EU law. 
Since the obligation is mutual, it is unnecessary to dwell on the national/most-favored 
nation treatment issue. Following the Court’s logic, Finland accords the BIT treatment to 
its own nationals in Bulgaria and is obligated to grant that treatment to EU investors 
established in its territory, and Bulgaria is required to cooperate to that end (i.e. it has to 
grant that treatment to all EU investors) and vice versa. Admittedly, this construction is 
somewhat 'engineered' because only a small percentage of EU investors established in 
Finland have an investment in Bulgaria or are planning to invest therein.  
 
This issue relates to another argument of the EURAM tribunal, namely, that if investors 
from other member states wish to enjoy intra-EU BIT treatment, they can utilize the 
internal market freedoms and structure their investments so as to receive that treatment, 
which makes the question of discrimination redundant.286 In Saint-Gobain the French 
parent company, Saint-Gobain SA, would have received the tax benefit if it had set up a 
subsidiary instead of a branch in Germany, as the former is a resident company under 
German law. The ECJ held that the different treatment of subsidiaries and branches 
restricted 'the freedom to choose the most appropriate legal form for the pursuit of 
activities in another member state', which was conferred to economic operators in Article 
49 TFEU. This finding overrules, indirectly, the EURAM tribunal’s argument, and the 
more general implication is that the limitation of BIT treatment to nationals of the 
contracting states can also be viewed as a restriction to the freedom of establishment as it 
reduces the attractiveness of, say, Bulgaria in the eyes of non-Finnish EU investors.287 On 
the other hand, the existence of discrimination, too, can be viewed as generally restricting 
                                                
286 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 273. 
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the creation of an integrated internal market, in addition to restrictions flowing from 
divergent treatment of specific forms of establishment. 
 
In the three tax cases the distinction between resident and non-resident taxpayers played a 
central role. BITs make no distinction between forms of corporate establishment. The most 
common form through which investments are made is a subsidiary, which qualifies as a 
resident company for taxation purposes. Branches, agencies and permanent establishments 
are considered non-resident companies and are subject to limited taxation only. If the tax 
cases are analyzed against this background, none of them dealt with the specific situation 
created by intra-EU BITs, which grant preferential treatment to non-resident and resident 
companies owned by nationals of a given member state in another member state to the 
exclusion of other EU companies, including those of the host state. Saint-Gobain set the 
principle that resident and non-resident companies in a comparable situation have to 
receive equal tax treatment. From D v Inspecteur flows the principle (argumentum e 
contrario) that when non-resident individual taxpayers are in a comparable situation, they 
have to be treated on equal terms. Test Claimants set the principle that when non-resident 
corporate taxpayers are in a comparable situation, they have to be treated on equal terms. 
Tax cases may be based on sui generis doctrinal constructions, but at the same time the 
Court's findings support the applicability of the non-discrimination principle in the 
situation of intra-EU BITs as well. When member states provide more favorable treatment 
to companies of another member state, then clearly the distinction between non-resident 
and resident companies cannot be invoked to claim that only one or the other of these 
categories is entitled to particular benefits. There is no rationale for such differentiation 
and it could also be challenged on the ground that it constitutes a restriction on the freedom 
of establishment, as the Court reasoned in Saint-Gobain. Moreover, if Saint-Gobain 
reflects the idea that resident and non-resident companies have to be treated on equal 
terms, then it can only mean that when a member state grants benefits to resident and non-
resident companies owned by nationals of another member state, that treatment has to be 
accorded to all EU companies established in that state, regardless of the form of 
establishment.  
 
As to the most-favored nation issue, Hindelang argues for a most-favored nation obligation 
in the context of free movement of capital and notes that such 'an interpretation also seems 
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to find sufficient support in systematic and teleological considerations'.288 Having 
discussed D v Inspecteur, he invokes Article 350 TFEU, which sanctions 'the existence or 
completion of regional unions' between the Benelux countries 'to the extent that the 
objectives of these regional unions are not attained by application of the Treaties'. The 
purpose of Article 350 TFEU is to enable 'the three member countries concerned to apply, 
in derogation from the Community rules, the rules in force within their Union in so far as it 
is further advanced than the common market'.289 From this Hindelang makes the e 
contrario argument that in the absence of other provisions permitting the application of 
more advanced market rules between certain member states only, member states appear 
'not to be entitled to grant specific benefits to' one or more member states or to their 
nationals.290 Ergo, benefits reserved for nationals of some member states only constitute 
discrimination. Yet, contra Hindelang, as Article 350 TFEU sanctions more developed 
internal market rules, a plausible argument is that it allows member states to apply such 
rules in their mutual relations even in the absence of specific authorization. If intra-EU 
BITs are perceived as catalysts for cross-border investments due to the privileged 
treatment they provide, then surely their contents qualify as being, in the ECJ's words, 
'further advanced' than the equivalent internal market rules. This would mean that the 
continued existence of intra-EU BITs is justified on the ground that they serve, ultimately, 
an essential Existenzberichtigung of the EU, namely, the peace through trade dictum as 
they contribute to 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe'.291 But this argument 
is highly tentative and Article 350 TFEU awaits to be raised in practice in this manner. 
Hindelang also assimilates national and MFN treatment on the basis that both stem 'from 
the idea of equal treatment of economic activities and non-discrimination in cross-border 
situations'.292 If the purpose of the non-discrimination provisions is to create a level 
playing field between economic actors within the internal market, an 'internal' MFN 
obligation can only be consistent with such purpose.293 This is a plausible argument. 
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To summarize, the six cases under discussion indicate that arbitration clauses in both intra-
EU and extra-EU BITs constitute prohibited discrimination under EU law. As to extra-EU 
BITs, it is relatively easy to make the argument that their arbitration clauses actually 
breach the national treatment principle. The Open Skies is most directly relevant, because it 
concerned benefits granted in third state treaties based on reciprocity, and the ECJ held that 
it was the eight member states that conferred the benefits to their own nationals in the third 
country, although the actual decisions, by which the benefits were conferred to EU 
nationals, were taken by the authorities of the latter. Analogously, and Matteucci can also 
be invoked here, the Court’s logic in Open Skies means that BIT rights accorded to EU 
investors in extra-EU BITs by third states are also granted by the member state parties, 
implying that the treaties violate the national treatment obligation. While the 
Grandfathering regulation sanctions the continued existence of extra-EU BITs under 
certain conditions, and while it is unlikely that the Commission will raise the 
discrimination issue in respect of extra-EU BITs, in strictly legal terms the treaties are 
problematic from the perspective of the non-discrimination rules. Before discussing what 
the legal implications of a finding of discrimination are (both under EU law and 
international law), I will address the issue of competence as it has the potential of 
complicating the above conclusions.  
4.4. The Issue of Competence 
Some commentators have made the argument, related to Article 350 TFEU, that as the 
object and purpose of intra-EU BITs is to increase cross-border capital flows, it is difficult 
to maintain that they 'contravene the TFEU capital freedoms'.294 This view, in turn, relates 
to the argument that as the internal market is an area of shared competence, member states 
remain free to conclude intra-EU BITs in the absence of BIT equivalent legislation, on the 
condition that the treaties respect the fundamental freedoms of the internal market.295 
Member states have not taken cue from such advice, but the question of competence 
                                                
294 Rumiana Yotova, 'The New EU Competence in Foreign Direct Investment and intra-EU Investment 
Treaties: Does the Emperor Have New Clothes?', in Freya Baetens (ed.), Investment Law within International 
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requires some elaboration. Without going into details, the division of competences varied 
considerably in the above cases. Matteucci and the three tax cases concerned areas over 
which the member states had competence, whereas the EU had at least some competences 
in the areas that Gottardo and Open Skies dealt with. In Open Skies the freedom of 
establishment provisions applied in the area of air transport, though the specific division of 
competences was a complex matter. As to the tax cases, the EU's competences over direct 
taxation are highly limited, but when member states exercise their direct taxation powers, 
they have to comply with the non-discrimination rules. In Matteucci the Court relied on 
secondary legislation to bring the scholarships within the scope of the fundamental 
freedoms, but in Gottardo the primary law provision on the free movement of workers was 
invoked directly as the applicability of the relevant regulation was unclear.296 It is clear 
that EU law does not provide for, inter alia, fair and equitable treatment, nor allows 
investors to resort to arbitration against the member states. In the absence of BIT 
equivalent secondary legislation, could one argue that member states are free to uphold the 
treaties and limit their application to their respective nationals (with the support of Article 
350 TFEU) as long as they respect the fundamental freedoms? The answer is no. Matteucci 
demonstrated how the principle of non-discrimination applied fully even in an area of 
exclusive member state competence and in respect of intra-EU treaties related to such area.  
 
As to extra-EU BITs, in Opinion 2/15 the ECJ held that investment protection, to the 
extent it relates to non-direct investments, and investment arbitration fall within a 
competence shared between the EU and the member states.297 This indicates that member 
state parliaments have to ratify EU agreements containing provisions on investment 
protection and arbitration before they can enter into force. What implications does this 
have for extra-EU BITs? The Grandfathering regulation was adopted in 2012 and it was 
                                                
296 With respect to Matteucci, Klamert makes the curious argument that the principle of 'loyalty extended a 
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297 There were some additional FDI issues that remain an area of shared competence, but it is necessary to 
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based on the assumption that extra-EU BITs had come 'under the Union's exclusive 
competence' with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.298 On the other hand, it also 
provided that member states have to 'eliminate incompatibilities' from extra-EU BITs, and 
left the Commission's powers under Article 258 TFEU intact in respect of such 
incompatibilities. However, it seems clear that the Commission will not raise the issue of 
discrimination for political reasons, and the main purpose of the Grandfathering regulation 
is to allow extra-EU BITs to remain in force, even if their provisions may conflict with EU 
law. That member states are obligated to eliminate conflicting provisions from extra-EU 
BITs is a truism, but this obligation should be seen against the broader political context. 
Extra-EU BITs are perceived as important (in particular) for the protection of outbound 
investments of the old member states, and the Commission has no interest in challenging 
them under the principle of non-discrimination, also because investment protection and 
arbitration has been a central part of the EU's own investment policy. In this light, whether 
extra-EU BITs breach the principle of non-discrimination is an academic concern. 
Moreover, the question of how the EU's competences in a given area affect the status of 
treaties concluded between member states and third states that relate to that area is riddled 
with uncertainty and complexity. Given this, and given the political context of extra-EU 
BITs, I will only make some tentative comments on the basis of the Open Skies judgments. 
 
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had some investment related 
competences (for example, over trade in services) and it had also adopted a number of 
investment related secondary acts, some of which dealt with third state companies as 
well.299 The EU Council also had the power to impose restrictions on investment related 
payments under a number of primary law arguments.300 However, these competences did 
not extend to FDI in general, or to investment protection in particular, as the EU had no 
general powers to legislate on matters typically covered by BITs. In Open Skies, the Court 
held that the EU had an exclusive external competence with respect to some of the 
provisions of the agreements concluded between a number of member states and the US. 
This exclusive competence stemmed from the provisions of two regulations, which were 
adopted before the Open Skies agreements were concluded, and which included provisions 
dealing with the same subject-matter as the Open Skies agreements. This EU competence 
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Agreements', supra note 94. 
300 See Articles 64(2), 66, 75 and 215 TFEU. 
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meant that by concluding the agreements, the member states in question had breached the 
principle of sincere cooperation as well as the relevant regulations. In an area of exclusive 
EU competence, member states are allowed to take action only if the EU authorizes them 
to do so.  
 
The Court also made a finding of discrimination with respect to the freedom of 
establishment, but this finding was not expressly connected to the question of competence 
- but were the two findings connected? In other words, was it necessary to establish the 
existence of an exclusive external competence vis-à-vis parts of the Open Skies agreements 
in order to make a finding of discrimination? And related, if the two findings were 
connected in the suggested manner, did the nature of the EU's competence (exclusive) play 
a role? In the judgment concerning the UK, the Court held that application of what is now 
Article 49 TFEU 
 
'in a given case depends, not on the question whether the Community has 
legislated in the area concerned by the business which is carried on, but on the 
question whether the situation under consideration is governed by Community 
law. Even if a matter falls within the power of the Member States, the fact 
remains that the latter must exercise that power consistently with Community 
law. Consequently, the claim by the United Kingdom that the Community has 
not legislated on air transport outside the Community, even if substantiated, is 
not capable of rendering Article 52 of the Treaty inapplicable in that sector.'301 
 
This excerpt, which is replicated almost verbatim in the other judgments as well, could be 
read in two ways. First, the reference to member state competence could imply that when 
member states conclude treaties with third states, they have to respect, without exception, 
the principle of equal treatment vis-à-vis EU nationals even if the EU has no competences 
over the subject-matter of the treaties. Second, the Court held that even if the EU had not 
'legislated on air transport outside the Community…[this would not be] capable of 
rendering Article 52 of the Treaty inapplicable in that sector'. This could be read as 
implying that it is necessary that internal legislation exists for the principle of non-
discrimination to apply vis-à-vis member states' extra-EU treaties governing the same area 
                                                
301 See Case C-466/98, Commission v United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2002:624, paras. 41-42. 
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as internal legislation. In other words, once the EU has legislated in an area, treaties 
between member states and third states falling in that area come within the scope of the 
principle of non-discrimination.302 It is also noteworthy that the existence of exclusive 
external competence in Open Skies was not connected to a finding of discrimination in 
another way: discrimination stemmed from the ownership and control clauses of the Open 
Skies agreements, whereas the exclusive external competence stemmed from EU law 
provisions dealing with computerized reservation systems, which were also regulated in 
the Open Skies agreements. In other words, the finding of discrimination related to 
provisions of the Open Skies agreements over which the EU appeared to have no 
competences. This supports the first reading of the Open Skies agreements, that is, the 
reading where it is not necessary that EU legislation/competence exists in a given area for 
third state treaties to come within the scope of EU law in relation to the non-discrimination 
rules. When transposed to the BIT context, this would mean that it does not matter that the 
EU had no competence over FDI (including investment protection) before the Lisbon 
Treaty, as extra-EU BITs breached the principle of non-discrimination as of their 
respective dates of conclusion. 
 
Generally speaking, to hold that it is irrelevant whether or not the EU has adopted 
legislation or has any competences in a given area for the principle of non-discrimination 
to become relevant vis-à-vis treaties between the member states and third states seems an 
overly categorical position. Such strict approach would imply that the member states' 
ability to conclude treaties with third states in areas falling within their competence is 
severely undermined, given also the typical reciprocal nature of such treaties. In sum, it is 
not entirely certain what the undergirding logic of the Court's finding of non-
discrimination was in the Open Skies judgments. Depending on how the Court's approach 
is understood, one could argue that since extra-EU BITs create a situation of direct 
discrimination on the basis of nationality between investors from different member states, 
they breached the principle of non-discrimination in the context of freedom of 
establishment already before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This argument 
could be based on two distinct assumptions: first, on the assumption that extra-EU BITs 
                                                
302 Another question is whether it was necessary that there was a substantive equivalence between the 
regulations and the relevant provisions of the Open Skies treaties on the basis of which the EU had an 
exclusive competence. Put differently, if both the Open Skies treaties and the regulations had not contained 
provisions on computerized reservation systems, would the Court have made a finding of discrimination? In 
yet other words, if the regulations had not contained provisions similar to those found in the Open Skies 
agreements, would the Court have been in a position to invoke discrimination? 
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came within the scope of the freedom of establishment regardless of the existence of 
relevant EU legislation; or on the assumption that the pre-Lisbon investment related EU 
legislation created an EU competence (however narrow) over some aspects of foreign 
investment, which brought extra-EU BITs within the scope of the non-discrimination 
principle. I find the first assumption more plausible, although it is, as noted, problematic 
from a political perspective. The second assumption is not entirely convincing given the 
differences between the content of the relevant EU legislation in Open Skies and the pre-
Lisbon investment related EU legislation: there was a clear substantive equivalence 
between the relevant parts of the Open Skies agreements and the two EU regulations, 
whereas no such equivalence existed between extra-EU BITs and the EU's pre-Lisbon 
investment related legislation.  
 
There are of course a number of differences between extra-EU BITs and the Open Skies 
agreements. First, the Council had used its competence (under what is now Article 100(2) 
TFEU) to regulate air transport, whereas prior to the Lisbon Treaty the EU's competences 
over FDI were not express (whether shared or exclusive) in the sense that the competences 
related to areas that touched upon some aspects of foreign investments. Second, the 
provisions of the Open Skies agreements over which the EU had exclusive competence 
regulated narrow technical matters in a particular business sector, whereas extra-EU BITs 
regulate across-the-board, as all qualified investors and investments in all business sectors 
come within their protective scope. Third, investment protection (in respect of non-direct 
investments) and investment arbitration is an area of shared competence, whereas the EU's 
competences in the area of air transport were exclusive. Whether these differences matter, 
and what the Court really meant in the relevant parts of the Open Skies judgments, remain 
open questions. This short discussion shows that the question of competence is shrouded in 
uncertainty. Generally speaking, the above discussion has demonstrated that it would 
appear that member state BITs violate the principle of non-discrimination as a matter of 
EU law. The following section discusses whether this finding is undermined by 
countervailing considerations and what the implications of such finding are as a matter of 
EU law and international law. 
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4.5. Implications of a Finding of Discrimination  
for Member State BITs 
In principle, to remedy discrimination, member states could extend BIT rights to all EU 
investors in case of intra-EU BITs and engage in negotiations with concerned third states 
to effectuate such extension in respect of extra-EU BITs. Another option would be to 
terminate the BITs either unilaterally or consensually. Some member states have 
terminated a number of intra-EU BITs,303 and some third states have terminated a number 
of extra-EU BITs,304 but it seems clear that this policy will remain the exception rather 
than the rule. The extension of the scope of intra-EU BITs is an equally implausible option 
for a number of reasons. In the D v Inspecteur case the Commission and a number of 
member states argued that 
 
'a Member State party to a bilateral convention is not in any way required, by 
virtue of the Treaty, to extend to all Community residents the benefits which it 
grants to residents of the Contracting Member State. Those governments and the 
Commission refer to the danger which the extension of the benefits provided for 
by a bilateral convention to all Community residents would entail for the 
application of existing bilateral conventions and of those which the Member 
States might be prompted to conclude in the future, and to the legal uncertainty 
which that extension would cause.'305 
 
This statement related specifically to double taxation treaties, but it is also relevant in 
relation to intra-EU BITs. All intra-EU BITs were originally extra-EU BITs,306 and their 
central object and purpose was to safeguard investors of the capital exporting member 
states in the formerly socialist states, which were not yet 'ready' for EU membership at the 
time of the treaties' conclusion. The general assumption was that (not just intra-EU) BITs 
would increase the inflow of western investments in those states, as investors could rely on 
arbitration instead of domestic courts in case of disputes with the host state. Such 
                                                
303 See supra note 196. 
304 See the discussion in Chapter 7. 
305 D v Inspecteur, supra note 167, para. 48. 
306 Prior to the 2004 EU enlargement, only two intra-EU BITs existed, namely, the Germany-Greece and 
Germany-Portugal BITs concluded in 1961 and 1980 respectively (i.e. prior to the EU accession of the latter 
parties). Even without statistical support, it seems evident that these treaties, in practice, protected German 
investments in Greece and Portugal. 
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assumption was undergirded by the perception that in the immediate post-communist 
environment the domestic institutions of the formerly socialist states lacked the necessary 
quality to make policy (across the three branches of government) in a predictable manner 
and in accordance with pre-established rules of law. Under such circumstances, investment 
arbitration provided a neutral forum for the settlement of investment disputes.307 As was 
the case with the earlier BITs concluded between western states and newly decolonized 
states, the underlying reciprocity of intra-EU BITs was not reflected in practice, as 
investment flows remained unidirectional, travelling mostly eastwards from the old 
member states to the post-2004 member states. Even today, only a tiny fraction (if even 
that) of the investment stocks of the old member states consist of investments coming from 
the new member states, with an overwhelming majority originating from the other old 
member states. Similarly, the bulk of the investment stocks of the formerly socialist states 
consist of investments coming from the old member states. 
 
A few examples illustrate this dynamic. Finland has eleven intra-EU BITs with states that 
accded to the EU in 2004 at earliest.308 According to the Central Bank of Finland, at the 
end of 2013 the value of the foreign investment stock in Finland was € 73 459 million, out 
of which more than ninety percent was of European origin.309 However, investors from just 
three of the eleven BIT partner states had investments in Finland and these counted for 
little less than 0,001 percent of the overall FDI stock. In contrast, more than ninety-five 
percent of the stock comprised of investments coming from the old member states. In case 
of Romania, almost eighty percent of its FDI stock consists of investments coming from 
the old member states,310 while the investments of Romanian investors in the main 
European economies are virtually non-existent.311 Though these figures vary from one 
member state to the next, they are representative of the general trend as regards 
                                                
307 For a general argument on the virtues of investor-state arbitration vis-à-vis national courts, see Brower 
and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law?', supra note 18, at 477-483. 
308 With Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia. 
309 The statistic is available at 
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/tilastot/maksutase/pages/tilastot_maksutase_ja_suorat_sijoitukset_maksutase
_suorat_sijoitukset_suomeen_kanta_maittain_en.aspx (accessed 9 August 2016). 
310 See National Bank of Romania, Foreign Direct Investment in Romania in 2015, pp. 11-12. 
311 Of the major economies, only the UK data referred expressly to Romanian investments which stood at 
zero at the end of 2015. Since Romanian investments were not broken down in respect of the inward FDI 
stocks of Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands, it is safe to assume that these were Lilliputian. The UK 
data is available at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/bulletins/foreigndirectinvestmentinvo
lvingukcompanies/2015/relateddata (accessed 14 January 2017). 
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investments that qualify for protection under intra-EU BITs; they only have relevance for 
investments flowing from the old member states to the formerly socialist states, and an 
overwhelming majority of intra-EU investments are not protected under existing BITs.312 
 
In light of such data, the argument that EU law requires member states to extend the scope 
of application of intra-EU BITs to cover all EU investors is implausible. Such imposition 
would also go against the object and purpose of intra-EU BITs and exponentially increase 
the exposure of old member states to arbitration claims and financial liability, if and when 
specific claims result in awards for damages.313 In Gottardo, the ECJ argued that the 
increase in Italy's fiscal burden flowing from the extension of the pension benefit to all 
resident EU nationals 'could not justify' Italy's failure to comply with its EU law 
obligations. In other words, that benefit had to be extended to resident EU nationals 
regardless of the costs Italy incurred.314 Similarly, in Saint-Gobain, the ECJ held that a 
decrease of tax revenue flowing from the extension of the relevant tax benefit 'cannot be 
regarded as a matter of overriding general interest which may be relied upon in order to 
justify unequal treatment that is in principle incompatible with Article 52 of the Treaty'.315 
However, the consequences of the extension of the benefits in these two cases are very 
different when compared to intra-EU BITs. It is one thing to impose an obligation to grant 
clearly defined individual tax or other benefits to all EU workers and companies 
established in a member state, and quite another to allow all EU investors to bring claims 
against a wide range of legislative, administrative and judicial acts, the success of which 
depends on the interpretation of vaguely formulated BIT standards by ad hoc arbitral 
tribunals. Arguably, this 'general consequence' was reflected in Opinion 2/15 where the 
Court held that member states had to give their consent to the CETA investment protection 
provisions on the ground that such provisions were not 'of a purely ancillary nature' as they 
removed 'disputes from the jurisdiction of the courts of the member states'.316 Extending 
                                                
312 The ECT, however, provides protection to all intra-EU investments in the energy sector. 
313 Legal costs of investment arbitration appear to be relatively high as well. A 2014 study found that the 
average costs in cases where such information was available was circa US$ 4,437,000 for claimants and circa 
US$ 4,559,000 for respondents. These figures exclude arbitrator and administrative fees. See Matthew 
Hodgson, 'Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration', Global Arbitration Review (24 March, 
2014), at 2. The average cost figures were based on 73 (claimant) and 66 (respondent) cases respectively. 
Hodgson also points out that 'a few cases with extremely high costs distort the figures' (idem.) and the 
median costs were circa US$ 3,145,000 for claimants and circa US$ 2,286,000 for respondents (ibid.). The 
average administrative and arbitrator costs, in turn, were US$ 746,000 (median US$590,000), ibid. at 3. 
314 Gottardo, supra note 225, para. 38. 
315 Saint-Gobain, supra note 271, para. 51. 
316 Opinion 2/15, supra note 66, para. 292. 
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the scope of intra-EU BITs to cover all EU investors would also be difficult to put into 
practice. For example, as the contents of Finland's intra-EU BITs vary, on which 
arbitration clause could EU investors established in Finland rely? Assuming that such 
extension would also cover the substantive protection standards and other provisions, 
which definitions of investments and investors, and which protection standards in intra-EU 
BITs are most investor-friendly? Could investors pick-and-choose BIT provisions 
according to their preferences and would this right extend to investors already protected by 
an intra-EU BIT? To quote the statement of the Commission and member states in D v 
Inspecteur, much 'legal uncertainty' would follow if member states were required to extend 
the scope of intra-EU BITs. Moreover, the Court cannot force the member states to expand 
the scope of intra-EU BITs as a matter of international law. 
 
One of the preliminary questions that the BGH submitted to the ECJ asked whether Article 
18 TFEU precludes the application of the Dutch-Slovak BIT's arbitration clause when the 
BIT was concluded before the EU accession of the Slovak Republic and when the claimant 
investor raised the relevant claim after the Slovak Republic's EU accession. The hearings 
on the BGH's preliminary questions were held in June 2017, and while the transcripts of 
the hearings are not publicly available, some attendees have revealed some of the 
arguments. One of the arguments was that the preliminary question concerning 
discrimination is inadmissible because the BGH proceedings do not involve a third party 
claiming discrimination.317 In other words, since there is no third party (a company or 
'investor') claiming that the Dutch-Slovak BIT's arbitration clause breaches the principle of 
non-discrimination, the BGH or the ECJ should not address such hypothetical argument. 
Should the ECJ accept this argument, the question of discrimination in the context of intra-
EU BITs would remain unsettled. Conversely, and hypothetically speaking, should the ECJ 
address the question and follow the reasoning outlined above, it should find that intra-EU 
BITs breach the principle of non-discrimination under EU law, with reference to its 
previous case law, the principle of sincere cooperation and primacy of EU law.  
 
As to arbitral tribunals, they have conceded that intra-EU BITs may breach the non-
discrimination rules of EU law and suggested that the problem is resolved by extending 
                                                
317 See Alexander Gross, 'Zwischen Skylla und Charybdis. Die Kollision von völkerrechtlichen Intra-EU 
BITs mit dem Unionsrecht', Völkerrechtsblog, 4 August 2017. See at https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/zwischen-
skylla-und-charybdis/ (accessed 18 August 2017). 
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those rights to all EU investors, and that in any case it is up to the EU Commission to take 
action to correct the alleged discrimination. In EURAM, the expert witness of the claimant 
argued that discrimination 'is an internal EU law problem and not an issue of treaty 
compatibility'.318 In one way, this statement goes in the right direction. The above cases 
indicated that under EU law member states are obligated to provide equal treatment to 
economic actors in a comparable situation, but it is not the material content of BIT rights 
that breaches the non-discrimination principle but their exclusivity in terms of 
beneficiaries. Likewise, the conflicting obligations can be construed as being owed to 
different subjects. BIT obligations are owed to the contracting states' investors (or the other 
contracting state) and the non-discrimination obligation to other EU investors (or their 
home states). Hence, as a matter of international law, because no material conflict exists 
between the two set of obligations, and because they are owed to different parties, the BIT 
obligations continue to apply and the problem of discrimination is to be resolved 
'internally' by the competent EU institutions.  
 
It is also useful to note that discrimination is not an academic problem, particularly in the 
context of intra-EU BITs. To give two examples, in 2011 and 2012 Hungary introduced 
two laws under which foreign owned companies were excluded from taking part in the so 
called 'social voucher' business (companies offer such vouchers to employees as benefits). 
As a response, the Commission started infringement proceedings against Hungary arguing 
that the laws breached a directive319 as well as the freedom of establishment and freedom 
to provide services. Around the same time, three companies affected by the laws (all 
French) brought claims against Hungary under the France-Hungary BIT.320 In February 
2016, the ECJ declared that the legislative changes violated the directive and the 
fundamental freedoms,321 and somewhat later one of the tribunals in the three BIT cases 
decided that the laws violated the French-Hungary BIT and awarded around 23 million 
euros as compensation to the claimant investor.322 Clearly, and in principle, if some of the 
                                                
318 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 270. 
319 This was Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the internal market, OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, pp. 36–68 
320 The cases are Edenred S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/21; Le Chèque Déjeuner and C.D 
Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35; Sodexo Pass International SAS v. Hungary, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/20. 
321 See Case C-142/4, Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2016:108. 
322 The Edendred tribunal rendered the final award on 13 December 2016, but it is not publicly available. The 
other two arbitrations are pending and no information on the cases has been released. See Luke Eric Peterson, 
'French investor wins 23 million EUR under France-Hungary BIT', IAReporter News, 16 December 2016; 
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companies affected by the legislative changes come from member states with which 
Hungary has not concluded a BIT, those companies are in a worse position than French 
and other companies that can rely on an intra-EU BIT, regardless of the remedies available 
to them under EU law and Hungarian law. 
 
The Eureko arbitration provides another useful example. The claimant investor had filed a 
complaint with the Commission around the same time it had initiated the arbitral 
proceedings. The claimant's cause of action was the same in both instances and related to 
the reversal of the privatization of the Slovak Republic's health insurance market, which 
had taken place in 2007 after a change in government. The claimant argued that the 
reversal had 'effectively destroyed the value' of its investment and the complaint led the 
Commission to start infringement proceedings against the Slovak Republic.323 In the letter 
of formal notice the Commission noted that the 'prohibition on health insurance companies 
to freely dispose of any profits resulting from the provision of public health insurance in 
Slovakia…constitutes an unjustified restriction on the freedom of capital movements 
guaranteed by Article 63' TFEU.324 Similarly, in January 2011, the Slovak Republic's 
constitutional court ruled that such 'ban on profits' was unconstitutional, and thus null and 
void,325 and it seems that this ruling prompted the Commission to discontinue the 
infringement proceedings. As to the remedies available under EU law, the claimant noted 
that it had little influence on how the Commission pursues the complaint, and that in any 
case the 'ancillary proceedings in the European Court of Justice can by their very nature 
not result in a damages award', and neither can its damages 'be redressed through other 
EU-channels'.326  
 
First, these remarks are no entirely convincing, because the Court's case law suggests that 
primary law provisions establishing the internal market freedoms can create vertical direct 
effect. In other words, those provisions 'confer on individuals rights upon which they are 
entitled to rely directly before the national courts'.327 Second, the ECJ has also held that a 
                                                                                                                                              
Jarrod Hepburn, 'An update on three investment treaty claims against Hungary', IAReporter News, 24 
February 2016. 
323 Eureko award, supra note 74, paras. 7, 55-56. 
324 See Commission Decision (EU) 2015/248 of 15 October 2014, OJ L 41, 17.2.2015, pp. 25-40, at footnote 
8. 
325 Achmea B.V. (formerly known as "Eureko B.V.") v. the Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Final 
Award (hereinafter Achmea award), 7 December 2012, paras. 115-116. 
326 Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 56. 
327 Joined Cases C-46/93 ja C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, ECLI:EU:C:1996:79, para. 23 
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breach of the fundamental freedoms may give rise to compensation if three conditions are 
met. First, the infringed rule 'must be intended to confer rights on individuals [i.e. must 
have direct effect]'; second, 'the breach must be sufficiently serious'; and, third, 'there must 
be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the 
damage sustained by the injured parties'.328 In policy areas where the member states enjoy 
wide discretion, a breach is sufficiently serious only if the member state 'manifestly and 
gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion'.329 Eureko concerned the privatization of 
the Slovak Republic's healthcare system, an area which has not been harmonized at the EU 
level, which implies that the member states enjoy wide discretion in that area. Assuming 
that the claimant investor had raised a claim for damages on the basis of Article 63 TFEU 
before the Slovak Republic's courts, it is difficult to predict whether the claim would have 
succeeded and what amount of compensation it could have received.330 However, what is 
clear that the criteria of liability under BITs is less strict. The seriousness of a breach may 
affect the calculation of damages, but is not an independent criterion, and whether the 
damages were caused by a state's legislative, executive or judicial branch does not play a 
formal role in the quantum of damages either, whereas under EU law the threshold of 
liability is higher when the loss is caused by a general legislative act. In this light, it is not 
surprising that the claimant in Eureko decided to pursue a claim only under the BIT; 
damages claims under national laws and EU law, particularly when they relate to a general 
legislative act, are less likely to succeed, and even if they succeed the amount of damages 
may not provide sufficient restitution.331 The Eureko tribunal awarded the claimant around 
22 million euros in damages, which implies, similarly to the first example, that the Dutch-
Slovak BIT placed the claimant investor in a more favorable position than EU investors 
that could not rely on an intra-EU BIT but were equally affected by the challenged 
                                                
328 Ibid., para. 51. 
329 Ibid., para. 55. The Court noted that the factors that should be taken into consideration in assessing the 
seriousness of the breach 'include the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the measure of discretion left 
by that rule to the national or Community authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was 
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330 In its statement of claim, Eureko argued that its case 'is further supported by Article 56 EC, which 
prohibits all (unjustified) restrictions on movements of capital'. This meant that the challenged measures 
'constitute breaches of this Article 56 EC as well'. Similarly, Eureko argued that the challenged measure 
constituted a 'blatant disregard' of EU law, which 'supports a finding that the Slovak Republic has failed to 
offer fair and equitable treatment to Eureko’s investment and restricted the freedom of capital movement'. 
See paras. IV.90 and IV.114 of the Statement of Claim, EUREKO B.V. v. Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 
2008-13, 16 June 2009. 
331 It is noteworthy that the Eureko tribunal ordered the Slovak Republic to pay to the claimant around €22.1 
million in damages. See Achmea award, supra note 325, para. 352. 
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measure. This would imply that foreign investors operating in a given business sector are 
always in a comparable situation in relation to general legislative and administrative acts 
that affect that business sector, but only some of them are able to rely on BIT protections. 
Similarly, investors are in a comparable position in respect of the available remedies; 
whether a state measure has general application or whether it targets a specific company, 
the affected investors can rely on the same remedies, apart from investors whose 
investments qualifies for protection under a BIT. These points provide indirect support to 
the argument that investors are in a comparable situation and that the existence of an 
investment treaty does not render their situation incomparable.  
  
As a final matter, the question of interests and values merits a few comments. One general 
argument for maintaining the status quo is that intra-EU BITs continue to be essential for 
protecting eastbound investments within the EU, because the rule of law remains weak and 
fragile in the formerly socialist member states. Such understanding receives support from 
various corruption indexes and Commission reports dealing with the member states' 
regulatory environment, including reports on the (lack of) institutional reforms that the 
new member states have taken after EU accession.332 For example, a recent Commission 
report expressed concerns about the 'independence, quality and efficiency' of Bulgaria's 
judicial system, 'including a certain lack of predictability due to inconsistent rulings'.333 
The report outlines similar types of concerns in respect of a number of other post-2004 
member states, and the proponents of intra-EU investment treaties have used this and other 
similar reports to attack the Commission's policy on intra-EU BITs.334 The rule of law may 
lack a universally accepted definition, but it is more or less uncontested that the domestic 
institutions of the old member states meet the criteria commonly associated with the 
concept, and this observation is supported by the fact that the old member states have not 
concluded any BITs between them.335 In this light, one could argue that it is a matter of 
'overriding general interest' to the old member states to maintain intra-EU BITs, and that 
the different treatment is 'objectively justified' on the ground of the rule of law concerns, as 
well as on the ground that the treaties increase investment flows.  
                                                
332 See EU Commission, The 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard (Publications Office of the European Union, 
2017); EU Commission, Member States Investment Challenges, SWD(2015)400 final/2, Brussels, 18 
December 2015. 
333 European Commission, The 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 13. 
334 See e.g. the Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Intra-EU Investment 
Treaties, submitted to the Trade Policy Committee, 7 April 2016.   
335 Apart from, as noted, the Germany-Greece and Germany-Portugal BITs which were concluded in 1961 
and 1980 respectively (i.e. prior to the EU accession of Greece and Portugal). 
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Chapter 7 will analyze the rule of law argument as well as the correlation between BITs 
and investment flows in more detail, but already here it is worth pointing out that while 
some of the new member states have faced and continue to face multiple BIT claims, the 
old member states with more developed rule of law systems are also facing an increasing 
number of claims, particularly under the Energy Charter Treaty.336 This suggests that what 
the rule of law of means in case specific circumstances is a perspectival matter in the sense 
that investors will naturally resort to investment arbitration if such possibility exists, 
however strong the rule of law may be in a given member state. More generally, interest 
groups are prone to think that their constituencies are never adequately protected, not even 
in western democracies, so the rule of law argument is always available to them in this 
sense. There probably is no shortage of domestic court cases across the EU where, for 
example, a foreign investor has been left uncompensated for economic loss. Another point 
is that it is equally possible that many of the claims against the new member states relate to 
requirements imposed by EU law, or they may be 'frivolous' claims, or then stem from 
what are widely considered as legitimate public interest concerns. A good example is the 
case against Romania, initiated in August 2015, where the claimant investor argues that the 
delay in the issuance of an environmental permit, a precondition for starting a mining 
project, breaches the Romania-UK and the Romania-Canada BITs. Rather than reflecting 
legal backwardness or administrative inertia and corruption, the non-issuance of the permit 
may well reflect (as reported by news agencies) justified concerns about the implications 
of the project for the environment, which is a 'modern' concern par excellence.337 This 
indicates that statistics are not a substitute for a more rigorous analysis of the relevant 
cases and the circumstances out of which they arose. To paraphrase an old idiom, whoever 
invokes the rule of law, may want to cheat.  
 
The above discussion has focused on intra-EU BITs, and while the status of extra-EU BITs 
is now governed by the Grandfathering regulation, for the sake of completeness it is useful 
to say a few words on how the issue of discrimination could impact their continued 
application and validity. Assuming that extra-EU BITs constitute prohibited discrimination 
under EU law, Article 351 TFEU and the principle of sincere cooperation would be 
relevant alongside the Grandfathering regulation. As discussed in Chapter 3, Article 351 
                                                
336 For example, investors have raised more than thirty claims against Spain under the ECT. The cases will be 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
337 See Adam Cernea Clark, 'Whose Resources? Gabriel Resources v. Romania', Huffington Post, 6 August 
2015. 
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TFEU holds that rights and obligations under pre-accession treaties concluded with third 
states 'shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty'.338 However, this protective 
ambit is subject to the limitation in the second paragraph, which provides that in case of 
conflict member states 'shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities 
established'.339 In other words, Article 351 TFEU allows the member states to honor their 
pre-accession treaty obligations, but simultaneously requires them to take 'appropriate 
steps' to eliminate such obligations if and when they conflict with EU law. Von Papp has 
characterized this ambiguity by noting that the article's first paragraph 'shows an openness 
towards public international law', whereas paragraph two is 'essentially…a statement of 
EU supremacy'.340 The ECJ has clarified the scope of Article 351 TFEU by finding that it 
also protects individuals who enjoy rights under a pre-accession treaty,341 such as rights of 
investors under extra-EU BITs. In essence, Article 351 TFEU creates a similar obligation 
as the Grandfathering regulation,342 but is more specific as it expressly protects the rights 
of third states and their nationals under pre-accession BITs. Article 4(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), in turn, establishes the principle of sincere cooperation, which 
                                                
338 The ECJ has specified that the term 'rights' refers to the rights of third states and the term ‘obligations’ to 
obligations of EU member states under earlier treaties. The provision also applies to treaties concluded by the 
founding member states of the EU prior to the creation of the Union. See Case 10/61, Commission v Italy, 
ECLI:EU:C:1962:2, p. 10; Case C-158/91, Jean-Claude Levy, ECLI:EU:C:1993:332, para. 12. For a critique 
of this construction, see Konstanze von Papp, 'Resolving Conflicts with International Investment Treaty Law 
from an EU Law Perspective: Article 351 TFEU Revisited', 42 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2015), 
pp. 325-356, at 340-341. For an analysis of the components of Article 351 TFEU, see Julie M. Grimes, 
'Conflicts between EC Law and International Treaty Obligations: A Case Study of the German 
Telecommunications Dispute', 35 Harvard Journal of International Law (1994), pp. 535-564, at 542-557. 
339 Article 351 TFEU reads: ‘[1.] The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more Member States 
on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the 
Treaties. [2.] To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the Member State or 
States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States 
shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude. 
[3.] In applying the agreements referred to in the first paragraph, Member States shall take into account the 
fact that the advantages accorded under the Treaties by each Member State form an integral part of the 
establishment of the Union and are thereby inseparably linked with the creation of common institutions, the 
conferring of powers upon them and the granting of the same advantages by all the other Member States.’ 
In the context of implementing UN Security Council resolutions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
the ECJ has held that Article 351 'could, if the conditions for application have been satisfied, allow 
derogations even from primary law’, but that ‘in no circumstances [does Article 351] permit any challenge to 
the principles that form part of the very foundations of the Community legal order, one of which is the 
protection of fundamental rights'. See Joined Cases C-402/05P and 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para. 301; Case C-124/95, Queen v HM Treasury and Bank of England, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:8, paras. 56-61. Given the content of Article 103 of the UN Charter and the nature of 
Chapter VII resolutions, it is safe to say that this case law has no bearing vis-a-vis member state BITs. 
340 Von Papp, 'Article 351 TFEU Revisited', supra note 338, pp. 333-334. 
341 See Case C-812/79, Attorney General v Burgoa, ECLI:EU:C:1980:231, para. 10. 
342 See Grandfathering Regulation, supra note 58, recital, para. 11 ('Member States are required to take the 
necessary measures to eliminate incompatibilities, where they exist, with Union law, contained in bilateral 
investment agreements concluded between them and third countries').  
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requires member states to take appropriate measures 'to ensure fulfillment' of their EU law 
obligations, to 'facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks', and to 'refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union's objectives'.343 These two 
provisions create a similar obligation and bind the member states as a matter of EU law 
only, just as the Grandfathering regulation does. While the scope and content of the three 
provisions is somewhat different, their cumulative scope of application extends to all 
existing extra-EU BITs.  
 
This begs the hypothetical question of what implications the existence of discrimination 
could have for the status of extra-EU BITs as a matter of international law. As to conflict 
rules, Articles 30(3) and 59 VCLT are not relevant for extra-EU BITs, because they only 
concern successive treaties between identical parties. Third states with which member 
states have concluded BITs are not parties to the EU founding treaties. As noted in Chapter 
2, two basic principles govern the position of third states in situations where their treaty 
party has or undertakes conflicting obligations under another treaty to which the former is 
not party: the res inter alios acta principle stipulates that treaties only bind their parties and 
are valid as between them, and the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle stipulates 
that 'no treaty may create obligations' for a third state 'without its consent'.344 These 
principles, enshrined in Article 30(4)(b) VCLT, 345 indicate that the principle of non-
discrimination, as it stands under EU law, has no effect on the rights of third states and 
their investors under extra-EU BITs as a matter of international law. The discussion on 
intra-EU BITs also showed that member states are obligated to provide equal treatment to 
economic actors in a comparable situation, but that it was not the material contents of BIT 
provisions that breached the non-discrimination principle, but the limitation of their 
application to the contracting states' investors. Hence, the problem of discrimination is 
again to be resolved 'internally' by the competent EU institutions. 
 
                                                
343 The full text of Article 4(3) TUE reads as follows: 'Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the 
Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow 
from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the 
Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union's objectives.' 
344 Ranganathan, Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts, supra note 51, p. 56. 
345 Article 30(4)(b) VCLT reads as follows: '4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the 
parties to the earlier one…(b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the 
treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.' 
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The above discussion has strived to show that the Court's case law implies that member 
state BITs constitute prohibited discrimination, and that it is difficult to think of 'objective 
justifications' that could authorize the different treatment, although Advocate General 
Wathelet's arguments suggest that the Court could still go either way. However, even if 
such objective justifications were to exist, this would not end the debate on member state 
BITs. The concern about the autonomy of the EU legal order remains, and it is to that 














5. The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order:  
Treaty Conflict or Co-operation? 
5.1. Preliminary Remarks 
The ECJ has rendered a number of decisions which examine the compatibility with EU law 
of court systems established under agreements to which the Union is party (or was to 
become a party) either alone or alongside its member states and/or third states. Apart from 
the MOX Plant judgment, these decisions were rendered pursuant to Article 218(11) 
TFEU, which provides that the member states and the main EU institutions 'may obtain the 
opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with 
the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not 
enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised'. The agreements that the 
Court has analyzed have varied in terms of content and party constellation, but these 
opinions establish, arguably, principles that are transposable to the member state BIT 
context and enable an assessment of the compatibility of investment arbitration with the 
autonomy of the EU legal order. The following discussion analyzes the MOX Plant case 
and four opinions: Opinion 1/91 (concerning the creation of the European Economic Area), 
Opinion 1/00 (concerning the European Common Aviation Area agreement), Opinion 1/09 
(concerning the creation of a Patent Court) and Opinion 2/13 (concerning the accession of 
the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights). Before proceeding to discuss them, 
however, it is useful to summarize how the question of autonomy has been dealt with in 
arbitral practice. 
5.2. Autonomy Related Arguments in Arbitral Practice 
Express references to the concept of autonomy of EU law are rare in arbitral practice. The 
respondent member states have relied, above all, on Article 344 TFEU to establish the 
incompatibility of BIT arbitration clauses with EU law, as has the EU Commission both in 
its amicus curiae submissions and in its letter of formal notice to the Swedish Government 
concerning the Romania-Sweden BIT. The basic argument is that the ECJ has exclusive 
jurisdiction over EU law related disputes under Article 344 TFEU,346 and in one of the 
                                                
346 See e.g. EURAM award, supra note 83, paras. 98 and 101. 
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Commission's submissions this exclusive jurisdiction was linked with the autonomy of EU 
law.347 The Commission specified that the Court's exclusive jurisdiction extends to 
disputes between the member states and private parties, at least when such disputes involve 
questions of EU law. To support this argument, the Commission invoked the MOX Plant 
case,348 which concerned the relationship of EU law and the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which both the EU and its member states are parties.  In 
essence, the Commission argued that the Court’s reasoning in MOX Plant, when read in 
connection with the text of Article 344 TFEU, reflects a 'more general principle' under 
which the member states 'cannot agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of Union law' are 'subject to a method of dispute settlement different from 
those provided in' the EU founding treaties.349 The Commission pointed out that arbitration 
under intra-EU BITs 'presupposes' that two member states have consented to the 
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals under certain conditions, and that mutual consent breaches 
Article 344 TFEU.350  
 
The Commission made a similar argument in its letter of formal notice to the Swedish 
Government concerning the Romania-Sweden BIT. The difference was that in the US Steel 
arbitration (where the Commission referred to MOX Plant) the subject matter of the 
dispute was of direct concern to the Commission,351 whereas in the letter of formal notice 
the mere existence of the BIT's arbitration clause was argued as breaching Article 344 
TFEU. The Commission argued that arbitral tribunals constituted under the BIT may have 
to interpret and apply EU law in individual disputes, which constitutes a breach of Article 
344 TFEU as such.352 The Commission also contended that Article 344 TFEU should be 
                                                
347 EU Commission, amicus curiae brief in US Steel, supra note 124, para. 36. 
348 Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345 (hereinafter MOX Plant). For a discussion 
of the case and the attendant legal instruments, see Nikolaos Lavranos, 'The MOX Plant and IJzeren Rijn 
Disputes: Which Court is the Supreme Arbiter?’, 19 Leiden Journal of International Law (2006), pp. 223-
246; Cesar P. R. Romano, 'Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland. Case C-459/03. Judgment', 
101 American Journal of International Law (2007), pp. 171-179. 
349 EU Commission, amicus curiae brief in US Steel, supra note 124, paras. 37 and 44. The case was 
discontinued at an early stage before the tribunal had decided the jurisdictional challenges of the respondent 
and the EU Commission. 
350 Ibid., para. 44. 
351 The claimant's cause of action in the US Steel arbitration concerned the revocation of certain investment 
incentives by the Slovak Republic. As in Micula, the Commission argued that the investment incentives had 
constituted illegal state aid under EU law and had to be revoked, although the Commission had not taken a 
formal decision in this regard. See ibid., paras. 6-12.  
352 See Commission letter, supra note 76, pp. 12-13 ('Genom sitt samtycke att avgöra tvister om frågor som 
omfattas av det bilaterala investeringsavtalet med relevant skiljedomsförfarande tar vardera avtalsparten, 
genom godtagande av artikel 7 i det bilaterala investeringsavtalet, upp tvister som även gäller tolkningen 
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interpreted against the principles of primacy, effectiveness and unity of EU law. Although 
the Romania-Sweden BIT did not prevent investors from taking the dispute to national 
courts in parallel to arbitral proceedings, the Commission argued that once an investor 
initiates arbitral proceedings, 'national courts can no longer preside over the same cause of 
action'.353 As a consequence, the preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 TFEU 
is bypassed, which threatens the primacy, effectiveness and unity of EU law, because 
arbitral tribunals interpret and apply EU law outside the ECJ's controlling arm.354  
 
Arbitral tribunals have not expressly referred to the concept of autonomy, and their 
consensus on Article 344 TFEU is that it is only relevant in respect of disputes between 
two member states. Further, in the absence of an EU law provision expressly prohibiting 
investment arbitration, the only plausible conclusion is that arbitration clauses in intra-EU 
BITs are compatible with EU law.355 Tribunals have also referred to the existence of 
multiple instances where various courts and tribunals interpret EU law without the 
involvement of the ECJ, with the inference that the latter has no 'absolute monopoly…over 
the interpretation and application of EU law'.356 This argument received backing from the 
discretion that member state courts enjoy (apart from courts of last instance) in respect of 
the preliminary ruling procedure and from the acte clair doctrine.357 Another relevant fact 
was that in most of the arbitrations the tribunal's seat was in a member state, which allowed 
the parties to challenge the tribunal's decisions before that state's courts, and the latter 
could seize the ECJ through the preliminary ruling procedure. In the event that member 
states comply with an award that breaches EU law, the EU Commission may start 
                                                                                                                                              
eller tillämpningen av [EU] fördragen med hjälp av en annan tvistlösningsmetod än de normala metoder som 
föreskrivs däri.'). 
353 Ibid., p. 13 ('Så snart ett ärende har hänskjutits till en skiljedomstol, kan en nationell domstol inte längre 
pröva samma mål.'). 
354 Idem. ('Till följd av detta skulle de nationella domstolarna och EU-domstolen inte vara i stånd att, genom 
de sedvanliga rättsmedel som föreskrivs genom EU-fördragen, se till att EU-lagstiftningens företräde, 
enhetlighet och verkan säkerställs.'). The Commission referred to Opinion 1/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, paras. 
60-89 in this context. As a final point, the Commission also argued that the arbitration clause undermines the 
principles of mutual trust and sincere cooperation, which require that member states trust each other’s court 
systems (see ibid., p. 14). 
355 See EURAM award, supra note 83, paras. 248, 254-255; Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 276; 
Electrabel award, supra note 144, paras. 4.151 and 4.153. 
356 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 248. 
357 The ECJ has placed a high threshold for the ability of member state courts to rely on the acte clair 
doctrine. In CILFIT, it held that before member state courts reach the conclusion that there is no reasonable 
doubt about the correct interpretation of EU law, 'the national court or tribunal must be convinced that the 
matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice. Only if those 
conditions are satisfied, may the national court or tribunal refrain from submitting the question to the Court 
of Justice and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it'. See Case 283/81, CILFIT, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, para. 16.  
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infringement proceedings, which again ensures the involvement of the ECJ.358 Taken 
together, these points provided a basis for the conclusion that the ECJ has no absolute 
monopoly to preside over EU law related disputes and that investment arbitration is 
compatible with EU law. What also facilitated the conclusion was that the parties did not 
invoke EU law arguments on the merits, which implied that the ECJ's jurisdiction was not 
under threat in the circumstances of the cases.  
 
However, these arguments exclude some of the central dicta of the ECJ over the autonomy 
of the EU legal order. I will now look at the relevant case law and assess its implications 
for member state BITs.  
5.3. The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order under the Case 
Law of the ECJ 
As is well-known, originally the autonomy of EU law focused on its internal dimension in 
the sense that the principles of direct effect and primacy of EU law arranged and controlled 
the relationship of domestic legal orders and EU law in a way that ensured the full 
effectiveness of EU law within the member states, with the preliminary ruling mechanism 
ensuring its uniform interpretation. When rationalizing these cornerstones of EU law, the 
Court emphasized the sui generis nature of the EU legal order with a number of oft-quoted 
characterizations: 'the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which…became an 
integral part of the legal systems of the Member States',359 and 'which constituted a new 
legal order of international law'.360 These remarks already implied that while the EU legal 
order was a creation of international law, the interpretation and application of its 
provisions take place under a distinct logic and in isolation of general international law. 
The implications of the external dimension of the autonomy of EU law only surfaced when 
the EU became more and more active on the international plane. The EU's external 
activities had an impact not only on the treaty-making capacity of the member states but it 
                                                
358 See e.g. EURAM award, supra note 83, paras. 259 and 264. In the Electrabel arbitration, which was raised 
under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the tribunal argued that the conclusion of the ECT implies that the 
EU has 'accepted the possibility of international arbitrations… without any distinction or reservation'. The 
ECT allows investors to choose between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration venues, with tribunals possibly 
convening outside the EU and outside the reach of member state courts and the ECJ. Clearly, the Electrabel 
tribunal reasoned, the conclusion of the ECT implies that the EU has tacitly acknowledged the compatibility 
of investor-state arbitration with EU law. Both the EU and its member states are parties to the ECT. See 
Electrabel award, supra note 144, para. 4.158. 
359 Case 6/64, Costa v E.N.E.L., ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, para. 3 of the summary. 
360 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, para. 3 of the summary. 
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also raised questions about the relationship of the autonomy of EU law and dispute 
settlement mechanisms established in treaties to which the EU was to become party. 
5.3.1. Opinion 1/91 
Opinion 1/91 concerned the creation of the European Economic Area (EEA) between the 
member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)361 and the EU and its 
member states.362 The basic idea was to create equal conditions of competition in the area 
of the EEA. The EEA agreement was to contain textually identical rules with the free 
movement and competition rules of the EU founding treaties, and an EEA Court was to 
have jurisdiction over disputes between the contracting states which concerned the 
interpretation and application of the agreement. Similarly, EU directives and regulations 
concerning free movement and competition were to be duplicated and implemented by the 
competent EEA institutions. Article 6 provided that the agreement’s provisions were to 'be 
interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings' of the ECJ on the corresponding 
provisions of EU law, but this obligation extended only to case law issued prior to the 
signing of the EEA agreement.363 Article 104(1) of the agreement, in turn, stipulated that 
both the ECJ and the EEA Court were to 'pay due account to the principles laid down' in 
their respective decisions to ensure the uniform application of the EEA agreement, but this 
obligation did not extend to the contracting states.364 The EEA Court was to comprise of 
eight judges, the majority of which were to come from the ECJ, and one of the Protocols to 
the agreement provided that the EFTA states 'may authorize their courts and tribunals to 
ask the Court of Justice to express itself on the interpretation of a provision of the 
agreement'.365 The purpose of these rules was to contribute to achieving 'homogeneity in 
the interpretation and application of the law [i.e. of the free movement and competition 
rules] in the EEA'.366  
 
To determine the compatibility of the EEA agreement with EU law, the Court analyzed 
two broad questions. First, it looked at whether the rules of the agreement achieved the 
objective of 'homogeneity of the law' and as a second matter the Court examined whether 
                                                
361 These were Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
362 Opinion 1/91, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490. 
363 Ibid., para. 8 (emphasis added). Despite some serious effort, the text of the draft agreement turned out to 
be ‘unGoogleable’ so the discussion relies solely on the incomplete references found in the Opinion. 
364 Ibid., para. 9. 
365 Ibid., para. 11. 
366 Ibid., para. 29. 
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the setting up of the EEA Court undermined 'the autonomy of the Community legal order 
in pursuing its own particular objectives'.367 To answer the first question, the Court 
compared the objectives of the EEA agreement with those of EU law.368 In its typically 
glorified manner, the ECJ held that the EU founding treaties constituted 'the constitutional 
charter of a Community based on the rule of law', and in particular the principles of 
primacy and direct effect reflected the sui generis nature of the EU legal order.369 The free 
movement and competition rules of EU law were part of a 'new legal order for the benefit 
of which' member states 'have limited their sovereign rights, in ever wider fields'.370 As to 
its specific objectives, the founding treaties aimed to create a single market and establish a 
monetary union, and Article 1 of the 1986 Single European Act made it clear that the 
founding treaties were geared towards achieving 'European unity'.371 This meant that rather 
than being ends in themselves, the free movement and competition rules were 'the only 
means' by which the single market and other objectives of the founding treaties could be 
reached.372 The EEA agreement, on the other hand, contained no transfer of sovereign 
rights to the institutions it was meant to create and the objectives of its provisions paled in 
comparison to those of EU law. In the Court’s view, they concerned the 'application of 
rules on free trade and competition in economic and commercial relations' between the 
contracting parties with no higher cause or purpose undergirding them.373  
 
Because the respective objectives of EU law and the EEA agreement could not but 
influence the interpretation of the free movement and competition provisions, it was clear 
for the ECJ that 'homogeneity of the rules of law throughout the EEA is not secured' by 
identically worded provisions in the two treaties.374 This conclusion was supported by two 
additional factors. First, as noted, the case law of the ECJ was to be taken into account in 
the interpretation of the EEA agreement, but this obligation did not extend to case law 
                                                
367 Ibid., para. 30. 
368 Here, the Court invoked Article 31 VCLT, which lays down the general rule of treaty interpretation, 
namely, that a ‘treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ 
369 Opinion 1/91, supra note 362, para. 21. 
370 Ibid., para. 21. 
371 Ibid., para. 17. 
372 Ibid., para. 18. 
373 Ibid., paras. 15. 
374 Ibid., para. 22. 
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issued after the signing of the agreement.375 Second, and more generally, the EEA 
agreement did not expressly recognize the primacy and direct effect of EU law as the 
contracting states merely agreed to introduce into their national legal orders a statutory 
provision pronouncing that EEA rules prevail over conflicting domestic law provisions.376 
As a result, the Court held that the requirement of complying with its case law, imposed on 
the contracting parties of the EEA agreement, 'does not extend to [its] essential elements' 
and the agreement 'cannot secure the objective of homogeneity [in the interpretation and 
application] of the law throughout the EEA'.377 
 
These points did not yet constitute a finding of incompatibility, but provided a stepping 
stone to the question of whether the proposed EEA court 'may undermine the autonomy of 
the Community legal order in pursuing its own particular objectives'.378 The EEA Court 
was to have jurisdiction over disputes between the contracting parties. Both the EU and its 
member states were 'contracting parties' of the agreement and the EEA Court was to 
determine in each case whether it was the EU or the member states or both together that 
were 'contracting parties' for the purposes of adjudicating a dispute. Such finding hinged 
not only on the relevant provisions of the EEA agreement but also on the respective 
competences of the EU and its member states in a given area. Hence, the EEA Court would 
necessarily have to rule on the division of competences between the EU and its member 
states in relation to the subject-matter of a dispute brought before it.379 The inference was 
that this was 'likely adversely to affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the 
Treaties and, hence, the autonomy of the Community legal order, respect for which must 
be assured by the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 164 of the EEC Treaty'.380 That is to 
say, the ECJ has exclusive jurisdiction to ensure that the 'law is observed' in the 
interpretation and application of the founding treaties, which includes the power to 
determine the division of competences between the EU and its member states. The Court 
also invoked Article 344 TFEU to emphasize the exclusive nature of its jurisdiction in this 
                                                
375 Article 104(1) of the draft agreement did oblige the ECJ and the EEA Court to ‘pay due account’ to the 
case law of the other court without any time limitations, but this obligation did not extend to the contracting 
parties.  
376 Opinion 1/91, supra note 362, paras. 26-27. 
377 Ibid., para. 28. 
378 Ibid., para. 30. 
379 Ibid., paras. 32-34. 
380 Ibid., para. 35. Article 164 of the EEC Treaty read: 'The Court of Justice shall ensure observance of law 
and justice in the interpretation and application of this Treaty'. This article is now Article 19(1) TEU, the 
relevant part of which reads: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union…shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.' 
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regard and the conclusion was that the proposed jurisdiction of the EEA Court was 
incompatible with EU law.381  
 
The second source of incompatibility382 originated in the legal effects of treaties concluded 
under Article 216 TFEU, under which the EEA agreement would have been 'binding on the 
institutions of the Community and on member states'.383 The Court noted that the EEA 
agreement would become 'an integral part of the Community legal order' and be subject to 
the preliminary ruling mechanism and infringement proceedings in case the member states 
or the EU institutions breached its provisions.384 Moreover, the decisions of the EEA Court 
would bind the latter, including the ECJ, as those decisions also were to become an 
'integral part' of the EU legal order. As noted, the EEA Court was obliged to interpret the 
EEA agreement in conformity with the case law of the ECJ, but this obligation extended 
only to decisions given prior to the signing of the agreement.385 Although the EEA Court 
was to interpret the EEA agreement with the objective of homogeneity in mind, it was 
clear that its interpretations could deviate from those of the ECJ, not only because the 
objectives of the two regimes were different but because the EEA court was not obliged to 
follow the ECJ's most recent jurisprudence. Since the (possibly deviating) decisions of the 
EEA court were binding on the ECJ, the latter held that this 'conditioned' the future 
interpretation of the EU free movement and competition rules on the rulings of the EEA 
                                                
381 Ibid., paras. 35-36. 
382 There was a third source of incompatibility, but as it is not directly relevant in the BIT context it is 
summarized here. The Court found that the preliminary reference system established in the EEA agreement 
in respect of the courts of EFTA states was incompatible with EU law. This was so because the Court’s 
answers to the preliminary questions of these courts were to be 'without any binding effects' (paras. 61 and 
65). Such advisory role 'would change the nature of the function of the Court of Justice as conceived…by the 
EEC Treaty' and potentially affect the legal value of the Court’s preliminary rulings in the eyes of the courts 
of EU member states. Further, that ECJ judges were to form a majority in the EEA Court did not reduce the 
threat which the court system posed to the autonomy of the EU legal order (para. 47). This was because the 
judges would still have to use 'different approaches, methods and concepts in order to take account of the 
nature of each treaty and of its particular objectives' (para. 51), indicating that it might be impossible for the 
judges to approach the legal issues 'with completely open minds' (para. 52). 
383 At the time of the opinion Article 228(2) of the EEC Treaty. The 'conditions' to which the paragraph refers 
are found in the first part of paragraph 1, which reads as follows: 'Where this Treaty provides for the 
conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more States or an international organization, 
such agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the powers conferred upon the 
Commission in this field, such agreements shall be concluded by the Council after the Assembly has been 
consulted in the cases provided for by this Treaty'. 
384 Opinion 1/91, supra note 362, paras. 37-38. 
385 See Article 6 of the EEA agreement (the content of the article remained unchanged in the final version of 
the agreement). As noted above, Article 104(1) of the agreement stated that both the ECJ and the EEA Court 
were to ‘pay due account to the principles laid down’ in their respective decisions so as to ensure the uniform 
application of the EEA agreement, and unlike in Article 6 this 'paying account' had no temporal limitation. 
Why the Court did not refer to Article 104(1) in this context is unclear. Yet Article 104(1) only concerned the 
EU and EEA court systems and did not require the contracting parties to 'pay due account' to the decisions of 
the courts. 
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Court, which meant that the 'machinery of courts' established in the EEA agreement was 
incompatible with what is now Article 19(1) TEU and, more generally, 'with the very 
foundations of the Community'.386 In other words, had the EEA agreement entered into 
force as proposed, the Court would not have been in a position to ensure that the 'law is 
observed' in the interpretation and application of the founding treaties, because the EEA 
Court could affect the content of EU law in a binding way.  
 
Admittedly, the Court's reasoning is not easy to follow, and commentators have also failed 
to reach a higher level of clarity on how exactly the EEA court's decisions 'conditioned' the 
future interpretation of the relevant EU law rules.387 In the hierarchy of EU law 
international agreements concluded by the EU are inferior to primary law, but superior to 
secondary law. This appears to mean that the decisions of the EEA court could not bind the 
ECJ when they concerned the interpretation of EEA provisions that were equivalent to 
primary law provisions on free movement and competition.388 On the other hand, if the 
EEA court interpreted EEA rules that duplicated EU acts (directives and regulations in 
particular), the relevant decisions would have overruled the ECJ's interpretation of the 
parallel EU acts as they outranked the latter as a matter of EU law. As one commentator 
put it, the ECJ would have had to take account of the EEA's decisions when interpreting 
the parallel EU act as those decisions and the EEA agreement outranked secondary law 
and as the Court had to keep the objective of homogeneity in mind.389 Brandtner, in turn, 
notes that from the perspective of international law the EU 'could not plead its own 
"constitutional" order against a failure to comply with EEA rules or their binding 
interpretation'.390 Be that as it may, what is clear is that the Court held that if a non-EU 
                                                
386 Opinion 1/91, supra note 362, para. 46. 
387 As Hix puts it, it 'is not clear from the Opinion on what reasons the Court founded' the conclusion that the 
EEA court's decisions were binding on the ECJ. See Jan-Peter Hix, 'Indirect Effect of International 
Agreements: Consistent Interpretation and other Forms of Judicial Accommodation of WTO Law by the EU 
Courts and the US Courts', Jean Monnet Working Paper Series (03/13), p. 98. 
388 Analogously, in 1990, the ECJ has held that the decisions of the Turkey-EEC association council were 
'directly connected with the Agreement to which they give effect' and 'form an integral part' of EU law 'in the 
same way as the Agreement itself'. See Case C-192/68, S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:322, paras. 8-9. For the argument that dispute settlement rulings stemming from 
agreements to which the EU is party do not form an integral part of the EU legal order, see Hix, 'Indirect 
Effect of International Agreements', supra note 388, pp. 97-99.  
389 See Kirsten Schmalenbach, 'Struggle for Exclusiveness: The ECJ and Competing International Tribunals', 
in Isabelle Buffard, James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Stephan Wittich (eds.), International Law Between 
Universalism and Fragmentation: Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 
1045-1068, at 1048-1049. 
390 See Barbara Brandtner, 'The "Drama" of the EEA Comments on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92', 3 European 
Journal of International Law (1992), pp. 300-328, at 309-310 (footnote 55). 
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court or tribunal's interpretation of EU law has a binding effect on the EU institutions, the 
ECJ in particular, this poses a threat to the autonomy of EU law.391 
 
When the Court's findings are transposed to the BIT context, the essential question is 
whether BIT arbitration clauses have similar implications as the two aspects of the EEA 
agreement which led to a finding of incompatibility. In other words, are there situations 
where arbitral tribunals rule on the division of competences between the EU and its 
member states? And when arbitral tribunals interpret and apply specific EU law provisions, 
does this have a similar 'conditioning effect' on those provisions, even if such 
interpretations (or the provisions of member state BITs) are not binding on the EU 
institutions? As to the EEA Court's findings on the question of competence, the binding 
effect of the findings would have been of the de facto type in the sense that they would 
have determined the question of competence in that specific case, even if the findings 
would not have bound the ECJ as a matter of EU law. One question is whether the 
decisions of arbitral tribunals can 'bind' the EU institutions in a similar manner when, for 
example, a tribunal rules on the division of competences between the EU and its member 
states. Decisions of tribunals are only binding on the disputing parties, but since those 
decisions are subject to limited review, they may have a de facto binding effect in 
individual cases in the sense that the relevant EU law interpretation is final and affects the 
outcome of the dispute (this issue is discussed further below).  
 
The Court also connected Article 344 TFEU to the EEA Court's ability to rule on the 
division of competences between the EU and its member states, which suggests that 
situations where non-EU courts and tribunals deal with disputes between member states 
and private parties could fall under the scope of Article 344 TFEU, at least when they 
address the issue of competence. In sum, what the Court left unclear was whether the 
autonomy of the EU legal order was threatened already when a non-EU court interprets 
                                                
391 Opinion 1/91 forced the EEA contracting parties to renegotiate the agreement. After a new compromise 
was reached, the ECJ was approached to ensure that the amended agreement met the requirements laid down 
in Opinion 1/91. Opinion 1/92 was rendered just four months after the first opinion and the Court found the 
amended agreement to comply with the conditions established in Opinion 1/91.this 'conditioned' the future 
interpretation of the EU free movement and competition rules on the rulings of the EEA Court, which meant 
that the 'machinery of courts' established in the EEA agreement was incompatible with what is now Article 
19(1) TEU and, more generally, 'with the very foundations of the Community'. See Opinion 1/92, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:189. For the present purposes, it is unnecessary to analyze the amendments made to the 
agreement. 
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and applies EU law or whether that threat exists only when those interpretations and 
applications bind the Court and the other EU institutions in one or another way. 
5.3.2. Opinion 1/00 
Opinion 1/00 concerned the European Common Aviation Area agreement (ECAA), which 
was to be concluded by the EU (but not by its member states), the EFTA states and a 
number of Central and Eastern European states. The agreement was to extend the 
application of the EU air transport rules to the non-EU state parties and this was to be 
achieved by including in the agreement rules that were essentially similar to those of EU 
law.392 The agreement established a Joint Committee, the central task of which was to 
ensure the homogenous interpretation of the ECAA agreement (i.e. to ensure that the air 
transport rules of the agreement were interpreted and applied in a uniform manner with the 
corresponding EU rules). The Court began its analysis by making the point that when 'an 
agreement more clearly separates' its own institutional framework from that of the EU, and 
when that framework does not affect 'either the exercise by the Community and its 
institutions of their powers by changing the nature of those powers, or the interpretation of 
Community law, the autonomy of the Community legal order can be considered to be 
secure'.393 At a higher level of abstraction, the Court held that safeguarding 'the autonomy 
of the Community legal order requires…that the essential character of the powers of the 
Community and its institutions…remain unaltered'.394  
 
In case of the ECAA agreement, the protection of the autonomy of the EU legal order 
required 'that the procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation of the rules of the ECAA 
agreement and for resolving disputes will not have the effect of binding the Community 
and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of 
the [air transport] rules of Community law referred to in that agreement'.395 In essence, this 
requirement echoed the Court’s finding in Opinion 1/91 that the EEA Court’s decisions 
would have 'conditioned' the future application of the relevant EU law rules. As the 
member states were not to become parties to the ECAA agreement, the Joint Committee 
and the courts of the non-EU contracting states seized of a dispute regarding the 
                                                
392 Opinion 1/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:231, para. 3. 
393 Ibid., para. 6. 
394 Ibid., para. 12. 
395 Ibid., para. 13. This was a general principle and not confined to the ECAA context (in para. 11 the Court 
held that it was important that the EU institutions are not bound by a 'particular interpretation' of the rules of 
EU law made by the organs established under an agreement to which the EU is party). 
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interpretation of the air transport provisions were not authorized to assess the respective 
competences of the EU and its member states in that field.396 This also meant that intra-EU 
disputes over the 'interpretation of the rules of Community law applicable to air transport 
will continue to be dealt with exclusively by the machinery [of courts] provided for by the 
[founding] Treaty'.397 The powers of the Joint Committee extended only to disputes 
between non-EU states and between those states and the EU. Hence, the proposed dispute 
settlement mechanism was not in conflict with Article 344 TFEU, and the conclusion was 
that the ECAA agreement 'will not affect the allocation of powers' between the EU and its 
member states.398 In other words, the Court's exclusive jurisdiction under Article 344 
TFEU was tied more formally to the identity of the disputing parties, whereas in Opinion 
1/91 the EEA court's ability to rule on the division of competences of the EU and its 
member states violated Article 344 TFEU. 
 
The Court also found that while the ECAA agreement had some impact on the powers of 
the EU institutions, it did 'not alter the essential character of those powers and, 
accordingly, did not undermine the autonomy of the Community legal order'.399 As to the 
ECJ's powers, it was empowered to rule on all 'questions concerning the legality of 
decisions taken by Community institutions' under the ECAA agreement.400 This was in line 
with the Court's exclusive power to review 'the legality of acts of the Community 
institutions' established under Article 263 TFEU.401 As to the nature of the ECJ's powers 
under the ECAA agreement, its decisions flowing from the exercise of those powers were 
to be binding in all respects. This meant that the ECAA agreement did not change the 
essential character of the Court's powers nor, to that extent, adversely affected the 
autonomy of the EU legal order.402 The Court waxed eloquently that 'the indispensable 
conditions for safeguarding the essential character of its powers are satisfied by the 
provisions of the proposed ECAA Agreement'.403  
 
                                                
396 Ibid., para. 16. Arguably, e.g. the Joint Committee could face an argument that the EU institutions do not 
have competence over a specific segment of air transportation, forcing the Joint Committee to analyze the 
division of competences under EU law. 
397 Ibid., para. 17. 
398 Ibid., para. 15. 
399 Ibid., para. 21. Here, the Court referred to Opinion 1/92, supra note 391, paras. 32 and 41. 
400 Ibid., para. 24.  
401 Idem. 
402 Ibid., paras. 25-26. The Court also found that the 'essential character' of the Commission’s powers were 
not affected by the ECAA agreement (see para. 22). 
403 Ibid., para. 23. 
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The second large question related to the ECAA Agreement's mechanisms designed to 
ensure the uniform interpretation of its provisions. As noted, if decisions taken under those 
mechanisms had 'the effect of binding the Community and its institutions, in the exercise 
of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of Community law', the 
autonomy of the EU legal order could be negatively affected.404 The Court made a number 
of points in support of the conclusion that this was not the case. First, the ECAA 
contracting states had made a general commitment to make their laws compatible with 
those of EU law in the area of air transport.405 Second, the preliminary reference procedure 
established in the ECAA Agreement, which was similar to the procedure established under 
Article 267 TFEU, made it clear that the Court's decisions were invariably binding on the 
referring courts of ECAA member states.406 Third, the ECAA Agreement's provisions 
ensured that the ECJ's relevant case law 'will be adequately taken into account' both by the 
Joint Committee and the contracting states, and should the former be unable to reach a 
decision on the homogenous interpretation of the agreement, the matter could be referred 
to the ECJ for a final and binding decision.407 Accordingly, the Court held that the system 
of legal supervision established under the ECAA Agreement did 'not affect the autonomy 
of the Community legal order',408 as none of its features had a similar conditioning effect 
as the EEA agreement's provisions would have had. 
 
Generally speaking, arbitral tribunals have no obligation to keep up to date and take 
account of the ECJ's case law when the disputing parties invoke EU law arguments. 
Tribunals can of course do so either on their own initiative or by hearing the parties and 
expert witnesses, but the essential question is whether the general ability of arbitral 
tribunals to interpret and apply EU law, to be discussed further below, constitutes a 
problem in light of Opinions 1/91 and 1/00. Situations where the ECJ's rulings are open to 
different interpretations, or where the Court has not clarified the meaning of specific EU 
law provisions may arise, and this will compel the tribunals to interpret the relevant rulings 
and provisions in one or another way. Should arbitral tribunals be able to submit 
preliminary questions to the ECJ (either directly or through member state courts), this 
could, arguably, safeguard the uniform interpretation of EU law and the autonomy of the 
                                                
404 Ibid., para. 27. 
405 Ibid., para. 29. 
406 Ibid., paras. 30-33. 
407 Ibid., paras. 34-44. 
408 Ibid., para. 46. 
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EU legal order. The problem with this argument is that not only is the access to ECJ highly 
unlikely under the relevant case law, but that in many situations tribunals will have no 
access to member state courts and the ECJ, for example, when the tribunal's seat is in a 
third state. It is noteworthy that in a number of arbitrations the respondent member states 
suggested that the question of the compatibility of the arbitration clauses with EU law is 
submitted to the ECJ, but the tribunals rejected the requests in each case.409 
5.3.3. Opinion 1/09  
Opinion 1/09 has been quoted in a number of arbitral awards to make a point about the 
inapplicability of Article 344 TFEU to investor-state disputes. This opinion concerned the 
creation of a European and Community Patents Court ('the PC') composed of a court of 
first instance and court of appeal.410 In addition to the EU and its member states, a number 
of third states (from Europe) were to become parties to the agreement. At the outset, the 
ECJ held that the planned court was compatible with Article 344 TFEU, because the PC's 
jurisdiction related only to 'disputes between individuals in the field of patents'.411 The 
Electrabel tribunal used this finding to argue that Article 344 TFEU does not apply to any 
dispute settlement mechanisms 'involving private parties',412 although the Court's statement 
(as the quote demonstrates) was much more confined.413 But he Court did find the 
proposed agreement to be incompatible with the founding treaties on a number of grounds, 
some of which are already familiar. As to Article 19(1) TEU, the Court emphasized that 
both the ECJ and member state courts act as 'the guardians' of the EU legal order by 
ensuring that the 'law is observed' in the interpretation and application of the founding 
treaties.414 The principle of sincere cooperation obligates the ECJ and member state courts 
to ensure 'judicial protection of an individual’s rights' under EU law, and the preliminary 
reference mechanism embodies this collaborative relationship.415 The Court described the 
                                                
409 See e.g. Eureko award, supra note 74, paras. 148 and 242. 
410 Opinion 1/09, supra note 354, para. 8. 
411 Ibid., para. 63. 
412 Electrabel award, supra note 144, para. 4.155. 
413 See Opinion 1/09, supra note 354, para. 63. The paragraph reads as follows: 'Nor can the creation of the 
PC be in conflict with Article 344 TFEU [formerly Article 292 EC], given that that article merely prohibits 
Member States from submitting a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any 
method of settlement other than those provided for in the Treaties. The jurisdiction which the draft agreement 
intends to grant to the PC relates only to disputes between individuals in the field of patents' (emphasis 
added). 
414 Ibid., paras. 66 and 69. 
415 Ibid., paras. 68-69. 
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EU judicial system as 'a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to 
ensure review of the legality of acts of the [EU] institutions'.416  
 
These features were then contrasted with the characteristics of the PC. As a first matter, the 
PC was not to be part of the judicial system of the EU provided for in Article 19(1) TEU, 
as it was 'an organization with a distinct legal personality under international law'.417 The 
PC was to replace national courts entirely in the area over which it was to have exclusive 
jurisdiction and that jurisdiction related to disputes in the 'Community patent field'. This 
meant that the PC was to 'ensure, in that field, the full application of European Union law 
and the judicial protection of individual rights under that law'.418 The Court referred to 
Opinion 1/91 to remind that the EU is competent, in principle, to enter into an agreement 
which creates a court 'responsible for the interpretation of its provisions';419 to Opinion 
1/92 to remind that an international agreement concluded with third states may confer new 
powers to the Court if such conferral 'does not change the essential character of the 
function of the Court as conceived' in the founding treaties;420 and to Opinion 1/00 to 
remind that a treaty may also affect the Court’s powers if the 'indispensable conditions for 
safeguarding the essential character of those powers are satisfied and, consequently, there 
is no adverse effect on the autonomy of the European Union legal order'.421  
 
The proposed courts in the referred opinions were to interpret and apply the provisions of 
the international agreements concerned (and not directly provisions of EU law, apart from 
the question of competence in the EEA context), whereas the PC was empowered to 
directly interpret and apply EU law.422 Likewise, some of the proposed courts in the other 
opinions were mandated to submit preliminary questions to the ECJ, but the powers of 
member state courts to interpret and apply EU law and to request preliminary rulings were 
left intact. This was not the case in relation to the PC, which was to replace national courts 
entirely in the area of its exclusive jurisdiction, and this 'deprivation' extended to the use of 
the preliminary ruling procedure.423 According to the draft agreement, the PC was to base 
                                                
416 Ibid., para. 70. 
417 Ibid., para. 71. 
418 Ibid., paras. 72-73. 
419 Ibid., para. 74. With reference to Opinion 1/91, supra note 362, paras. 40 and 70. 
420 Ibid., para. 75. With reference to Opinion 1/92, supra note 391, para. 32. This statement related to the 
proposed non-binding nature of the decisions of the CJEU in the first EEA draft agreement. 
421 Ibid., para. 76. With reference to Opinion 1/00, supra note 392, paras. 21, 23 and 26. 
422 Ibid., para. 77. 
423 Idem. 
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its decisions on the provisions of that agreement, directly applicable EU law and the 
European Patent Convention.424 The Court construed that the PC was bound to interpret 
and apply not only the 'future regulation on the Community patent', but also other relevant 
regulations and directives, including rules on intellectual property, as well as the TFEU's 
rules on the internal market and competition law.425 In addition, the Court saw that the PC 
could be called on to interpret and apply 'the fundamental rights and general principles' of 
EU law and to examine the validity of the acts of EU institutions.426 The draft agreement 
entailed a preliminary ruling procedure under which both the Court of First Instance and 
the Court of Appeal were authorized to submit preliminary questions to the ECJ when 'a 
question of interpretation of the…[founding treaties] or the validity and interpretation of 
acts of the institutions of the European Community' are raised before them.427 Similarly to 
Article 267 TFEU, the Court of First Instance was to submit questions when 'necessary', 
whereas the Court of Appeal 'shall request' the ECJ to decide such questions.428  
 
The Court recognized that it has no jurisdiction to rule on disputes between individuals in 
the field of patents, as that jurisdiction belongs to national courts.429 However, member 
states were not entitled to transfer that jurisdiction to a court such as the PC, inasmuch as 
this would deprive national courts of their power to apply EU law and to use the 
preliminary reference procedure in the patent field.430 The Court underlined the importance 
of the preliminary ruling procedure in ensuring that EU law has the same effect in all 
member states and in all circumstances, and described it as 'indispensable to the 
preservation of the very nature of the law established by the Treaties'.431 For practical 
purposes, and despite textual differences, the preliminary ruling procedure in the draft 
agreement was identical to the one established in Article 267 TFEU,432 but this was not 
enough for the Court, also because there were two more specific problems with the PC 
                                                
424 Ibid., para. 9. 
425 This led the Electrabel tribunal to argue that the Court’s finding of incompatibility in Opinion 1/09 was 
not applicable in respect of BIT arbitration clauses, because unlike the Patent Court, investment tribunals 
settle disputes concerning alleged violations of the ECT or a BIT, and not of EU law, and neither are arbitral 
tribunals authorized to determine the validity of particular EU acts, as the PC would have. See Electrabel 
award, supra note 144, paras. 4.156-4.157. See also EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 263 and Eureko 
award, supra note 74, para. 290. 
426 Opinion 1/09, supra note 354, para. 78. 
427 Ibid., para. 12. 
428 Idem. 
429 Ibid., para. 80. 
430 Idem. 
431 Ibid., paras. 82-85. 
432 Ibid., para. 20. 
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system. The first problem stemmed from the fact that under EU law member states are 
obligated to compensate damages (on certain conditions) that individuals incur as a result 
of violations of EU law, and this includes the obligation to compensate damages caused by 
decisions of judicial bodies. The second problem related to the fact that under EU law the 
Commission can start infringement proceedings against a member state if the decisions of 
its domestic courts violate EU law.433 In contrast, if the PC were to render decisions that 
violate EU law, those decisions 'could not be the subject of infringement proceedings', nor 
cause financial liability for any member state.434 Put differently, under the draft agreement 
the ECJ was not in a position to judicially review the decisions of the PC, and individuals 
incurring damages as a result of the PC's decisions (which violate EU law) could not 
receive compensation. 
 
It is uncertain whether the PC court system would have been incompatible with EU law 
even in the absence of these two last points. On the one hand, the Court held categorically 
that member states 'cannot confer the jurisdiction' to resolve patent disputes on the PC, 
because this would deprive member state courts of their task to implement EU law and 
thereby 'of the power…or, as the case may be, the obligation, to refer questions for a 
preliminary ruling in the field concerned'.435 On the other hand, the Opinion's substantive 
part emphasized that the cooperation between member state courts and the ECJ ensured the 
'judicial protection of an individual’s rights' and constituted ‘a complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to ensure review of the legality of acts of the [EU] 
institutions.’436 Since the PC's decisions were not subject to such review, and since the 
rights of affected individuals were not adequately protected, it is arguable that these 
shortcomings rendered the proposed agreement incompatible with the autonomy of the EU 
legal order, and not the conferral of jurisdiction alone. The Court summarized its position 
and held that the envisaged PC system 'would deprive' national courts 'of their powers in 
relation to the interpretation and application' of EU law and the ECJ of 'its powers to reply, 
by preliminary ruling, to questions' referred by the former. This, in turn, 'would alter the 
essential character of the powers which the Treaties confer' on EU institutions and on the 
                                                
433 Ibid., paras. 86-87. 
434 Ibid., para. 88. 
435 Ibid., para. 80. 
436 Ibid., paras. 68-70. 
 131 
member states, those powers being 'indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of 
European Union law'.437  
 
BIT arbitration clauses have no impact on the powers of member state courts or the ECJ, 
although many BITs contain so called fork-in-the-road clauses, which stipulate that if an 
investor takes a dispute to arbitration, he can no longer resort to remedies available under 
national law (and vice versa), but it is unclear to what extent this exclusion extends to 
remedies investors may have under EU law. Be that as it may, it is useful to say a few 
words on the Court's finding that the PC's jurisdiction was not in conflict with Article 344 
TFEU, because the 'jurisdiction which the draft agreement intends to grant to the PC 
relates only to disputes between individuals in the field of patents'.438 Read literally, this 
finding has no direct relevance for answering the question of whether BIT arbitration 
clauses are compatible with Article 344 TFEU, because BIT disputes can in principle 
relate to any field of EU law and always include a member state as a disputing party. 
Neither does the Court's finding answer the question of whether Article 344 TFEU reflects 
a more general principle, as argued by the Commission, according to which member states 
may not conclude treaties authorizing private parties to bring claims against them before 
non-EU courts and tribunals in respect of disputes involving questions of EU law.  
 
Similarly, and as already noted, there clearly are situations where the decisions of arbitral 
tribunals are outside the reach of member state courts and the ECJ. While there is variation 
in the content of arbitration clauses, most BITs allow investors to choose between ICSID 
and other arbitration institutions, and the seat of a tribunal may well be outside the EU 
irrespective of the arbitration rules that govern the proceedings. When an arbitration takes 
place outside the EU, the case can end up before a member state court only at the 
enforcement stage, and the New York and ICSID conventions provide very limited 
grounds for reviewing the content of arbitral awards. Likewise, there may be situations 
where the disputing parties comply with the tribunal's decisions, including the final award, 
in which case the tribunal's interpretation of the relevant EU law provisions is not subject 
to review under the preliminary ruling procedure. Again, the question is whether the fact 
that arbitral tribunals may interpret and apply EU law 'alter the essential character of the 
powers' of member state courts and the ECJ as envisaged in Article 267 TFEU, because, 
                                                
437 Ibid., para. 89. 
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first, the latter are excluded from reviewing the 'correctness' of those interpretations in a 
number of situations and, second, because tribunals may have to rule on the division of 
competences between the EU and its member states, which led to a finding of 
incompatibility in Opinion 1/91.  
5.3.4. Opinion 2/13439 
The draft agreement concerning the accession of the EU to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)440 was the result of lengthy negotiations between the EU 
Commission and the European Council, with the official history of the EU's accession 
having started in 1979 when the Commission drafted a memorandum on the topic.441 In 
Opinion 2/94, the ECJ had held that the EU had no competence to become a party to the 
ECHR, but this deficiency was resolved through the adoption of Article 6(2) TEU, which 
provides that the 'Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' on the condition that the accession does not 
affect 'the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties'. In addition to Article 6(2) TEU, 
one of the protocols to the TFEU lists a number of other conditions to the accession; the 
accession agreement has to ensure that the 'specific characteristics of the EU and EU law' 
are preserved; the accession may not affect the competences of the EU or the powers of its 
institutions, and the accession agreement may not affect Article 344 TFEU.442 In its 
lengthy analysis extending to over hundred paragraphs, the Court found the draft accession 
agreement to be incompatible with Article 6(2) TEU and Protocol No (8) on a number of 
grounds.443  
 
As a first matter, the Court laid down the groundwork for its findings by outlining the 
contours of the 'constitutional framework' of the EU legal order, which instructs and 
                                                
439 Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
440 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by 
Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 213 UNTS 222. 
441 For this early history, see Walther Michl, Die Überprüfung des Unionsrechts am Maßstab der EMRK 
(Mohr Siebeck, 2014), pp. 51-65. 
442  Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union to 
the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, p. 273. This Protocol has the same legal value as the founding treaties. 
443 Given the length of the analysis and the many nuances that each of the Court's findings entail, I have 
excluded some parts of the Court's reasoning to maintain a sufficient level of clarity and generality. I will not 
provide a critique the Court's findings, as such concerns are outside the scope of this study, but I will refer to 
some academic sources which discuss some of the issues and questions that the Court's findings raise. 
 133 
controls the interpretation and application of fundamental rights within the EU.444 Some 
aspects of this framework are familiar by now. The founding treaties had created 'a new 
legal order', with its own 'founding principles' and a 'particularly sophisticated institutional 
structure', which have 'consequences as regards the procedure for and conditions of 
accession to the ECHR'.445 Primacy of EU law and its direct effect, and other 'essential 
characteristics of EU law', have created a 'structured network of principles, rules and 
mutually interdependent legal relations linking' the EU and its member states, and the 
member states with each other, to a 'process of creating an ever closer union'.446 From this 
the Court inferred that each member state shares with the other member states 'a set of 
common values on which the EU is founded', and that a 'mutual trust' exists between the 
member states that 'those values will be recognized and, therefore, that the law of the EU 
that implements them will be respected'.447 These values have two distinct sources: first, 
Article 2 TEU stipulates that the EU is founded on freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, and second, as the Charter of the Fundamental Rights 
of the EU (the Charter) is now an integral part of the Union’s legal order, all acts of the EU 
institutions must be compatible with the rights enshrined therein, as Article 6(1) TEU 
provides that the Charter has 'the same legal value as the Treaties'.448  
 
The autonomy of the EU legal order requires that the fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Charter are interpreted and applied in isolation of both member states' legal orders and 
international law, and the Court referred to Kadi where it had held that its power to review 
acts of the EU institutions in light of fundamental rights 'is not to be prejudiced by an 
international agreement'.449 Other fundamental rules of EU law require similarly 
autonomous interpretation, and the preliminary ruling procedure in particular was designed 
to ensure that these rules receive a uniform interpretation.450 The Court invoked the 
principle of sincere cooperation to make the point that member states are under an 
obligation to 'ensure, in their respective territories, the application and respect for EU law', 
                                                
444 In the Court's words: 'Fundamental rights, as recognised in particular by the Charter, must therefore be 
interpreted and applied within the EU in accordance with the constitutional framework referred to in 
paragraphs 155 to 176 above'. Opinion 2/13, supra note 439, para. 177.  
445 Ibid., para. 158. 
446 Ibid., para. 167. 
447 Ibid., para. 168.  
448 Ibid., para. 169. 
449 Ibid., para. 170. The Court referred to Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 
ECLI:EU:C:1970:114, para. 4, and to Kadi & Al-Bakaraat, supra note 339, paras. 281-285, the quote is from 
para. 316. 
450 Ibid., paras. 172 and 174.  
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and national courts are obliged to safeguard 'the full application of EU law' and to provide 
'judicial protection of an individual’s rights under that law'.451 The preliminary ruling 
procedure was central to achieving the 'uniform interpretation of EU law', which entailed 
ensuring 'its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well, ultimately, the particular 
nature of the law established by the Treaties'.452  
 
At the beginning of its analysis of the ECHR accession agreement, the Court postulated 
two broad questions which reflected the preconditions of the EU's accession: first, is the 
proposed agreement liable to have a negative impact on the specific characteristics of EU 
law or the autonomy of EU law in the area of fundamental rights protection; and second, 
do the institutional and procedural mechanisms proposed in the accession agreement 
ensure that the requirements for the Union’s accession are satisfied.453 Pursuant to Article 
216(2) TFEU, the provisions of the ECHR were to bind the EU institutions as of accession, 
and those institutions, including the ECJ, would become 'subject to external control to 
ensure the observance of the rights and freedoms' established in the ECHR.454 While in 
principle the institutions of the EU are authorized to conclude an agreement having such 
binding effects, the Court reminded that an international agreement can 'affect its own 
powers only if the indispensable conditions for safeguarding the essential character of 
those powers are satisfied and, consequently, there is no adverse effect on the autonomy of 
the EU legal order'.455 In particular, the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) 'must not have the effect of binding the EU and its institutions, in the exercise of 
their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of EU law'.456 
 
As to Article 344 TFEU, the Court construed that the obligation of member states to 
respect its exclusive jurisdiction was a 'specific expression' of the principle of sincere 
cooperation established in Article 4(3) TEU.457 Transposed to the ECHR context, the 
implication was that when a dispute arises between member states or between member 
states and the EU over the compatibility of a given EU law instrument with the ECHR, the 
                                                
451 Ibid., para. 175. With reference to Opinion 1/09, supra note 354, para. 68. 
452 Ibid., para. 176. With reference to Opinion 1/09, supra note 354, paras. 67 and 83. 
453 Ibid., para. 178. 
454 Ibid., paras. 180-181. 
455 Ibid., paras. 182-183. With reference to Opinion 1/00, supra note 392, paras. 21, 23 and 26; and Opinion 
1/09, supra note 355, para. 76). 
456 Ibid., para. 184 (emphasis added). With reference to Opinion 1/91, supra note 362, paras. 30-35; and 
Opinion 1/00, supra note 392, para. 13. 
457 Ibid., paras. 201-202. 
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ECJ has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.458 Article 55 of the ECHR provides that 
the contracting states agree not to 'avail themselves' of other dispute settlement 
mechanisms when their dispute concerns the interpretation or application of the ECHR.459 
While the draft agreement provided that proceedings before the ECJ were excluded from 
the scope of Article 55 ECHR,460 the Court saw that it was 'not sufficient to preserve' its 
exclusive jurisdiction under Article 344 TFEU.461 For the Court, the draft agreement only 
reduced 'the scope of the obligation laid down by Article 55 ECHR' and made it possible 
that either the EU institutions or the member states submit a dispute to the EctHR which 
concerns the compatibility of an EU act with the ECHR.462 As Article 344 TFEU was 
designed to ensure that the specific characteristics and objectives of EU law are taken 
account of when disputes over its contents arise, only an explicit exclusion of the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR over disputes between member states and between member 
states and the EU 'in relation to the application of the ECHR within the scope ratione 
materiae of EU law would be compatible with Article 344 TFEU'.463  
 
The second problem of the draft agreement related to the 'co-respondent mechanism'. The 
purpose of the mechanism was to ensure that proceedings 'by non-Member States and 
individual applications [to the EctHR] are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the 
Union as appropriate'.464 In other words, the mechanism strove to ensure that claims 
against the EU and/or its member states were addressed to the correct respondent, and this 
attribution had to be achieved in a way that preserves the 'specific characteristics of the 
                                                
458 Ibid., para. 204. 
459 The full text of Article 55 ECHR reads: 'Exclusion of other means of dispute settlement. The High 
Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, they will not avail themselves of treaties, 
conventions or declarations in force between them for the purpose of submitting, by way of petition, a 
dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Convention to a means of settlement other than 
those provided for in this Convention.' 
460 See Article 5 of the Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter 'draft agreement'). The draft 
agreement is included in the Final Report to the Steering Committee for Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe, which is available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf 
(accessed 14 January 2017). 
461 Opinion 2/13, supra note 439, para. 206. 
462 Ibid., para. 207. Article 33 ECHR reads: 'Inter-State cases. Any High Contracting Party may refer to the 
Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High 
Contracting Party.' For a critique of this position, see Stian Øby Johansen, 'The Reinterpretation of TFEU 
Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and its Potential Consequences', 6 German Law Journal (2015), pp. 169-178. 
463 Ibid., para. 213. For an analysis and critique of the Court's approach, see Piet Eeckhout, 'Opinion 2/13 on 
EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky?', 38 Fordham International Law 
Journal (2015), pp. 955-992, at 972-979. 
464 Protocol (No 8), supra note 442, Art. 1. 
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Union and Union Law'.465 The ECJ noted that the determination of the correct respondent 
depends on the division of powers between the EU and its member states and on the 
criteria by which an act or omission is attributed between them.466 Such determination, in 
the words of the Court, 'necessarily presupposes an assessment of EU law'.467 Further, 
Article 3(5) of the draft agreement concerned situations where either the EU or a member 
state requests to become a co-respondent. In such situations, the ECtHR was to 'seek the 
views of all parties to the proceedings' before deciding whether the conditions laid down 
for the use of the co-respondent mechanism were met.468 Likewise, the draft agreement 
provided that the respondent and co-respondent were jointly responsible for a violation of 
the ECHR, but the ECtHR was empowered to decide that only one of them bears 
responsibility.469 Both type of decisions would necessarily entail an assessment of EU law 
provisions 'governing the division of powers between the EU and its member states', as 
would the resolution of the question of attribution.470 Hence, the conclusion was that the 
co-respondent mechanism would 'interfere' or 'risk adversely affecting the division of 
powers' between the EU and its member states, and the specific characteristics of the EU 
and EU law would not be preserved as Article 1 of Protocol No (8) required.471 This was 
similar to Opinion 1/91, where the Court held that the EEA court's power to determine 
whether the Community or a member state was the correct respondent in a specific case 
was 'likely adversely to affect…the autonomy of the Community legal order'.472 
 
The third issue of concern related to the 'prior involvement' procedure.473 To understand 
the Court's concern, it is necessary to say a few words on the procedure's background. 
Generally speaking, national courts ensure that individuals enjoy the rights that EU law 
provides. Should an individual wish to challenge an EU act on the ground that it violates 
his fundamental rights, the individual can raise a claim before a national court, which may 
                                                
465 Ibid., Art 1(b). 
466 Opinion 2/13, supra note 439, para. 221. 
467 Idem. 
468 Art. 3(5) of the draft agreement, supra note 460. 
469 Such decision was to be taken 'on the basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the co-respondent, 
and [after] having sought views of the applicant'. See Article 3(7) of the draft agreement, supra note 460.  
470 Opinion 2/13, supra note 439, para. 230. 
471 Ibid., paras. 225, 231 and 235. 
472 Opinion 1/91, supra note 362, para. 35.  
473 For a discussion and analysis of the procedure, see Roberto Baratta, 'Accession of the EU to the ECHR: 
The Rationale for the ECJ's Prior Involvement Mechanism', 50 Common Market Law Review (2013), pp. 
1305-1332. 
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lead to the involvement of the ECJ through the preliminary ruling procedure.474 When a 
member state court submits a relevant preliminary question, the ECJ then assesses the 
validity of the EU act in light of fundamental rights provisions or, alternatively, provides 
an interpretation of a primary law provision that is most consistent with fundamental rights 
protection (the Court has no power to rule on the validity of primary law). The prior 
involvement procedure was meant to apply in situations where the ECJ had not previously 
given such a ruling on a provision of EU law which an applicant had invoked before the 
ECtHR. The draft agreement's text implied that the ECtHR was to determine whether the 
ECJ had ruled 'on the same question of law as that at issue in the proceedings before the 
EctHR', and, if not, the Court was to provide an assessment of that question.475 For the 
ECJ, this was equal to granting to the ECtHR 'jurisdiction to interpret' its case law.476 
Similarly, the draft agreement excluded from the prior involvement procedure the 
interpretation of secondary law acts, which meant the ECtHR alone was to interpret such 
acts.477 This exclusion 'most certainly' breached the Court's exclusive jurisdiction 'over the 
definitive interpretation of EU law'.478 In other words, if an individual files an application 
before the ECtHR and argues that a provision of secondary law violates his rights under 
the ECHR, the Strasbourg court was to interpret that provision in light of the ECHR 
however ambiguous the provision's text and without the ECJ's involvement. This affected 
'the competences of the EU and the powers of the Court of Justice', and the general 
                                                
474 Individuals can initiate proceedings before the ECJ against EU acts addressed to them or against acts 
which are 'of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to 
them and does not entail implementing measures'. See Article 263(4) TFEU.  
475 Opinion 2/13, supra note 439, para. 238. Article 3(6) of the draft agreement is the relevant provision in 
this regard and it reads as follows: 'In proceedings to which the European Union is a co-respondent, if the 
Court of Justice of the European Union has not yet assessed the compatibility with the rights at issue defined 
in the Convention or in the protocols to which the European Union has acceded of the provision of European 
Union law as under paragraph 2 of this article, sufficient time shall be afforded for the Court of Justice of the 
European Union to make such an assessment, and thereafter for the parties to make observations to the Court. 
The European Union shall ensure that such assessment is made quickly so that the proceedings before the 
Court are not unduly delayed. The provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the powers of the Court.'  For 
a discussion of this aspect of the procedure, see Baratta, 'Accession of the EU to the ECHR', supra note 473, 
pp. 1313-1316. 
476 Ibid., para. 239. 
477 The draft explanatory report of the draft agreement characterized the CJEU's assessment powers in the 
following terms: 'Assessing the compatibility with the Convention shall mean to rule on the validity of a 
legal provision contained in acts of the EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, or on the interpretation of 
a provision of the TEU, the TFEU or of any other provision having the same legal value pursuant to those 
instruments.' See para. 66 of the Draft explanatory report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European 
Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Appendix 5 in the 
Final Report to the Steering Committee for Human Rights, see supra note 460). 
478 Opinion 2/13, supra note 439, paras. 242-246. 
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conclusion was that the prior involvement procedure does not preserve 'the specific 
characteristics of the EU and EU law'.479  
 
The Court also took issue with the ECtHR's powers to review EU acts adopted in the area 
of Common Foreign and Security policy, but there is no need to elaborate on the Court's 
analysis because it was by and large analogous to the analysis in Opinion 1/09.480 Many of 
the Court's findings were fundamentally similar to those of the previous opinions as the 
numerous cross-references also testify. The requirement of preserving the 'specific 
characteristics' of EU law stemmed from Protocol (No 8), but in substantive terms it is 
identical with the criteria established in the previous opinions in respect of the autonomy 
of the EU legal order. Similar to Opinion 1/91, Opinion 2/13 raises the question of whether 
the possibility that arbitral tribunals will have to assess the division of powers between the 
EU and its member states for the purposes of attribution breaches the autonomy of the EU 
legal order, also because such decisions are not necessarily subject to review under the 
preliminary ruling procedure. The Court's take on the prior involvement procedure, in turn, 
reminds that arbitral tribunals may have to interpret EU law provisions, the meaning of 
which the ECJ has not clarified, and the question is whether this possibility breaches, by 
analogy, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court 'over the definitive interpretation of EU 
law', as it may be excluded from reviewing tribunals' interpretations.  
 
                                                
479 Ibid., paras. 247-248. For the argument that the Court's approach on the co-respondent mechanism and 
prior involvement procedure are 'well founded', see Daniel Haberstam, '"It's the Autonomy, Stupid!" A 
Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on the EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward', 6 German Law 
Journal (2015), pp. 105-146, at 115-117. 
480 The jurisdiction of the ECJ over the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is explicitly limited in 
the founding treaties, but the Court has not ruled on the scope of that jurisdiction. Yet, for the Court, it was 
clear that 'certain acts adopted in the context of the CFSP fall outside the ambit of judicial review by the 
Court of Justice'. As a result of the EU’s accession, the ECtHR would have jurisdiction to decide whether 
certain CFSP acts are compatible with the ECHR, while the Court could not review their legality under EU 
law for lack of jurisdiction. The ECJ referred to Opinion 1/09 and held that the competence to judicially 
review particular EU acts 'cannot be conferred exclusively on an international court which is outside the 
institutional and judicial framework of the EU'. The conclusion was that the draft agreement failed 'to have 
regard to the specific characteristics of EU law with regards to the judicial review of acts, actions or omission 
on the part of the EU in CFSP matters'. Although the ECJ had no competence to review certain CFSP acts, 
the ECtHR could not be placed in a position where from it is authorized to interpret such acts so as to 
determine their compatibility with the ECHR. See ibid., paras. 249-252, 254, 256-257. On the last finding, 
Peers argues that this finding means, by analogy, 'that it would also breach EU law for Member States to 
bring a CFSP dispute to the International Court of Justice, or indeed any other international court or tribunal, 
although presumably national courts could still have jurisdiction.'. See Steve Peers, 'The EU's Accession to 
the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare', 6 German Law Journal (2015), pp. 213-222, at 220.  
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5.3.5. The MOX Plant Judgment 
The underlying dispute in MOX Plant concerned the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment. Ireland had brought an arbitral claim against the UK for alleged 
breaches of several provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS/Convention), which led the Commission to start infringement proceedings 
against Ireland.481 Both the EU and its member states are parties to UNCLOS and had 
competences over the subject-matter of UNCLOS. The Commission's first argument was 
that the provisions of the Convention whose breach Ireland had invoked before the 
UNCLOS tribunal fell within the competence of the EU.482 Hence, Ireland had breached 
Article 344 TFEU by raising the arbitral claim as the ECJ had exclusive jurisdiction over 
the dispute as it concerned the interpretation and application of EU law (i.e. the UNCLOS 
provisions over which the EU had competence). The Court agreed and noted that the 
Convention forms an integral part of the EU legal order once the Union had become a 
party and it was binding on the EU institutions and the member states under what is now 
Article 216(2) TFEU. Similarly, the Convention's provisions on which Ireland relied 
before the UNCLOS tribunal came within the scope of Community competence, and the 
Court 'has jurisdiction to deal with disputes relating to the interpretation and application of 
those provisions and to assess a Member State's compliance with them'.483 The Court also 
referred to Opinions 1/91 and 1/00 and repeated the point that 'an international agreement 
cannot affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties and, consequently, 
the autonomy of the Community legal system'.484 What allowed preserving autonomy in 
the UNCLOS context was Article 282 of the Convention which provides that the 
contracting states can submit a dispute concerning its interpretation and application to 
another judicial body when they had agreed to do so in a 'general, regional or bilateral 
agreement or otherwise', and in such cases that other procedure 'shall apply in lieu of the 
procedures provided' in the Convention. In other words, the Convention authorized other 
courts and tribunals to settle disputes stemming from UNCLOS, and this allowed the ECJ 
                                                
481 MOX Plant, supra note 348. Ireland had also raised a claim against the UK under the 1992 Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), but the OSPAR 
tribunal had decided the case in favor of the UK before the Commission initiated the proceedings before the 
CJEU. For a discussion of this part of the MOX Plant dispute, see Yuval Shany, 'The First MOX Plant 
Award: The Need to Harmonize Competing Environmental Regimes and Dispute Settlement Procedures', 17 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2004), pp. 815-827. 
482 MOX Plant, supra note 348, para. 60. 
483 Ibid., para. 121. 
484 Ibid., para. 123. 
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to hold that 'the system for the resolution of disputes set out in the EC Treaty must in 
principle take precedence over' the UNCLOS system.485  
 
As to the scope of Article 344 TFEU, the Court noted that the dispute was between two 
member states and concerned 'an alleged failure to comply' with EU law obligations based 
on UNCLOS provisions, which implied that it was 'clearly covered by one of the methods 
of dispute settlement established' by the founding treaties 'within the terms' of Article 344 
TFEU, namely, the procedure set out in what is now Article 259 TFEU.486 Similarly, that 
the arbitral proceedings were a form of dispute settlement in the meaning of Article 344 
TFEU was clear on the basis of Article 296 UNCLOS which provided that decisions of 
UNCLOS tribunals' 'shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the 
dispute'. BITs also provide that arbitral awards are final and binding on the parties, so it 
seems evident that investment arbitration qualifies as a method of dispute settlement in the 
meaning of Article 344 TFEU, on the assumption that it applies to investment arbitration 
as well. The question of competence was also central to the Court's findings; if the EU had 
had no competence over the UNCLOS provisions which Ireland had invoked, the dispute 
between Ireland and the UK would not have fallen under the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction. 
The Court acknowledged that some aspects of the dispute between Ireland and the UK 
might 'fall outside its jurisdiction',487 but Article 282 of the Convention allowed it to 
bypass this dilemma and made it unnecessary to delineate the exact division of 
competences. But the central question is whether the existence of EU competence was 
relevant for the Court's brief remarks on the autonomy of EU law? In the Open Skies 
judgments, it was unclear whether the Court's finding of discrimination hinged on the 
existence of EU competence, whereas in MOX Plant the question is whether the issue of 
autonomy became relevant because of the EU's competence over the UNCLOS provisions 
that Ireland had invoked before the UNCLOS tribunal.  
 
To answer this question, it is necessary look at the Commission's second head of complaint 
in MOX Plant. Ireland had invoked a number of EU law instruments before the UNCLOS 
tribunal, and the Commission argued that 'the submission by Ireland of instruments of 
                                                
485 Ibid., para. 125. 
486 Ibid., para. 128. The first paragraph of Article 259 TFEU provides that a 'Member State which considers 
that another Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties may bring the matter before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union'. 
487 See ibid., para. 135. 
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Community law for interpretation and application by the Arbitral Tribunal amounts to a 
breach' of Article 344 TFEU.488 The UK Government intervened to support the 
Commission's case and argued, first, that Ireland's arguments before the UNCLOS tribunal 
concerned 'the interpretation to be given to specific provisions' of (inter alia) two directives 
and, second, that Ireland had contended that the UK's conduct 'was incompatible with 
certain Community-law obligations' that it had under these two directives and other 
relevant EU law instruments.489 There was a clear substantive overlap between the 
UNCLOS provisions and the EU instruments that Ireland invoked; for example, Ireland 
had referred to Directive 85/337 before the UNCLOS tribunal to provide a reference point 
to the interpretation of Article 206 UNCLOS. That directive provided that the member 
states shall carry out an impact assessment of 'projects likely to have significant effects on 
the environment', whereas Article 206 UNCLOS provided that when the contracting states 
'have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction or 
control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine 
environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential effects of such activities 
on the marine environment'.490 
 
Ireland argued that the relevant instruments of EU law were invoked solely 'as non-binding 
elements of fact' with the purpose of assisting the interpretation of the relevant UNCLOS 
provisions 'by indicating how those terms are understood' under EU law.491 Ireland argued 
that it was not requesting the UNCLOS tribunal to assess whether the UK had breached the 
EU law instruments, and claimed that its references to them were an instance of renvoi, 'a 
frequently used juridical technique designed to guarantee the harmonious coexistence of 
rules deriving from different legal orders'.492 In other words, Ireland argued that the 
UNCLOS provisions which the UK had allegedly breached should be understood in an 
analogous fashion to the corresponding provisions of the EU law instruments, and in that 
                                                
488 MOX Plant, supra note 348, para. 140. These instruments included Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 
June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 
175, 5.7.1985, pp. 40-48, and Council Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to 
information on the environment, OJ l 158, 23.6.1990, pp. 56-58.  
489 Ibid., paras. 142-143.  
490 See Article 2(1) of Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of 
certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, pp. 40-48 (the directive is no 
longer in force). 
491 MOX Plant, supra note 348, para. 144. In other words, the EU law instruments and UNCLOS contained 
similarly worded provisions and Ireland strove to show how the text of the former are understood under EU 
law. 
492 Ibid., para. 145. See also Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, Opinion of AG Maduro, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:42, para. 45. 
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sense they were part of the factual evidence presented to the tribunal. However, the ECJ 
concurred with the Commission and the UK. For the Court, it was clear that Ireland 
invoked the EU law instruments pursuant to Article 293 UNCLOS, which provided that 
the arbitral tribunal 'shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not 
incompatible with this Convention'. In this light, the instruments were raised not only to 
elucidate the meaning of the relevant UNCLOS provisions, but also 'as rules of 
international law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal pursuant to Article 293 of the 
Convention'.493 While Ireland expressly denied that it had invited the tribunal to determine 
whether the UK had breached the EU law instruments, the Court held that Ireland's 
submissions were made to receive a 'declaration' that the UK had violated the instruments, 
and such declaration necessarily hinged on the interpretation and application of those 
instruments by the UNCLOS tribunal.494 This breached 'the exclusive nature of the Court's 
jurisdiction' under Article 344 TFEU as the instruments came within the scope of EU law 
in the meaning of that article. 
 
The Court did not stop there. It continued by noting that the manner in which Ireland had 
acted at the UNCLOS proceedings (i.e. by invoking the EU law instruments), 'involve a 
manifest risk that the jurisdictional order laid down in the Treaties and, consequently, the 
autonomy of the Community legal system may be adversely affected'.495 Ireland's 
assurance that it was not requesting the UNCLOS tribunal to examine whether the UK had 
breached EU law did not remove this 'manifest risk', and the existence of such risk 
rendered 'entirely irrelevant the fact that Ireland may have called on the Arbitral Tribunal 
to apply Community law by way of renvoi or by recourse to any other technique'.496 After 
the Court's judgment, Ireland withdrew its claim and the UNCLOS tribunal terminated the 
proceedings accordingly.497 One important observation is that the question of competence 
appeared to be irrelevant to the Court's general conclusion on the second head of complaint 
(including to its remarks on the issue of autonomy), whereas in relation to the other heads 
of complaint it was central.498 Neither did the Court refer to the fact that the EU is an 
UNCLOS contracting party alongside its member states when making the conclusion that 
                                                
493 Ibid., para. 149. 
494 Ibid., para. 151. 
495 Ibid., para. 154. 
496 Ibid., paras. 155-156.  
497 See MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), PCA Case No. 2002-01, Procedural Order No. 6 
(Termination of Proceedings), 6 June 2008. 
498 There were three heads of complaint, but I will not deal with the third head of complaint because it adds 
nothing new to the analysis. 
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Ireland's invocation of the instruments breached Article 344 TFEU and posed a threat to 
the 'autonomy of the Community legal system'. Generally speaking, this would imply that 
the Court's findings on the second head of complaint are also relevant in respect of 
situations where the member states invoke EU law instruments in disputes concerning a 
treaty to which they alone are parties and which provides that disputes concerning its 
interpretation and application are to be settled by ad hoc arbitration tribunals (like member 
state BITs). 
  
The Court's reasoning leaves some questions open. It is uncertain whether the Court 
indicated that the interpretation and application of EU law by a court or tribunal operating 
outside the EU legal order threatens the autonomy of the EU legal order as such, or 
whether such 'manifest risk' exists only when a non-EU court also determines whether a 
member state has breached specific EU law provisions. Arguably, a literal interpretation of 
the relevant paragraphs imply that it is enough that a non-EU court interprets and/or 
applies EU law for such 'manifest risk' to appear for three reasons. First, the Court 
discussed the autonomy issue separately and expressly held that Ireland's argument that it 
had raised the EU law instruments only as factual elements was 'entirely irrelevant' for the 
existence of the 'manifest risk'. In other words, the potential interpretation and application 
of EU law by the UNCLOS tribunal created a 'manifest risk' in itself and it was irrelevant 
whether or not the tribunal had also examined whether the UK had breached the 
instruments. Second, in respect of the fact/applicable law distinction, if EU law was only a 
factual element in the analysis, the tribunal would still need to interpret the instruments to 
assess their relevance for the dispute, and this is what the Court also implied by noting that 
it was irrelevant whether the instruments were a fact or part of the applicable law. Third, 
when a court or tribunal interprets an EU law instrument, that interpretation already entails, 
in many cases, an implicit declaration on whether a member state has violated its 
obligations under that instrument. For example, if the UNCLOS tribunal had analysed 
what the directives required from the member states, that analysis would have entailed an 
implicit declaration on the UK's compliance with the directive.  
 
The Court's take on Article 293 UNCLOS also merits a few comments. As noted, that 
article provides that UNCLOS tribunals 'shall apply this Convention and other rules of 
international law not incompatible with this Convention'. From this text, the Court inferred 
that the UNCLOS tribunal was bound to interpret and apply the EU law instruments raised 
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by Ireland, which breached Article 344 TFEU. Generally speaking, the Court's inference 
that Ireland's invocation of the EU law instruments necessarily leads the tribunal to 
interpret and apply them is correct, but it fails to specify what the ECJ thought about the 
status that EU law had in the UNCLOS proceedings; was it only a factual element as 
Ireland argued or part of the law that applies to the merits of the dispute. The ECJ held that 
Ireland had requested the tribunal to declare that the UK 'had breached the provisions of 
those [EU law] instruments'. Arguably, this twin contention - that Ireland was inviting the 
tribunal to declare a breach of EU law and that the tribunal would have accepted the 
invitation - is less than plausible. It may be the case that the tribunal's ruling could have 
been read as implying that the UK either breached or complied with its obligations under 
the EU law instruments, but an express ruling in this respect would have signalled manifest 
incompetence on the tribunal's part. The wording of the choice of law clause in Article 293 
UNCLOS is highly general, but arbitral tribunals are aware of the fact that their 
jurisdiction does not extend to give rulings 'on alleged breaches of EU law as such', as the 
EURAM tribunal put it,499 which also covers declarations on such breaches. An UNCLOS 
tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to resolving disputes which concern alleged breaches of the 
Convention's provisions, and EU law provisions can only act 'as non-binding elements of 
fact' in such analysis, as Ireland had argued. 
 
Put differently, assuming that the UNCLOS tribunal had declared a breach of EU law, such 
declaration would entail an assessment of the UK's actions only in light of the EU law 
instruments, but not an assessment of their compatibility with the relevant UNCLOS 
provisions, and only the latter was relevant for resolving the dispute between Ireland and 
the UK. Hence, the argument that those instruments were part of the applicable law is 
incorrect as the underlying dispute could only be resolved against the relevant UNCLOS 
provisions.500 The ECJ's reasoning in the Commission v. Slovakia judgment lends support 
to this understanding.501 In that case, Advocate-General Jääskinen had noted that the 
                                                
499 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 190. 
500 Schmalenbach makes the same argument by noting that although Article 293 UNCLOS 'allows the 
tribunal to apply – apart from UNCLOS – other rules of international law, this does not extend the tribunal's 
jurisdiction ratione materiae to' the EU founding treaties. Similarly, Article 293 UNCLOS 'neither opens the 
gate for a direct consultation of EC law in order to fully appreciate the meaning of UNCLOS rules, nor does 
it extend the tribunal’s mandate to the interpretation and application of EC law in a given case'. See 
Schmalenbach, 'Struggle for Exclusiveness', supra note 389, p. 1051 (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, 
had Ireland argued that certain UNCLOS provisions conflict with EU law, the tribunal would have needed to 
assess if the alleged conflict exists and which conflict rule applies, with EU law becoming, potentially, part 
of the applicable law, but Ireland did not raise such argument. 
501 Case C-264/09, Commission v Slovak Republic, ECLI:EU:C:2011:580. 
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Slovak-Switzerland BIT's interpretation is a task that 'falls exclusively within the 
competence' of arbitral tribunals established under the BIT, also because of the risk of 
different conclusions that the EU courts and arbitral tribunals could reach.502 Similarly, the 
Court recognized that it was not competent to interpret the BIT, but it nonetheless 
proceeded to analyze whether the termination of an investment contract by the Slovak 
Republic, as requested by the EU Commission, would breach the BIT's expropriation 
clause. The Commission had started the infringement proceedings on the ground that the 
investment contract breached EU non-discrimination rules. The Advocate-General pointed 
out that the BIT's provisions 'appear as facts relating to the alleged infringement [of EU 
law], not as legal norms to be interpreted by the Court'.503 While the BIT was only a factual 
element in the analysis, the Court not only interpreted the BIT but also declared that the 
contract's termination would 'have the same effect as expropriation within the meaning of 
Article 6 of the Investment Protection Agreement'.504 In other words, the Court's judgment 
entails a declaration that the termination of the investment contract would breach the 
Slovak Republic's obligations under the BIT.  
 
The point is that this is what arbitral tribunals will also necessarily do when the parties 
invoke EU law instruments in their submissions, while simultaneously recognizing that 
they are not authorized to rule on alleged breaches of EU law as such. The Advocate-
General's distinction between facts and 'legal norms to be interpreted by the Court' also 
suggests that the Court's finding in MOX Plant (that the Community law instruments were 
part of the applicable law in the UNCLOS proceedings) is analytically incorrect. By 
analogy to Commission v Slovakia, the EU law instruments would have remained mere 
facts even if the UNCLOS tribunal had interpreted and applied them in a similar way as 
the ECJ did in Commission v Slovakia. More generally, the Court's reasoning in MOX 
Plant implies that when EU law is part of the factual matrix or part of the applicable law in 
an arbitration, the autonomy of the EU legal order is exposed to a 'manifest risk', because 
the tribunal may have to interpret and apply EU law.505 Admittedly, this would 
significantly expand the scope of the autonomy doctrine, so the question is whether the 
                                                
502 Ibid., para. 40; Case C-264/09, Commission v Slovak Republic, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:150, para. 79. 
503 Commission v Slovak Republic, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, supra note 502, para. 80. 
504 Commission v Slovak Republic, supra note 501, para. 48. 
505 In this context, the word 'apply' refers above all to the situation where the tribunal looks at the meaning of 
an EU law instrument and thereby provides an implicit assessment of the question of whether a member 
state's actions comply with that instrument. 
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different ways in which arbitral tribunals may engage with EU law should be distinguished 
for the purposes of the analysis. For example, if an arbitral tribunal interprets an EU 
directive, and the directive is not subject to different interpretations, it would seem clear 
that the autonomy of EU law is not under threat. A good example is Maffezini where the 
tribunal stated that a directive required the investor to carry out an environmental impact 
assessment,506 but the tribunal's primary focus was on deciding whether the member state 
had breached its obligations under Argentine-Spain BIT, with the directive being a minor 
factual element in the analysis.  
 
It seems also plausible to assume that the question of competence is only 'indirectly' 
relevant to the existence of a manifest risk. When EU law instruments are raised before an 
arbitral tribunal, the EU has competence over the subject-matter of those instruments 
(creating a manifest risk), although it may not have competence over the subject-matter of 
the treaty under which the tribunal was established. What the above discussion implies for 
member state BITs is discussed in the following section, but already here it is useful to 
note that a number of arbitral tribunals have expressly noted that they may interpret and 
apply EU law. In Electrabel, the tribunal reasoned that it was 'required…to interpret the 
European Commission's Final [state aid] Decision…and in that sense, to apply EU law to 
the Parties' dispute'.507 Similarly, the EURAM tribunal noted that it 'can consider and apply 
EU law, if required, both as a matter of international law and as a matter of German 
law'.508 Many BITs lack a choice of law clause in which case the applicable arbitration 
rules become relevant. Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, for example, provides that 
if the disputing parties cannot agree on the applicable law, tribunals 'shall apply the law of 
the Contracting State party to the dispute…and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable'. Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty provides that tribunals 'shall decide the 
issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of 
international law.'509  
 
These provisions are quite similar to Article 293 UNCLOS, so if a member state raises EU 
law instruments as part of its defence in an ICSID arbitration, for example, the ECJ's 
findings in MOX Plant appear to become relevant, as they may become in relation to 
                                                
506 See Maffezini award, supra note 162, para. 69. 
507 Electrabel award, supra note 144, para. 4.198. 
508 EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 283. The proceedings took place in Frankfurt. 
509 See Article 26(6) of the ECT, supra note 95. 
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investment disputes governed by other arbitration rules. Arbitral awards rendered under 
BITs are final and binding, and the ability of member state courts and the ECJ to review 
awards in respect of questions of EU law are limited in three ways: first, the grounds of 
annulment of arbitral awards are limited, and the ability of the ECJ to review a tribunal's 
interpretation of EU law is equally limited; second, the disputing parties may comply with 
the award voluntarily which excludes its review by any court; and, third, the tribunal's seat 
may be outside the EU in which case member state courts can become involved only if the 
winning party seeks enforcement within the EU.  
5.4. Implications for Member State BITs 
The Court's use of language in the above cases is somewhat arcane, but its central concern 
is to ensure that EU law is interpreted homogenously and has the same effect in all 
member states. In this sense, the ECJ's perception of its mandate resembles the mandate of 
courts of last instance in domestic legal systems. Allowing member states to create courts 
and tribunals whose jurisdiction extends to questions of EU law threatens the uniform 
interpretation and application of EU law within the EU, as would the creation of a regional 
court of general jurisdiction by two provinces in a member state, when that court operates 
in isolation of the domestic legal system and the provinces have no necessary authority 
under the national constitution. The question is to what extent the ECJ 'tolerates' situations 
where courts and tribunals other than member state courts interpret and apply EU law 
without the Court being in a position to ensure the 'correctness' of those interpretations. As 
noted, investment disputes raised under member state BITs do not necessarily involve 
questions of EU law. Such disputes may relate, for example, to national criminal 
proceedings against an investor or to a reversal of a privatization policy over which 
member states have exclusive competence, apart from the requirement that the policy 
complies with the fundamental freedoms and the principle of non-discrimination. 
Moreover, when the parties raise EU law arguments, the tribunal might conclude, as the 
Eureko tribunal did, that the resolution of the dispute 'has no bearing upon any question of 
EU law'.510 One central question is what type of EU law arguments the parties can raise 
under standard arbitration clauses and what kind of 'techniques' tribunals use when 
addressing those arguments. In general terms, the disputing parties can invoke EU law 
related arguments if this is considered a good litigation strategy and if the facts and legal 
                                                
510 Achmea award, supra note 325, para. 276. 
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materials facilitate their use, and this holds true irrespective of the wording of the 
arbitration clause or the content of the arbitration rules that govern the dispute. The choice 
of law clauses in BITs, when they exist, place no restrictions in this regard either. Another 
question is, as noted, to what extent member state courts and the ECJ can review the ways 
in which tribunals have engaged with EU law, in particular how the latter have interpreted 
EU law in individual cases.  
 
The ways in which arbitral tribunals use EU law also relate to 'regulatory conflicts', to 
which I alluded in the introduction. Regulatory conflicts refer to the following scenario: a 
member state takes action to comply with the requirements of EU law; this action affects 
an investment qualifying for protection under a BIT; the investor decides to raise a claim 
against the member state, arguing that the measure breaches, for example, the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. The challenged measure can relate to various types of EU 
acts - to implementation of the decisions of the Commission, to general legislative changes 
that relate to the requirements of specific EU directives, or to administrative and legal 
decisions taken on the basis of an EU regulation. In defending the measure, the member 
state can make the general argument that EU law mandated the contested action, but also 
employ more specific arguments related to EU law. First, it can argue that its obligations 
under EU law take priority over its BIT obligations as matter of international law (and EU 
law). Second, it can argue that EU law is a factual element which is relevant for analyzing 
the measure's compatibility with the BIT. Third, the member state can argue that the 
measure is attributable to the EU under international law and the investor's claim therefore 
inadmissible. When analyzing such arguments, the tribunal has to determine what role EU 
law has in the proceedings. Is it part of the applicable law or a factual element? 
 
The following section looks at the dichotomy of applicable law and fact as it relates 
directly to the ways in which arbitral tribunals will use EU law in individual cases. After 
that, I discuss arbitrations which involved some variant of the basic regulatory conflict 
scenario outlined above and where the tribunals addressed questions of EU law. This 
discussion not only shows the extent to which arbitral tribunals use EU law but also 
demonstrates the basic approaches that arbitral tribunals take in regulatory conflict 
scenarios. The final section provides a more general assessment of the relationship of 
member state BITs and the autonomy of the EU legal order as well as provides some 
comments on the question of interests and values. 
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5.4.1. The Question of Applicable Law 
The dichotomy of 'applicable law' and 'fact' requires some clarification. It is often invoked 
in discussions concerning the question of whether arbitrators are obliged, ex officio, to 
know the content of the applicable law or whether the dispute should be decided solely 
with reference to the arguments of and legal grounds raised by the disputing parties. Some 
commentators frame this issue by asking whether the 'applicable law is a matter of law to 
be determined by the decision maker or rather a fact to be proven by the parties'.511 In this 
approach, applicable law is either a fact or 'a matter of law' depending on the way the 
tribunal determines its contents. But the dichotomy is used in another way as well. That 
states may not invoke provisions of domestic law to justify a breach of a treaty obligation 
is a recognized principle of international law.512 In other words, national law is only an 
element of fact when a state is accused of breaching its treaty obligations. Similarly, when 
an investor raises a claim against an EU member state, the provisions of the BIT are the 
applicable law as the dispute is resolved by assessing the member state's actions against the 
provisions of the BIT (and not against EU law). The relevant question in the present 
context is whether EU law can be part of the applicable law in the sense that it is applied to 
the merits of an investment dispute. The way in which tribunals determine the contents of 
the applicable law and of the law that is considered a fact is a different question, and one 
which will not be addressed in the following. 
 
The principle of party autonomy is central to the idea of arbitration and entails the freedom 
of the parties to choose the law that governs their dispute. However, if the BIT under 
which the claim is raised entails a choice of law clause, the tribunal is to apply that clause 
although the claimant investor played no role in its construction.513 It is not uncommon that 
                                                
511 Emphasis added. Cezary Wiśniewski and Alicja Zielińska, 'Who Should Know the Law: The Arbitrators 
or the Parties?', Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 3 October 2016. Similarly, Kaufmann-Kohler asks whether the 
applicable law 'is…a fact to be proven by the parties or…law to be investigated by the arbitrators.' See 
Gabriele Kaufmann-Kohler, 'The Arbitrator and the Law: Does He/She Know It? Apply It? How? And a Few 
More Questions', 21 Arbitration International (2005), pp. 631-638, at 632.  
512 This principle is enshrined in Article 27 VCLT, the relevant part of which reads as follows: 'A party may 
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.' 
513 See e.g. Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed. 2012), p. 289; Yas Banifatemi, 'The Law Applicable in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration', in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide 
to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 191-210, at 194-195. See also Antoine Goetz et al. v. 
Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/03, Award (embodying the parties' settlement agreement), 10 
February, 1999, para. 94 ('Sans doute la détermination du droit applicable n’est-elle pas, à proprement parler, 
faite par les parties au présent arbitrage (Burundi et investisseurs requérants), mais par les parties à la 
Convention d’investissement (Burundi et Belgique). Comme cela a été le cas pour le consentement des 
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BITs lack a clause on the applicable law and that the parties have not agreed on the matter 
either, in which case tribunals resort to the choice of law clauses in the applicable 
arbitration rules.514 As noted, the generality of choice of law clauses means that they 
usually do not determine the formal status of EU law. If a tribunal concludes that EU law 
is part of the applicable law, this means, in principle, that EU law applies to the merits of 
the dispute together with the provisions of the BIT and any other applicable rules of 
international law. Since international law is not a hierarchical legal order, treaty 
obligations stand on equal footing. If EU law is part of the applicable law and the 
respondent state argues that its obligations under specific EU acts take priority over its BIT 
obligations, the priority of one obligation over the other can only be established by 
applying conflict rules.515 On the other hand, if EU law is considered a fact, it cannot rise 
to the same hierarchical level as the relevant BIT, nor invoked to justify a breach of BIT 
obligations. If EU law is equated with national law, the principle enshrined in Article 27 
VCLT applies by analogy: the respondent member state cannot 'invoke the provisions of 
its internal law [i.e. EU law] as justification for its failure to perform a treaty'.516 In other 
words, the designation of EU law as national law is necessarily equivalent to treating it as 
fact, which cannot override the provisions of the applicable BIT. To understand better 
regulatory conflict scenarios and to show how arbitral tribunals tackle questions of EU 
law, it is useful to look at a number of relevant arbitrations. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
parties, le Tribunal estime cependant que la République du Burundi s’est prononcée en faveur du droit 
applicable tel qu’il est déterminé dans la disposition précitée de la Convention belgo-burundaise 
d’investissement en devenant partie à cette Convention et que les investisseurs requérants ont effectué un 
choix similaire en déposant leur requête d’arbitrage sur la base de ladite Convention.').  
514 Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that in the absence of an agreement between the parties, 
tribunals 'shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict 
of laws and such rules of international law as may be applicable.' Article 35(1) of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules provides that the tribunal 'shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties as 
applicable', and 'failing such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law which it 
determines to be appropriate'. Article 26(6) of the ECT makes no reference to the agreement of the parties on 
applicable law and it reads as follows: 'A tribunal…shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this 
Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law.' Article 22(1) of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce Arbitration Rules state that if the parties have not agreed upon applicable law, the tribunal 'shall 
apply the law or rules of law which it considers to be most appropriate'. 
515 I am referring here not to primary conflict arguments but to regulatory conflict arguments (i.e. alleged 
conflicts between BIT protection standards and secondary EU law). 
516 As Crawford notes, this 'position is not in doubt.' See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed. 2012), p. 51. The quote in the text is from Article 27 
VCLT. 
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5.4.2. Arbitral Tribunals and EU Law 
The rules of thumb are clear. Once a state has acceded to the EU, the primacy of EU law 
dictates that its obligation to implement EU acts takes priority over its obligations under 
intra-EU BITs as a matter of EU law. But regulatory conflicts may be 'neutralized' in a 
number of ways. For example, a tribunal may conclude that EU law is only an element of 
fact or then hold that the challenged measure was not related to or required by the relevant 
EU act. Similarly, the parties may agree that EU law and the relevant BIT are compatible, 
but disagree over the status of the relevant EU law instrument: was the challenged measure 
mandated by EU law or not, and is it part of the applicable law or merely a fact that either 
is central to or plays no role in the tribunal's analysis. As to extra-EU BITs, member states 
have to eliminate treaty obligations that prevent the implementation of EU acts as a matter 
of EU law, but third state investors can continue to rely on BIT protections also when 
domestic acts of implementation affect their investments in a negative way. But, again, 
direct conflict arguments are unlikely to be raised for the same reasons as in intra-EU 
disputes, with other litigation strategies being more plausible. 
 
In many arbitrations, the claimant investor has relied on the legitimate expectations 
doctrine and the fair and equitable treatment standard. The doctrine of legitimate 
expectations exists under EU law and international investment law, but its basic elements 
are broadly similar under both legal systems.517 In essence, the doctrine refers to the 
regulatory framework of the host state (or the EU) and to specific assurances and 
representations that the host state (or the EU institutions) have made in respect of the 
stability of that framework. Changes in that framework, which cancel out such assurances 
and representations, can lead investors to seek redress both under EU law and member 
state BITs on the ground that the changes breached their legitimate expectations. Put 
differently, the central question is what kind of expectations a diligent businessman can 
entertain in respect of the stability of the regulatory framework of the host state (or the 
internal market). Another central question is whether tribunals should apply the legitimate 
expectations doctrine as it stands under EU law, or whether their analyses will necessarily 
                                                
517 On the legitimate expectations doctrine as it stands under EU law, see Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2012), Chapter 18. On its content in the context of investor-state 
arbitration, see Michele Potesta, 'Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the 
Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept', 28 ICSID Review (2013), pp. 88-122, at 98-121; Elizabeth 
Snodgrass, 'Protecting Investors' Legitimate Expectations: Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle', 
21 ICSID Review (2006), pp. 1-58. 
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be based on the doctrine as developed by arbitral tribunals. The ECJ has held that 
economic operators (including investors) 'cannot have a legitimate expectation that an 
existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the 
exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained'.518 In other words, and in general 
terms, if investors are bound by EU law rules and principles once they have made an 
investment in a member state, how should this 'binding effect' affect BIT claims that relate 
to EU law in one or another way.  
 
Many of the arbitrations where EU acts have played a role were raised under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT), to which both the EU and its member states are parties. While this 
clearly distinguishes the ECT from member state BITs, it is useful to look at the cases 
because we are interested in the general question of how arbitral tribunals approach and 
use EU law and whether this poses a 'manifest risk' to the autonomy of the EU legal order. 
Similar type of claims could be brought under member state BITs, in which case the 
tribunals would have to address the relevant EU law questions in one or another way. 
5.4.2.1. The Power Purchase Agreement Cases 
The AES Summit, EDF and Electrabel arbitrations were raised under the ECT and 
concerned so called power purchase agreements (PPAs) concluded between Hungary and 
the claimant companies in the 1990s. In the agreements, Hungary pledged to buy 
electricity at a given price for a fixed time period, which guaranteed a return on the 
claimants' investments without commercial risk. The PPAs were not 'processed' under the 
state aid rules of the EU-Hungary association Agreement (as they should have), and 
neither did they qualify as existing aid under the rules established in the accession treaty 
and its annexes,519 which prompted the Commission to begin the investigation after 
Hungary had acceded to the EU.520 At the same time, the perception that the PPAs allowed 
generators to pocket overly high profits generated political debate in Hungary and led 
                                                
518 See e.g. Case C-350/88, Delacre and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1990:71, para. 33. 
519 See Electrabel award, supra note 144, paras. 4.94-4.97. 
520 Hungary's Europe Agreement entailed state aid provisions that were identical with the corresponding EU 
state aid rules. See Article 8 of Protocol 2 of the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the other 
part, OJ L 347, 31.12.1993, pp. 2-266. The PPAs had not been processed under the state aid rules of the 
Europe Agreement (as they should have), and neither did they qualify as existing aid under the various rules 
established in the accession treaty and its annexes, which prompted the Commission to begin the 
investigation. On this, see Electrabel award, supra note 144, paras. 4.94-4.97. 
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(together with the state aid concern) to the introduction of price regulation in 2006, which 
substantially reduced the profitability of the generators. 
 
A central principle under EU law is that economic operators cannot entertain any 
legitimate expectations over the lawfulness of state aid they have received unless the aid 
scheme was notified to and authorized by the Commission before its application.521 If there 
are exceptional circumstances which caused the beneficiary to assume that the aid is 
lawful, such circumstances can play a role 'only in resisting the possible recovery of that 
aid'.522 In other words, if a given aid scheme is not authorized by the Commission 
beforehand, its beneficiaries cannot entertain any legitimate expectations about its 
continuation or argue that they are entitled to keep the aid they have already received, 
unless the recovery breaches a principle of EU law. In June 2008, the Commission decided 
that the PPAs constitute illegal state aid and ordered Hungary to recover the aid which the 
claimants had received under the PPAs after Hungary's EU accession.523 In the wake of the 
Commission’s decision, the Hungarian parliament adopted a law authorizing the early 
termination of the PPAs by the end of 2008.524 The basic argument of the claimants in AES 
Summit, EDF and Electrabel was that by introducing the price regulation and/or 
terminating the PPAs, Hungary had breached its obligations under Article 10 ECT, 
including the investors' legitimate expectations under the fair and equitable treatment 
standard.525 While the EU is party to the ECT, none of the claimants raised a claim against 
the EU on the basis of the Commission’s state aid decision, but the Hungarian subsidiaries 
of the claimants, which owned and operated the power plants, brought direct actions 
against the Commission's decision before the General Court.526 The following analysis 
focuses on the AES Summit and Electrabel awards as they are publicly available, and some 
references are also made to the Micula arbitration which was raised under the Romania-
Sweden BIT. I will focus on two aspects of the awards; those that are directly relevant to 
                                                
521 See e.g. Case T-179/09, Dunamenti Erőmű Zrt. v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:236, para. 104. 
522 Idem. 
523 Commission decision of 4 June 2008 on the State Aid C 41/05 awarded by Hungary through Power 
Purchase Agreements, OJ L 225, 27.8.2009, pp. 53-103, at 102. 
524 European Commission, State aid N 691/2009, Hungarian stranded costs compensation scheme, Brussels 
(27 April, 2010), C(2010)2532 final, p. 2. 
525 Electrabel award, supra note 144, para. 1.47; AES Summit Generation Limited and AES- TISZA Erömü 
Kft. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award (hereinafter AES Summit award), 23 September 2010, 
paras. 4.1 and 5.1. 
526 Article 256 TFEU establishes the jurisdiction of the General Court to 'hear and determine at first instance 
actions or proceedings referred to' e.g. in Article 263 TFEU. Article 263(4) TFEU authorizes natural and 
legal persons to 'institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and 
individual concern to them'. 
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the question of autonomy of the EU legal order as well as to aspects that relate to the 




In all three cases (AES Summit, EDF and Electrabel) the tribunals were to apply the 
provisions of the ECT and 'applicable rules and principles of international law', as provided 
by Article 26(6) ECT. On the role of EU law, the Electrabel tribunal noticed that it could 
operate in three different ways. As international law, as a legal order distinct both from 
international law and legal orders of member states, or as part of Hungary's national law.527 
The claimant argued that EU law was part of Hungary's domestic law and should be 
considered as 'a matter of fact or evidence', which implied that Hungary could not invoke 
EU law to justify a breach of its ECT obligations.528 Hungary agreed that EU law is 
relevant as an element of fact, but added that EU law also qualifies as international law 
because it originates in international treaties.529 Neither party raised conflict arguments but 
argued that EU law and the ECT should be read as constituting a harmonious set of 
obligations.530 As a first step, the tribunal concurred with Hungary and classified EU law 
as international law, 'because it is rooted in international treaties'.531 Both primary and 
secondary EU law were 'part of a regional system of international law'.532 More 
specifically, since the Commission's state aid decision was central to the termination of the 
PPA, it 'would be artificial' to classify Article 107 TFEU as international law and assign a 
different status to the implementation of that article by an organ created under the same 
international treaty.533  
 
The claimant argued that the PPA's termination breached the ECT's fair and equitable 
treatment standard, but the act of termination was detached from the state aid decision in 
two ways. First, the claimant was not requesting the tribunal 'to make any decision 
                                                
527 Electrabel award, supra note 144, para. 4.20. 
528 Ibid., paras. 4.24.-4.25.  
529 Ibid., paras. 4.57-4.58. For more detailed arguments of Hungary in this regard, see paras. 4.65-4.74. The 
Commission submitted a lengthy brief to the tribunal and claimed, in essence, that Article 26(6) ECT 
‘requires the application of EU law because EU law is international law’ (see para. 4.102). 
530 Ibid., paras. 4.43, 4.59 and 4.75. 
531 Ibid., para. 4.120. 
532 Ibid., para. 4.122. With reference to Van Gend & Loos, supra note 360, p. 12 ('The Community constitutes 
a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereing rights.'). 
533 Ibid., paras. 4.122-4.123.  
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concerning the correctness' of the state aid decision 'as a matter of EU law'.534 Second, the 
claimant argued that the decision did not require Hungary to terminate the PPA.535 This 
isolated the PPA's termination from the state aid decision. As the tribunal put it, the 
claimant 'does not seek to impugn, in these arbitration proceedings, the legal validity' of 
the state aid decision under EU law, 'nor Hungary's legal obligation under EU law to 
implement that Decision in accordance with its terms'.536 The relationship of EU law and 
the ECT played an important role in the tribunal's analysis, and similarly to the disputing 
parties, the tribunal held that there is a presumption that the ECT's provisions are 'in 
conformity with EU law'.537 This presumption was based on a number of factors: on the 
EU's central role in the conclusion of the ECT; on the similar objectives of EU law and the 
ECT; on Article 207(3) TFEU, which provides that the Council and the Commission have 
to ensure that treaties falling under the Common Commercial Policy, such as the ECT, 'are 
compatible with internal Union policies and rules'; and on Article 1(3) ECT which 
recognizes that the EU has the authority to take binding decisions over EU member states, 
including in matters covered by the ECT.538 A logical corollary of the presumption of 
compatibility was that 'the ECT does not protect the Claimant, as against the Respondent, 
from the enforcement by the Respondent of a binding decision of the European 
Commission under EU law'.539 Put differently, if ECT and EU law obligations form a 
harmonious set of obligations, investors cannot invoke the ECT when member states 
implement EU law.  
 
Since the tribunal held that the ECT does not protect the claimant from the consequences 
of the enforcement of the state aid decision, the crucial question was whether that decision 
required Hungary to terminate the PPA. A negative answer would denote that Hungary 
could not rely on the state aid decision as part of its defense, and the tribunal's dictum on 
the relationship of the ECT and the state aid decision would not apply either. Rather, 
Hungary's termination of the PPA would be assessed solely against the ECT's fair and 
                                                
534 Ibid., para. 6.20. 
535 Ibid., paras. 6.22.-6.26. 
536 Ibid., para. 6.77. 
537 Ibid., para. 4.134. can have had no legitimate expectations [under the ECT] in regard to the consequences 
of the implementation by an EU member state’ of decisions taken by the Commission (see para. 4.142). 
538 See ibid., paras. 4.134-4.135, 4.137-4.138 and 4.142. As to Article 1(3) ECT, the tribunal held that this 
provision indicated that 'investors can have had no legitimate expectations [under the ECT] in regard to the 
consequences of the implementation by an EU member state' of decisions taken by the Commission (see 
para. 4.142). 
539 Ibid., para. 4.169. 
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equitable treatment standard, with the state aid decision becoming an (inconsequential) 
part of the factual evidence. A positive answer, in turn, would denote that the tribunal's 
dictum applied fully and the termination was compatible with the ECT. The tribunal 
provided a detailed analysis of the state aid decision and concluded that it had required 
Hungary to terminate the PPA.540 Under the tribunal's approach, this finding alone was 
enough to lead to the dismissal of the claimant's PPA termination claim, but the tribunal 
also carried out a short discussion on the attribution of the termination as between Hungary 
and the EU. It held that the state aid decision had obligated Hungary to terminate the PPA, 
which meant that Hungary was 'not legally responsible for acts by the European 
Commission…under the ECT or under international law'.541 The tribunal argued that 
binding decisions of the EU institutions, 'recognized as such under the ECT', could not 
create responsibility for Hungary, because Hungary can only be responsible for its own 
wrongful acts under international law.542 
 
In sum, the Electrabel tribunal assessed the division of competences between the EU and 
its member states (in the context of attribution) and rejected the claimant's PPA termination 
claim on the basis of the Commission's state aid decision. It is noteworthy that the 
tribunal's finding on attribution was based on the application of international law rules 
governing attribution, and not on the application of EU law. Yet, as a matter of EU law 
attributing responsibility for the implementation of EU acts falls under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the ECJ. Clearly, and again, this appears to be problematic in particular in 
light of the Court's findings in Opinions 1/91 and 2/13. As to the potential conflict between 
the ECT and the Commission's state aid decision, the disputing parties agreed that there 
was no conflict, and the claimant disconnected the two by claiming that it was not 
challenging the state aid decision and that in any case the decision did not require Hungary 
to terminate the PPA. By and large, the tribunal followed suit and also attributed the 





                                                
540 Ibid., paras. 6.78-6.91. 
541 Ibid., para. 6.70. 




AES Summit differs from Electrabel in that the case commenced prior to Hungary's 
termination of the PPAs and prior to the Commission's state aid decision. The claimants 
were challenging only the 2006 and 2007 price regulations, which had reduced their 
profitability and allegedly breached a number of ECT protection standards.543 On the 
applicable law, Hungary argued that as the ECT and EU competition law have similar 
objectives, its respective obligations under them should 'be read in harmony and be 
interpreted to minimize conflict'.544 Since the price regulations were partly motivated by 
the Commission's preliminary view that the PPAs constituted illegal state aid, the 
claimants could not legitimately expect that Hungary does not address such concerns by 
regulating electricity prices.545 As to the status of EU law, Hungary acknowledged that it is 
a factual element which should influence the tribunal's assessment of the price regulations. 
The claimants equated EU law with Hungarian national law, which meant that EU law 
could not justify the alleged breaches of the ECT.546 In contrast to Hungary, the claimants 
saw that the price regulations had to be assessed against the ECT's standards alone, with 
the state aid concerns being entirely irrelevant to deciding the dispute, even if part of its 
factual matrix.547 
 
The tribunal first noted that it was mandated (under Article 26(6) ECT) to decide the 
dispute on the basis of the ECT and 'applicable rules and principles of international law'.548 
EU competition law was both an ‘international law regime’ and part of the national law of 
EU member states, but the tribunal held that it should be considered as fact on the ground 
that the parties had so agreed.549 As to conflicts between EU law and the ECT, the tribunal 
held that the dispute was 'about the conformity or non-conformity of Hungary's acts and 
measures with the ECT', and the relationship of the price regulations to the dictates of EU 
                                                
543 See AES Summit award, supra note 525, para. 5.1 (Hungary's actions constituted a breach of its obligation 
to provide fair and equitable treatment; impairment of the claimants' investment by unreasonable and 
discriminatory measures; breach of its obligation to provide national treatment; breach of its obligation to 
provide most favored nation treatment; breach of its obligation to provide constant protection and security; 
and expropriation).  
544 Ibid., para. 7.2.3. 
545 Ibid., para. 7.2.5. 
546 Ibid., paras. 7.3.4 and 7.3.8. In the oral proceedings, Hungary agreed that EC law is relevant as fact (see 
para. 7.5.2). 
547 Ibid., para. 7.3.2. 
548 Ibid., paras. 7.6.1-7.6.4. 
549 Ibid., para. 7.6.6. 
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law was 'only an element to be considered…when determining the "rationality," 
"reasonableness," "arbitrariness" and "transparency"' of the regulations.550 Unlike the 
Electrabel tribunal, the AES Summit tribunal did not analyze the EU's central role in the 
conclusion of the ECT, nor provided a general analysis of the relationship of the ECT and 
EU law.  
 
The claimants asserted that fair and equitable treatment requires that states honor 
agreements they have entered into. Hence, the introduction of the price regulations 
breached their legitimate expectations as it altered Hungary's commitments under the 
PPA.551 Likewise, some of the legislative changes introduced in connection with the price 
regulations 'eviscerated the legal framework' upon which the claimants 'had legitimately 
relied' when making their investment.552 Hungary replied by noting that the existence of 
legitimate expectations requires that the investor has received express 'representations and 
assurances' on which the investor relies when making the decision to invest. Since the 
claimants had not received any such assurances, their case failed to meet the test.553 The 
only reference to EU law in the arguments of the parties on the issue of legitimate 
expectations was Hungary's observation that the price regulations were partly motivated by 
the Commission's demands that its state aid programs are brought in line with EU law.554  
 
The tribunal concurred with Hungary on the criteria against which the existence of 
legitimate expectations should be assessed. Legitimate expectations can only arise in 
relation to assurances given at the time the investment was made and the tribunal referred 
to a string of investment arbitrations where this rule was applied.555 The claimants had 
made investments on two separate occasions in 1996 and 2001, and the question was if 
Hungarian authorities had given assurances upon which the claimants could rely on either 
occasion. Having analyzed the facts before it, the tribunal concluded that Hungary gave no 
such assurances and the claimants could not entertain any legitimate expectations that 'a 
regime of administrative pricing would not be reintroduced'.556 The tribunal also made the 
general point that 'any reasonably informed business person or investor knows that laws 
                                                
550 Ibid., para. 7.6.9. 
551 Ibid., paras. 9.1.2-9.1.4. 
552 Ibid., para. 9.1.5. 
553 Ibid., para. 9.2.5-9.2.8. 
554 Ibid., para. 9.2.13. 
555 Ibid., para. 9.3.8-9.3.12. 
556 Ibid., paras. 9.3.15-9.3.26 (the quote is from para. 9.3.26). 
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can evolve in accordance with the perceived political policy dictates of the times',557 but 
the role of Hungary's EU accession was not expressly referred to in this context.  
 
However, the state aid concerns that (in part) motivated the price regulations were 
discussed in the context of the claim that the regulations were unreasonable and 
discriminatory in the meaning of Article 10(1) ECT. Hungary had justified the price 
regulations on three main grounds, one of them being the Commission's investigation on 
the compatibility of the PPAs with EU state aid rules.558 The tribunal saw that measures 
taken to comply with EU state aid obligations constitutes 'a rational public policy measure', 
but since the Commission had not yet decided that the PPAs constitute illegal state aid 
when the price regulations were introduced, Hungary could not justify them with reference 
to EU competition law.559 However, the tribunal was split on this with the majority 
concluding that the price regulations were 'not motivated by pressure from the EC 
Commission',560 whereas the dissenting arbitrator saw that the communications between 
the Commission and Hungary proved that there were good reasons to presume that the 
PPAs constituted illegal state aid, which implied that the question of the PPAs could not be 
disconnected from the 'motivation that was behind' the price regulations. Hence, arbitrator 
Stern concluded that 'the evidence is overwhelming' that the price regulations were 'a 
rational, non-arbitrary response to a complex set of legitimate policy concerns', one of 
which was the state aid concern.561 It is noteworthy that although the majority held that the 
price regulations were not causally related to EU competition law, the claimant's claim 
about unreasonable and discriminatory treatment was rejected on the ground that the 
regulations were a 'reasonable, proportionate and consistent' policy response to the 'luxury 
profits' of the power generators.562 Generally speaking, also the majority approached EU 
law as fact that would have affected the analysis of the 'rationality' and 'reasonableness' of 
the price regulations, if the two arbitrators had found a connection between the regulations 
and the state aid concerns. 
 
                                                
557 Ibid., para. 9.3.34. 
558 Ibid., para. 10.2.3. 
559 Ibid., para. 10.3.16. 
560 Ibid., para. 10.3.18. 
561 Ibid., para. 10.3.19. In Electrabel, the claimant had also challenged the price regulations, but the tribunal 
rejected the claim e.g. on the basis that the regulations were motivated by the state aid concerns that the 
Commission had repeatedly expressed to Hungarian authorities. See Electrabel award, supra note 144, paras. 
8.24-8.27. 
562 Ibid., paras. 10.3.34 and 10.3.36. 
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In parallel with the arbitral proceedings, the Hungarian subsidiaries of Electrabel and AES 
Summit sought the annulment of the Commission’s state aid decision before the General 
Court (GC), which dismissed both actions in 2014.563  Electrabel and its subsidiary 
appealed to the ECJ, which dismissed the plea in 2015, but the grounds of appeal are not 
relevant for the present discussion.564 The two judgments of the GC outline the basic 
elements of the legitimate expectations doctrine under EU law and provide a pathway into 
analyzing the different approaches that EU courts and investment tribunals take in state aid 
cases and on the relationship of the ECT and EU law. The judgments demonstrate that 
conflict arguments tend to play the second fiddle also before EU courts in regulatory 
conflict scenarios. The relevant arguments of the applicants were broadly similar in both 
cases and centered on the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations as well 
as Article 10 ECT, which contains the fair and equitable treatment standard and the 
prohibition of unreasonable and discriminatory measures.565  
 
As to the legitimate expectations principle under EU law, the GC referred to its previous 
case law according to which three conditions 'must be satisfied in order for a claim to 
entitlement to the protection of legitimate expectations to be well founded'.566 First, EU or 
national authorities must have given 'precise, unconditional and consistent assurances…to 
the person concerned'; second, the assurances must be of such nature 'as to give rise to a 
legitimate expectation on the part of the person to whom they are addressed'; and third, the 
assurances 'must comply with the applicable rules'.567 The principle of legal certainty, in 
turn, requires that EU law rules 'be clear and precise' so that 'interested parties can 
                                                
563 Case T-468/08, Tisza Erőmű v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:235 (hereinafter AES Summit GC); Case T-
179/09, Dunamenti Erőmű Zrt. v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:236 (hereinafter Electrabel GC). 
564 See Case C-357/14, Electrabel SA and Dunamenti Erőmű Zrt. v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2015:642. 
565 AES Summit GC, supra note 563, para. 219; Electrabel GC, supra note 563, para. 99. Article 10(1) ECT 
reads as follows: 'Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage 
and create stable, equitable, favorable and transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to 
make Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to 
Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments shall 
also enjoy the most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair by 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no 
case shall such Investments be accorded treatment less favorable than that required by international law, 
including treaty obligations. Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered into with an 
Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party.' 
566 AES Summit GC, supra note 563, para. 220; Electrabel GC, supra note 563, para. 100. 
567 Idem. With reference e.g. to Case T-347/03, Branco v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2005:265, para. 102; 
Case T-282/02, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2006:64, para. 77. 
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ascertain their position in situations and legal relationships governed by EU law'.568 In both 
judgments, the GC held that the applicants had not received any assurances over the 
compatibility of the PPAs with EU law, meaning that no legitimate expectations had 
arisen.569 Further, the state aid rules in Hungary's association agreement, in the Accession 
Treaty and in the Act of Accession, 'regarding both the substantive and the procedural rules 
of EU law on State aid', were clear and precise.570 In other words, the applicants had to 
know, first, that the compatibility of the PPAs with the state aid rules was not assessed 
prior to the Commission's decision and, second, that the PPAs did not qualify as existing 
aid under any of the relevant state aid provisions.571 Another principle to which the GC 
referred to provides that a beneficiary of illegally granted aid, 'implemented without prior 
notification to the Commission', cannot entertain a legitimate expectation that the 'grant of 
the aid is lawful'.572 If there are exceptional circumstances, which caused the beneficiary to 
assume that the aid is lawful, such circumstances can play a role 'only in resisting the 
possible recovery of that aid'.573 Likewise, and as noted, the Commission does not 'require 
recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of Union law', such as 
the principle of legitimate expectations.574 No such circumstances were present and neither 
                                                
568 AES Summit GC, supra note 563, para. 221; Electrabel GC, supra note 563, para. 101. See also Case C-
63/93, Duff and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1996:51, paras. 19-20 (where the ECJ held that the principle of the 
protection of legitimate expectations 'is the corollary of the principle of legal certainty'). 
569 AES Summit GC, supra note 563, para. 222; Electrabel GC, supra note 563, para. 102. 
570 AES Summit GC, supra note 563, para. 223; Electrabel GC, supra note 563, para. 105. The relevant 
provisions in the 2003 Act of Accession read as follows: 'The following aid schemes and individual aid put 
into effect in a new Member State before the date of accession and still applicable after that date shall be 
regarded upon accession as existing aid within the meaning of Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty: (a) aid 
measures put into effect before 10 December 1994;  (b) aid measures listed in the Appendix to this Annex; 
(c) aid measures which prior to the date of accession were assessed by the State aid monitoring authority of 
the new Member State and found to be compatible with the acquis, and to which the Commission did not 
raise an objection on the ground of serious doubts as to the compatibility of the measure with the common 
market, pursuant to the procedure set out in paragraph 2. All measures still applicable after the date of 
accession which constitute State aid and which do not fulfil the conditions set out above shall be considered 
as new aid upon accession for the purpose of the application of Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.' See Part 3 of 
Annex IV to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, 
the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the 
adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, pp. 33-988, pp. 
797-802. 
571 See Electrabel GC, supra note 563, paras. 50-72, for a discussion on the rules governing Hungary's aid 
schemes during the association and accession process. 
572 Ibid., para. 104. With reference to Case 223/85, RSV v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1987:502, para. 17; Case 
C-183/91, Commission v Greece, ECLI:EU:C:1993:233, para. 18; and Joined Cases C-183/02 P and C-
187/02 P, Demesa and Territorio Histórico de Álava v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:701, para. 51. 
573 Idem. 
574 See Article 16 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (codification), OJ L 248, 
24.9.2015, pp. 9-29, at 20. 
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did the recovery breach a general principle of EU law.575 Finally, the GC also made the 
more general observation that EU accession entails 'a major change in legal and economic 
features of a market', which entails the possibility that a measure may transform into illegal 
state aid upon EU accession 'without that undermining the legitimate expectations of the 
interested party or the principle of legal certainty'.576 
 
One observation is that the GC's take on the clarity and precision of the state aid rules 
under Hungary's association agreement is quite different from the Micula tribunal's 
analysis. Micula concerned a pre-accession aid scheme and its premature revocation by 
Romania in 2004, some three years before its EU accession. The Micula tribunal 
emphasized much more the difficulties Romanian authorities had had in understanding, 
implementing and operating the pre-accession state aid rules, and the consequences this 
had on the investors' legitimate expectations,577 whereas the GC simply looked at the 
'abstract' clarity of those rules and then held that the applicants had to know their contents 
and requirements. This is quite interesting because the GC also acknowledged that 
Hungarian authorities had completely neglected the implementation of the pre-accession 
state aid mechanism; apparently, Hungary had not established any national competition 
agency to which its existing aid schemes (including the PPAs) could have been notified at 
the pre-accession stage.578 The Commission's reasoning in the Micula state aid decision is 
also interesting as it by and large follows the reasoning of the GC. The Micula claimants 
had become eligible to benefit from the revoked aid scheme only after the Romanian 
Competition Council had decided in May 2000 that it constitutes illegal state aid under the 
association agreement. While the date of eligibility was not relevant for the Commission's 
state aid decision, this fact still meant that the claimants 'must have been fully aware' of the 
Competition Council's decision and of the state aid provisions of the association agreement 
and Romanian national law, both of which prohibited state aid and designated the 
Competition Council as the competent national authority on state aid matters.579 Since the 
ECJ's case law on state aid applied vis-à-vis Romania under Article 64 of the association 
agreement (including the legitimate expectations doctrine), and since the Competition 
                                                
575 AES Summit GC, supra note 563, paras. 161-164; Electrabel GC, supra note 563, paras. 281ff. 
576 AES Summit GC, supra note 563, para. 223; Electrabel GC, supra note 563, para. 105. 
577 For a scathing critique of the Micula tribunal's reasoning on the claimants' legitimate expectations, see 
Maja Stanivuković, 'Legitimate Expectations: A Commentary of Micula v. Romania, 14 Transnational 
Dispute Management (2017, Issue 1). 
578 Electrabel GC, supra note 563, para. 52. 
579 Ibid., para. 159. 
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Council had not authorized the aid scheme at the pre-accession stage, the claimants 'could 
never have entertained a legitimate expectation' that the aid scheme constitutes lawful state 
aid, 'regardless of the subsequent actions of the Romanian Government' after the decision 
of the Competition Council in May 2000.580581 Similarly to the two judgments of the GC, 
the Commission relied on the abstract clarity of the state aid rules and ignored the 
difficulties Romanian authorities had in respect of the application and enforcement of the 
pre-accession state aid rules (and in understanding whether or not the entire scheme had to 
be revoked), which difficulties were an important element in the Micula tribunal's analysis.  
 
The GC's judgments and the Commission's state aid decision in Micula demonstrate that 
the legitimate expectations doctrine has a high threshold of application under EU law. The 
relevant assurances of domestic or EU authorities have to be ‘precise, unconditional and 
consistent', and addressed directly to the person relying on them; the content of the 
assurances have to give 'rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the person to whom 
they are addressed'; and the assurances must also be compatible 'with the applicable rules'. 
Further, as noted, the ECJ has consistently held that economic operators 'cannot have a 
legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the 
Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained'.582 
In the area of state aid the rules are equally strict: economic operators have to know 
whether an aid scheme was notified to and approved by the Commission prior to its 
application; they also have to know whether a pre-accession aid scheme qualifies as 
'existing aid' (i.e. as legal state aid under EU law) under the provisions governing the host 
state's EU accession. Had the Electrabel and Micula tribunals applied the above EU law 
principles, the PPA termination claim and the legitimate expectations claim in Micula 
would have been rejected in a heartbeat, given that those principles assume that the 
claimants knew that the aid schemes were not authorized by the competent national 
authorities at the pre-accession stage. 
 
Generally speaking, these cases suggest that arbitral tribunals may use different standards 
than the EU institutions to determine whether an investor's legitimate expectations were 
breached in the context of state aid, although the cases related to pre-accession aid 
                                                
580 Idem. 
581 This last point referred to the decision of Romania to implement the aid scheme in a modified form, 
despite the Competition Council's finding that it violates the Europe Agreement. 
582 See Delacre and others, supra note 518, para. 33. 
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schemes. Admittedly, once a state has acceded to the EU, it is unlikely that investors can 
successfully challenge measures taken to comply with EU state aid rules, because the rules 
of the game should be clear to all stakeholders, including arbitral tribunals.583 However, 
disputes that relate to pre-accession regulatory changes may arise in the future. According 
to the UNCTAD investment treaty database, current candidate states and potential 
candidate states have 243 BITs.584 Out of these, 116 are concluded with current EU 
member states, with Serbia and Turkey respectively having 23 and 25 extra-EU BITs.585 
Under the association agreements,586 candidate states (and potential candidate states) 
pledge to take sweeping political and economic reforms. For example, the EU-Serbia 
association agreement, which entered into force in September 2013, provides that the 
'Parties recognize the importance of the approximation of the existing legislation in Serbia 
to that of the Community and of its effective implementation. Serbia shall endeavor to 
ensure that its existing laws and future legislation will be gradually made compatible with 
the Community acquis'.587 The association agreements also contain rules on competition 
policy that correspond to EU competition rules. These rules impose requirements on the 
candidate states and economic operators by proscribing the same practices as EU 
competition rules: practices which distort competition between the Community and the 
candidate state; abuses of a dominant market position; and granting of state aid 'which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or certain 
                                                
583 Micula is an outlier in this respect. In the Commission's view, it is Romania's compliance with the award 
that breaches EU state aid rules, rather than the 2004 revocation of the aid scheme. 
584 Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are candidate states, whereas Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidate states. 
585 See at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited 23 April 2016). 
586 Officially Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs). These agreements were previously called 
Europe Agreements, but all existing agreements have the title of Stabilization and Association Agreement. 
587 See Article 72(1) of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, OJ L 278, 18.10.2013, pp. 
16-473. For a similarly worded provision, see e.g. Article 70(1) of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic 
of Albania, of the other part - Protocols - Declarations, OJ L 107, 28.4.2009, pp. 166-502; Article 70(1) of 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, OJ L 164, 30.6.2015, pp. 2-547. The 
agreements identify priority areas for the approximation of laws which relate to the fundamental elements of 
the internal market. Article 72(3) of the EU-Montenegro association agreement contains a standard provision 
in this regard as it provides that the approximation 'will, at an early stage, focus on fundamental elements of 
the Internal Market acquis, including financial sector legislation, Justice, Freedom and Security as well as on 
trade-related areas. At a further stage, Montenegro shall focus of the remaining parts of the acquis'. See 
Article 72(3) of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part, OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, pp. 
3-354. Similar provisions are found in the other agreements as well (see e.g. Article 72(3) of the EU-Serbia 
agreement). 
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products'.588 While general changes in the regulatory framework that relate to the 
approximation of laws should not lead to successful BIT claims, it is not foreclosed that 
investors challenge changes in aid schemes they are entitled to, because the state aid rules 
are highly complex and their implementation at the pre-accession stage has proven to be a 
challenge.589 
 
As to regulatory conflicts, in each case the parties agreed that there was no conflict 
between EU law and the relevant investment treaty. Apart from Electrabel where the 
Commission's state aid decision was part of the applicable law in the context of the PPA 
termination claim, EU law constituted a fact that was taken account of in different ways by 
the tribunals so as to assess whether the challenged measure was a rational public policy 
measure. Similarly, apart from Electrabel, the tribunals did not need to interpret and apply 
                                                
588 See e.g. Article 71(1) of the EU-Albania agreement, supra note 588. The agreements also require that the 
candidate state establishes a national monitoring agency to carry out the application and enforcement of the 
competition rules. For example, Article 71(4) of the EU-Albania association agreement requires Albania to 
create 'an operationally independent authority which is entrusted with the powers necessary for the full 
application' of the state aid provision 'within four years from the date of entry into force' of the agreement. 
The general purpose of this and similar provisions is to ensure that the interpretation and application of the 
competition rules is aligned with EU competition rules and with the attendant practice of the EU institutions. 
For a useful discussion on these mechanisms and the role of the EU Commission, see Marise Cremona, 
‘State Aid Control: Substance and Procedure in the Europe Agreements and the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements’, 9 European Law Journal (2003), pp. 265-287. 
589 While much of the above discussion has focused on competition policy, state aid in particular, the SAAs 
also contain provisions on free movement of goods and capital, freedom to provide services and freedom of 
establishment, which follow, by and large, the logic of the internal market freedoms and the principle of 
equal treatment. These provisions are subject to numerous exceptions and often contain timelines for their 
gradual implementation, but it is not foreclosed that their implementation compels candidate states to take 
measures that affect aid schemes granted or assurances given to specific investors, leading the latter to take 
action under BITs. One example would be the withdrawal of the promise to renew public procurement 
contracts without inviting competing tenders - such promise clearly violates the non-discrimination principle 
in the context of freedom to provide services. The above general considerations apply to these situations as 
well. In principle, these remarks are also relevant in respect of association agreements concluded with third 
states that are not yet potential future member states or cannot become member states. While there is clear 
variance in the content of such agreements in comparison to those concluded with candidate states, these 
agreements usually contain rules on the fundamental market freedoms and competition policy as well as 
provisions under which the associate state commits to approximate its laws to specific areas of Union law. 
For example, Chapter VI of the Georgia-EU association agreement, which entered into force in July 2016, 
deals with establishment, trade in services and electronic commerce, and contains a number of articles under 
which Georgia commits to align its laws with those of the EU within specific timeframes, in particular with 
EU rules dealing with the provision of different types of services. Article 81 provides that Chapter VI 
provisions 'shall not affect the rights of entrepreneurs of the Parties arising from any existing or future 
international agreement relating to investment, to which a Member State of the EU and Georgia are parties.' 
The wording of Article 81 suggests that when Georgia implements the association agreement and an investor 
raises a claim under a BIT concluded between Georgia and an EU member state, the BIT takes priority in 
case of conflict. See Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia of the other part, OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, pp. 
4-743. Most of the other association agreements in this category do not contain similar rules, but the point is 
that when investors challenge policy measures of associate states, those claims are evaluated according to 
similar principles as claims raised under the association agreements of candidate states if EU law related 
arguments are raised in the proceedings. 
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EU law to the merits, which begs the question of whether EU-law-as-fact poses a threat to 
the autonomy of the EU legal order. In Electrabel, the termination of the PPAs was 
attributed to the EU on the ground that the state aid decision had mandated that measure. If 
the ability of the EEA court and EctHR to assess the division of competences between the 
EU and its member states posed a threat to the autonomy of EU law, the question is 
whether the same principle applies in respect of arbitral tribunals, regardless of the fact that 
such assessments are not binding on the EU institutions.  
5.4.2.2. The Spanish Solar Energy Cases 
EU investors have lodged more than thirty claims against Spain under the ECT. These 
cases stem from the scaling back of certain solar energy subsidies between 2008 and 2014, 
and in the Charanne arbitration Spain referred to the Commission's 2015 decision to start a 
preliminary investigation over the compatibility of the original subsidy scheme with EU 
state aid rules.590 That scheme, adopted in 2007, was in part motivated by the 2001 
renewable energy directive,591 but Spain did not invoke the directive in the Charanne 
proceedings as a ground for the scheme or the subsequent amendments. However, the 
directive did provide that any subsidies which member states provide to investors so as to 
reach their renewable energy goals were without prejudice to the application of EU state 
aid rules.592 It is also noteworthy that the 2001 directive did not contain any mandatory 
national targets as regards the production of renewable energy, whereas its successor, the 
2009 directive, sets such targets which member states have to achieve by 2020.593 
However, it is safe to assume that the latter directive is not directly relevant for the ECT 
cases, because member states retain much latitude in determining how to reach their 
national targets. It is also interesting that the Commission has expressly stated that the 
legislative changes that scaled back the subsidies did not breach the 2009 directive. The 
Commission reasoned that member states 'retain full discretion over whether they use 
                                                
590 Charanne B.V. & Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, Award 
(hereinafter Charanne award, 21 January 2016. 
591 See Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the 
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market, OJ L 283, 
27.10.2001, pp. 33-40. 
592 Ibid., Article 4(1). This article provides that without 'prejudice to Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty [now 
Article 107 and 108 TFEU], the Commission shall evaluate the application of mechanisms used in Member 
States according to which a producer of electricity, on the basis of regulations issued by the public 
authorities, receives direct or indirect support, and which could have the effect of restricting trade, on the 
basis that these contribute to the objectives set out in Articles 6 and 174 of the Treaty' (emphasis added). 
593 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion 
of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 
2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, pp. 16-62 (see annex I for the national targets). 
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support schemes or not and, should they use them, over their design, including both the 
structure and the level of support'. This discretion includes the right to 'enact changes to 
their support schemes, for example to avoid overcompensation or to address unforeseen 
developments such as a particularly rapid expansion of a precise renewables technology in 
a given sector'. The Commission concluded that the 2009 directive provides no grounds 'to 
take legal action against Spain with regard to the legislative changes which affected the 
level of support given to investors in renewable energy projects', and the affected investors 
were advised to seek judicial review before national courts if they considered that the 
scaling back breached their legitimate expectations.594 
 
But the Commission also remarked that 'support schemes' for the production of renewable 
energy 'need to be compatible with the Guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection and energy in as far as they constitute state aid'.595 Pending state aid 
investigations are confidential, but it is known that the Commission's investigation 
includes the Spanish law which introduced the generous feed-in-tariff system for solar 
energy production and quickly led to an investment boom.596 It appears that Spain had not 
notified the aid scheme to the Commission, most likely because it assumed that the feed-
in-tariff system fulfills the criteria of lawful state aid established both in numerous 
Commission guideline documents, which exempt certain categories of aid from the 
notification obligation, as well as in the case law of the ECJ. Be that as it may, if the 
Commission finds that the aid scheme constitutes unlawful state aid, the question is what 
implications it has for the pending arbitrations. Should the above principles apply, it would 
mean that under EU law the affected investors could not entertain any legitimate 
expectations that the scheme is compatible with EU law if the Commission had not 
expressly authorized it. Without the Commission's approval, there would be appear to be 
no exceptional circumstances either that enabled investors to legitimately assume that the 
scheme is compatible with EU law. Likewise, explicit assurances of Spanish authorities 
that the scheme is lawful state aid would be materially irrelevant. To paraphrase the ECJ, 
diligent solar energy producers should normally be able to determine whether Spain had 
followed the state aid procedure prior to implementing the aid scheme. 
                                                
594 The Commission expressed these remarks in the context of a petition submitted to the European 
Parliament on behalf of a Spanish renewable energy association. See European Parliament, Committee on 
Petitions, Notice to Members, Petition No 2520/2014, on the situation of the photovoltaic sector and the 
legality of the changes made to the law by the Spanish government, 29 February 2016. 
595 Idem. 
596 See Charanne award, supra note 590, para. 449. 
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Both Spain and the Commission argue that the 2001 and 2009 directives are materially 
unconnected to the scaling back of the subsidies, implying that the directives play no role 
in the pending arbitrations. But the Commission's state aid investigation may complicate 
matters to Micula like proportions. In May 2017, the Eiser tribunal held that Spain had 
breached the ECT's fair and equitable treatment by one of the relevant measures (adopted 
in 2014) and awarded the claimants €128 million in damages.597 In principle, the 
enforcement of the Eiser award could breach EU state aid rules,598 but this hinges on the 
Commission's findings: the implications are different depending on which version(s) of the 
aid schemes constitute illegal state aid. It is also uncertain whether the Commission would 
obligate Spain to recover the incompatible aid in full or whether countervailing 
considerations could exempt recovery, although this should only be possible if the 
recovery breaches a general principle of EU law. Any finding of incompatibility would 
probably be appealed to the ECJ, which may eventually come to a different conclusion 
than the Commission. I have worked on the assumption that arbitral tribunals will defer to 
the Commission's state aid decision, as the Electrabel tribunal did, but it is not guaranteed 
that tribunals go along this path. The Charanne tribunal referred to the Commission's state 
aid investigation, but since it was pending it had no bearing on the merits.599 Regardless of 
the outcome of the Commission's investigation, Spain could also invoke the Commission's 
position that the amendments to the aid scheme did not violate the 2009 directive or other 
EU law provisions, and provide no ground for infringement proceedings under EU law, 
even if this would only be a factual element in the analyses of tribunals (on the assumption 
that the 2009 directive cannot be invoked as a ground for the amendments). Here, the EU 
law compatibility of the amendments would support the argument that the scaling back 
was a reasonable policy based on sound public interest considerations. Arguably, these 
types of references to EU law constitute only a 'light touch' to EU law, and it would seem 
                                                
597 See Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg S.À R.I. v. Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/36, Award, 4 May 2017. In the other two arbitrations that have concluded at the time of writing, the 
tribunals rejected the claimants' claims based on the scaling back of the subsidies. In the Isolux arbitration, 
the tribunal assessed the same measures as the Eiser tribunal, but saw that these did not constitute a breach of 
the claimant's legitimate expectations. See Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case 
V2013/153, Award, 12 July 2016. The Charanne arbitration concerned earlier modifications to the aid 
scheme, but again the tribunal rejected the claimant's claims. 
598 Spain had argued that 'European authorities might regard any monetary award by the Tribunal in favor of 
the Claimants as impermissible state aid, implying that payment of such an award by Spain would be 
contrary to European law'. See Eiser award, supra note 597, para. 173. 
599 Idem. Spain argued (see at para. 224) that if the Commission finds that the subsidy program constitutes 
illegal state aid and the tribunal decides the dispute in favor of the claimants, it is probable that the award is 
unenforceable due to its compatibility with EU state aid rules. 
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plausible to argue that such light touches do not pose a threat to the autonomy of EU law, 
because the directive grants broad discretionary powers to the member states. 
 
A final observation is that the more than 30 claims brought against Spain are somewhat 
paradoxical, as they are challenging Spain's failure to uphold pro-environmental 
legislation, which is one of the central general concerns of the critics. 
5.4.2.3. The Vattenfall v. Germany (No. I) Case  
Vattenfall started to plan the construction of a coal-fired power plant on the bank of Elbe 
in 2004. The power plant's site was situated on the outskirts of Hamburg, and at first local 
politicians not only gave the go-ahead to the project, but suggested that Vattenfall builds a 
larger plant than originally planned. The company agreed, approved the €2.2 billion 
investment, and received a preliminary permit to start the construction as well as 
assurances on the conditions under which the plant was to be operated, including the 
amount of water it could abstract from and release back to the Elbe. Around the same time, 
the political climate in Hamburg and elsewhere in Germany started to shift, with anxieties 
over the implications of climate change becoming a more urgent political concern, in 
particular in the wake of the 2006 Stern report on the economics of climate change. In 
2008, Hamburg city-state elections brought to power a CDU-Green alliance, which led to a 
review of the project and the imposition of more stringent conditions on the plant's 
operation. As a result, Vattenfall filed a claim against Germany under the ECT, claiming 
that the delays in the authorization of the final permit and the stricter environmental 
conditions would render the plant economically unviable. The case was settled in 2010, 
and while the details of the settlement remain confidential, media reports implicated that 
Germany thinned the water-use limitations imposed on Vattenfall in the final permit.600 
 
The power plant started to operate in February 2015, but already before this the 
Commission had started infringement proceedings against Germany on the ground that it 
had failed to 'apply the requirements of the Habitats Directive in relation to the 
authorization of a coal power plant in Hamburg/Moorburg'. The operation of the power 
plant risked 'having a negative impact on a number of protected fish species', and since 
                                                
600 These facts are derived from Sebastian Knauer, 'Vattenfall vs. Deutschland: Machtkampf um Moorburg', 
Der Spiegel, 11 July 2009; IAReporter, 'Parties announce settlement of dispute over German power plant', 
IAReporter News, 28 August 2010. 
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Germany had repeatedly refused to perform an assessment of alternatives to the planned 
operating process, as the directive required, the Commission referred the matter to the ECJ 
in March 2015,601 which rendered its judgment in April 2017. Germany's original 2008 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) had shown that the plant's operation would 
adversely affect certain fish species protected under the Habitats Directive. Germany had 
taken certain precautionary measures to protect those species, but since there was no 
'definitive data' as to the effectiveness of those measures at the time the plant's construction 
was authorized, it had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive. Article 6(3) requires that such authorization is given only after it is certain that 
the plant's operation 'will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned' (i.e. the 
site through which the fish species migrate).602 Such finding implies, in principle, that 
Germany is obligated to carry out a new EIA to determine whether the precautionary 
measures prevent the negative effects on 'the integrity of the site'. What complicates 
matters, however, is the fact that the settlement between Vattenfall and Germany loosened 
the environmental requirements in comparison to the 2008 permit. For example, the fish 
monitoring standards became less strict under the terms of the settlement.603  
 
Depending on the conclusions of the new EIA, Germany might have to impose new 
requirements on the plant's operation, with Vattenfall potentially reopening the arbitration 
proceedings under the ICSID Convention. Arguably, since this is an intra-EU dispute 
(Swedish investor v. Germany), the Habitats Directive should take priority over the ECT as 
a matter of EU law, and the principle that treaties concluded by the EU take priority over 
secondary EU law is materially irrelevant. If the Electrabel tribunal's finding that EU law 
and the ECT are compatible is applied (by analogy), the implementation of the directive 
cannot be successfully challenged under the ECT, also because Article 1(3) ECT 
recognizes the power of the EU to take binding decisions in matters governed by the ECT, 
which decisions bind the member states. If the directive is an element of fact in our 
hypothetical case, Germany could argue that it is uncontested that the Habitats Directive is 
a rational and non-discriminatory response to a legitimate policy concern, which cannot 
                                                
601 European Commission press release, 'Environment: Commission refers Germany to Court over coal 
power plant in Moorburg', IP/15/4669, Brussels, 26 March 2015. See also Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 
21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (Habitats Directive), OJ L 
206, 22.7.1992, pp. 7-50. 
602 Case C-142/16, Commission v Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2017:301, paras. 37 and 45.  
603 Laurens Ankersmit, 'Case C-142/16 Commission v Germany: The Habitats Directive Meets ISDS?', 
European Law Blog, 6 September 2017. 
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constitute a breach of the ECT protection standards. Further, since the environmental 
requirements would be based on the Habitats Directive, Germany could argue that the 
tribunal lacks jurisdiction, because its actions are attributable to the EU as a matter of 
international law.  
 
The Vattenfall case is indicative of the fact that conflicts between EU acts and member 
state BITs and the ECT may arise outside competition law as well. If the Commission has 
monopoly over the authorization of state aid schemes under EU law, national authorities 
play a central role in other subject areas over which the EU has competences, including 
other areas of competition policy. If regulatory conflict arguments are often less 
compelling than 'EU law as fact' arguments, the general question is under which conditions 
investors can entertain legitimate expectations over the stability of the EU regulatory 
framework, and whether arbitral tribunals should apply the legitimate expectations doctrine 
as it stands under EU law. In state aid matters the basic EU law principles are well 
established, but it is difficult to assess what type of principles should apply in other policy 
areas. From the perspective of arbitral tribunals, much will depend on the clarity and 
precision of the relevant EU legislation, on the attendant practice of the EU institutions, on 
the assurances and representations given to the claimant investor, and on the linkage that 
the challenged domestic act has to the requirements of specific EU law instruments. 
Generally speaking, once a state has acceded to the EU, investors are subject to the 
requirements of the legitimate expectations doctrine as it stands under EU law and they 
should not be able to (successfully) resort to BIT protections when they cannot obtain 
redress for a regulatory change under EU law. The same principle should apply in respect 
of state aid matters. As to the distinction between intra-EU and extra-EU BITs, it seems 
plausible to argue that nationality should play no role in assessing whether the investor 
could entertain legitimate expectations. As to the autonomy of the EU legal order, given 
the broad range of EU acts and the differences in the discretion they leave to the member 
states, the autonomy concerns will vary in accordance with the underlying circumstances. 
The central question is whether the interpretation of EU law by an arbitral tribunal, as 
such, may pose a threat to the autonomy of EU law or whether those interpretations need to 
have some sort of binding effects within the EU legal order before a 'manifest risk' arises. 
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5.5. General Assessment and Arguments Supporting  
the Compatibility of BIT Arbitration Clauses with  
the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order 
The previous section showed that regulatory conflict arguments are rarely invoked in 
practice. The legitimate expectations doctrine played a central role in determining whether 
the claimant's treatment was fair and equitable, with the parties having different views over 
the role and weight that EU law should have in the resolution of the dispute. As to the 
autonomy of the EU legal order, the Electrabel tribunal's use of EU law 'went furthest', but 
in most cases EU law was a factual element that played a relatively modest role in the 
tribunals' analyses. It is relatively easy to imagine multiple scenarios where arbitral 
tribunals may have to engage with EU law similarly to the Electrabel tribunal. For 
example, a member state may implement the National Emissions Ceiling Directive by 
imposing more stringent environmental conditions on power generators.604 An affected 
investor could bring a claim under a relevant BIT, arguing that the new requirements 
constitute unfair and inequitable treatment as they place an unreasonable burden on power 
generators in comparison to other business sectors and economic operators. As to the 
directive, the investor could argue that it is only a factual element that cannot override the 
member state's BIT obligations, and that in any case the directive did not require that 
power generators are overburdened to meet the relevant emission targets. In such case, the 
arbitral tribunal would not only have to determine to what extent the directive is relevant 
when the domestic act of implementation is assessed in light of the BIT standards, but also 
interpret the directive to understand what it requires from the member states. Likewise, the 
member state could argue that the domestic act of implementation is attributable to the EU 
under international law as it was based solely on the requirements of the directive. 
Depending on the circumstances of the underlying dispute, these and analogous arguments 
will have varying degrees of plausibility, but the point is that when addressing such 
arguments, arbitral tribunals will have to interpret the EU law instrument and, if the issue 
of attribution is raised, assess the division of competences between the EU and its member 
states.605 
                                                
604 See Directive (EU) 2016/2284 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 on 
the reduction of national emissions of certain atmospheric pollutants, amending Directive 2003/35/EC and 
repealing Directive 2001/81/EC, OJ L 344, 17.12.2016, pp. 1-31. 
605 The content of the invoked EU law provisions may not require any interpretation on the tribunal's part, for 
example, when the EU courts have provided a conclusive interpretation, and this could be raised to argue that 
the acte clair doctrine applies similarly in respect of arbitral tribunals. In other words, when there is no doubt 
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In Opinions 1/91 and 2/13, the agreements under scrutiny enabled the EEA court and the 
EctHR to assess the division of competences between the EU and its member states for the 
purposes of attributing responsibility for a specific act or omission. This was 'likely 
adversely to affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties and, hence, the 
autonomy of the Community legal order'.606 Importantly, it appeared that the ability of the 
two courts to address the question of competence alone led to a finding of incompatibility. 
In other words, it was irrelevant whether or not (e.g.) the EEA court's assessment of 
competences bound the ECJ. If an arbitral tribunal determines the question of competence 
directly, or indirectly by attributing a measure either to the EU or the respondent state, it 
would appear that this is equally problematic from the perspective of autonomy. Such 
determination is final and binding and will determine the outcome of (at least some aspect) 
of the dispute. The ECJ could become involved and review the tribunal's assessment under 
certain conditions and therewith safeguard the autonomy of EU law.607 However, these 
conditions entail limitations on the ECJ's review powers, and I will address them below. 
 
The BGH made a number of interesting points on the scope of Article 344 TFEU in its 
referral to the ECJ, with MOX Plant playing a central role. The wording of Article 344 
TFEU does not provide conclusive answer to the question of whether it applies to disputes 
between member states and private parties.608 In Opinion 2/13, the ECJ held that Article 
344 TFEU applies to disputes between the EU and its member states,609 and the General 
Court has held that a pre-accession arbitration clause in an agreement between the EU 
Commission and the Czech Republic came within the article's scope.610 In Opinion 1/09, 
                                                                                                                                              
about the meaning of specific EU law provisions, the autonomy of the EU legal order is not threatened. But 
even if this argument is plausible as such, it does not remove the possibility that under any given arbitration 
clause disputes can arise in which the parties raise EU law instruments, the meaning of which is unclear. 
606 Opinion 1/91, supra note 362, para. 35. In Opinion 2/13, supra note 439, para. 235, the ECJ held that 'the 
arrangements for the operation of the co-respondent mechanism laid down by the agreement envisaged do 
not ensure that the specific characteristics of the EU and EU law are preserved.' While the Court used 
different phrases to make a finding of incompatibility, the basis of the conclusion was similar in both 
opinions. 
607 Of course, member state BITs are binding on the contracting states alone and the EU cannot be a 
respondent in a dispute raised under them. Similarly, the EU was to become party to the EEA agreement and 
the ECHR, whereas it is not and will not be a party to member state BITs. However, and arguably, the 
Court's take on the question of competence was not based on the possibility of the EU being a respondent in 
disputes brought under the EEA agreement and the ECHR or on the EU's status as a contracting party. 
608 As the BGH put it, 'Der Wortlaut des Art. 344 AEUV lässt allerdings keinen eindeutigen Schluss darauf 
zu, ob die Bestimmung auch für Streitigkeiten zwischen einer Person des Privatrechts und einem 
Mitgliedstaat gilt.' See Eureko referral, supra note 150, para. 27. Another issue is whether Article 344 TFEU 
applies to disputes between member states and third state private parties or only to disputes between member 
states and private parties having an EU nationality. 
609 Opinion 2/13, supra note 439, para. 202 ff. 
610 See Case T-465/08, Czech Republic v European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:186, paras. 95-102. 
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disputes between two private parties in the field of patents were outside the sweep of 
Article 344 TFEU, but none of these findings shed light on the relationship of BIT 
arbitration clauses and Article 344 TFEU. Academic commentators remain divided over 
the issue, but the majority concur with arbitral tribunals and hold that the article's scope is 
limited to disputes between member states.611 The BGH noted that Article 344 TFEU 
refers expressly to disputes 'concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties'. 
When analyzing this phrase, the BGH referred to MOX Plant and inferred that Article 344 
TFEU is not necessarily breached when non-EU courts use EU law as an interpretative aid 
so as to determine whether a provision in a non-EU treaty is breached.612 The BGH then 
held, crucially, that MOX Plant suggests that Article 344 TFEU is breached only when the 
non-EU court's decision is based on the interpretation and application of EU law, and the 
BGH made an express reference to the ECJ's finding that Ireland submitted the EU law 
instruments to the UNCLOS 'tribunal for purposes of their interpretation and application in 
the context of proceedings seeking a declaration that the United Kingdom had breached the 
provisions of those instruments'.613 Further, and as noted, the BGH's referral stemmed from 
the Eureko arbitration, and the compensation that the claimant investor had received was 
based solely on a breach of the Dutch-Slovak BIT. As the award entailed no declaration 
that the Slovak Republic had breached its obligations under EU law, the BGH reasoned 
that the dispute fell outside the scope of Article 344 TFEU.614 This would imply that if a 
tribunal declares that a member state has breached EU law, investment disputes come 
within the scope of Article 344 TFEU, but as noted such declarations are unlikely to occur 
in practice because in most arbitrations EU law is a factual element rather than part of the 
applicable law. As to Electrabel, the tribunal's finding on attribution did not entail any 
                                                
611 See e.g. Dimopoulos, ‘The Validity and Applicability of International Investment Agreements', supra note 
26, at 86-87; Christer Söderlund, 'Intra-EU Investment Protection and the EC Treaty', 24 Journal of 
International Arbitration (2007), pp. 455-468, at 459-460; Eilmansberger, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
EU Law’, supra note 26, at 404; Wehland, 'Intra-EU Investment Agreements and Arbitration', supra note 280, 
at 318-319. For the opposing view, see Hindelang, ‘Circumventing Primacy of EU Law ', supra note 26, at 
199 (footnote 82). For the view that the scope of Article 344 is uncertain, see Konstanze von Papp, 'Clash of 
"Autonomous Legal Orders": Can EU Member State Courts bridge the Jurisdictional Divide between 
Investment Tribunals and the ECJ? A Plea for Direct Referral from Investment Tribunals to the ECJ', 50 
Common Market Law Review (2013), pp. 1039-1082, at 1052-1054. 
612 See Eureko referral, supra note 150, para. 32 (in the BGH's words, the MOX Plant judgment suggests that 
'für einen Verstoß gegen Art. 344 AEUV wohl nicht ausreichen, dass ein Schiedsgericht Unionsrecht als 
Auslegungskriterium für eine nicht dem Unionsrecht angehörende Bestimmung berücksichtigt.'). 
613 Idem. ('Vielmehr könnte ein Verstoß gegen Art. 344 AEUV erst vorliegen, wenn Gegenstand der 
Entscheidung des Schiedsgerichts die Auslegung und Anwendung unionsrechtlicher Vorschriften selbst ist'.), 
with reference to paras. 140, 149 and 151 of MOX Plant, supra note 348 (the quote is from para. 151). 
614 Ibid., paras. 32-33. 
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assessment of whether Hungary had breached its EU law obligations, but the finding 
nonetheless creates autonomy concerns.  
 
The above discussion suggested that MOX Plant could be understood in another way for 
two main reasons. First, I argued that the ECJ's finding on the 'manifest risk' to the 
autonomy of the EU legal order was based solely on Ireland's invocation of the EU law 
instruments at the UNCLOS proceedings, and the question of how the tribunal was to use 
those instruments (either as facts or applicable law) was, to quote the Court, 'entirely 
irrelevant' to the existence of that risk. Second, I pointed out that arbitral tribunals assess 
the respondent member state's actions against the treaty under which they were established 
(e.g. a BIT or the UNCLOS) and not against the provisions of EU law, just as the ECJ did 
in Commission v Slovakia. Unless the parties raise regulatory conflict arguments or argue 
that EU law takes priority over the BIT, EU law is only a factual element and not part of 
the law that applies to the merits. Hence, the BGH's implicit suggestion that the decision of 
the UNCLOS tribunal could be based on the interpretation and application of EU law is 
incorrect to the extent that the material dispute between Ireland and the UK could only be 
resolved by applying the provisions of the UNCLOS to the merits of the dispute. While the 
ECJ's own analysis blurred the fact/applicable law dichotomy, the MOX Plant judgment 
could still be read as implying that Article 344 TFEU is breached, in disputes between 
member states, when a non-EU court interprets and applies EU law to ascertain its 
meaning as fact, because the Court held that the autonomy of the EU legal order was under 
threat regardless of whether the EU law instruments were raised as facts or as applicable 
law.  
 
This finding was not connected to the twin-fact that the UNCLOS was part of EU law and 
that many of its provisions fell under EU competence. Further, the UNCLOS provisions 
that Ireland had invoked came within the scope of EU competence, which meant that the 
Court had exclusive jurisdiction to settle disputes between member states concerning those 
provisions, but again this point was not tied to the finding that Ireland's invocation of the 
(non-UNCLOS) EU law instruments posed a manifest risk to the autonomy of the EU legal 
order. In other words, it appears that the autonomy doctrine was raised independently of 
Article 344 TFEU. Interestingly, the BGH made a connection between Articles 259 and 
344 TFEU to support the argument about the latter's inapplicability to investment 
arbitration. Article 259 TFEU allows a member state to raise a claim against another 
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member state before the ECJ for an alleged failure 'to fulfil an obligation under the 
Treaties'. The BGH saw that Article 344 TFEU obligates member states to use the 
procedure under Article 259 TFEU when their dispute concerns EU law.615 The BGH then 
referred to MOX Plant where the Court held that the dispute between Ireland and the UK 
was covered by a method of settlement in the meaning of Article 344 TFEU, and that 
method of settlement was found in what is now Article 259 TFEU.616 The BGH argued 
that there is no equivalent provision under EU law allowing investors to bring actions for 
damages against member states. In other words, disputes between member states were 
covered by Article 344 TFEU, because Article 259 TFEU provided a method for their 
settlement, whereas the founding treaties contained no 'method of settlement' for disputes 
between EU investors and member states. The preliminary ruling procedure under Article 
267 TFEU was not such a method of settlement either. When investors bring actions for 
damages against member states before domestic courts, these courts can submit 
preliminary questions to the ECJ, but this was not a 'method of settlement' in the meaning 
of Article 344 TFEU, but an interim procedure for resolving a question of EU law in a 
national 'Streitbeilegungsverfahren'.617 It is noteworthy that in MOX Plant the ECJ held 
that the UNCLOS arbitration was a 'method of settlement other than those provided for' 
under EU law, as the tribunal's decision was to be final and binding on the disputing 
parties.618 By analogy, investment arbitration qualifies as such 'method of settlement' in the 
meaning of Article 344 TFEU, as awards of tribunals are final and binding, but this 
analogy is relevant only if investment disputes fall under the article's scope in the first 
place.  
 
I argued that the Court misunderstood the jurisdiction of the UNCLOS tribunal, because 
arbitral tribunals will not make formal declarations on alleged breaches of EU law. EU law 
can be part of the applicable law only if a member state argues that its obligation to 
implement an EU act takes priority over its BIT (or UNCLOS) obligations, which assumes 
                                                
615 Ibid., para. 34 
616 MOX Plant, supra note 348, para. 128. 
617 Eureko referral, supra note 150, para. 35. 
618 MOX Plant, supra note 348, para. 129. Here, Article 296 UNCLOS is relevant and reads as follows: '1. 
Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be final and shall be 
complied with by all the parties to the dispute. 2. Any such decision shall have no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular dispute.'  
 177 
the existence of conflict,619 but even in this scenario the tribunal would not rule on 
breaches of EU law, as the conflict could only be resolved by applying a conflict rule of 
international law. Or, alternatively, the member state could argue that its relevant EU law 
and BIT obligations constitute a harmonious set of obligations which implies that the 
challenged measure is compatible with the BIT as it was mandated by EU law. However, 
arbitral tribunals assess the challenged measure only against the relevant BIT standards, so 
in the latter scenario EU law cannot rise to the level of applicable law in the sense that the 
tribunal would apply EU law to the merits. The point of this quibbling is that unless 
conflict arguments are raised, EU law is necessarily a factual element in the tribunal's 
analysis, although it may constitute a direct (and only) basis for the finding that the 
challenged measure was (or was not) a rational public interest measure which does not 
breach the BIT. Another scenario is one where the member state argues that the challenged 
measure is attributable to the EU, which would render the claim inadmissible as a matter of 
international law, but here too EU law would not be part of the applicable law as the 
question of attribution is decided on the basis of the relevant rules of international law. 
 
This suggests that MOX Plant and the four opinions could be read in two ways. First, as 
implying that member states are not allowed to refer disputes to a court or a tribunal if the 
dispute raises questions of EU law. Even if the presiding body's jurisdiction extends only 
to the treaty (e.g. UNCLOS, BIT) under which it was created, the invocation of EU law 
instruments by a member state creates a manifest risk to the autonomy of EU law. This 
would suggest that each arbitration clause in member state BITs creates such a risk, 
because of the possibility that member states invoke EU law instruments in given cases. 
Second, the Court's approach could indicate that whatever the status of EU law is in an 
arbitration, the crucial question is whether the tribunal's interpretation (and/or application) 
of EU law produces binding effects in one or another way. Arbitral awards are final and 
binding, but only on the disputing parties, and the Court alluded to this when it held that 
UNCLOS arbitrations are a form of dispute settlement in the meaning of Article 344 
TFEU. The first reading would broaden the scope of the autonomy doctrine but also set 
relatively clear limits to it, whereas the second reading raises the difficult question of 
whether or not arbitral awards have 'binding effects' within the EU legal order. The first 
                                                
619 Clearly, if there is no conflict, and the member state argues that EU law is part of the applicable law, the 
argument is based on a flawed logic; in such cases EU law can only be a fact because the tribunal assesses 
the challenged measure against the applicable BIT.  
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reading would also raise the question of whether autonomy is safeguarded adequately if 
member state courts and the ECJ can review the EU law engagements of arbitral tribunals. 
The following tackles these two questions, as well as addresses the question about the 
scope of Article 344 TFEU.  
 
Many of the Court's opinions emphasize the centrality of the preliminary ruling procedure 
for the uniform interpretation of EU law and for ensuring that EU law has the same effect 
in all member states.620 In Opinion 2/13, the Court alluded to this by noting that the 
'interpretation of a provision of EU law, including of secondary law, requires, in principle, 
a decision of the Court of Justice where that provision is open to more than one plausible 
interpretation'.621 In most of the arbitral cases discussed above, the seat of the tribunals was 
in an EU member state. This meant that the disputing parties could turn to national courts 
during and after the arbitral process, with the ECJ (potentially) becoming involved through 
the preliminary ruling procedure. This is of course what happened in Eureko. The Slovak 
Republic challenged the final award before German courts, but already during the arbitral 
proceedings the Slovak Republic requested the tribunal to submit preliminary questions to 
the ECJ on the compatibility of the BIT's arbitration clause with EU law.622 In Eastern 
Sugar, the Czech Republic made a similar request,623 but in both cases the tribunals 
rejected the requests. Three questions arise: first, can arbitral tribunals submit preliminary 
questions; second, to what extent can member state courts and the ECJ review the 
decisions of arbitral tribunals, in particular their interpretations of EU law; and third, what 
implications do the answers to the two previous questions have for the relationship of BIT 
arbitration clauses and the autonomy of the EU legal order.  
 
Generally speaking, each state has its own rules of procedure which determine the ways in 
which arbitral tribunals and the parties can resort to national courts at different stages of 
the arbitral process. In its referral, the BGH noted that the German Zivilprozessordnung 
(ZPO) contained a provision allowing arbitral tribunals to request German courts, for 
                                                
620 For example, in Opinion 2/13, supra note 439, para. 176, the ECJ held that the preliminary ruling 
procedure is the 'keystone' of the EU legal order and 'has the object of securing uniform interpretation of EU 
law…thereby serving to ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the 
particular nature of the law established by the Treaties.' Similarly, in Opinion 1/09, supra note 354, para. 83, 
the preliminary ruling procedure was described as guaranteeing that EU law 'has the same effect' in the 
member states and as aiming to 'avoid divergences in the interpretation' of EU law. 
621 Opinion 2/13, para. 440. 
622 See Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 148. 
623 Eastern Sugar award, supra note 98, para. 130. 
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example, to carry out judicial acts which the former are not authorized to do under German 
law.624 The BGH referred to the überwiegend view of German commentators that Article 
1050 ZPO allows German courts to submit preliminary questions to the ECJ on the 
interpretation of an EU law provision on the request of an arbitral tribunal.625 However, 
since Article 8(5) of the Dutch-Slovak BIT provided that the 'tribunal shall determine its 
own procedure applying the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission for 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)', the BGH saw that the tribunal could not invoke 
the ZPO provision to make a request concerning the preliminary ruling procedure.626 
National rules of procedure do not necessarily allow arbitral tribunals to use national courts 
to obtain the ECJ's interpretation on a relevant EU law question, and even when they 
accommodate such requests, tribunals are not obligated to make one. Two commentators 
have also argued that the wording of Article 267 TFEU and the Court's judgment in Roda 
Golf suggest that a member state court can refer preliminary questions 'only if there is a 
case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to 
lead to a decision of a judicial nature.'627 Arguably, a request to a member state court by an 
arbitral tribunal to submit preliminary questions on its behalf does not fulfil this 
requirement, with the ECJ potentially rejecting such requests.628 Likewise, the seat of 
arbitral tribunals may be outside the EU, in which case the proceedings are subject to the 
procedural law of the seat state, with member state courts and the preliminary ruling 
procedure being excluded from the process at all stages of the arbitration.629  
 
National rules of procedure may provide an indirect access to the ECJ, but can arbitral 
tribunals submit preliminary questions directly to the Court, without an intermediary? 
Arguably, if arbitral tribunals were authorized and obligated to submit preliminary 
                                                
624 See Article 1050 of the Zivilprozessordnung (the relevant part reads as follows: 'Das Schiedsgericht oder 
eine Partei mit Zustimmung des Schiedsgerichts kann bei Gericht Unterstützung bei der Beweisaufnahme 
oder die Vornahme sonstiger richterlicher Handlungen, zu denen das Schiedsgericht nicht befugt ist, 
beantragen.' 
625 Eureko referral, supra note 150, para. 51. For one such view in German legal commentary, see Bernhard 
Wieczorek, Rolf A. Schütze et al. (eds.), Zivilprozessordnung und Nebengesetze Großkommentar, Band 11 
(De Gruyter, 4th ed. 2014), p. 602. 
626 Ibid., para. 52. 
627 Case C-14/08, Roda Golf & Beach Resort SL, ECLI:EU:C:2009:395, para. 34 
628 This is the argument in Miloš Olík and David Fyrbach, 'The Competence of Investment Arbitration 
Tribunals to Seek Preliminary Rulings from European Courts', 2 Czech Yearbook of International Law 
(2011), pp. 191-205, at 202-203.  
629 Apart from situations where the winning party seeks the award's enforcement in a member state, but given 
the narrow grounds under which an award's enforcement can be challenged, it is unlikely that a member state 
court can submit a preliminary question concerning the tribunal's interpretation of particular EU law 
provisions. 
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questions to the ECJ whenever questions of EU law arise to which there is no clear answer, 
this could eliminate any and all autonomy concerns. The ECJ has not ruled on this specific 
issue and its case law on commercial arbitration provides support for opposing arguments 
on whether arbitral tribunals qualify as 'ordinary courts' for the purposes of Article 267 
TFEU.630 Academic commentators disagree over the matter,631 but it seems unnecessary to 
address this question in detail. Assuming that the ECJ authorizes arbitral tribunals to 
submit preliminary questions, the latter would not have a legal obligation to do so unless 
the relevant treaty articles are amended accordingly.632 As tribunals have thus far rejected 
requests to use the preliminary ruling procedure, it is unlikely that they will change course 
unless obligated to do so under law. Hence, on the assumption that tribunals are authorized 
to use the preliminary ruling procedure, it does not, at present, ensure that member state 
courts and the ECJ become involved so as to review the way in which tribunals have 
interpreted EU law in particular cases. 
 
Arbitral tribunals have referred to the Eco Swiss and Nordsee cases to support the thesis 
that BIT arbitration clauses are compatible with EU law.633 In both cases, the ECJ 
emphasized that when questions of EU law are raised in a commercial arbitration, member 
state courts 'may be called upon to examine them either in the context of their collaboration 
with arbitration tribunals, in particular in order to assist them in certain procedural matters 
                                                
630 In Nordsee the ECJ held that the referring arbitral tribunal was not a court or tribunal of a member state in 
the meaning of Article 267 TFEU and could not submit preliminary questions to the Court. See Case C-
102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hockseefischerei Nordstern AG 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:107, paras. 11-13. The Court made a similar finding in the Denuit and Cordenier case, 
indicating that commercial arbitration tribunals do not, as a rule, qualify as courts of member state for the 
purposes of Article 267 TFEU. See Case C-125/04, Guy Denuit und Betty Cordenier v. Transorient – 
Mosaïque Voyages und Culture SA, ECLI:EU:C:2005:69, paras. 11-17. However, the Court has also ruled 
that under certain conditions an arbitral tribunal can qualify as a court or tribunal of a member state. See Case 
109/88, Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, ECLI:EU:C:1989:383, paras 7-8. For a useful discussion on the criteria 
of an 'ordinary court' established in the relevant ECJ case law, see von Papp, 'A Plea for Direct Referral from 
Investment Tribunals to the ECJ', supra note 611, at 1066-1079. 
631 For the argument that investor-state tribunals cannot use the preliminary ruling procedure, see 
Dimopoulos, 'The Validity and Applicability of International Investment Agreements', supra note 26, p. 91 
(footnote 98). For the opposing argument, see Hindelang, ‘Circumventing Primacy of EU Law', supra note 
26, pp. 201-203; Jürgen Basedow, 'EU Law in International Arbitration: Referrals to the European Court of 
Justice', 32 Journal of International Arbitration (2015), pp. 367-386, at 378-381. See also Case C-567/14, 
Genentech, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, ECLI:EU:C:2016:177, para. 59 (footnote 34, where the 
Advocate General supports the idea that ICSID tribunals could qualify as 'ordinary courts' and submit 
preliminary questions).  
632 This would at least require the inclusion in member state BITs of a clause providing that arbitral tribunals 
qualify as courts and tribunals in the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, and are thus bound by its contents. It is 
unclear whether the EU founding treaties would have to be amended. It is equally uncertain whether tribunals 
whose seat is in a third state could be authorized to use the preliminary ruling procedure. 
633 Eco Swiss, supra note 145; Nordsee, supra note 630. 
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or to interpret the law applicable, or in the course of a review of an arbitration award'.634 
Likewise, it is the task of member state courts to 'ascertain whether it is necessary for them 
to make a reference' to the ECJ 'in order to obtain an interpretation or assessment of the 
validity of provisions of Community law which they may need to apply when reviewing an 
arbitration award'.635 In Eco Swiss, the Court also recognized that 'it is in the interest of 
efficient arbitration proceedings that review of arbitration awards should be limited in 
scope and that annulment of or refusal to recognise an award should be possible only in 
exceptional circumstances'.636 Arbitral tribunals have inferred that Eco Swiss and Nordsee 
indicate that since the ECJ has sanctioned commercial arbitration, the same principle 
should apply, by analogy, in respect of investment arbitration. The BGH also argued that 
the Court's reference in Eco Swiss to the 'interest of an efficient arbitration proceedings' 
applies equally to investment arbitration, with the consequence that national courts can 
review awards only in exceptional circumstances without this causing any autonomy 
concerns.637 
 
These arguments refer to two scenarios. First, to the scenario where the ECJ becomes 
involved during the arbitral proceedings to clarify the meaning of specific EU law 
provisions, and, second, to the scenario where the losing party challenges the enforcement 
of an award before a member state court on the grounds provided in national rules of 
procedure. The grounds of challenge under national rules of procedure are purposely 
narrow and reflect the basic idea of arbitration, namely, that it provides a fast, final and 
binding settlement of the underlying disputes and is an alternative to national courts. To 
schematize matters, arbitral awards (and other decisions of tribunals) can only be 
challenged on similar grounds as domestic judgments which have obtained res juridicata 
effect. Manifest violations of due process, lack of jurisdiction, and decisions breaching a 
state's public policy are typical examples of such grounds, which imply that the grounds 
rarely accommodate arguments based on a mistaken interpretation of the law, including 
EU law. The BGH argued that this does not mean that BIT arbitration clauses are 
incompatible with EU law, because the ECJ has expressly acknowledged that member state 
courts are to review commercial arbitration awards only to the extent that they can be 
certain that the award does not breach 'a fundamental provision [of EU law] which is 
                                                
634 Nordsee, supra note 630, para. 14. See also Eco Swiss, supra note 145, para. 32. 
635 Eco Swiss, supra note 145, para. 33. See also Nordsee, supra note 630, para. 15. 
636 Eco Swiss, supra note 145, para. 35. 
637 Eureko referral, supra note 150, paras. 62-63. 
 182 
essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in 
particular, for the functioning of the internal market'.638 In other words, if arbitral tribunals 
have interpreted and applied 'ordinary' EU law provisions, there is no need to review those 
interpretations, because the 'efficiency' of arbitration proceedings requires this.  
 
However, and clearly, the ECJ can provide an interpretation of such ordinary provisions 
during the arbitral proceedings if the national rules of procedure allow tribunals to ask 
national courts to send preliminary questions on their behalf. Equally clearly, however, if 
such requests are not possible or if the tribunal refuses to make such request, the tribunal's 
misinterpretation is final, because it does not constitute a ground of challenge of the final 
award. Only if the award's enforcement would breach a 'fundamental' EU law provision 
can the presiding court annul the award, and in Eco Swiss the Court held that the award 
breached such fundamental provision, namely Article 101 TFEU, and the Dutch Supreme 
Court then annulled the award on the ground that it was equivalent to a breach of Dutch 
public policy in the meaning of its national rules of procedure.639  
 
Generally speaking, whether investment arbitration is akin to commercial arbitration is in 
the eye of the beholder.640 Government officials, politicians, NGOs, arbitrators and 
academic commentators take different approaches to investment arbitration because their 
interests and objectives as regards the investment treaty regime are different. As Roberts 
argues, different stakeholders employ different analogies between commercial and 
investment arbitration so as to compel other stakeholders to accept a particular 
interpretation of either a specific BIT provision or the investment treaty regime as a 
whole.641 In our case, the purpose of the commercial arbitration analogy is to provide 
support to the argument that investment arbitration is equally compatible with EU law. The 
analogy strives to ensure that public law institutions keep a similarly polite distance to the 
work of investment and commercial arbitrators, and the idea is that the requirements of the 
autonomy doctrine should be loosened to a similar extent in relation to both. In the above 
                                                
638 Eco Swiss, supra note 145, para. 36. See also Eureko referral, supra note 150, paras. 55-63. 
639 Ibid., para. 37. 
640 For an insightful critique of the widely accepted argument that investor-state arbitration is 'public' and 
commercial arbitration 'private' in nature, see José E. Alvarez, 'Is Investor-State Arbitration 'Public'?, 
Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper 2016/6 (Global Administrative Law Series). 
641 Anthea Roberts, 'Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System', 107 
American Journal of International Law (2013), pp. 45-94. 
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cases, the tribunals simply assumed that the two types of arbitration are alike, without 
providing arguments that support its use.642  
 
It is important to note that the underlying arbitrations in Eco Swiss and Nordsee did not 
involve member states. Both were contractual disputes between two private parties and in 
both cases the basic argument was that the relevant contracts breached EU law. In Eco 
Swiss the arbitral tribunal had ordered one of the companies to pay damages to the other 
party on the basis of a licensing agreement, which was automatically void under Article 
101 TFEU, as it constituted a market sharing arrangement. In Nordsee the Commission had 
informed a group of shipping companies that a pooling agreement concerning the 
allocation of EU aid as between them breached the regulations under which the aid was 
granted and could not be enforced, but one of the shipping companies still sought 
compensation from another shipping company for breach of the agreement. In Nordsee the 
Court held that 'Community law must be observed in its entirety throughout the territory' of 
the member states, and the disputing parties in the arbitration were not 'free to create 
exceptions to it'.643 In Eco Swiss the tribunal's seat was in the Netherlands and in Nordsee 
in Germany, and the ECJ held, as noted, that when a tribunal or one of the parties resort to 
member state courts during or after the arbitral proceedings, it is the task of those courts to 
determine whether to submit preliminary questions to acquire 'the interpretation or 
assessment of the validity of provisions of Community law'.644 In Eco Swiss the losing 
party resorted to Dutch courts after the arbitral tribunal had rendered its final award, while 
in Nordsee the sole arbitrator submitted preliminary questions directly to the ECJ during 
the arbitral proceedings, with the Court finding that it had no jurisdiction to give a ruling 
on the ground that the arbitrator did not qualify as a court or tribunal of a member state 
under Article 267 TFEU. It is unknown how the arbitral process progressed from thereon 
and whether the sole arbitrator resorted to German courts.  
 
This suggests two things. First, the ECJ acknowledged that once a tribunal has rendered 
the final award, member state courts have limited possibilities to annul them in light of EU 
law, but this was not a problem for the Court. On the other hand, in Nordsee, the ECJ held 
                                                
642 As Dworkin once put it, '…analogy without theory is blind. An analogy is a way of stating a conclusion, 
not a way of reaching one, and theory must do the real work.' See Ronald Dworkin, 'In Praise of Theory', 29 
Arizona State Law Journal (1997), pp. 353-376, at 371. 
643 Nordsee, supra note 630, para. 14. 
644 Ibid., para. 15. 
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that parties to an arbitration cannot contract out of the requirements of EU law, as 
'Community law must be observed in its entirety' throughout the EU. Without taking a 
stand on the ability of the sole arbitrator to seize the ECJ through German courts, the Court 
then made a general reference to the cooperation of arbitral tribunals and member state 
courts. The Court's findings in Eco Swiss and Nordsee appear to be somewhat illogical in 
respect of each other, but there is no point in placing too much emphasis on this. In both 
cases, the Court was addressing preliminary questions submitted by member state courts, 
and none of those questions related to the general issue of compatibility of commercial 
arbitration with EU law or to the situation where a member state is a party to a commercial 
arbitration. Neither did the questions concern situations where arbitral tribunals have to 
address questions of EU law in ways that might breach the autonomy of the EU legal order 
under the Court's case law. As argued above, BIT arbitration clauses may lead, for 
example, to claims where the tribunal is required to assess the respective competences of 
the EU and its member states and to analyze the question of attribution in relation to a 
domestic measure which implements an EU act. Likewise, BIT arbitration clauses may 
lead to cases where a member state invokes various types of EU law instruments, which 
the tribunal has to interpret to understand what the instruments required from the member 
state, and this holds true both when EU law is considered a factual component in the 
tribunal's analysis and (in the odd case) where it is part of the applicable law.  
 
The third scenario that fell outside the sweep of Eco Swiss and Nordsee is the one where 
the tribunal's seat is in a third state. In such cases, as noted, member state courts and the 
ECJ can only become involved if the winning party seeks the award's enforcement within 
the EU, but their involvement has its limits given the narrow grounds under which awards 
may be challenged. It is also noteworthy that ICISD arbitrations are governed solely by the 
ICSID convention and ICSID arbitration rules, which prevent tribunals and the parties to 
seize member state courts during the arbitral process. Likewise, once an ICSID tribunal has 
rendered its final award, the award can only be annulled by an ICSID annulment 
committee but not by national courts. If the annulment committee upholds the award, 
ICSID contracting states are obligated to 'recognize an award rendered pursuant 
to…[ICSID] Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that 
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State'.645 This 
                                                
645 See Article 54(1) ICSID Convention, supra note 8 (emphasis added). 
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implies that challenges to ICSID awards are possible on extraordinary grounds of appeal 
under which final judgments of domestic courts can be challenged. Whether such grounds 
accommodate a challenge based on a tribunal's misinterpretation of EU law is an open 
question, but it seems clear that the misinterpretation would at least have to concern a 
fundamental EU law provision. 
 
The Court's statement, that it is in 'the interest of interest of efficient arbitration 
proceedings that review of arbitration awards should be limited in scope and that 
annulment of or refusal to recognise an award should be possible only in exceptional 
circumstances', should be seen in the light of its context. The Eco Swiss tribunal had 
rendered its final award and the Court was in a position to ensure that the Dutch Hoge 
Raad annuls the award on the ground that its enforcement would have amounted to 
enforcing a market sharing arrangement, which would have breached Article 101 TFEU. 
Moreover, the Court's statement is descriptive and not a categorical acceptance of the 
many implications that the 'efficiency' of arbitration proceedings may have on the uniform 
interpretation and full effect of EU law. In other words, 'efficiency' is clearly one of the 
reasons why the disputing parties choose arbitration over national courts, but this does not 
mean that the parties are 'free to create exceptions to' EU law, as the Court put it in 
Nordsee. Hence, again, it seems that the two cases provide no conclusive answer to the 
compatibility of BIT arbitration clauses with the autonomy of the EU legal order.  
 
The analysis suggests that in many situations the EU law interpretations of arbitral 
tribunals are outside the reach of member state courts and the ECJ. If the above broad 
reading of the Court's case law is accepted, the implication is that BIT arbitration clauses 
pose a manifest risk to the autonomy of EU law, and the fact that the ECJ cannot control 
tribunals' EU law interpretations only strengthens the conclusion. On the other hand, if the 
second, more narrow reading is accepted, the question is in which situations do decisions 
of arbitral tribunals have binding effects within the EU legal order.646 The legal opinion of 
the European Parliament's Legal Service on the relationship of investment dispute 
settlement provisions in EU trade agreements and EU law contains an interesting analysis 
                                                
646 The Electrabel tribunal's finding of attribution between the EU and its member states was 'binding' in the 
sense that it formed the basis for the rejection of the PPA termination claim. While the ECJ might have 
concurred with the tribunal on the issue of attribution, it could not review that finding because the 
proceedings were governed by the ICSID Convention under which awards can only be challenged before an 
ad hoc tribunal established in accordance with the Convention's provisions. No such challenge was made, so 
the member state courts or the ECJ did not become involved. 
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in this regard.647 The opinion discussed the topic through the proposed investment 
protection provisions of CETA. Article 8.31 CETA provides that tribunals shall not have 
jurisdiction to determine the legality of a [challenged] measure…under the domestic law of 
the disputing party', with the domestic law of the disputing party considered 'as a matter of 
fact'. Likewise, tribunals will 'follow the prevailing interpretation given to the domestic 
law by the courts or authorities' of the disputing party, and 'any meaning given to domestic 
law by the Tribunal shall not be binding upon the courts or the authorities of that Party'. 
These points led the Legal Service to conclude that when CETA tribunals 'make 
assessments of EU law' in their rulings, 'this would have no effect on the jurisdiction…[or] 
on the interpretive powers' of the ECJ, because CETA tribunals, and investment tribunals 
more generally, can only award damages to investors, and the disputes concern 'the 
interpretation and application of the CETA Investment Chapter' and not the interpretation 
and application of EU law.648 In other words, the challenged EU law instruments would 
remain in force and applicable, and the Court's exclusive jurisdiction would not be under 
threat, because CETA tribunals' EU law interpretations have no normative reverberations 
within the EU legal order. 
 
By analogy, arbitral tribunals established under member state BITs only award damages, 
and the disputes concern the interpretation and application of the BIT rather than of EU 
law. Clearly, member state BITs leave the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction over the 'definitive 
interpretation' of EU law intact. It is noteworthy that Article 8.21 CETA provides that 
when it is unclear whether the EU or its member state is the correct respondent in an 
investment dispute, the EU is competent to determine that question and that determination 
binds the tribunal. This provision was included so as to address the Court's concern in 
Opinions 1/91 and 2/13 that the EEA court and the EctHR would have addressed the 
division of competences between the EU and its member states in the context of attributing 
a measure between them. This would suggest that the Court's exclusive jurisdiction under 
Article 344 TFEU and the autonomy of EU law are breached when an arbitral tribunal 
established under a member state BIT has to address the question of competence. While 
                                                
647 Legal Service of the European Parliament, Legal Opinion: Compatibility with the Treaties of investment 
dispute settlement provisions in EU trade agreements, 1 June 2016, SJ-0259/16 AAM/hwo D(2016)16759. It 
should be noted that he relationship of investment dispute settlement provisions in EU trade agreements and 
EU law is clearly different from the question of the compatibility of BIT arbitration clauses with EU law, 
given that the EU is party ot such agreements. 
648 Ibid., paras. 51-52. Schill makes a similar argument, see Stephan W. Schill, 'Editorial: Opinion 2/13 - The 
End for Dispute Settlement in EU Trade and Investment Agreements?', 16 Journal of World Investment & 
Trade (2015), pp. 379-388, at 385. 
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the Electrabel arbitration appears to be the only case where this has happened thus far, 
similar cases may arise, and the above discussion suggested that tribunals may engage with 
EU law in a number of other ways as well. One of the arguments of tribunals was that the 
EU Commission can always start infringement proceedings against a member state that 
complies with an award that breaches EU law, therewith ensuring that EU law is ultimately 
complied with.649 Against this, Hindelang argues that BIT arbitration clauses create a 
situation of 'structural incompatibility'650 as they create a legal space outside the EU legal 
order where arbitral tribunals can engage with EU law in ways that undermine the ECJ's 
exclusive jurisdiction and the uniform interpretation of EU law. Be that as it may, what is 
clear is that infringement proceedings have no impact on the validity of arbitral awards or 
on the interpretations of EU law that tribunals have provided. 
 
The relevant preliminary questions of the BGH focused on Articles 267 and 344 TFEU.651 
I have argued that BIT arbitration clauses could breach the autonomy of the EU legal 
order, and that this finding is not necessarily based on direct breaches of Articles 267 and 
344 TFEU, as the Court's construction of the autonomy of the EU legal order is in part 
detached from specific primary law provisions. Yet the Commission's argument that 
Article 344 TFEU reflects 'a more general principle' under which member states are 
obligated not to create 'methods of settlement' for disputes involving questions of EU law, 
is plausible. That those disputes involve private parties in case of investment arbitration 
                                                
649 See e.g. EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 264. 
650 Hindelang, ‘Circumventing Primacy of EU Law', supra note 26, p. 198. For a similar type of argument, 
see Teis Tonsgaard Andersen and Steffen Hindelang, 'The Day after: Alternatives to Intra-EU BITs', 17 The 
Journal of World Investment & Trade (2016), pp. 984-1014 (footnote 13). The EURAM tribunal also argued 
that since member state courts retain discretion as to whether to submit preliminary questions to the ECJ, 
there was 'no automatic or ex officio seizure of the ECJ as soon as EU law is at stake, which leaves open…the 
possibility of divergent interpretations of EU law'. EURAM award, supra note 83, para. 252. This argument is 
subject to the critique that, unlike arbitral tribunals, member state courts are obligated to interpret and apply 
EU law and to give priority to it over conflicting rules of national law. The latter are also obligated to submit 
preliminary questions on certain conditions, while arbitral tribunals have no possibility or obligation to 
submit preliminary questions. 
651 Hindelang argues that intra-EU BITs may also breach Article 259 TFEU which deals with disputes 
between member states concerning an alleged breach of EU law by one of them. The logic is that 'litigation 
between investor and host Member State can arguably be perceived as litigating a conflict over substantive 
rights contained in the BIT between the home state of the investor and the host state'. In this view, 'the 
material rights and obligations resulting from the BIT primarily concern only… [the two] Member States and 
procedural rights are granted to an investor in a BIT only in order to effectively enforce the substantive ones, 
the latter still belonging to the state parties to the treaty'. Hence, Hindelang concludes, 'what the individual 
investor fights out before the arbitral tribunal can ultimately still be considered as a dispute of his home 
Member State with the host Member State regarding the violation of material protection standards in the 
BIT'. In other words, when an intra-EU investment dispute involves questions of EU law, the 'initiation of 
arbitral proceedings would have to be considered as a violation of Article 259 TFEU'. See Hindelang, 
'Circumventing Primacy of EU Law', supra note 26, pp. 199-200.   
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does not necessarily undermine the Commission's argument. First, Article 344 TFEU is 
located in Part Seven of the TFEU, which is titled 'General and Final Provisions', whereas 
provisions dealing with the jurisdiction and powers of the ECJ are located in Part Six 
(Chapter I, Section five), titled 'Institutional and Final Provisions'. This indicates that 
Article 344 TFEU has to be understood as reflecting a 'more general principle',652 and not 
simply as relating to the provisions dealing with the ECJ. In other words, the BGH's 
argument that Article 344 TFEU has to be read in connection with Article 259 TFEU, 
which provides for a method of settlement for disputes between two member states, and 
that Article 344 TFEU therefore only covers disputes between two member states, is 
problematic given the more general nature of the latter. It is much more plausible to 
understand Article 344 TFEU as a general provision that safeguards the autonomy of the 
EU legal order and the Court's central position within it. As the mandate of the ECJ 
resembles the mandate of domestic courts of last instance, the member states cannot 
contract out of their obligation to bring disputes involving questions of EU law before EU 
courts, regardless of the identity of the other disputing party. However, as noted, it is not 
entirely clear where the outer boundaries of the autonomy doctrine lie, but it would seem 
that the possibility that tribunals rule on the twin-issue of competence and attribution 
constitutes a problem in light of the Court's case law (see following paragraph). This 
would also indicate that if BIT arbitration clauses breach the autonomy of the EU legal 
order, both intra- and extra-EU BITs are problematic. The autonomy of EU law can be 
exposed to a similar 'manifest risk' in disputes between a member state and a third state 
investor, because tribunals may have to assess similar EU law questions as in intra-EU 
disputes. 
 
The BGH's finding that Article 267 TFEU was not breached in the circumstances of the 
Eureko arbitration stemmed in part from the fact that the Eureko tribunal had not ruled on 
any question of EU law in its final award.653 In other words, and more generally speaking, 
when an arbitration under a member state BIT has no connection to EU law, the 
preliminary ruling procedure is entirely irrelevant to the arbitration. But the same argument 
could be made in relation to Article 344 TFEU. If the parties raise no EU law arguments in 
the proceedings, then the dispute's settlement by an arbitral tribunal cannot breach Article 
                                                
652 EU Commission, amicus curiae brief in US Steel, supra note 124, para. 37. For a similar argument, see 
Hindelang, ‘Circumventing Primacy of EU Law', supra note 26, at 199 (footnote 82). 
653 Eureko referral, supra note 150, paras. 60-61. 
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344 TFEU. The point is, as noted above, that particular investment disputes may well be 
'compatible' with EU law when they relate to purely national measures, but each arbitration 
clause has the potential of breaching the autonomy of the EU legal order given the broad 
range of circumstances from which investment disputes stem. A good analogy is found in 
the three extra-EU BIT cases.654 Those cases related to a potential conflict between the free 
transfer of payments provisions in the BITs and primary EU law provisions allowing the 
EU Council to restrict capital movements between member states and third states. The EU 
Council had not adopted any such restrictions vis-à-vis the third states with which Austria, 
Finland and Sweden had concluded the BITs, but the Court held that the BIT provisions 
were incompatible with the primary law provisions, and the respondent states had failed to 
fulfill their obligation to eliminate that conflict as required by Article 351(2) TFEU.655 By 
analogy, one could argue that each BIT arbitration clause may lead to disputes between 
investors and member states where a broad range of EU law questions are raised, 
indicating that the clauses have the potential of adversely affecting the autonomy of the EU 
legal order. 
 
The EU is also party to the founding agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
In a number of judgments, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has declared that specific 
EU law instruments breach one or more of the WTO agreements.656 Prima facie, this 
appears to pose a threat to the autonomy of the EU legal order, given that the ECJ has no 
powers to review DSB decisions that interpret EU measures, nor is there any formal 
institutional relationship between the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and the ECJ. 
Moreover, the decisions of the DSB are binding upon the disputing parties, including the 
EU. The ECJ has never addressed the question of the relationship of WTO dispute 
settlement and autonomy of EU law. The Court has issued a number of judgments in which 
it has 'accepted' that the DSB interprets EU law and also defined what consequences its 
decisions have as a matter of EU law. As many commentators have noted, the Court has 
thus far 'evaded the question of whether such [DSB] decisions have legal force within the 
                                                
654 Case C-205/06, Commission v Austria, ECLI:EU:C:2009:118; Case C-249/06, Commission v Sweden, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:119; Case C-118/07, Commission v Finland, ECLI:EU:C:2009:715. 
655 Ibid., para. 1 of the declarative parts of the three judgments.  
656 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (9 September 1997); Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/AB/R (16 January 
1998).  
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EC legal order',657 but it has provided a clear set of principles on the effects that DSB 
decisions have as a matter of EU law. In a nutshell, the ECJ has held that the WTO is 
based on the 'principle of negotiations' between the contracting states, through which they 
strive to achieve 'reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements', and WTO law is 
characterized by 'the great flexibility of its provisions, in particular those conferring the 
possibility of derogation' from them.658 Similarly, WTO law and DSB decisions have no 
direct effect under EU law, that is to say, the GC and ECJ do not review the legality of EU 
acts in light of WTO law as this would deprive WTO members of the necessary 'flexibility 
and discretion in devising solutions' to DSB decisions which establish violations of WTO 
law.659 Generally speaking, these findings allow the EU institutions to interpret and apply 
EU law as before internally, despite the fact that this may breach a DSB ruling.  
 
The ECJ's position pays respect to the political sensitivities inherent in trade disputes as 
well as to the fact that DSB rulings are not addressed to individuals but to the disputing 
parties of the WTO agreements. The Court does not want to tread on the toes of the 
Commission and the member states in the sense that it allows them to decide how to react 
to a DSB ruling, also because the other WTO parties give no direct effect to DSB rulings 
in their domestic legal orders either. This indicates that the EU's participation in WTO 
dispute settlement is not relevant, by analogy, in the member state BIT context. While the 
DSB interprets EU acts in light of the WTO agreements, the implications of those 
interpretations are a political matter to be decided by the relevant political organs.660 
Again, given the broad range of EU law related questions that arbitral tribunals may have 
                                                
657 Schmalenbach, 'Struggle for Exclusiveness', supra note 389, p. 1059. 
658 Joined Cases C-21-24/72, International Fruit Company, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115, para. 21. 
659 See John Errico, 'The WTO in the EU: Unwinding the Knot', 44 Cornell International Law Journal 
(2011), pp. 179-208, at 194. As the ECJ put it: 'To accept that the role of ensuring that Community law 
complies with those rules [i.e. WTO rules] devolves directly on the Community judicature would deprive the 
legislative or executive organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by their counterparts 
in the Community's trading partners'. See Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:574, paras. 40-47 (the quote is from para. 46). For a general analysis of this matter, see 
Hélène Ruiz Fabri, 'Is There a Case - Legally and Politically - for Direct Effect of WTO Obligations?', 25 
European Journal of International Law (2014), pp. 151-173. However, the Court has shown some 
acceptance of WTO rulings. After the AB had ruled that the so called 'zeroing' method breached WTO law, 
the ECJ held that the method violated EU law as well, but the judgment made no references to the AB ruling, 
as the violation was based solely on a relevant EU regulation. See Case C-351/04, Ikea Wholesale Ltd v 
Commissioners of Customs & Excise, ECLI:EU:C:2007:547. Similarly, the ECJ has held that a DSB decision 
may in certain circumstances be used to interpret EU law. See Joined Cases C-319/10 and C-320/10, X and Y 
& X BV, ECLI:EU:C:2011:720. 
660 Individual applicants can only ask the EU courts whether certain EU measures comply with WTO rules in 
light of a DSB ruling after the EU organs have implemented the obligations flowing from a DSB decision. 
See Case C-377/02, Léon Van Parys, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121, para. 40. 
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to address, the relationship of member state BITs and EU law should be decided on the 
basis of the implications that such 'addressing' may have within the EU legal order, rather 
than by relying on the peculiarities of the WTO system.  
 
Finally, the EU member states are parties to the ECHR and the Strasbourg court has faced 
a number of applications that concern the domestic implementation of EU acts. In essence, 
in all scenarios the EctHR has attributed domestic implementing measures to the member 
states, but the way in which a measure's compatibility with the ECHR is assessed depends 
on the discretion that the EU act leaves to domestic institutions. For example, in 
Boshphorus, the EctHR held that a regulation left no discretion to Ireland as it 'was 
"generally applicable” and "binding in its entirety"…so that it applied to all member 
States, none of which could lawfully depart from any of its provisions', and it became part 
of Irish law 'when it was published in the Official Journal…without the need for 
implementing legislation'. Further, Irish authorities had no discretion over the aircraft's 
seizure and the measure 'amounted to compliance by the Irish State with its legal 
obligations' under Article 8 of the regulation.661 When the EU act leaves no discretionary 
powers to the member states, there is a presumption that EU law provides equivalent 
protections to the applicant, but the ECtHR still examines whether the presumption holds 
water in an individual case.662 On the other hand, if the EU act provides discretion over its 
implementation, the presumption of 'equivalent protection' does not apply, and the EctHR 
reviews the implementing measure in full to understand whether it complies with the 
ECHR.663 This means that not only does the ECtHR interpret EU law instruments on a 
                                                
661 Application no. 45036/98, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, Judgment 
of 30 June 2005 (hereinafter Bosphorus judgment), para. 145. In contrast, the underlying Security Council 
resolution, which was implemented within the EU via the regulation, was not part of Irish law and did not 
provide a 'legal basis for the impoundment of the aircraft.' The judgment had previously (at para. 83) 
recognized that regulations take effect in member state legal orders 'without the need for domestic 
implementation.' 
662 In Bosphorus the EctHR concluded that 'it cannot be said that the protection [under EU law] of the 
applicant company's Convention rights was manifestly deficient, with the consequence that the relevant 
presumption of Convention compliance by the respondent State has not been rebutted. Ibid., para. 166. The 
applicant had also challenged the regulation before the ECJ. Demonstrating that the wheels of justice may 
grind slowly, the ECJ had rendered its decision on the aircraft's seizure some nine years before the EctHR 
gave its judgment, with the ECJ finding that the seizure did not violate the applicant's fundamental rights and 
was an appropriate and proportionate measure given the importance of the undergirding aim of the 
regulation. See Case C-84/95, Bosphorus, ECLI:EU:C:1996:312, paras. 19-27. 
663 See e.g. Application no. 17862/91, Cantoni v. France, Judgment of 11 November 1996. The French 
implementing legislation of a directive reproduced the directive's text almost literally and the applicant 
claimed that the legislation's wording 'lacked sufficient clarity and precision to satisfy the requirements of 
Article 7(1) of the Convention'. Rather than examining whether the implementing measure was attributable 
to France, the Court simply noted (at para. 30) that although the relevant article in the French public health 
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regular basis but also assesses the division of competences between the EU and its member 
states by attributing implementing measures to the latter. Clearly, in light of the above, this 
appears to be problematic from the perspective of the autonomy of EU law.  
 
Given the knockout delivered in Opinion 2/13, it will take considerable time before EU 
acts can be directly challenged before the ECtHR. However, since all EU member states 
are parties to the Convention, its provisions have sneaked into the EU legal order through 
the backdoor. The Convention does not formally bind the EU, but Article 6(3) TEU 
provides that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the Convention and 'as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union's law'. Accordingly, the ECJ has applied the Convention's 
provisions and the attendant case law 'indirectly' as part of those general principles.664 
Likewise, Article 52(3) of the Fundamental Rights Charter provides that '[i]n so far as this 
Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those 
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention'.665  As Advocate 
General Jacobs put it, 'for practical purposes the Convention can be regarded as part of 
Community law and can be invoked as such both in this Court and in national courts where 
Community law is in issue. That is so particularly where, as in this case, it is the 
implementation of Community law by Member States which is in issue. Community law 
cannot release Member States from their obligations under the Convention'.666 Similarly, 
in its submissions in Bosphorus before the ECtHR, the EU Commission endorsed the 
'equivalent protection' doctrine and urged the ECtHR to apply it 'pending accession to the 
Convention by the European Union'.667 
                                                                                                                                              
code was almost identical to the directive's text, this 'does not remove it from the ambit of Article 7 of the 
Convention', and no further relevant analysis followed. 
664 The first case where the ECJ held that fundamental rights are part of the general principles of EU law was 
Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm - Sozialamt, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57, para. 7. For an example of the 
ECJ relying on the Convention's articles, see e.g. Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, ECLI:EU:C:2002:493, para. 72 ('Moreover, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, 
Regulation No 1612/68 must be interpreted in the light of the requirement of respect for family life laid down 
in Article 8 of the European Convention. That requirement is one of the fundamental rights which, according 
to settled case-law, are recognized by Community law.'). 
665 Fundamental Rights Charter, supra note 69. The ECJ has also showed willingness to change its case law 
in accordance with the case law of the ECtHR. See Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v Directeur général de 
la concurrence, ECLI:EU:C:2002:603, para. 29.  
666 See Case C-84/95, Bosphorus, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, ECLI:EU:C:1996:179, para. 53 
(emphasis added). 
667 See Bosphorus judgment, supra note 661, para. 122. 
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Clearly, the judgments of the EctHR are not binding on the EU institutions, and one could 
also characterize the judgments as concerning not the question of competence but member 
states' compliance with the Convention provisions. It is also evident that the ECJ will not 
get a chance to address the question whether the ECtHR's findings are problematic from 
the perspective of autonomy, because the status quo appeases all concerned parties 
(witness the Commission's statement). Generally speaking, the equivalent protection 
doctrine protects the autonomy of EU law indirectly, and I am unaware as to the number of 
cases where the ECthR might have found that a member state implementing measure 
breaches the Convention and what practical consequences such findings have had on the 
implementation of the underlying EU act. What is more, it appears that a typical ECtHR 
judgment makes a declaration of breach, rather than obligates the losing state to repeal or 
amend the challenged measure. This would suggest that the judgments have no binding 
effects within the EU legal order, even if the ECtHR where to find that an implementing 
measure breaches the Convention. In sum, it is difficult to make clear conclusions as to 
what implications the ECtHR's case law could have in the context of investment 
arbitration, because the EU institutions have accepted its authority to review domestic 
implementing measures.   
 
As it appears to be somewhat uncertain whether arbitration clauses in member state BITs 
pose a threat to the autonomy of EU law, the question is which way should the scales tip? 
Here, arguably, the question of values and interests should play a central role. Many 
commentators have argued that the ECJ should focus on 'the facilitation of interaction with 
other international legal regimes [i.e. the investment treaty regime], rather than 
concentrating strictly on the delimitation of an autonomous EU legal order'.668 In this 
perception, investment arbitration serves an important purpose and the Court should 
facilitate its inclusion in EU investment agreements in one or another way. Similarly, the 
relationship of autonomy and arbitration under member state BITs should be resolved with 
reference to the fact that EU law is only an incidental visitor to arbitral proceedings and 
remains a mere (often insignificant) fact in most arbitrations, and only the Electrabel 
tribunal's finding on attribution looks problematic, although that finding was clearly in line 
with the division of competences between the Commission and the member states in the 
area of state aid. In this light, investment arbitration is not a real problem for the autonomy 
                                                
668 Hannes Lenk, 'Investment Arbitration under EU Investment Agreements: Is There a Role for an 
Autonomous EU Legal Order?', 28 European Business Law Review (2017), pp. 135-162, at 162. 
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or uniform of interpretation of EU law, and the decisions of arbitral tribunals do not, in 
principle, have any binding effects within the EU legal order, apart from the extremely rare 
situation where the enforcement of an award breaches particular EU law rules, although in 
such situations the Commission could intervene and start infringement proceedings to 
ensure compliance. 
 
Second, as commentators have noted, EU law does not provide equally broad and effective 
protection to investors, and many arbitrations concern situations where EU law either plays 
no role and where the remedies under EU law and national law are less generous, and 
where compensation is not forthcoming given the more stringent liability criteria that apply 
under EU law and national law. Generally speaking, Article 53 of the Fundamental Rights 
Charter could be invoked in this context. It provides that the Charter does not restrict or 
adversely affect 'human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective 
fields of application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements 
to which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and 
by the Member States' constitutions'. Read literally, investment treaties do not fall under 
any of the categories listed in Article 53, but if member states are allowed to provide better 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms under domestic constitutions when 
they implement EU law, clearly the same principle should apply in respect of bilateral 
treaties to which they are party and regardless of whether or not the treaty protections 
relate to the implementation of EU law. The Melloni case implies that when the EU has 
harmonized the protection of fundamental rights in a certain area, Article 53 does not apply 
(in such cases member states have to apply the EU standard),669 but the EU has not 
harmonized the area of investment protection which leaves the member states free to 
provide better protection in the form of BITs.670 This argument may seem a bit stretched, 
but the point is that the question of values and interests could play a role when the 
relationship of autonomy and investment arbitration is addressed, also because the Court's 
case law is less than clear on where the limits of the doctrine lie in respect of dispute 
settlement mechanisms established in treaties concluded by the member states. 
                                                
669 Case C-399/11, Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. 
670 However, Chapter 4 argued that member state BITs violate the principle of non-discrimination, and the 
application of Article 53 cannot override the requirement of equal treatment, which suggests that all EU 
investors shoud be able to rely on BIT protections, but Chapter 4 also showed that this option is highly 
unlikely for a number of reasons. 
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The question of values and interests should also be taken account of if BIT arbitration 
clauses pose a threat to the autonomy of the EU legal order. Generally speaking, the 
proponents of investment treaties could argue that in relation to intra-EU BITs the member 
states have an obligation to ensure that investors cannot invoke the clauses in relation to 
disputes that lead tribunals to interpret and apply EU law in ways that breach the autonomy 
of EU law. For example, the member states could amend intra-EU BITs so as to ensure 
that disputes related to EU law no longer fall within the sweep of the arbitration clause, but 
the clauses could continue to apply in relation to disputes concerning purely domestic 
measures. This solution would respect the argument that investment treaties and arbitration 
protect the fundamental rights of investors as well as the fact that many investment 
disputes have no relation to EU law. In relation to extra-EU BITs, member states are under 
a general obligation to 'take the necessary measures to eliminate incompatibilities' from 
extra-EU BITs as a matter of EU law.671 In principle, the contracting states could amend 
the treaties similarly to intra-EU BITs, but this is a purely hypothetical scenario to begin 
with, given the broader political context outlined above. 
 
To return to intra-EU BITs, much will depend on the ECJ's findings in the pending 
Achmea case, although those findings are confined to that clause and have no direct 
relevance for other intra-EU BITs. The relevant part of that clause provides that the 
'arbitration tribunal shall determine its own procedure applying the arbitration rules of the 
United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)',672 and unlike 
many other clauses, it does not allow investors to choose between different arbitration 
venues and arbitration rules. This will prevent the ECJ from addressing, for example, 
specific questions that relate to arbitrations carried out under the ICSID Convention. It is 
also unclear to what extent the circumstances in the underlying Eureko arbitration will 
affect the Court's reasoning (for example the fact that the tribunal concluded that the 
dispute had no bearing on any question of EU law). Assuming that the Court makes a 
finding of incompatibility, those member states that oppose to the Commission's intra-EU 
BIT policy could argue that other intra-EU BITs remain valid and continue to apply as a 
                                                
671 The Grandfathering Regulation, supra note 58, recital, para. 11. 
672 See Article 8(5) of the Dutch-Slovak BIT, quoted in Eureko award, supra note 74, para. 11. 
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matter of international law,673 which would compel the Commission to continue the 
ongoing infringement proceedings.674  
 
The final issue that needs to be addressed is the relationship between the Court's autonomy 
doctrine and the division of competences between the EU and its member states over 
matters regulated in BITs.675 The internal market is an area of shared competence, so the 
question could be raised as to whether this means that intra-EU BITs could somehow stay 
outside the reach of the autonomy doctrine. The question is premised on the assumption 
that the EU has not used its competence in matters governed by intra-EU BITs, which 
would mean that member states remain competent to act in areas covered by them. This 
approach misunderstands the relationship between autonomy and competence. As 
Cremona argues in another context, the issue is not to what extent the EU has exercised a 
shared competence in a given area but whether a dispute in relation to a non-EU 
agreement, to which one or more member states are parties, raises issues that come within 
the scope of EU law. If such disputes are submitted to a method of settlement other than 
those provided in the founding treaties, the autonomy of the EU legal order may be 
adversely affected in light of the Court's case law.676 As should be clear by now, disputes 
raised under member state BITs may raise issues that come within the scope of EU law,677 
even if many BIT claims have no connection to EU law. 
 
This discussion on the autonomy of the EU legal order has been long, relatively complex 
and technical, in part because the Court's case law is written in language that leaves many 
questions open. However, the analysis highlights that the ECJ has some latitude in 
deciding how to answer the BGH's preliminary questions, which suggests that its chosen 
                                                
673 Given that all BIT arbitration clauses have the potential of leading to disputes where tribunals have to 
interpret and apply EU law in ways that threaten the autonomy of the EU legal order, it is not convincing to 
argue that an ECJ judgment declaring that a BIT arbitration clause is incompatible with EU law would not 
apply, by analogy, in respect of other arbitration clauses. According to Article 260(1) TFEU, member states 
are 'required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court', and non-compliance 
may lead to the impoistion of a 'lum sump or penalty payment under Article 260(2) TFEU. 
674 Yet, and this is not an entirely implausible scenario, a member state could refuse to comply with the ECJ's 
judgment, which could lead to the imposition of a lump sum fine and/or a penalty payment against the 
member state, but even in that case the relevant treaty would remain in force as a matter of international law. 
675 Generally speaking, when the EU has competence over a given policy area, that competence includes 
dispute settlement related to that area. 
676 Marise Cremona, 'Defending the Community interest: The Duties of Cooperation and Compliance', in 
Marise Cremona and Bruno De Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart 
Publishing, 2008), pp. 125-170, at 151. 
677 Dimopoulos makes the same conclusion, but qualifies it in some respect. See his ‘The Validity and 
Applicability of International Investment Agreements', supra note 26, pp. 86-90. 
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course of action should be based on a proper understanding of the broader implications of 
investment treaties and arbitration. Chapters 6 and 7 strive to establish such understanding 
as the discussion centers on the alleged pros and cons of the investment treaty regime.  
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6. Arguments for Investment Treaties and 
Arbitration  
6.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 showed how arbitral tribunals have rejected the conflict arguments of the 
Commission and a number of member states. For the tribunals, the ability of investors to 
bring claims against the host state without exhausting local remedies distinguished the 
subject-matter of BITs from that of EU law. Investment arbitration was described as a 
guarantee against undue interferences by the host state, with the tribunals emphasizing en 
masse that neither EU law or domestic laws of the member states provide an equally 
effective remedy. As two commentators put it, the clauses transform BITs from 'mere 
political declarations' to an effective 'set of rules enforceable against states'.678 Chapter 3 
also noted that the argumentation of the tribunals carried ethical connotations in the sense 
that investment treaties were perceived as providing a necessary check on the opportunistic 
behavior of the host state as they provide access to a neutral and depoliticized venue for 
the settlement of investment disputes.679 In this vein, Brower and Blanchard argue that 
arbitral tribunals 'contribute to international and domestic rule of law by relying on and 
developing human rights jurisprudence when interpreting treaties', with BIT rights 
overlapping 'substantially with the rights protected in human rights treaties'.680  
 
As noted in the introduction, it is important to go to the roots of the critique of investment 
arbitration as well as of the arguments with which the regime is defended. The 
                                                
678 Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law?', supra note 18, at 477. 
679 'Neutral' and 'depoliticized' are value-laden terms, but as has been noted investment arbitration is neutral 
at least in the sense that it proceeds 'outside the direct control of both host states and foreign investors'. See 
Jonathan Bonnitcha, Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen and Michael Waibel, The Political Economy of the 
Investment Treaty Regime (Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 87.   
680 Brower and Blanchard, 'The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration', supra note 19, at 757-758 (emphasis 
added). See also See Christoph Schreuer and Ursula Kriebaum, 'From Individual to Community Interest in 
International Investment Law, in Ulrich Fastenrath et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest. 
Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 1079-1096, at 1088 (arguing 
more cautiously that 'investment law has certain similarities with human rights law in that it protects an 
individual or corporate investor against infringements' by the host state.). Typically, the relationship of 
investment protection and human rights is approached from a perspective where the central question is 
whether arbitral tribunals accommodate human rights in their analysis, which, of course, is entirely different 
from the approach where investors are understood as the bearers of human rights. For two contributions 
adopting the former approach, see Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. (eds.), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2009), Lone Wandahl Mouyal, International 
Investment Law and the Right to Regulate: a Human Rights Perspective (Routledge, 2016). 
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understanding that investment treaties serve an ethical purpose is one such argument and 
without an appreciation of this and other relevant arguments it is difficult to take sides in 
the debate on how the relationship of EU law and investment treaties should be resolved.  
 
The investment treaty regime is a moving target. New developments emerge on a weekly 
basis, with each new award potentially supporting or undermining the critique or fading 
quickly out depending on the outcome and the identity of the disputing parties. Scholarship 
is burgeoning and it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep track of the results and 
conclusions it brings. Similarly, a high number of states continue to conclude new 
investment treaties, whereas others are terminating or amending their existing treaties as a 
reaction to their hitherto experiences.681 That it is impossible to keep track of all these 
changes and developments is not necessarily a problem. Whether the Commission's 
proposal for an investment court system will gain traction in the years to come is uncertain, 
but what is certain is that an overwhelming majority of member state BITs will remain in 
force for the foreseeable future, with investors continuing to bring new claims under them. 
As this thesis is going to press, for example, ICSID alone has registered 38 new claims 
during 2017, many of which were raised under BITs concluded in the 1990s, including 
member state BITs.682 Most of these treaties contain vaguely formulated protection 
standards, with no reference made, for example, to the host state's right to regulate. Hence, 
although the policy and academic debate is focusing more and more on how to reform the 
'old system', the old system is very much in place and provides an additional motive for the 
following discussion.  
 
In the introduction, I also noted that the critics and proponents employ economic 
arguments to support their respective cases. These arguments are highly general and relate 
either to the economic benefits that investment treaties are understood to bring about, or to 
the ways in which they reinforce the position and interests of the most dominant players in 
the global economy at the expense of other stakeholders and interest groups. But the 
economics of foreign investment and investment treaties is a complex and multi-
dimensional topic and one that requires expertise in (or at least familiarity with) the 
attendant theoretical frameworks and models. One could look at the dynamics of foreign 
                                                
681 At the time of writing, around 2700 investment treaties are in force and investors have initiated over 800 
known arbitrations. The most up-to-date statistics are available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org 
(accessed 28 August 2017). 
682 See at https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx (accessed 19 September 2017). 
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investment (whether direct or portfolio) from the perspective of investors or home and host 
states, and then choose between a microeconomic and a macroeconomic perspective. The 
microeconomics of investment treaties refers to their effects on the decision-making of 
individual firms and governments, whereas the macroeconomic perspective looks at the 
'aggregate economic effects of investment treaties, which depend on the cumulative impact 
of decisions of individual firms and states'.683 In the following, I will focus on two 
intertwined macroeconomic arguments: that investment treaties increase investment flows, 
and that an increase in investment flows contributes to economic growth and development. 
The point of the discussion is to understand whether or not (or to what extent) the 
arguments are plausible. This chapter proceeds as follows. The following sections looks at 
the building blocks of the case for investment treaties and arbitration. At first I look more 
closely at the human rights analogy to which I referred in Chapter 3, and then focus on the 
argument that investment treaties promote the rule of law domestically and internationally. 
After this, I address the two economic arguments that enjoy considerable vogue in political 
rhetoric. I will provide a critical analysis of each argument to pave the way for the 
discussion on the critique of investment arbitration, which is addressed in Chapter 7.  
6.2. The Human Rights Analogy 
Chapter 3 provided some remarks on the broad idea that investment treaties bear 
similarities to human rights treaties. This idea was based on a number of features of 
investment treaties and arbitration,684 as well as on cases where the factual record 
supported the argument that the host state's treatment violated an investor's core human 
right, such as the right to a fair trial.685 The underlying contention was that investors are 
more or less at the mercy of host states, with investment arbitration providing an important 
counterbalance against arbitrary exercises of public power. In this regard, one argument 
was that small- and medium-sized investors 'make up a large part of the claimants in 
contemporary investment-treaty arbitration'.686 Arguably, this was meant to provide 
emotive support to the human rights analogy as it draws a parallel between persecuted 
                                                
683 The quote is from Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel, The Political Economy, supra note 679, p. 127. 
684 E.g. in addition to BITs, property rights are protected under a number of human rights conventions such as 
the ECHR and the Fundamental Rights Charter, and similarly to human rights courts, the state is always the 
respondent (and never the claimant) in investment arbitration, and state behavior is assessed only in light of 
international standards. 
685 See e.g. Hesham v. Indonesia, supra note 192. 
686 Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law?', supra note 18, p. 481. 
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minorities and foreign investors whose negotiating position vis-à-vis host states is much 
weaker than that of large multinationals. More generally, some proponents associate the 
rise of the investment treaty regime with the rise of international human rights. As Judge 
Schwebel put it,  
 
'entitlement to international arbitration is one of the most progressive 
developments in the procedure of international law of the last fifty years, indeed 
in the whole history of international law. It is consistent with the development of 
international human rights, including the right to own property, and with the 
dethroning of the State from its status as the sole subject of international law.'687 
  
Similarly, Robers refers to commentators who argue that similarly to human rights law, 
'investment treaties…regulate a state's treatment of nonstate actors within its territory and 
permit those actors to challenge governmental conduct before an international body'.688 
Some arbitral awards have also used the analogy. In Tecmed, for example, the tribunal 
referred to an EctHR judgment to give weight to the argument that since the claimant 
company had no political rights in the host state, it was in a more vulnerable position vis-à-
vis domestic policy-making than domestic investors,689 whereas in Thunderbird one 
arbitrator held that the 'judicial practice most comparable to treaty-based investor-state 
arbitration is the judicial recourse available to individuals against states under the 
European Convention on Human Rights' under which 'states have to defray their own legal 
representation expenditures, even if they prevail'.690 This meant that the same principle 
should apply in the investment arbitration context as well. Generally speaking, the formal 
                                                
687 Stephen M. Schwebel, 'Keynote Address: In Defence of Bilateral Investment Treaties', in Jan van den 
Berg (ed.), Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, Challenges, ICCA Congress Series, Vol. 18 (Kluwer, 2015), pp. 1-
11, at 4.  
688 Roberts, 'Clash of Paradigms', supra note 641, p. 46. See also Zachary Douglas, 'The Hybrid Foundations 
of Investment Treaty Arbitration', 74 British Yearbook of International Law (2004), pp. 151-289, at 153-154 
(arguing that in 'the sphere of legal relationships between private entities and sovereign states, there are many 
parallels between the legal regime created by investment treaties on the one hand and those regimes 
established by the European Convention of Human Rights and the Algiers Accords (creating the Iran/US 
Claims Tribunal) on the other', footnotes omitted); Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, 'Enterprise v. State: the New 
David and Goliath?', 23 Arbitration International (2007), pp. 93-104, at 93 (arguing that similarly 'to the 
situation of private persons claiming international protection of human rights such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights, private enterprises are today accepted as subjects and holders individual 
procedural and substantive rights in international law'). 
689 Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (hereinafter Tecmed award), 29 May 2003, 
para. 122 (with reference to Application no. 8793/79, James and Others, Judgment of 21 February 1986). 
690 Thunderbird v. Mexico, UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion of Thomas Wälde, 1 December 2005, para. 141. 
See also Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 11 October 2002, para. 
144. 
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plausibility of the analogy depends on how we define human rights, and it seems 
unnecessary to engage in such pedantry, but there are a number of general factors that 
undermine the credibility of the analogy. Firstly, the critics could point out that it is 
implausible to draw a parallel between foreign investors and ethnic groups facing violent 
persecution from their governments, because there is no conclusive evidence that foreign 
investors are the target of systematic abuse anywhere in the world. On the contrary, one 
recent empirical study concluded that foreign investors 'often tend to be treated the same, 
or better, than domestic firms, even after robustly controlling for size, sector, and other 
relevant factors that may distinguish foreign firms'.691 Another empirical study found that 
foreign investors often 'derive substantial fiscal and regulatory advantages from their 
political influence and from their ability to negotiate superior entry conditions' in 
developing countries in particular.692  
 
These findings, of course, do not mean that foreign investors always receive better 
treatment than domestic investors or that foreign investors are never mistreated or 
oppressed. There will always be cases where a host state behaves arbitrarily, and if such 
cases are used as the (only) reference point for the analogy, its refutation will be a difficult 
task. But the existing evidence does undermine rather than supports the argument that 
foreign investors are subject to systematic mistreatment, although the empirical literature is 
still 'in its infancy'.693 Second, the critics could also point out that 'small- and medium-
sized' investors are de facto either extremely wealthy individuals or corporations running 
multi-million businesses in a foreign country, and they usually have the wherewithal to 
defend themselves against government excess and are never in as vulnerable a position as 
private individuals. This suggests that violations of human rights 'proper' and violations of 
investor rights are not in the same ballpark as the relative position of foreign investors and 
oppressed individuals and groups is fundamentally different.694  
 
However, these general remarks do not refute the human rights analogy, as they focus on 
the extent to which foreign investors are (or are not) mistreated and on their relatively 
privileged position. Arguably, the persuasive force of the analogy will depend on the 
                                                
691 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel, The Political Economy, supra note 679, p. 150 (referring to an 
unpublished manuscript 'Are Aliens Mistreated' by Emma Aisbet and Lauge Poulsen). 
692 The quote is from Rodolphe Desbordes and Julien Vauday, 'The Political Influence of Foreign Firms in 
Developing Countries', 19 Economics & Politics (2007), pp. 421-451, at 421. 
693 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel, The Political Economy, supra note 679, p. 150. 
694 For a critical discussion of the analogy, see Roberts, 'Clash of Paradigms', supra note 641, esp. at 69-74. 
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general perception one has of the purposes and implications of investment treaties and 
arbitration. If the investment treaty regime is understood to provide valuable protection to 
foreign investors, and to contribute to economic growth and development, the analogy will 
seem plausible regardless of the 'size' of and influence that foreign investors may have in 
host states, as the purpose of the regime is to ensure that host states refrain from arbitrary 
treatment in all circumstances. Arguably, this basic perception also dictates the way in 
which the proponents approach the relationship of investment arbitration and domestic 
policy-making. Gus van Harten has argued that, in comparison to domestic courts, arbitral 
tribunals exercise much less 'judicial restraint' in respect of host states' legislative and 
executive acts as well as in relation to parallel litigation before other adjudicative 
bodies.695 For example, domestic courts often defer to legislative and executive acts on 
democratic grounds, which includes situations where an elected body makes policy 'in 
areas of decision-making that are considered sensitive or complex, such as social and 
economic policy, national security, or public health'.696 Van Harten's analysis covers more 
than two hundred awards and he notes that the 'pervasive lack of evidence of [judicial] 
restraint highlights that arbitrators are, to a significant extent, agents of their own role'.697  
 
Arguably, this 'role' is another word for the perception that the proponents have about the 
purposes of investment treaties and arbitration, which also explains the reluctance of 
arbitral tribunals to defer to domestic policy-making. Brower and Schill provide a useful 
description of this basic perception. They argue that BITs 'prevent governments from 
sacrificing foreign investors for the public good by protecting them against expropriations 
without compensation and [against] measures that exceed what is reasonably acceptable in 
a market economy'.698 The perceived proclivity of state authorities to make policy on 
grounds that go beyond what is 'reasonably acceptable' in a market economy necessitates 
an impartial and independent dispute-settlement mechanism which elevates the dispute to 
the (depoliticized) international level and away from the 'shop floor' of domestic 
institutions where parochial priorities and concerns are likely to intervene in the enactment 
of policy. If human rights activists and lawyers claim to represent the 'global standard' and 
speak in the name of the international community, the proponents of investment arbitration 
                                                
695 This is one of the central arguments in Gus Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: 
Judicial Restraint in Investment Treaty Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
696 Ibid., p. 4. 
697 Ibid., p. 17. 
698 Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law', supra note 18, at 489 (emphasis 
added). 
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assume that investment treaties and arbitration represent the 'global standard' in a 
globalized economy. As Wälde once noted, the conclusion of BITs 'expresses a formal 
decision to accept a rules and value system characteristic of developed market economies. 
The host state signals to investors - and to the global markets - that its intention is to 
behave as developed market economies do or are expected to do'.699 This mentality is also 
reflected in how Wälde characterizes BITs as setting a 'benchmark against which national 
legislative action is measured and by which it is inspired'. For him, legislative acts which 
fail to meet the benchmark are 'deviations' stemming from 'nationalist, socialist or 
protectionist tendencies'.700 The tone of these remarks is very similar to that of human 
rights organizations which name and shame governments that 'deviate' from international 
human rights standards.  
 
If this is the understanding that the proponents (and arbitrators) have of investment treaties 
and arbitration, its natural corollary is the lack of restraint that Van Harten identifies. In 
such view, the critique that arbitral tribunals fail to defer to measures adopted in sensitive 
policy areas misunderstands the basic idea of investment arbitration, which is to provide an 
assessment of all domestic policy in light of international protection standards.701 Another 
way to understand the role of arbitrators stems from research that analyzes 'interpretive' or 
'epistemic' communities. The latter concept refers to a 'network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area'.702 The expertise and 
knowledge of an epistemic community is unified in the sense that its members share a 
particular way of looking at social reality, which is based on 'a set of shared symbols and 
references, mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of intention'.703 In other words, 
epistemic communities 'delimit, for their members, the proper construction of social 
reality'.704 Stanley Fish invented the concept of 'interpretive community',705 and the term is 
                                                
699 Thomas Wälde, 'Law, Contract and Reputation in International Business: What Works?', 2 Business Law 
International (2002), pp. 190-210, at 196. 
700 Ibid., p. 197. 
701 This is of course in line with the maxim (found in Article 27 VCLT) that a state 'may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty'. 
702 Peter Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', 46 
International Organization (1992), pp. 1-35, at 3. 
703 John Ruggie, 'International Responses to Technology', 29 International Organization (1975), pp. 557-583, 
at 569-570. 
704 Ibid., p. 570. 
705 See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Harvard 
University Press, 1980). 
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relatively vague, but in the present context it simply refers to a 'social group whose shared 
comprehension of a context makes possible the common interpretation of socially relevant 
texts'.706 Schematically speaking, the proponents of the investment treaty regime form an 
epistemic and interpretive community which shares a set of beliefs about the purpose of 
the regime as well as about what should be the starting-point of investment treaty 
interpretation, namely, that investment treaties provide a benchmark for what is reasonably 
acceptable government conduct in a market economy. 
 
This understanding ties in with the perception that the proponents have on the role of 
arbitrators in deciding individual investment disputes. Some argue that 'an arbitrator is not 
the guardian of public policy, that his duties are towards the parties only, and that he must 
confine himself to the determination of disputes involving private interests'.707 Such view 
implies that arbitral tribunals should refrain from considering the 'governance implications 
of their decisions (including the interests of third parties) because the outcome of the 
dispute is only relevant to the disputing parties themselves'.708 What supports this view 
indirectly is that most BITs (including member state BITs) contain no references to host 
states' right to regulate but solely emphasize the investment protection function. Finland's 
BIT stock provides a good example of this. Out of the around 70 BITs, a lion's share was 
concluded before 2005 and the treaties follow by and large the European template as they 
focus on post-establishment treatment (and not on liberalization) with the protection 
standards being highly general in content. In the preamble of the Finland-Dominican 
Republic BIT, for example, the contracting states recognize the need to protect investments 
and to promote greater economic co-operation, as well as agree that 'a stable framework for 
investment will contribute to maximising the effective utilisation of economic resources'. 
The public interest receives no mention in the preamble and Article 2(2) provides that each 
contracting state 'shall…accord to investments…fair and equitable treatment and full and 
constant protection and security', with no further description given as to the standards' 
contents.709 Since the provisions of the relevant BIT constitute the applicable law in most 
arbitrations, it is not surprising that the investment protection function usurps other 
                                                
706 Eben Moglen and Richard J. Jr. Pierce, 'Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Stautory 
Interpretation', 57 University of Chicago Law Review (1990), pp. 1203-1245, at 1207. 
707 Pierre Mayer, 'Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law', 17 Arbitration 
International (2001), pp. 235-248, at 246-247. 
708 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel, The Political Economy, supra note 679, p. 246. 
709 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Dominican 
Republic on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (SopS 36/2007). 
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functions in practice, even if the countervailing public interests are recognized in one or 
another way in the tribunals' reasoning. 
 
Admittedly, the investment arbitration community does not constitute a homogenous 
epistemic or interpretive community. Its membership holds different views about the past, 
present and future of the investment treaty regime, which reflect its members' work 
affiliations as well as the institutional and political leanings of the academic traditions in 
which they were fostered into professional maturity. For example, in contrast to the narrow 
function just described, many argue that arbitral tribunals exercise law-making and 
governance functions and 'therefore require democratic legitimacy'.710 These arguments 
recognize that investment disputes may necessitate a review of host state legislative and 
other acts related to sensitive areas of public policy, which should place requirements both 
on the applicable law and the rules that govern the arbitral process (e.g. on rules related to 
transparency and third party intervention). Similarly, any sample of arbitral awards will 
contain references to the host state's right to regulate in one or another way: for example, 
the S.D. Myers tribunal held that determining whether an investor's treatment is unjust or 
arbitrary 'must be made in light of the high measure of deference that international law 
generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own 
borders',711 whereas the Unglaube tribunal noted that when state action relates to its 
'responsibility to protect public health, safety, morals or welfare,…such measures are 
accorded a considerable measure of deference in recognition of' the state's right to regulate 
such matters inside its borders.712 This is not to say that such deference is invariably the 
starting-point of interpretation, but that in most cases arbitral tribunals take account of the 
public interest that motivated the challenged measure, although they may 'adopt different 
interpretive paradigms depending on who the arbitrators are'.713  
 
The purpose of these remarks is two-fold. First, they attempt to show that the view one has 
of the purpose of investment treaties and arbitration will influence the view one has of the 
                                                
710 See Ingo Venzke, 'Investor-State Dispute Settlement in TTIP from the Perspective of a Public Law Theory 
of International Adjudication', 17 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2015), pp. 374-400, at 374. See also 
José E. Alvarez, 'What are International Judges for? The Main Functions of International Adjudication', in 
Cesare P.R. Romano et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University 
Press, 2014), pp. 158-178. 
711 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 263. 
712 Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award, 16 May 2012, para. 246. 
713 Michael Waibel, 'Interpretive Communities in International Law', in Andrea Bianchi et al., Interpretation 
in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 147-165, at 159. 
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authority of arbitral tribunals to review domestic policy. If the purpose of investment 
treaties and arbitration is to set and enforce international protection standards, then any and 
all public measures adopted by the three branches of government are subject to review by 
arbitral tribunals. In one way, the human rights analogy is a useful sidekick to the 
paternalistic assertion that arbitral tribunals discipline states for making policy that exceeds 
what is reasonably acceptable in a market economy, as the analogy and the examples used 
divert attention away from who is doing the disciplining; not the tribunals, but host states 
which engage in opportunistic and arbitrary behavior toward 'small- and medium-sized' 
investors. The second purpose was to undermine the perception that arbitral tribunals show 
no deference to domestic policy-making and are only concerned with promoting narrow 
investor interests. Clearly, the investment arbitration community is diverse and holds 
different views about the extent to which arbitral tribunals should take account of the 
public interest in individual cases, as well as about the role that arbitral tribunals should 
have in respect of broader governance questions. But regardless of the position one holds 
in respect of these questions, the critique that investment treaties and arbitration undermine 
the right to regulate will seem more or less misplaced, because this is what states 
consented to when ratifying investment treaties.714  
 
The above discussion has said nothing about the reasons that drove states to conclude 
investment treaties or about the implications that investment treaties and arbitration have 
had for domestic policy-making. Both issues are complex, and while the reasons that 
compelled states to sign investment treaties may be more generic, there still is variation in 
this regard as well. The next section looks at one general argument that relates to the 
alleged implications of investment treaties and arbitration, namely, that they promote the 
rule of law.  
6.3. The Rule of Law Argument 
BITs emerged as a solution to the anxiety of developed states over the investment climate 
of developing and newly decolonized states, although similar type of treaties were 
                                                
714 See e.g. Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law, supra note 18, p. 477 
(arguing that 'the investor's right to initiate arbitration enables the host state to make credible the 
commitments it made under its investment treaties'). 
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concluded already much earlier.715 A central object and purpose of early BITs was to 
ensure that western investors receive compensation for large-scale nationalizations, 
particularly in the extractive industries sector. However, this original assumption - that 
protecting western investments was not a priority for developing states in the absence of 
BITs - has transformed into a much broader and largely untested assumption about the 
necessity of investment treaties and arbitration in promoting economic globalization. The 
previous section already touched on two aspects of this assumption, namely, on the twin-
argument that investment treaties resemble human rights treaties and set international 
standards for what is acceptable government conduct in a globalized economy. The third 
aspect of the assumption relates to the idea that the enforcement of those standards through 
investment arbitration promotes the rule of law. The descriptive part of the argument is 
premised on the view that 'in many developing and transitioning countries' there are no 
'independent courts' that would resolve cases 'in accordance with pre-established rules of 
law in a timely fashion'.716 As arbitral tribunals have interpreted the fair and equitable 
treatment standard to entail basic due process requirements,717 the assumption is that host 
states are bound to 'improve the rule of law and governance generally in order to avoid 
liability' under investment treaties,718 or, as another commentator put it, investment treaty 
obligations create a spillover effect 'that benefits national citizens and residents as the host 
country gradually develops better administrative practices to comply with international 
investment best practices'.719 In other words, investment treaties, through the medium of 
                                                
715 For a history of BITs that is situated in a more general economic and political context, see Chapter 2 of 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation 
(Oxford University Press, 2010). See also Chapter 1 of Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradel, Law and 
Practice of Investment Treaties. Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International, 2009). 
716 Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law, supra note 18, p. 479. For a similar 
argument, see Christoph Scheuer, 'Do We Need Investment Arbitration?', in Jean E. Kalicki and Anna 
Joubin-Bred (eds.), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System (Brill, 2015), pp. 879-890, at 
883. 
717 See e.g. The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 26 June 2003, para. 137 (the tribunal noted that the trial in a Mississippi court and 
the 'resultant verdict were clearly improper and discreditable and cannot be squared with minimum standards 
of international law and fair and equitable treatment'); Azinian et al. V. Mexico, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/2, Award, 1 November 1999, para. 102 (noting that a 'denial of justice could be pleaded if the 
relevant courts refuse to entertain a suit, if they subject it to undue delay, or if they administer justice 
in a seriously inadequate way'). More generally, tribunals have also emphasized that the rule of law requires 
that host states have legislation to recognize and enforce property and contractual rights, the quality of which 
'meets minimum international standards'. The quote is from AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, 
Final Award, 26 March 2008, para. 87.    
718 Robert Howse, 'International Investment Law and Arbitration', IILJ Working Paper 2017/1 (MegaReg 
Series), p. 34. 
719 See Roberto Echandi, 'What Do Developing Countries Expect from the International Investment Regine?', 
in Jose E. Alvarez and Karl P. Sauvant, The Evolving International Investment Regime. Expectations, 
Realities, Options (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 3-21, at 13-14. See also UNCTAD, Investor-State 
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arbitral tribunals, may slowly transform domestic governance structures as host states 
realize the high cost of not complying with basic principles of procedural fairness and 
access to justice.  
 
Generally speaking, the rule of law concept suffers from overuse and is for many a 'self-
congratulatory rhetorical device',720 which means little more than 'Hooray for our side!'721 
Rule of law projects and indicators abound, with a standard definition being that it is  
 
'a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public 
and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as 
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, 
equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of 
the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.'722 
 
It seems commonsensical that institutional reform toward the rule of law is both time-
consuming and difficult and requires a multitude of human and financial resources. The 
following discussion will only point to the general problems that relate to the proponents' 
rule of law arguments as well as provides an overview of empirical studies dealing with the 
relationship of investment treaties and the rule of law.  
 
In their lengthy defense of investment arbitration, Brower and Blanchard demonstrate how 
vaguely the concept is often used to make a general argument for the investment treaty 
regime. They argue that 'investment treaties and arbitration are in fact powerful tools for 
                                                                                                                                              
Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking (United Nations, 2007), at ix (noting that 'the 
increased number of [investment] arbitrations may…motivate developing host countries to improve domestic 
administrative practices and laws in order to avoid future disputes'). Similarly, Vandevelde concludes that 
'BITs help establish the institutional framework necessary for a modern, developed economy able to benefit 
from economic globalization'. See Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 715, p. 114. 
720 Judith Shklar, 'Political Theory and the Rule of Law', in Allan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan (eds.), 
The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Carswell, 1987), p. 1. 
721 Jeremy Waldron, 'Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida?), 21 Law and 
Philosophy (2002), pp. 137-164, at 139. 
722 See Report of the Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict 
societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 6. 
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advancing the rule of law, both internationally and domestically'.723 To support this bold 
argument, they refer to circumstances where domestic authorities have extracted rents from 
foreign investors under false pretenses; they suggest that investment treaties have 'replaced 
gunboat diplomacy' and stabilized the international order; they draw a parallel between 
foreign investors and 'ethnic minorities' to argue that without investment treaties foreign 
investors would be in a similarly vulnerable position as the latter; and, finally, they refer to 
cases where the investor's cause of action 'could just as fittingly be heard by a human rights 
tribunal'.724 Clearly, these arguments are either based on sweeping generalizations about 
the virtues of investment arbitration or on implausible correlations between conclusion of 
investment treaties and broader political developments (is there really a correlation 
between BITs and a more stable international order?). As noted, the proponents can always 
refer to cases where foreign investors are the target of arbitrary treatment, with investment 
arbitration providing the only effective remedy to which the affected investor can resort. 
But surely this does not support the argument that investment treaties promote the rule of 
law 'domestically and internationally'. 
 
It is easy to create the impression that the investment treaty regime contributes to the rule 
of law by referring to cases where tribunals have referred to the concept. Similarly, as the 
rule of law is weak in many parts of the world, it seems plausible to assume that 
investment treaties are a step in the right direction. But impressionistic evidence is quite 
different from actual empirical evidence. State officials may change their view on policy-
making if and when an investor is awarded compensation, but whether this can lead to a 
broader governance reform is an entirely different matter. An UNCTAD study noted that 
many investment disputes relate to measures adopted by provincial or local authorities who 
are not necessarily aware of the international obligations that the upper levels of 
government have committed to.725 This institutional distance has led a small number of 
countries to adopt mechanisms to inform 'various stakeholders at various levels of 
government' about the relevant investment treaty obligations to prevent future disputes.726 
                                                
723 Brower and Blanchard, 'The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration', supra note 19, p. 755. For additional 
rule of law arguments, see e.g. Stephan W. Schill, 'In Defense of International Investment Law', in Mark 
Bungenberg et al. (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Springer, 2016), pp. 309-341, 
at 313-318; Judd Kessler, 'Investment Arbitration, Legitimacy and National Law in Latin America: An 
Arbitrator's Perspective', 27 The American Review of International Arbitration (2016), pp. 265-310. 
724 Ibid., pp. 755-759. 
725 UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration (United Nations, 2010), 
pp. 66-67. 
726 Ibid., pp. 67-74. 
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But clearly such mechanisms say nothing about the governance implications of potential 
investment claims in those countries. Sottorova notes, on the basis of interviews carried out 
with Turkish and Uzbek officials, that once the countries had faced a number of investor 
claims, 'some learning occurred' but this was 'confined to those [officials] who were 
involved…in defending the government in investment arbitration'. But when she refers to 
'learning', Sottorova is not referring to a new policy mindset, but to a revision of 
investment treaties so as to 'prevent or mitigate future exposure of the government to 
investment claims'.727 Van Harten and Scott, in turn, find that Canadian officials had 
varying degrees of knowledge about Canada's investment treaty obligations, but policy 
proposals were often vetted in light of those obligations.728 This could be taken to mean 
either that the rule of law was bolstered in Canada or that duly processed policy proposals 
were chilled for fear of costly litigation  Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel refer to three 
studies which looked at the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) to see 
whether the conclusion of BITs leads to improvement in a country's WGI 'regulatory 
quality' and 'rule of law' indicators over time. The respective conclusions of the studies 
were contradictory, and the WGI data itself is based on assumptions and methods that 
undermine the quality and reliability of the conclusions.729 
 
One empirical study purported that the conclusion of BITs 'can sometimes have a negative 
effect on domestic governance quality' when investment disputes are taken away from 
domestic courts and local institutions are given no incentives to engage in reform.730 
Another study concluded that in autocratic countries BITs create parallel property rights 
regimes, as foreign investors have no incentive to lobby for improved domestic 
governance, whereas domestic business elites continue to benefit from a 'stagnating 
domestic property rights environment'.731 Similarly, Wälde has argued that 'there is no 
                                                
727 Mavluda Sottorova, 'Reassertion of Control and Contracting Parties' Domestic Law Responses to 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Between Reform, Reticence and Resistance', in Andreas Kulick (ed.), 
Reassertion of Control over the Investment Treaty Regime (Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 53-80, at 
59-60. 
728 Gus van Harten and Dayna Nadine Scott, 'Investment Treaties and the Internal Vetting of Regulatory 
Proposals: A Case Study from Canada', 7 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2016), pp. 92-116. 
729 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel, The Political Economy, supra note 679, pp. 170-172. The studies they 
refer to are Cesar Aranguri, 'The Effect of BITs on Regulatory Quality and the Rule of Law in Developing 
Countries' (an unpublished paper, 2010); Tom Ginsburg, 'International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance', 25 International Review of Law and Economics (2005), pp. 
107-123; Jan Peter Sasse, An Economic Analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties (Springer, 2011). 
730 Ginsburg, 'International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions', supra note 729, p. 121. 
731 Soumyajit Mazumder, 'Can I Stay a BIT Longer? The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Political 
Survival', 11 The Review of International Organizations (2016), pp. 477-521, at 477. 
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evidence that a developed and effective legal framework [i.e. the rule of law] is either a 
necessary condition for economic development or for growth in international trade and 
investment'.732 He also noted that corruption may be more preferable to investors 'familiar 
with a host country setting' as it 'compensates for over-rigid regulation and bureaucratic 
inertia'.733 The merits of his comments aside, the point is that simplistic references to the 
rule of law seem remarkably out of touch with the dynamics of investment decisions and 
the varied circumstances under which investors operate. This is not to argue that 
investment protection is not necessary in many parts of the world, but to point out that 
sugar-coating the argument with references to the rule of law is, well, sugar-coating rather 
than a statement grounded in solid evidence. Then again, if the investment treaty regime is 
understood to set and enforce international protection standards, each investment treaty 
and arbitration can seem to embody the international rule of law. In sum, very little 
research has been done on the impact that investment treaties and arbitration have on the 
rule of law and domestic governance, with existing evidence providing no support to the 
proponents' general argument. 
 
Even the most ardent proponents of the investment treaty regime tend to acknowledge that 
the rule of law argument is weak in respect of 'countries with well-developed judicial 
systems',734 but, as an influential advocacy group put it, this is not a reason for excluding 
investment protection from agreements between developed economies, because 'countries 
that enact laws and regulations with due process and that respect the rule of law have 
nothing to fear from international arbitration as their acts are not likely to be challenged'.735 
This argument warrants a comment. Generally speaking, the decisions of courts and 
tribunals are always subject to varying degrees of criticism, even in countries that place 
highest in rule of law rankings. All courts render judgments that either have devastating 
consequences for the concerned individuals or that provide less than perfect redress for the 
disputing parties, and this includes the courts of, say, the Nordic countries. To give an 
example, the European Court of Human Rights continues to render judgments against 
Finland although the latter is regularly on the podium of various global rule of law 
rankings. This means that advocacy groups can always invoke the rule of law argument by 
                                                
732 Wälde, 'Law. Contract and Reputation, supra note 699, at 191. 
733 Ibid., p. 194-195. 
734 Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of international Investment Law', supra note 18, p. 479 (footnote 28). 
735 See European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration, A response to the criticism against ISDS, 
17 May 2015, para. 9.3. 
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referring to cases where the members of their constituencies have suffered injustice at the 
hands of domestic courts or where access to courts is limited in one or another way.736 The 
argument that developed economies have nothing to fear from investment arbitration 
diverts attention away from the fact that what the 'rule of law' means is a highly 
perspectival matter in the circumstances of specific cases, with arbitral tribunals judging 
cases differently than domestic courts precisely because the applicable standards and 
assumptions are different.  
 
Hence, although there is broad consensus over the basic components of the rule of law, and 
although such definitions are useful in analyzing the legitimacy of judiciaries and the 
perceptions that publics have of them, it seems important to distinguish such assessments 
from the meaning that the concept has for the disputing parties, on the one hand, and for 
domestic courts and arbitral tribunals on the other hand. The factual and legal matrix of 
most investment disputes is contradictory and ambiguous, and the parties can make 
opposing (and often equally convincing) arguments about how the case should be decided, 
which suggests that the rule of law is in the eye of beholder in case specific circumstances. 
The argument that 'countries with well-developed judicial systems' need not worry about 
investment arbitration is also problematic for another reason. Developed states have faced 
an increasing number of claims under investment treaties, many of which center on 
measures adopted in sensitive areas of policy-making. This is not surprising given that 
arbitral tribunals apply different standards than domestic courts, and resourceful law firms 
are inclined to test to what extent arbitral tribunals' views on acceptable public policy 
might differ from those of judiciaries which enjoy widespread legitimacy among the 
population. A good example of this is provided by the Bilcon tribunal's decision on 
jurisdiction and liability in 2015.737 The case centered on the plans of a US owned 
company to develop and operate a mining quarry and marine terminal in Nova Scotia. The 
claimants were obligated to carry out an environmental assessment in accordance with 
Canadian federal law, which a Joint Review Panel (JRP) was to assess. The tribunal noted 
                                                
736 In this regard, Schill points out that foreign investors are excluded from the 'enjoyment of fundamental 
rights' and have no access to the German Constitutional Court. Similarly, he points out that in some countries 
'certain government measures may be completely exempt from domestic judicial review'. This creates the 
impression that lack of access to courts and lack of judicial review affect foreign investors in particular, but 
Schill provides no evidence in this regard, nor suggests that such evidence exists. See Schill, 'In Defense of 
International Investment Law', supra note 723, p. 316. 
737 William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of 
Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, 17 March 2015.  
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that the JRP process 'is the most rigorous, protracted and expensive kind of review...[and] 
involves public hearings and a report by an independent panel'.738 The JRP recommended 
that the claimant's application for the approval of the project is rejected on the ground that 
the project would have had significant and adverse effects 'on community core values', and 
the federal and provincial authorities followed suit by refusing to grant the necessary 
permits. 
 
This led to the NAFTA arbitration and the tribunal held that Canada had violated its 
obligations to provide international minimum standard of treatment and national treatment. 
Neither Canada's federal law nor Nova Scotia's law recognized the concept of 'community 
core values', with the implication being that it was highly problematic to use it as a basis to 
make recommendations on the project's approval.739 Similarly, the JRP report failed to 
specify what the standard means, and the claimant was never informed of the standard's 
existence, nor of its 'overriding importance' in getting approval for the project.740 The JRP 
report had also failed to consider what mitigation measures the claimants could adopt so as 
to receive approval, although this is what the federal law arguably required.741 Taken 
together, the JRP process amounted to arbitrary and unjustified treatment which breached 
the minimum standard of treatment under Article 1105 NAFTA.742 It also violated the 
national treatment obligation, because the claimant received less favorable treatment than 
Canadian investors, because the 'community core values' standard had not been previously 
applied and similar domestic projects had been analyzed in light of potential mitigation 
measures.743  
 
As two commentators have noted, Canada's liability stemmed from what the tribunal 
'considered to be due process and rule of law deficiencies' in the implementation of its own 
environmental laws.744 The JRP report's reliance on community core values implies that 
the concerns of the local population were central to the recommendation to reject the 
claimant's application. That state organs adopt the preferences of local communities in 
                                                
738 Ibid., para. 15. 
739 Ibid., para. 508. 
740 Ibid., paras. 506 and 555. 
741 Ibid., para. 546. 
742 Ibid., paras. 588-604. 
743 Ibid., paras. 685-731. It is noteworthy that the tribunal was split 2 to 1, with the dissenting arbitrator 
(appointed by Canada) finding that the JRP process was compatible with the relevant NAFTA obligations. 
744 Laura Létourneau-Tremblay and Daniel Behn, 'Judging the Misapplication of a State's Own 
Environmental Regulations', 17 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2016), pp. 829-838, at 830. 
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policy-making is far from evident, but the broader point is that the way in which domestic 
institutions interpret and apply domestic law in case-specific circumstances is prone to 
include situations where the law is interpreted and applied in a way that displeases one of 
the parties, and this holds equally true in respect of countries which are perceived to 
uphold the rule of law. When reading the Bilcon award, one can agree that the JRP report 
applied the federal law in a manner that was problematic in a formal sense, although both 
the dissenting arbitrator and a number of Canadian environmental law experts have 
criticized the tribunal's analysis. In their view, the 'community core values' standard was 
among the criteria against which the JRP was required to evaluate the project.745 The 
claimants did not exhaust local remedies before initiating the arbitration,746 so Canadian 
courts will not be able to review the legality of the JRP process in light of Canadian law.747 
The point of Bilcon is that foreign investors will undoubtedly think that investment 
arbitration is a useful remedy in case a dispute arises with the host state, but clearly the 
same principle applies in respect of each and every interest group. Granting privileged 
access to foreign investors should be grounded on clear evidence pointing to 
discrimination and arbitrary treatment in specific countries, and in case of developed (and 
most developing) countries such evidence awaits discovery. Bilcon also suggests that 
arbitral tribunals may interpret domestic law rules differently than domestic courts, and 
such inconsistency will seem problematic for many. 
 
In sum, the rule of law argument is less than plausible and should be met with caution, also 
in the context of intra-EU BITs. While some formerly socialist states place low on global 
                                                
745 One commentator argues that the JRP report used the 'community core values' concept as an umbrella 
term that brought together the different aspects of the category 'human environment effects', the assessment 
of which was part of the JRP's mandate. In other words, the term 'community core values' was an alternative 
description of a criterion that the JRP was obligated to assess under the applicable law. See Meinhard Doelle, 
'Clayton Whites Point NAFTA Challenge Troubling', Environmental Law News, 25 March 2015 (another 
general argument was that the tribunal 'lacked, with the exception of the dissenting member, even a basic 
understanding of the legal context within which the decisions it was asked to rule on where made. It also 
lacked any real appreciation for the factual context within which the decisions being challenged were 
made…[and] that the "expert legal advice" was completely misunderstood and misapplied by the majority of 
the NAFTA tribunal'). 
746 NAFTA does not require investors to exhaust local remedies before bringing a claim. See Article 1121 
NAFTA (official citation North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993)). 
747 Canada has sought the award's annulment before its domestic courts on the ground that the award conflicts 
with the public policy of Canada. See Attorney General of Canada v William Ralph Clayton, William 
Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware, Notice of Application, FC, T-
1000-15 (16 June 2015), para. 16. 
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rule of law rankings, particularly with respect to 'judicial independence',748 this does not 
necessarily indicate that their courts mistreat foreign investors. Lack of judicial 
independence could target mostly the host state's own nationals, whether individuals or 
companies, and its existence could also be based on public perceptions whose validity is 
impossible to verify. More generally, and as noted, the empirical question of whether 
foreign investors are subject to mistreatment in host states has not been addressed 
systematically, and existing research points to an opposite conclusion. Foreign investors 
are more likely to receive better treatment in comparison to domestic investors.  
6.4. Two Economic Arguments 
6.4.1. Investment Treaties Increase Investment Flows 
A widely-used argument is that the conclusion of BITs will increase investment flows, as 
the possibility or threat of arbitration stabilizes the host state's regulatory framework and 
increases the likelihood of positive investment decisions.749 Larger investment stocks, in 
turn, contribute to economic development, as FDI leads to employment opportunities, rises 
in tax revenue, improved worker skills, and to transfers of technology to developing states. 
Further, investment treaties increase economic efficiency in their own right by decreasing 
the political risk that comes with investing in a foreign market. Lower political risk results 
in more cost-efficient investment projects, with the prices of the investor's products and 
services going down. Brower and Schill provide a succinct summary of this broad 
argument: 'investment treaties create a legal infrastructure for the functioning of a global 
market economy by protecting property rights', and assuming that perfect market 
conditions exist, BITs contribute to 'the efficient allocation of capital, economic growth 
and development', and thus 'benefit both capital-exporting and capital-importing countries 
through an increase in overall well-being'.750 If this is what investment treaties contribute 
to, who could be against them?  
 
The question of whether BITs increase investment flows, however, is a very complex 
matter, and some of the existing research is of less than stellar quality as the analyses have 
                                                
748 For example, in the World Economic Forum's judicial independence ranking, Bulgaria is placed 126th and 
the Slovak Republic 130th among 140 countries. See at http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-
report-2014-2015/rankings/ (accessed 26 August 2017). 
749 This section focuses on the economic impact that investment treaties have on host states, but not on home 
states. 
750 Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law', supra note 18, p. 496-497. 
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ignored important differences between contents of investment treaties and host state 
characteristics, with some studies paying inadequate attention to the so called 'endogeneity' 
problem.751 For example, many early studies failed to make a distinction between 
investment treaties containing robust arbitration clauses and those that did not.752 
Similarly, the question whether investment treaties encourage investment only in specific 
sectors (such as extractive industries) is clearly important, as a positive answer would 
imply that BITs are redundant for countries that have, for example, scarce natural 
resources, but there is relatively little research that focuses on this question.753 The 
endogeneity problem refers to the scenario where a BIT is concluded around the same time 
that a host state adopts a number of other legislative and administrative reforms, including 
rules on investment liberalization, and if this is not accounted for in the analysis, the 
conclusions will be less than plausible.754 With these caveats in mind, existing research 
provides inconclusive answers to the question whether BITs increase investment flows, 
with one commentator noting that 'some studies show that BITs can have massive positive 
impacts on foreign investment; others show modest positive impacts; still others show no 
impact at all, or even a negative impact'.755 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel note that a 
majority of the studies 'find that investment treaties have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on inward FDI in at least some circumstances', but the 'scale of the 
impact varies remarkably', and 'a sizeable minority of studies' find that BITs have no 
statistically significant effect on FDI flows.756  
 
An UNCTAD study on developing economies concluded that investment treaties 
(whatever their contents) alone are not sufficient to attract FDI, with other determinants - 
including political stability, access to natural resources, market size, labor costs, tax breaks 
and other such incentives - playing a 'more powerful role'.757 Clearly, the correlation 
between investment flows and BITs is an intricate question that requires appreciation of 
                                                
751 The discussion in this section owes a large debt to Chapters 2, 5 and 6 in Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel, 
The Political Economy, supra note 679. 
752 Ibid., p. 159. 
753 Ibid., p. 161. 
754 Ibid., pp. 161-162. They also note that the 'quality of FDI stock data is poor' and identify a number of 
specific deficiencies that undermine the credibility of the relevant data (see at pp. 162-164). 
755 See Jason Webb Yackee, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some 
Hints from Alternative Evidence’, 51 Virginia Journal of International Law (2010), pp. 397-442, at 399 
756 Ibid., p. 159. 
757 UNCTAD, The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to 
Developing Countries (United Nations, 2009), at xi-xii. 
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the above methodological limitations.758 The mixed results of existing research suggests 
that it is easy to point to studies that either support or undermine the correlation, but the 
most plausible approach is to acknowledge that as the evidence is highly mixed, and 
difficult to assess without proper understanding of the attendant methodologies, it does not 
provide conclusive support to the general argument that investment treaties increase 
investment flows. A country-specific analysis that incorporates other FDI determinants 
would make much more sense.759 Another commonsense observation is that there is even 
less evidence about the impact of investment treaties on investment flows between 
developed economies, given the rareness of 'North-North' BITs. It is noteworthy that the 
Commission's fact sheet on investment treaties notes that investment 'protection 
provisions, including investor-state dispute settlement are important for investment flows', 
and this general statement is linked up with the argument that FDI is 'a critical factor for 
growth and jobs'.760 What this suggests is that it does not necessarily matter what empirical 
evidence says about the correlation between BITs and investment flows if and when 




                                                
758 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel, The Political Economy, supra note 679, p. 165. There are also some 
qualitative studies that survey whether companies consider investment treaties as being relevant for their 
decision-making. Again, the results are mixed and what should of course note that their reliability is 
impossible to verify. Relevant studies include Lisa Sachs and Karl Sauvant, 'BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An 
Overview', in Karl Sauvant and Lisa Sachs (eds.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Investment Flows (Oxford University Press, 
2009); Jason Webb Yackee, 'Do BITs really work? Revisiting the empirical link between investment treaties 
and foreign direct investment', in Sauvant and Sachs (eds.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment; Copenhagen Economics, EU-China Investment Study: Report for European Commission 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2012); Hogan Lovells, Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, and the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Risk and Return: Foreign Direct Investment and the Rule of 
Law (London, 2015). 
759 It is also useful to remember that investment treaties are just one instrument for protecting foreign 
investment: political risk insurance and investment contracts entailing arbitration clauses are regularly used 
in practice, and though they are not identical to BIT protections, they receive relatively modest attention in 
the political debate on investment arbitration. For a discussion (based on contractual theories) on why treaty 
based investment arbitration is 'better' than arbitration under an investment contract, see Anne van Aaken, 
'International Investment Law between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis', 12 
Journal of International Economic Law (2009), pp. 507-538. For a tentative argument that political risk 
insurance provides adequate protection to investors, see Efi Chalamish and Robert Howse, 'Conceptualizing 
Political Risk Insurance: Toward a Legal and Economic Analysis of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA)', in Mathias Audit and Stephan Schill (eds.), The Transnational Law of Public Contracts 
(Bruylant, 2015), pp. 721-736. 
760 EU Commission, 'Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in EU agreements', Fact 
Sheet, November 2013, p. 3. 
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6.4.2. FDI Promotes Economic Growth and Development 
Perhaps the more interesting (and important) question is whether FDI promotes economic 
growth and development in host states, and if it does, how the attendant costs and benefits 
are distributed.761 In this regard, an extreme example is found in the following description 
of a US$1.5 billion natural gas plant in Equatorial Guinea, which was built and operated by 
a US oil company: 
 
'The plant…could have been on the moon for all the benefit it offered local 
business... Instead of buying cement from a Malabo company that might not 
deliver on time, Marathon [i.e. the oil company] built a small cement factory 
on the construction site. Raw materials were imported, and the factory would 
be dismantled when construction ended. The trailers in which the Asians [i.e. 
the foreign workers working at the site] lived were prefab units - no local 
materials or local labor had been used to build them. The plant had its own 
satellite phone network, which was connected to the company's Texas 
network - if you pieced up a phone you would be in the Houston area code, 
and dialling a number in Malabo would be an international call. The facility 
also had its own power plant and water-purification and sewage system. It 
existed off the local grid.'762 
 
While this is by no means your average foreign direct investment, it already points to 
problems in the proponents' argument that there 'has long been consensus that foreign 
direct investment increases national income and employment and accelerates development 
and modernization, including by establishing valuable tangible assets within the host 
country, promoting the development of human capital, facilitating the acquisition of 
technical knowledge, and creating network effects that create opportunities for future 
market access abroad'.763 A central conclusion of the economic literature is that FDI 'can 
play an important role for economic development in host states…[but] its impact is 
                                                
761 There are also number of general arguments for and against investment liberalization, but the following 
does not focus on these, nor do I address the question whether investment treaties containing liberalization 
commitments bring about economic benefits. For a discussion (and references to additional sources) on these 
questions, see Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel, The Political Economy, supra note 679, pp. 172-178. 
762 Peter Maass, Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil (Vintage, 2009), pp. 35-36. 
763 Brower and Blanchard, 'The Truth about Investment Arbitration', supra note 19, p. 703. 
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contingent on host state and investment-specific conditions'.764 Those conditions relate to, 
for example, how educated the local workforce is,765 to the mode of entry of the foreign 
investor,766 and to the 'quality' of domestic institutions.767 A related point is that 
dependence on the exploitation of natural resources has a 'long-run negative effect on 
economic performance', and these 'problems appear to be particularly acute for poor 
countries'.768 In other words, investments in the extractive industries sector appear to have 
adverse economic effects for countries struggling with administrative and regulatory 
incapacity. Given this, Howse argues that investors 'whose activities generate significant 
negative externalities…will be the most attracted to [investment] treaty protection when 
they are investing in countries with low regulatory standards and weak governance', 
although the evidence suggests that FDI is least likely to promote economic development 
under such circumstances.769 Howse infers that even if some of these types of investments 
are made by virtue of an investment treaty, 'this might not be the kind of FDI that is 
beneficial to economic development, or it might not be directed towards the kinds of 
countries likely to benefit developmentally from FDI'.'770  
 
But does this evidence matter? Challenging the broad proposition that FDI contributes to 
economic development is not necessarily an easy task, whatever the empirical evidence 
suggests. For example, trade and investment liberalization is among the top priorities of the 
Commission for the 2015-2019 period and its recent communication paper noted that 
foreign direct investment 'is an important source of jobs, growth and innovation'.771 The 
2017 World Investment Report, prepared by UNCTAD, surveyed changes in national laws 
                                                
764 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel, The Political Economy, supra note 679, p. 49. 
765 See Eduardo Borensztein, José De Gregorio, and Jong-Wha Lee, 'How does Foreign Direct Investment 
affect Economic Growth?', 45 Journal of International Economics (2011), pp.115-135. 
766 Paula Neto, Antonio Brandão, and Antonio Cerqueira, 'The Impact of FDI, Cross Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions and Greenfield Investments on Economic Growth’, 7 The IUP Journal of Business Strategy 
(2010), pp. 24-44. 
767 Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi, 'Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions 
over Geography and Integration in Economic Development', 9 Journal of Economic Growth (2004), pp. 131-
165, at 135. See also Theodore Moran, Edward M. Graham and Magnus Blomström (eds.), Does Foreign 
Direct Investment Promote Development (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2005); Cristina 
Jude and Grégory Levieuge, Growth Effect of FDI in Developing Economies: The Role of Institutional 
Quality (Banque de France, June 2015); Manuchehr Irandoust, 'A Survey of Recent Developments in the 
Literature of FDI-Led Growth Hypothesis', 11 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2010), pp. 276-291. 
768 Cullen Hendrix and Marcus Noland, Confronting the Curse: The Economics and Geopolitics of Natural 
Resource Governance (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2014), p. 121. 
769 Howse, 'International Investment Law and Arbitration', supra note 718, p. 17 
770 Idem. 
771 EU Commission, Communication from the Commission: Welcoming Foreign Direct Investment while 
Protecting Essential Interests, COM(2017) 494 final, Brussels, 13 September 2017, p. 2.   
 221 
and regulations and noted that most measures adopted in 2016 'aimed at investment 
promotion, facilitation and liberalization', including the liberalization of entry conditions 
for FDI.772 Most developing countries have adopted 'deep market-oriented reforms',773 and 
south-south BITs are now counted in the hundreds,774 with a number of transitioning and 
developing countries having become capital-exporters. If and when policy-makers and 
governments the world over think that promoting cross-border investments is a priority, it 
seems somewhat irrelevant to point to the myriad ways in which FDI may manifest itself in 
different parts of the world. The entry conditions of large-scale investments and their post-
establishment treatment - under national environmental law, corporate law, tax law and 
contract law, for example - are matters that fall under the responsibility of local 
governments whose decision-making various international institutions and actors strive to 
influence. While governments have much leeway in determining policy priorities and how 
to achieve them, in practice they are binding their hands in a multitude of ways. As noted, 
governments actively seek to encourage foreign investments in a number of ways - for 
example, by providing free consultation services to foreign companies contemplating on 
whether to make an investment - and the economic incentives that countries offer come in 
many shapes and forms. In this light, the evidence that suggests that correlation between 
FDI and economic growth and development is less than clear, may not at all matter for the 
(broadly understood) political class. 
 
This also suggests that, as Neumayer once put it, 'what really matters is what policy 
makers believe, not what economic theory and evidence says'.775 While these beliefs may 
be based on crude simplifications and misunderstandings, they can still have important 
political ramifications when they are considered received wisdom among policy-makers 
and state officials. In this light, challenging the economic arguments about the virtues of 
investment treaties is an uphill battle, even if the arguments rely on anecdotal evidence and 
ideology or even go against the (scant) empirical evidence.  
                                                
772 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017: Investment and the Digital Economy (United Nations 
Publications, 2017), at xi. 
773 Echandi, 'What Do Developing Countries Expect', supra note 719, at 4.  
774 An UNCTAD study found that at the end of 2006, 27 percent (680 out of some 2500) of all BITs were 
concluded between developing countries. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007: Transnational 
Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development (United Nations Publications, 2007), p. 17.  
775 Eric Neumayer, 'Do Countries Fail to Raise Environmental Standards? An Evaluation of Policy Options 
Addressing "Regulatory Chill"', 4 International Journal of Sustainable Development (2001), pp. 231-244 
(revised version, pp. 1-27, at 20, available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/18895/). 
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6.5. Conclusion   
The preceding discussion provides few certain answers. The analysis sought to 
demonstrate that the arguments for investment treaties rely not on solid empirical evidence 
but on ambiguous or untested assumptions about the correlation between the investment 
treaty regime and economic development and the rule of law. While investment treaties 
may have a statistically relevant impact on investment flows between certain countries, on 
a general level other determinants appear to be more important for investment decisions. 
Similarly, the alleged correlation between FDI and economic development turned out to be 
equally equivocal, with evidence suggesting that the strength of the correlation varies 
'across sectors and industries' and depends on the host state's political conditions and level 
of development.776 As to the rule of law argument, it has much intuitive appeal given the 
administrative incapacity and corruption prevalent in many countries as well as individual 
investment disputes where host states have acted in arbitrary and discriminatory ways. The 
suggestion was, however, that there is no evidence supporting the general argument that 
investment treaties and arbitration improve the quality of domestic governance. Investment 
arbitration may be the only effective remedy in many cases, but this does not constitute a 
plausible reference point for the general argument that promotes the further globalization 
of investment protection. Then again, if trade and investment liberalization are a top 
priority of public policy, and if investment treaties are believed to increase investment 
flows, it is likely that the correlation between the rule of law and investment treaties is 
among the beliefs that policy-makers and state officials have the world over. If everybody 
around you assumes that such correlation exists, it must exist whatever the evidence might 
say. 
 
The rule of law argument also relates to the perception that the proponents have about the 
basic idea of investment arbitration. As Kessler put it, arbitrators 'are charged to apply in a 
careful and principled way, established international legal standards…[and] they must 
apply the law as it has been set forth in authoritative form by numerous arbitral tribunals, 
judges, scholars and practitioners'.777 Kessler refers to his own experience 'that, with rare 
exception, the arbitrators have been highly qualified professionals with broad and deep 
experience…[and they] felt genuinely honored to have been chosen to serve, and took the 
                                                
776 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel, The Political Economy, supra note 679, p. 48. 
777 Kessler, 'An Arbitrator's Perspective', supra note 723, pp. 265-310, at 297. 
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responsibility of deciding disputes between private investors and sovereign governments as 
something akin to a sacred trust'.778 A logical corollary of Kessler's reflection is the idea 
that investment arbitration promotes the rule of law, as arbitrators ('with rare exception') 
not only have impeccable credentials but also a clear sense of ethics and a strong 
commitment to decide cases in a manner that holds water upon closer scrutiny by all 
stakeholders. Kessler appears to be offended by the widespread criticism of the investment 
treaty regime, which he sees as an 'important bulwark for the rule of law',779 and his 
contribution is animated by the worry that the critics do not appreciate the extent to which 
governments continue to disrespect basic notions of due process and justice. For him, 
investment arbitration provides a lifeline for foreign investors operating in an asymmetric 
threat environment. As Schwebel put it, the host state 'has not only the police power; it has 
the police. It can bring the weight of its bureaucracy, and its politicians, to bear. It can 
prescribe, delay, decree, tax, incite, and strangle'.780  
 
The following chapter provides an opposing narrative about the reality of investment 
protection. In the critics' view, investment treaties and arbitration constitute an entirely 
different species. Rather than setting an international benchmark for what is reasonably 
acceptable government conduct, investment treaties further entrench the position of the 
most dominant players in the global economy at the expense of host states' regulatory 
autonomy and the promotion of public goods. Chapter 7 represents and unpacks the critic's 
version, after which I strive to join the different chapters of the thesis together and provide 
a more general assessment of the underlying themes as well as some general conclusions. 
As noted, the critique comes in many shapes and forms, but my analysis focuses on the 
general political critique, which questions the raison d'être of the regime and leaves the 
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7. The Critique of Investment Treaties and 
Arbitration  
 
'The last two decades have witnessed the silent rise of a powerful international 
investment regime that has ensnared hundreds of countries and put corporate 
profit before human rights and the environment.'781 
 
This quote is from a report published by two NGOs in 2012 and its authors provide a biting 
description and analysis of the investment treaty regime and of the background of the 'elite 
arbitrators' who 'dominate' the attendant arbitration industry. The report may have 
contributed to bringing awareness on what previously was a largely unknown legal field in 
Europe, with the heated debate on the EU's external investment policy starting soon after. 
However, the ongoing debate in Europe is in large measure continuation of an earlier 
debate carried out with respect to the proposal on the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) and NAFTA investment provisions and arbitrations. The MAI 
negotiations started in 1995 and the purpose was to reach an agreement on investment 
protection and investment liberalization and to create effective dispute settlement 
mechanisms.782 Given the relatively small number of OECD member states, MAI was to 
be a free-standing treaty open to accession by non-member states as well. The negotiations 
were discontinued in 1998 when France declared its withdrawal from the project after the 
draft text of the agreement had received extensive criticism from civil society actors and a 
number of developing countries. In particular, concerns were expressed about the impact 
that MAI could have on host states' policy space as well as about the political wisdom of 
providing privileged treatment to foreign investors.783 The current debate is also strikingly 
similar to the previous debates concerning the legitimacy of the WTO and I will address 
this debate in Chapter 8. 
 
                                                
781 Pia Eberhardt and Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from injustice. How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are 
fuelling an investment arbitration boom (Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute, 
2012), p. 7. 
782 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'OECD begins Negotiations on a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment', News release, 27 September 1995. 
783 For a discussion on the MAI negotiations and the attendant public criticism, see Rainer Geiger, ‘Towards 
a Multilateral Agreement on Investment’, 31 Cornell International Law Journal (1998), pp. 467-475; Jan 
McDonald, 'The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Heyday or MAI-day for Ecologically sustainable 
Development?' 22 Melbourne University Law Review (1998), pp. 617-656. 
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As to NAFTA, and to the surprise of many, Canada and the US quickly faced a number of 
claims under NAFTA Chapter 11 once the treaty had entered into force, although it was 
only Mexico that had resisted the chapter's inclusion. The US had lobbied diligently for 
Chapter 11 because it wished 'to liberalize Mexican restrictions on investment and to lock 
in legal protections for [US] investors'.784 Once NAFTA tribunals had reviewed US and 
Canadian legislative acts and domestic court decisions, and in some cases awarded 
compensation for the claimant investors, the critics started to argue that the decisions 
constitute an 'extraordinary attack on normal government activity' and threaten the national 
sovereignty of NAFTA states as well as 'their ability to freely engage in democratic law-
making processes'.785 As the number of arbitrations under other investment treaties started 
to rise around the same time as these concerns were expressed, the critique gradually 
broadened beyond the NAFTA context, but its basic components remain the same, 
although there is much variation in the analytic rigor of the arguments. Before proceeding 
to addressing the critique in more detail, it is useful to note that only a relatively small 
number of states have made changes to their existing investment treaties. Canada and the 
US have drafted more 'state-friendly' model BITs, and already in 2001, the NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission issued an interpretive statement providing that the 'fair and equitable 
treatment' and 'full protection and security' standards found in Chapter 11 are equivalent to 
the minimum standard of treatment of aliens under customary international law.786 This 
came about as a reaction to awards where NAFTA tribunals had provided more liberal 
interpretations of the standards.  
 
The 'backlash' against investment arbitration has been particularly strong in Latin America 
where governments have ratcheted up the controversy with high-octane rhetoric equating 
investment arbitration to 'colonialism' and 'slavery' with respect to large multinationals, 
Washington and the World Bank.787 Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela denounced the ICSID 
                                                
784 United States General Accounting Office, North American Free Trade Agreement: Assessment of Major 
Issues: Report to Congress, GAO/GGD-93-137B (September 1993), at 19.  
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(2001), p. 2,  and Ray C. Jones, 'NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be 
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(accessed 25 August 2017). On reactions to the statement by NAFTA tribunals, see Anthea Roberts, 'Power 
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President' on May 30, 2009, as reported by Fernando Carbrera Diaz in 'Ecuador continues exit from ICSID', 
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Convention as a response to multiple claims raised against them under the Convention,788 
and Ecuador took further steps by amending its constitution in 2008, which made entering 
into treaties containing investment arbitration provisions unconstitutional. Ecuador's 
Supreme Court has also issued a series of rulings declaring that investment arbitration 
provisions in a number of Ecuador's BITs are unconstitutional and many of the existing 
BITs are undergoing termination procedures.789 South Africa, in turn, suspended the 
signing of new investment treaties pending a review of its existing treaties and 
experience.790 Many investment treaties have also undergone different degrees of reform, 
so as to accommodate some of the perceived flaws in their original design,791 and some of 
the procedural rules governing the transparency of arbitral proceedings have been amended 
to increase public access.792 To give two examples, the preambles of many 'second 
generation' BITs contain references to labor rights, sustainable development, protection of 
the environment and other similar priorities,793 and some BITs now include general 
exceptions clauses which provide that the contracting states may take measures whose 
object is the protection of public health and safety as well as other essential state 
interests.794 In Europe, the Commission's pressure on intra-EU BITs has led to some 
unilateral terminations, but most of the treaties remain in force and investments that were 
made prior to the terminations continue to enjoy BIT protections as provided in the treaties' 
sunset clauses.795 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Investment Treaty News, 5 June 2009. Available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/06/05/ecuador-continues- 
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291. 
789 On some of these developments, see Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, 'Is There a Life for Latin American Countries 
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790 Republic of South Africa, Department of Trade and Industry, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy 
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Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime', 50 Harvard International Law Journal (2009), pp. 491-
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Europe's Evolving Investment Treaty Policy', 15 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2014), pp. 645-678. 
793 See Andrew Newcombe, 'Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law', 8 Journal of World 
Investment & Trade (2007), pp. 357-407, at 398-402. 
794 To give an example, Article 14(1) of the Finland-Zambia BIT provides that nothing in the agreement 
'shall be construed as preventing a Contracting Party from taking any action necessary [...] for the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health'. See Agreement  
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But an overwhelming majority of BITs have not been amended or terminated, and some 
countries that had adopted a critical stand on investment treaties have changed tack and are 
concluding new treaties.796 Similarly, countries and/or regions with a major share of global 
FDI are negotiating so called mega-regional trade agreements, which include investment 
protection chapters, and this of course includes the EU's trade agreements with Canada, 
China and the US. The future of the Commission's proposal for an investment court system 
is uncertain, but that proposal is meant to address the procedural aspects of the critique, 
whereas the state-of-the-art CETA investment provisions are designed to address the 
political and substantive critique, in particular by ensuring that host states' regulatory space 
is safeguarded. I will provide a comment on the relevant CETA provisions below.  
 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. I start by providing a general sketch of the 
critics' basic view of investment treaties. If the proponents rely on individual cases to show 
that governments act in ways that are 'blatantly arbitrary, illegal or unconstitutional',797 the 
critics have their own pet cases which relate to policy measures adopted in sensitive areas 
of public policy, such as public health and protection of the environment. Importantly, 
these cases (appear to) confirm the more general view that the critics have of economic 
globalization. I provide some comments on why it is problematic to rely on individual 
cases - or case outcome statistics - when arguing for or against investment treaties. After 
this, I look at two arbitrations where the claimant investors challenged measures that were 
taken as a response to political opposition against the claimant's investment. The tribunals 
approached the political context in entirely different ways, in part because of the parties' 
arguments. The first case, Tecmed, reflects how difficult it is to maintain a black-and-white 
view of investment disputes when the factual record is put under the microscope, which 
also highlights that the critique should become more open about its political preferences in 
order to make more sense. The second case, Occidental, provides a useful basis for a 
discussion on some of the weaknesses of the critics' political vision. In my view, 
Occidental should not be seen as simplistically juxtaposing the interests of a US oil giant 
and a poor developing country, but as a reflection of the costs that economic development 
brings about the world over, including in stable western democracies. These case 
comments are followed by two more general arguments that academic commentators have 
                                                
796 For example, Australia reversed its policy by signing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2016. The 
agreement contains a full-blown investment protection chapter. 
797 Kessler, 'Arbitrator Perspective', supra note 723, p. 282. 
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made about the relationship of investment treaties and economic liberalism. The 
'regulatory chill' argument asserts that the threat of investment arbitration compels host 
states to refrain from adopting public interest measures that might affect influential foreign 
investors, with the question being if there is evidence that supports this intuitively 
plausible concern. The second argument strives to prove the schematic thesis that 
international investment law is the handmaiden of neoliberal ideas and policies. This 
argument forms the core of Sornarajah's recent monograph, and I will provide a summary 
of its main components as well as consider its limitations and purpose.  
7.1. Appearances Matter 
A common thread that runs to the critical arguments is that investment arbitration 
undermines the domestic political process and provides special privileges to already 
privileged actors. That tribunals may award sizeable compensation only adds insult to the 
injury by creating uncertainty over the fiscal implications of domestic policy proposals. 
This basic idea is behind arguments such as that 'traditional' investment arbitration is 
contrary to sustainable development,798 or that it 'fundamentally shift[s] the balance of 
power between investors, states and other affected parties in a manner that undermines fair 
resolution of legal disputes'.799 Others note that the critics have argued that investors 'may 
use BIT provisions to challenge human rights-inspired regulations that interfere 
with…[their] investment',800 or that companies may 'demand compensation when a 
government-initiated change lowers the value of their assets',801 or that arbitral tribunals 
'have on many occasions struck down host states' environmental regulations and awarded 
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large damages to investors'.802 At the outset, it should be noted that while tribunals in 
principle may order host states to repeal or amend the challenged measure, monetary 
compensation is the main (if not only) remedy used in practice. Hence, the argument about 
tribunals striking down 'environmental regulations' is clearly misleading, as is the 
argument that investors can win cases solely on the basis of lost profits.  
 
In addition to scholarly arguments, the media has reported cases that provide much fodder 
for the critique, with the attendant circumstances juxtaposing private and public interests. 
For example, Indonesia's exemption of a number of mainly foreign-owned mining 
companies from a ban on open-pit mining in protected forests appeared to stem from the 
companies' previous threats to take Indonesia to arbitration if the ban is adopted.803 
Another news story related to a lead-acid battery factory in El Salvador, which was owned 
by members of a prominent El Salvadorian family who also held United States citizenship. 
The factory's operation produced clouds of ash, which contained lead and reportedly 
caused severe health problems among the local population, including deaths of children. 
The government ordered closing of the factory and brought charges of aggravated 
environmental pollution against the owners who quickly fled to the United States. The 
owners then threatened to bring an expropriation claim against El Salvador under the 
relevant BIT, which eventually led El Salvador's prosecutors to settle the case, with the 
owners moving back from the threat of arbitration.804 An oft-quoted news article 
contributed to this shady image by starting with the following description of how arbitral 
tribunals operate: 'Their meetings are secret. Their members are generally unknown. The 
decisions they reach need not be fully disclosed'.805  
 
The 2012 NGO report, referred to above, uses equally vivid language to condemn the 
investment treaty regime, with the central message being that by 'signing investment 
treaties and agreeing to arbitration, states have…accepted to be sued by the devil in hell'.806 
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The report invokes eye-catching cases, such as Philip Morris v. Australia/Uruguay and 
Vattenfall v. Germany to argue that arbitrators 'tend to defend private investor rights above 
public interest, revealing an inherent pro-corporate bias', as tribunals 'have granted big 
business millions of dollars from taxpayers' pockets…in compensation for the alleged 
impact on company profits of democratically made laws that protect the environment, 
public health or social well-being'.807 One cause of this bias stems from the 'vested 
interests' of arbitrators and counselling law firms. The logic of this argument is that 
because investment arbitration is highly profitable, arbitrators are more likely to interpret 
vague treaty provisions in investor-friendly ways so as to facilitate growth in the number 
of claims. The report's conclusion is that governments should 'turn away' from investment 
arbitration because the suggested reforms are inadequate: 'the system will remain skewed 
in favour of big business and the highly lucrative arbitration industry'.808 As part of the 
conclusions, the report notes how 'the world has seen the enormous social costs of 
excessive corporate control over the financial system and of short-sighted deregulation of 
capital', which has led to an increase in 'calls for reregulation and corporate 
accountability'.809 These quotes testify how the investment treaty regime is seen as a 
symptom of the wider problem where governments are bending their knees to transnational 
economic forces so as to promote further trade and investment liberalization. As noted, the 
critique relies on individual cases to prove how arbitral tribunals downplay the public 
interest or how the mere threat of investment arbitration compels governments to refrain 
from adopting legitimate public interest measures. At this stage, it is useful to provide 
some examples of the kind of cases that animate the critique.  
 
One case that is often invoked is Occidental v. Ecuador, which dealt with Ecuador's 
termination of a participation contract, the purpose of which was to allow the claimant 
investor to explore and exploit hydrocarbons in the Ecuadorian Amazon region.810 The 
case was decided with a two to one majority, with the dissenting arbitrator voicing strong 
critique against the majority's reasoning on the calculation of damages.811 The tribunal 
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awarded the claimant US$ 1.77 billion in damages, but Ecuador filed a request for 
annulment, and in October 2015 the annulment committee annulled parts of the award 'on 
the ground of manifest excess of powers' and cut the compensation by some forty 
percent,812 with the Ecuadorian president vowing to continue negotiations to further 
decrease the payment. What is noteworthy is that the tribunal acknowledged that the 
claimant's actions preceding the contract's termination had breached both Ecuador's 
national law and the terms of the participation contract, but the tribunal held that the 
termination was a disproportionate act to the scale of the claimant's breach. Another much 
discussed case used to demonstrate the potentially sky-high cost of investment arbitration 
centers on Ronald Lauder, a US billionaire who brought parallel claims under the Dutch-
Czech and US-Czech BITs for a string of regulatory decisions which had caused CME, the 
Dutch company he owned, to divest itself of a TV network. The two tribunals came to 
different conclusions on the question of damages, with the other tribunal awarding no 
damages and the other some USD$270 million (plus ten percent in interest to be paid 
retroactively for a period of three years), although the causes of action and the claimants' 
arguments were the same.813 The compensation equaled roughly the Czech Republic's 
health-care budget and 'adjusted for population size and gross national income, it was 
equivalent to an award of… $131 billion against the United States'.814  Soon after the 
Czech Republic had decided to pay the award in full, it was reported that Mr. Lauder had 
purchased a Gustav Klimt painting for USD$135 million, 'at the time the highest sum ever 
paid for a painting'.815 A third example relates to the at least dozen claims raised against 
Libya, most of which are pending and which relate to the deteriorating security situation in 
the aftermath of the collapse of the Gaddafi regime.816 In one of the arbitrations, concluded 
in 2013, the tribunal awarded the Kuwaiti claimants around USD$935 million in damages 
in relation to a resort complex the claimants had planned to build on the coast of Libya,817 
with Libya immediately challenging the award. It appears that before the claim was raised 
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the claimants had proposed that the dispute is settled if Libya agrees to pay USD$5 million 
in compensation for the claimant's losses, but Libya declined the offer.818 Over 90 percent 
of the compensation consisted of future and lost profits resulting from 'real and certain lost 
opportunities', as the English version of the award puts it,819 and one can only wonder what 
those 'real and certain lost opportunities' were in light of Libya's chaotic political situation.  
 
These cases, along many others, provide background material to the argument that BITs 
provide leverage and opportunities for large corporations and wealthy individuals to 
challenge a wide range of policy measures, which reflect public interest considerations or 
constitute a legitimate response to the claimant's action or relate to circumstances where 
the host state has drifted into a protracted political crisis or is in the middle of an armed 
conflict. Occidental v. Ecuador also juxtaposes the interests of a multinational corporation 
and a poor developing state, which carries strong echoes of colonialism and its many 
injustices. The examples also indicate that in the critics' eyes it is irrelevant to distinguish 
between investors in accordance with their 'size', as the regime grants additional privileges 
to the well-off of the global economy without imposing any obligations on them. That the 
world's Mr. Binders (referred to in Chapter 3) may suffer injustice at the hands of state 
authorities is a marginal concern because of the systemic impact that investment treaties 
and arbitration are understood to have on the distribution of wealth and power at the global 
level and on the relative weight of public and private interests in global economic 
governance. For every Mr. Binder, there is a Mr. Lauder, a billionaire who utilizes an 
investment treaty in a way that makes the human rights analogy seem ludicrous. 
 
Although the above discussion is highly impressionistic, it is tempting to side with the 
critics. The chain of association that begins from cases such as Occidental v. Ecuador 
leads easily to bleak images dominated by growing inequality, environmental degradation, 
systemic tax evasion, rogue multinationals, the interests of the top one percent, and erosion 
of faith in the democratic political process and public institutions in general. The daily 
newsfeed provides ample support to a dystopian worldview where governments collude 
with big business to make myopic policy with little consideration given to the preservation 
of the global commons. If this is the imagery with which the investment treaty regime is 
associated, reform proposals targeting the procedural aspects of investment arbitration and 
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specification of protection standards will seem entirely inadequate. This also highlights 
how differently the two sides evaluate the implications of economic globalization. If the 
proponents argue that BITs contribute to global well-being, with globalization being an 
unstoppable and largely beneficial force, the critics argue the very opposite. This basic 
difference stems in part from the way in which the proponents externalize or marginalize 
the costs of economic globalization, whereas the critics' focus is solely on the costs. What 
is remarkable is the way in which both sides are at ease in making sweeping statements 
about the import of BITs and how such statements are accompanied by equally sweeping 
narratives about the global economy. But diagnosing the forces that drive and benefit from 
economic globalization, and their potential antidotes, is an immensely complex task. The 
political and legal arrangements that support the functioning of the global economy are 
highly complex, as are the various technologies that constitute its lifeline and drive its 
evolution forward. Given this, it is tempting to focus on individual cases and default 
arguments about the normative and distributive outcomes that the investment treaty regime 
is understood as producing. I will return to this issue below. 
 
Generally speaking, as important as individual cases are for an analysis of the regime's 
costs and benefits, they are a problematic reference point for a number of reasons. First, if 
individual case outcomes are used to argue for or against the investment treaty regime, 
choosing the sample cases will shape (if not determine) the conclusions reached. Second, 
at the time of writing, 528 arbitrations have been concluded, out of which 36.6 percent 
were decided in favor of host states and 26.9 percent in favor of claimant investors, with 
23.5 percent settled and 10.6 percent discontinued.820 One could suggest that these figures 
undermine the critics' basic arguments, but this is hardly the case. It may well be that many 
of the cases that states won were based on frivolous claims that would have been dismissed 
immediately before domestic courts. On the other hand, in cases decided in favor of the 
claimant, the tribunal's reasoning may be based on a 'series of errors and defects', with the 
tribunal applying the law 'cryptically and defectively', or the tribunal's calculation of 
damages could rest on 'grossly incorrect legal bases'.821 These quotes are from the decision 
of an ICSID annulment committee and a dissenting opinion related to an ICSID arbitration, 
but only the latter 'misapplication' was rectified (partly) at the annulment stage. Clearly, 
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the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 25 September 2007, 
paras. 136 and 158; Occidental v. Ecuador, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 811, para. 1. 
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the above statistics cannot be used as a yardstick to measure the regime's gravitation 
toward one way or the other. At best, the figures provide impressionistic evidence about 
the legitimacy of the regime and should thus be met with caution. Moreover, a focus on 
case outcomes ignores the way in which tribunals have reached their conclusions as well as 
the underlying factual record, both of which are central components in case law analysis. 
 
Although case outcomes provide a less than convincing analytic base for evaluating the 
regime, I will nonetheless analyze two decisions that both the critics and proponents have 
invoked when making their respective cases. This should, again, allow a better 
understanding of the different views that the two sides have about the purposes and 
implications of the regime, as well as how these views affect the way in which they read 
individual awards (and statistics on case outcomes).  
7.2. Political Opposition in Tecmed and Occidental:  
Bad Economics, Populism or Legitimate Concerns? 
7.2.1. Tecmed 
In their study on how arbitral tribunals take account of the politics of investment disputes, 
Cotula and Schröder note how there are 
 
'tensions between the mindsets and approaches of lawyers on arbitral tribunals 
and the real world of community relations. In the latter, the politics are often 
complex and solutions can require interventions to address technical issues and 
promote public participation in contested terrains. Capacity constraints may be at 
play, and the officials delivering these interventions may not be familiar with 
legal concepts and language. This could increase the risk that public action to 
address community issues may expose states to successful arbitration 
claims…For investments that require approval from, and ongoing relations with, 
multiple government agencies at local and national levels, consistency in public 
action can prove difficult to achieve. This is particularly so in low- and middle-
income countries where capacity challenges may be more acute. Public 
authorities may not be equipped to tackle technically complex and politically 
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sensitive community dimensions in ways that would not expose them to 
arbitration claims.'822 
   
Such sensitive community dimensions were part and parcel of the Tecmed and Occidental 
arbitrations. In Tecmed, a Spanish company had purchased a hazardous waste landfill 
situated thirteen kilometers from Hermosillo, the capital of the state of Sonora.823 The 
claimant had bought the landfill through public auction in 1996. In March 1997, reports 
started to circulate how a truck driver, hired to transport waste from California to the 
landfill, had developed a burn in his leg after coming in contact with contaminated soil 
headed for the site. Local residents investigated the facility and found 'a dump of toxic 
waste lying exposed to the open air' which contained lead, cadmium, cyanide and other 
waste materials.824  As a result, they made complaints to local authorities, with the main 
concern being that the 'wastes were uncontained and exposed to the elements', which 
'posed threats to the environment, to the health and welfare of residents, and jeopardized 
the underground water supply'.825  An almost two-year campaign ensued during which the 
local residents used a variety of tactics to exert pressure on local and federal authorities, 
and in November 1998 a federal agency, the National Ecology Institute of Mexico (INE), 
rejected the claimant's application for renewal of the landfill's operating permit and ordered 
its closure without providing compensation.  
 
The investor raised a claim under the Spain-Mexico BIT and argued that the permit's 
cancellation constituted an expropriation for which no compensation was paid as well as a 
breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. Without the permit, the company was 
unable to operate the landfill 'in accordance with its sole intended purpose'.  The claimant 
argued that 'political circumstances… rather than…legal considerations' motivated the 
decision not to renew the permit, with local authorities 'encouraging' the grassroots 
opposition, which in turn influenced the INE decision.826 As to the alleged environmental 
and public health threats, the claimant noted that another federal agency (PROFEPA) had 
investigated the site to assess whether its operation complied with the relevant 
                                                
822 Lorenzo Cotula and Mika Schröder, Community Perspectives in Investor-State Arbitration (International 
Institute for Environment and Development, 2017), pages 3 and 28. 
823 Tecmed award, supra note 689. 
824 Anna Ochoa O'Leary, 'Of Information Highways and Toxic Byways: Women and Environmental Protest 
in a Northern Mexican City', MASRC Working Paper Series 30 (University of Arizona, 2002), p. 1. 
825 Tecmed award, supra note 689, para. 96. 
826 Ibid., paras. 42-43. 
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requirements, and while 'certain breaches' were identified, these did not 'endanger the 
environment or the health of the population', as the federal agency had only issued fines 
against the company and noted that 'the infringements committed…are not sufficient to 
immediately cancel, suspend or revoke the permit for carrying out hazardous material 
and/or waste management activities, nor do they have an impact on public health or 
generate an ecological imbalance' - this implied that the landfill's forced closure was a 
disproportionate act.827 Mexico's counsel noted that INE was acting within its statutory 
powers when ordering the landfill's closure, and that INE alone is authorized to renew an 
expired permit on conditions provided under federal law. Hence, that the other agency 
(PROFEPA) had only imposed fines on the claimant was materially irrelevant. Mexico 
also referred to the 'negative attitude of the community towards the landfill due to its 
location and to the negative and highly critical view taken by the community' on the 
transportation of hazardous toxic waste from other locations, which highlighted 'the 
importance of demanding strict compliance with the new operating permit granted by 
INE…on November 19, 1997'.828  More generally, Mexico argued that the refusal to renew 
the permit 'was a regulatory measure issued in compliance with the State's police power 
within the highly regulated and extremely sensitive framework of environmental protection 
and public health'.829 
 
The tribunal referred to the maxim that a state may not invoke provisions of its domestic 
law to justify a breach of its treaty obligations, but also recognized that a state's 'exercise of 
its sovereign powers within the framework of its police power may cause economic 
damage to those subject to its powers as administrator without entitling them to any 
compensation whatsoever is undisputable'.830 Similarly, regulatory measures that purport 
to benefit a local community or the society as a whole - such as the INE decision - have to 
be assessed in light of the consequences they have on the claimant's investment. In other 
words, the stated purpose of a measure alone cannot determine whether it is compatible 
with the BIT. Likewise, it was necessary to assess whether the INE decision was 
'proportional to the public interest protected…and to the protection legally granted to 
                                                
827 Ibid., paras. 43 and 100. The refusal to renew the permit was justified on four grounds, which related to 
the storing or receiving of unauthorized substances at the landfill, but the claimant referred e.g. to the 
statement quoted as well as to the fact that it had reported to INE of some of the four grounds without the 
latter making no 'objection or reservation'. See paras. 100-102. 
828 Ibid., paras. 49-50. 
829 Ibid., para. 97. 
830 Ibid., paras. 119-120. 
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investments, taking into account that the significance of such impact has a key role upon 
deciding the proportionality'.831 The tribunal understood that the breaches for which the 
claimant was previously fined also constituted the ground for the INE decision, as the same 
breaches, by and large, were referred to as reasons for the decision. When imposing the 
fines, PROFEPA had noted that 'the inspections conducted by this Office to the 
landfill…have not shown any indication that risks for the population's health or the 
environment might exist'.832 Similarly, the INE decision's text provided no support to the 
argument that the claimant's breaches had threatened public health or impaired 'ecological 
balance'.833  Other statements made by Mexican authorities supported this view. For 
example, Mexico's environmental ministry had noted just two months before the INE 
decision that the claimant 'handles hazardous waste in strict compliance with the law, that 
the last stage of the landfill has the maximum safety conditions required, which provide the 
necessary grounds to authorize the relevant operations'.834   
 
For the tribunal, a central reason for the community opposition stemmed from a Mexican 
law requiring that landfills are located at least twenty-five kilometers from residential 
areas. However, as this law had entered into force after the claimant had obtained and 
started to operate the landfill, the law could not be applied retroactively to the claimant's 
site. But the community opposition had led the claimant to agree on relocating the landfill's 
operations (mostly at its own cost) to another site which would comply with the twenty-
five-kilometer rule. In June 1998, during the negotiations concerning the relocation, the 
federal, state and local authorities issued a joint statement which provided that while the 
investigations at the landfill had not provided 'evidence of any risk to health and the 
ecosystems', the relocation was necessary to 'secure environmental safety in view of the 
rapid urban growth of Hermosillo, provide a response to the concerns that had been 
expressed and guarantee, in the long term, the environmental infrastructure to handle and 
dispose of industrial waste'.835 The view that the landfill's location was the main source of 
concern among the opposition movement was supported by a number of additional 
statements made by Mexican authorities. During the proceedings Mexico's counsel argued 
that the 'problem was not a problem with a company or with an investor, but with a 
                                                
831 Ibid., para. 122. 
832 Ibid., para. 124. 
833 Idem. 
834 Idem. 
835 Ibid., para. 110. 
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specific site'.836 Similarly, the head of INE noted that the landfill's unresolved relocation 
was one of the reasons for denying the renewal of the permit, with the relocation being 
closely related to the socially and politically 'tense circumstances surrounding' the landfill's 
operation.837 This led to the conclusion that although the INE decision made no reference 
to the local opposition, it 'was [nonetheless] mainly driven by [such] socio-political 
factors'.838   
 
The tribunal then addressed the question whether these socio-political factors amounted to 
a 'serious emergency situation, social crisis or public unrest'. The gravity of such factors 
was relevant to the tribunal's analysis of whether the INE decision was a proportionate 
measure.839 The tribunal noted that the grassroots opposition against the landfill had begun 
almost three years before the INE decision, but none of the complaints made by local 
groups had led to the cancellation of the claimant's permit. As noted, in the tribunal's view, 
the local opposition was 'mainly based…on the site's proximity to Hermosillo's urban 
center and on the circumstance…that the landfill's location' breached the twenty-five 
kilometer rule.840 As to the intensity of the community opposition, the tribunal 
characterized it as not being 'massive' in any way and as not going 'further than the 
positions assumed by some individuals or the members of some groups' opposing the 
landfill.841 The public protests against the landfill 'could gather on two occasions a crowd 
of only two hundred people the first time and of four hundred people the second time out 
of a community with a population of almost one million inhabitants'.842 This meant that the 
local opposition did 'not constitute a real crisis or disaster of great proportions, triggered by 
acts or omissions committed by the foreign investor or its affiliates'.843 In sum, the tribunal 
understood that the real problem was the location of the landfill and not the manner in 
which the claimant was operating it, which was 'confirmed by the fact that the Mexican 
federal, state and municipal authorities, including INE, did not hesitate to entrust' the 
claimant 'with the construction and operation of a new hazardous waste landfill located 
                                                
836 Ibid., paras. 125-126. 
837 Ibid., para. 131. 
838 Ibid., paras. 129-130. 
839 Ibid., para. 133. 
840 Ibid., paras. 140-141. 




outside Hermosillo, with characteristics, activities and a scope apparently wider and more 
ambitious than the operation' at the contested site.844 
 
In the end, the tribunal held that the INE decision amounted to an expropriation and also 
violated the Mexico-Spain BIT's FET standard, with Mexico ordered to pay around 5.5 
million dollars plus interest in damages to the claimant. The critics of investment 
arbitration have not been impressed with the tribunal's reasoning. Schneiderman reads the 
award as indicating that the tribunal separated the public health concerns from the 'socio-
political motivations' behind the INE decision, which allowed it to 'shield itself from 
accusations that it had thwarted legitimate environmental or public-health regulation [i.e. 
the INE decision]'.845 This argument assumes that the refusal to renew the permit was 
based on public health concerns instead of the political opposition, and while the factual 
record in Tecmed is less than straightforward, Schneiderman takes no issue with the 
tribunal's reading of the facts. Odumosu, in turn, sees that the tribunal's decision implies 
that even if government action 'is beneficial to the society as a whole', it is not excluded 
from the scope of a BIT if it has 'negative economic impacts on the financial position of 
the investor'.846 In his view, the tribunal paid lip service to the public interest by analyzing 
the intensity of the local opposition, but ultimately 'downplayed the significance of 
peoples' voices…foregrounded the political nature of the protests, and interpreted…[the 
INE decision] as a response to political circumstances', rather than seeing it as a legitimate 
public health measure.847 Framing the dispute as only pitting the community interest 
against the investor's economic interest already implies that the tribunal got it wrong, and 
assumes either that the INE decision was motivated by overriding public health 
considerations instead of political pressure and that the tribunal should have in any case 
deferred to the political opposition. However, while Tecmed's factual record is open to 
interpretation, it is clear that the tribunal was acting within its jurisdiction when 
characterizing the opposition as marginal and as being based on fears and hearsay rather 
than on legitimate public health concerns. In this light, I understand the criticisms to stem 
more from the ability of the tribunal to second-guess the motives of Mexican authorities, 
and less from the quality of its reasoning. That domestic policy-making is prone to respond 
                                                
844 Ibid., para. 145. 
845 David Schneiderman, 'Investing in Democracy? Political Process and International Investment Law', 60 
University of Toronto Law Journal (2010), pp. 909-940, at 917. 
846 Ibironke T. Odumosu, 'The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in Investment Dispute Settlement', 
26 Penn State International Law Review (2007), pp. 251-287, at 278. 
847 Ibid., p. 279. 
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to 'populist' concerns on occasion is to be expected, and arbitral tribunals will necessarily 
approach such concerns differently than domestic institutions. 
 
A number of commentators have also taken issue with the Tecmed tribunal's dictum on the 
FET standard. In the official English translation (translated from Spanish), the relevant part 
of the award held that the standard, 
 
'requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments 
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account 
by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the 
host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know 
beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as 
well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or 
directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. 
Any and all State actions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to 
the guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions approved 
thereunder, but also to the goals underlying such regulations.'848 
 
Roberts refers to this passage to make the argument that when 'defining the requirements 
for certain standards, such as fair and equitable treatment, some tribunals have adopted 
idealized standards of perfect governmental conduct and regulation divorced from any real 
consideration of state practice'.849 Similarly, Douglas notes that the 'Tecmed "standard" is 
actually not a standard at all; it is rather a description of perfect public regulation in a 
perfect world, to which all states should aspire but very few (if any) will ever attain'.850 
These readings carry two problems. First, it is easy to refer to individual paragraphs of 
awards to make arguments about interpretative overreach, although the tribunals' reasoning 
in other paragraphs may qualify those interpretations, and although the tribunals' findings 
on the merits are not necessarily based on such 'idealized standards'. When reading the 
Tecmed tribunal's analysis of whether Mexico had also breached the FET standard, for 
example, it becomes clear that the tribunal was not applying such fantasy standard, but 
                                                
848 Tecmed award, supra note 689, para. 154. 
849 Roberts, 'Power and Persuasion' , supra note 786, p. 223. 
850 Zachary Douglas, 'Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and 
Methanex', 22 Arbitration International (2006), pp. 27-52, at 28. 
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assessed Mexico's actions on the basis of its construction of the factual record as outlined 
above. The Tecmed award was first written in Spanish and only later translated into 
English. However, as Kessler notes, the above English translation 'is actually a very poor - 
even grossly distorted - translation of the original Spanish version'.851 The demands of 
'total transparency' and 'free of ambiguity', for example, were inventions of the translator 
and it is somewhat embarrassing that the incorrect translation has been used as an example 
of interpretative overreach by arbitral tribunals.  
 
In sum, one can disagree with the tribunal's framing of the factual record as well as with its 
approach on the nature of the local opposition and the implications this had on the 
outcome. But it is difficult to agree with the contention that the INE decision was 
motivated by overriding public health concerns, given the repeated statements to the 
contrary. One can also question the economic and environmental wisdom of the INE 
decision. As the Tecmed award notes, Mexico was in urgent need of hazardous waste 
services,852 and, apparently, the claimant operated a much larger landfill in another 
location. One can also argue over the amount of compensation the investor received, but 
the general principle that measures tantamount to expropriation should be compensated is 
difficult to dispute. Host state reactions to domestic political pressure will of course vary 
from one case to the next, and analyzing the question whether tribunals should defer to 
such pressure when assessing a state's attendant policy measure should depend on the 
factual record rather than on a principled position, unless the point is to make an argument 
against the idea of investment arbitration. Brower and Blanchard note that the refusal to 
renew the claimant's permit 'was refused on a pre-textual basis discordant with Mexican 
administrative law and without due process'.853 This sounds somewhat categorical, but its 
tone is similar to the above criticisms of the award, with both sides providing one-sided 
representations of the political sensitivities.  
                                                
851 Kessler, 'An Arbitrator's Perspective', supra note 723, p. 300. The Spanish version of the quoted passage 
reads as follows: 'El Tribunal Arbitral considera que esta disposición del Acuerdo, a la luz de los imperativos 
de buena fé requeridos por el derecho interncional, exige de las Partes Contratantes del Acuerdo brindar un 
tratamiento a la inversión extranjera que no desvirtúe las expectativas básicas en razón de las cuales el 
inversor extranjero decidió realizar su inversión. Como parte de tales expectativas, aquél cuenta con que el 
Estado receptor de la inversión se conducirá de manera coherente, desprovista de ambigüedades y 
transparente en sus relaciones con el inversor extranjero, de manera que éste pueda conocer de manera 
anticipada, para planificar sus actividades y ajustar su conducta, no sólo las normas o reglamentaciones que 
regirán tales actividades, sino también las políticas perseguidas por tal normativa y las prácticas o directivas 
administrativas que les son relevantes.' 
852 Tecmed award, supra note 689, para. 147. 
853 Brower and Blanchard, 'The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration', supra note 19, pp. 739-740. 
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The critics strive to point out how arbitral tribunals place too much emphasis on investor 
interests, as if an objective standard exists against which tribunals should carry out the 
balancing act. This suggests, again, that they should openly acknowledge that the real 
problem is the ability of arbitral tribunals to review policy measures in the first place, 
rather than how such review is carried out in individual cases. The purpose of investment 
protection rules is investment protection and no amount of treaty reform can compel 
arbitral tribunals to defer to domestic policy in a way that would appease the critics. This is 
of course what the proponents are arguing - that the idea of investment arbitration is to 
provide a neutral analysis of the factual record in light of international protection standards 
that pay due consideration to the interests of foreign investors. Again, this is a political 
disagreement about the propriety of investment treaties and arbitration, rather than a 
technical disagreement about the proper balance of private and public interests in 
individual investment disputes.  
 
To return to Tecmed, one can empathize with the position of the INE staff. Caught between 
grassroots opposition and the claimant's request for new site, the INE decision strove to 
speed up the relocation and attenuate the local opposition, but the award suggests that, for 
some reason, the relocation had not moved forward in the following 15 months.854 The 
claim was raised in July 2000, which implies that the Mexican federal and local authorities 
had probably no knowledge about the Mexico-Spain BIT, let alone about its potential 
fiscal implications, as the first investment claim against Mexico was raised only in 1997. 
Generally speaking, the proponents could use Tecmed as an example of how investment 
arbitration provides incentives for host states to improve their decision-making processes 
as well as to give due consideration to the interests of foreign investors vis-à-vis the 
interests of domestic interest groups. For the critics, Tecmed demonstrates how arbitral 
tribunals are prone to downplay the wisdom of the relevant public interest, as they focus on 
the economic impact of the challenged measure. Tecmed could also be invoked to point out 
how an unsuspecting developing country is disciplined for a decision that could just as 
well have been taken by an agency in a developed country. After all, bureaucracies 
overseeing projects that involve sensitive public health and environmental concerns often 
have to take decisions that go against the interests of some stakeholders and that are based 
on contested evidence. I will return to this idea in the following pages.  
                                                
854 Tecmed award, supra note 689, para. 143. 
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7.2.2. Occidental 
The Occidental v. Ecuador award was already discussed shortly above. The monumental 
compensation that the tribunal awarded has diverted attention away from the dispute's 
factual record and the tribunal's reasoning. The award extends to over three hundred pages 
and the dissenting arbitrator described the case as being 'a very complex case to which the 
three members of the tribunal have been extremely devoted during many years'.855 Clearly, 
understanding these complexities would appear to be central to appreciating the tribunal's 
conclusions as well as the dissenting arbitrator's concerns with the majority's calculation of 
damages. These complexities also suggest that focusing only on one aspect of the award is 
bound to create an incomplete picture and may distort the conclusions reached. To give an 
example, Sornarajah criticizes the Occidental v. Ecuador award on the ground that the 
tribunal used a proportionality test to determine whether the challenged action breached the 
FET standard. He argues that there was 'no justification in the text of' the relevant BIT 'to 
use such a test', neither were there grounds to hold that proportionality 'constitutes a 
general principle of law', and the 'proportionality test calls for the making of highly 
subjective value judgments', which is one of the reasons why its use is limited in many 
'European systems'.856 While these points may have some general merit, Sornarajah takes 
no issue with the factual record of Occidental v. Ecuador nor appears to recognize that the 
disputing parties had agreed that the principle of proportionality is part of the applicable 
law.  
 
When reading the award, it seems plausible to assume that Ecuador's termination of the 
participation contract, which the claimant challenged, was at least partly motivated by 
another arbitration (concerning value added tax refunds) where Ecuador was ordered to 
pay roughly $US 70 million in compensation to Occidental.857 As the tribunal put it, the 
'VAT award had created anger and disappointment in Ecuadorian political circles'.858  
The liberalization of Ecuador's oil sector had been a contentious affair from the scratch. 
'Anti-neo-liberal activists' had contributed to the removal from office of two governments 
by 2005 and Occidental's operations had been criticized repeatedly by indigenous and 
                                                
855 Occidental v. Ecuador, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 811, para. 1. 
856 Sornarajah, Resistance and Change, supra note 23, pp. 377-378, 380-381. 
857 See Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. 
UN3467, Award, 1 July 2004. 
858 Occidental award, supra note 810, para. 442. 
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environmental groups.859 These political divisions between indigenous peoples and 
Ecuador's economic and political elite reflect broader conflicts plaguing the Ecuadorian 
society, which one commentator described as being 'characterized by deep racism, 
widespread poverty, extreme inequality, and discrimination against indigenous peoples and 
the poor', alongside 'pervasive corruption and a discredited judiciary and political class'.860  
 
In case of Occidental, the indigenous and environmental groups were demanding 'a larger 
share in the benefits [of oil production] and the adoption of more sustainable 
environmental practices'.861 As a result of the protests, members of Ecuador's congress 
called for the impeachment of the Minister of Energy and Mines unless he terminates the 
contract. Soon after Ecuador acted accordingly and justified the termination on the ground 
that the claimant had failed to seek prior approval for a transfer of certain rights to another 
company that had operations in Ecuador. Quite interestingly, however, during the 
proceedings Ecuador's former Minister of Energy and Mines argued that the transfer was 'a 
good idea since it was beneficial to the country',862 and the company to which the rights 
were transferred was an 'approved operator in Ecuador', which 'continued to receive further 
approvals in relation to other projects/fields' after signing the contested agreement with 
Occidental.863 The broader political context of Occidental's operations in Ecuador is not 
discussed in the tribunal's award. As noted, the track record of crude oil production in 
Ecuador is rather depressing, with Texaco's early operations in the 1970s embodying the 
destruction that oil production can bring in the absence of regulatory oversight.864 As to 
Occidental, writing in 2001, Kimerling noted that 'despite a clear trend on paper towards 
increasingly detailed - albeit incomplete - environmental requirements, implementation, 
oversight and compliance remain poor', and 'Occidental has negotiated a legal framework 
with the government that, for the most part, seems designed to perpetuate and even legalize 
the exclusive reliance on corporate environmental self-regulation'.865 The Occidental award 
                                                
859 Julia Kalvert, 'Civil Society and Investor-state Dispute Settlement: Assessing the Social Dimensions of 
Investment Disputes in Latin America', 22 New Political Economy (2017), pp. 1-20, at 7. 
860 Judith Kimerling, 'International Standards in Ecuador's Amaxon Oil Fields: The Privatization of 
Environmental Law', 26 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law (2001), pp. 289-397, at 304-306. A more 
general account is found in John Martz, Politics and Petroleum in Ecuador (Routledge, 1987). 
861 Kalvert, 'Civil Society and Investor–state Dispute Settlement, supra note 859, at 9.  
862 Occidental award, supra note 810, para. 444. 
863 Ibid., para. 445. 
864 The relevant events are found in Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Third Interim 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 27 February 2012. 
865 Kimerling, 'International Standards in Ecuador', supra note 860, pp. 313 and 392. 
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contains a single generic reference to 'protection of the environment' in the context where 
the tribunal is listing the claimant's obligations under the participation contract.866 
 
Sornarajah's discussion of the Occidental award is limited to the proportionality principle. 
He argues that the tribunal 'was hunting fruitlessly for a peg on which to hang the 
proportionality rule, which it had decided to use',867 but, as noted, both Ecuador and 
Occidental had agreed that the rule is part of the applicable law, with Ecuador arguing that 
the termination satisfied the applicable test.868 One can of course disagree with the 
tribunal's interpretation and application of the principle, and even more so with the sky-
high compensation, but what makes the award interesting (or problematic) is the exclusion 
of the political context, apart from few incidental references. In one way, the tribunal's 
reasoning is representative of the argument that tribunals set an international benchmark 
for what is reasonably acceptable government conduct in a market economy. The tribunal 
could not take a stand on the environmental concerns associated with Occidental's 
operations, because Ecuador did not raise them. Had those concerns been raised, it is 
doubtful if they would have influenced the tribunal's analysis. The case centered on the 
question whether the termination of the participation contract breached the US-Ecuador 
BIT, and the broader societal implications of oil production are by and large extraneous to 
answering such question. That 'pervasive corruption' plagues Ecuador, with successive 
governments being disinterested or incapacitated to exercise any effective regulatory 
oversight in respect of ongoing oil operations, is clearly not a problem that arbitral 
tribunals can address. It is also noteworthy that although Ecuador denounced the ICSID 
Convention and terminated a number of investment treaties, the US-Ecuador BIT remains 
in force. An Ecuadorian state official reasoned that 'the BIT is a necessary legal 
intervention that helps to attract and retain foreign capital despite the risk of future investor 
claims'.869  
 
Another observation is that Article 47 of the ICSID Convention allows the respondent state 
to raise a counterclaim 'arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute'. Ecuador 
                                                
866 Occidental award, supra note 810, para. 116 (simply noting that the claimant 'had various other 
obligations under the Participation Contract, including payment of all Ecuadorian taxes and duties; periodic 
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867 Sornarajah, Resistance and Change, supra note 23, p. 378. 
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869 Kalvert, 'Civil Society and Investor–state Dispute Settlement', supra note 859, p. 10 (based on an 
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has raised counterclaims in two other cases on the ground of environmental harm caused 
by the claimant,870 but did not do so in Occidental as its defense focused solely on the 
legality of the termination of the participation contract. It is easy to criticize the Occidental 
tribunal for excessively disciplining Ecuador, but such critique misunderstands the 
tribunal's mandate in the circumstances of the case, and one can again ask whether 
electoral pressure alone can ever constitute a rational and legitimate policy motive in the 
eyes of arbitral tribunals. As noted, Ecuadorian activist groups 'did not object to oil 
exploitation' as such, but sought to receive some of the attendant benefits and compel the 
government to enforce more efficiently the relevant environmental laws and regulations.871 
Ecuador's crude oil production fluctuates, but is on a much higher level than in the early 
2000s.872 The left-wing party that seized power in 2007 in the wake of widespread protests 
quickly increased social welfare spending which appears to have reduced Ecuador's 
poverty rates, even considerably.873 Since global oil prices have remained at a much lower 
level in the past few years, it remains to be seen whether or not the incumbent president, 
Lenín Moreno, is able to continue the 'socialist revolution' of the past decade. For those on 
the political left, Occidental may represent a form of neocolonialism whose only upside 
was the rising into power of a leftist government. However, without downplaying the 
environmental harm that Occidental's operations caused in Ecuador, the arbitration could 
be framed in another way.  
 
Large-scale projects in the extractive industries sector create different type of social costs 
in developed countries as well. A good example is provided by the Talvivaara mining-
project in Finland. In 2012, the mine's waste reservoirs leaked into the environment, which 
acidified the neighboring lakes and led to a rise in toxic metal levels. The capacity of the 
reservoirs was inadequate to cope with the volume of waste water which led to additional 
releases of contaminated water. The mining company recovered nickel through a method 
known as bioleaching, which had previously been used to recover other metals from ores. 
Many of the environmental problems stemmed from the unforeseen consequences of 
bioleaching which were not considered at the time the company received the permit to start 
                                                
870 These are Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Ecuador's Counterclaims, 7 February 2016; Perenco Ecuador Ltd v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/6, Interim Decision on the Environmental Counterclaim, 11 August 2015. 
871 Kalvert, 'Civil Society and Investor–state Dispute Settlement', supra note 859, p. 9.  
872 See at https://tradingeconomics.com/ecuador/crude-oil-production (accessed 23 August 2017). 
873 See Mark Weisbrot, Jake Johnston and Lara Merling, Decade of Reform: Ecuador's Macroeconomic 
Policies, Institutional Changes and Results (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2017).  
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operating the mine. The Talvivaara company went bankrupt in 2014 (also because of 
world market prices), with some 80 000 minority shareholders losing their investment. 
There were some reports that the minority shareholders planned to bring claims against the 
Finnish government on the ground that the bankruptcy was caused by the decisions of 
Finnish authorities, with one reporter hinting that some foreign shareholders were 
contemplating of bringing a claim under the Energy Charter Treaty. The Finnish 
Government became the majority shareholder of the company that continued operating the 
mine, and at the end of 2016 it was estimated that the government had spent around €700 
million at various stages to support the continuation of the mine's operations, although they 
continue to adversely affect the ecological balance of the adjacent environment. The point 
of this story is that large-scale investment projects come with various types of risks, and if 
such risks materialize, the question is who bears responsibility for the costs. Whether 
Talvivaara has brought any benefits to the Finnish economy is an open question, but the 
general population in Finland is largely disinterested in the attendant economic and 
environmental costs, although the mine's operation continues to cause direct harm to local 
residents and the environment.  
 
In this light, Occidental should not be described simplistically as juxtaposing the interests 
of a poor developing country and a US oil giant. Rather, it is a standard example of the 
various costs that economic development brings about the world over. It is also reflective 
of how the functioning of the global economy depends on large-scale resource extraction 
and of the burden it places on the environment. Ecuador's termination of the participation 
contract was, arguably, a symbolistic move which created the impression that the 
government was defending the sovereignty and self-determination of its 'people'. The 
generous social welfare programs that followed the change of government also testify that 
crude oil production in the Ecuadorian Amazon region has brought tangible benefits to 
large segments of Ecuador's population, whatever its environmental and social costs may 
be. This is the paradox at the heart of the critique of the investment treaty regime. Crude 
oil production continues in Ecuador, with a large number of foreign companies having 
operations therein, but whether the government exercises any oversight of the operations is 
a question that is of no concern to those discussing the (lack of) legitimacy of the 
investment treaty regime. Seizing the moral high ground by referring to cases such as 
Occidental is tempting, but such move may strike as inconsequential and hypocritical. 
Inconsequential because Ecuador's leftist government has already reformed the country's 
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investment policy without protesters demanding that the US-Ecuador BIT is also 
terminated, and hypocritical because the way in which the costs and benefits of Ecuador's 
crude oil production are allocated will not depend on policy debates concerning the 
investment treaty regime but on the energies and resources of the indigenous and 
environmental groups living and operating in Ecuador. The critics could argue that 
Ecuador's termination of a number of BITs has provided policy space for its government to 
regulate and oversee oil production, but it is entirely unclear whether the government does 
so. It is also problematic to assume that investment treaties would have prevented Ecuador 
from exercising effective oversight previously. Investment treaties do not prevent the 
adoption and enforcement of environmental laws whose purpose is to contain or prevent 
the harm that large-scale resource extraction brings about. The proponents, in turn, could 
argue that Occidental supports the broad argument that arbitral tribunals provide a neutral 
venue for the resolution of investment disputes where the populist pressures that 
governments face are not allowed to replace a rational, fact-based analysis of the 
underlying events.  
7.3. Sornarajah's Account 
At this juncture, it is useful to remember that arbitration clauses became a standard part of 
BITs from the middle of the 1980s onward. Alvarez has argued that the 1984 United States 
model BIT was central to the later investment arbitration boom as its core provisions were 
included in most BITs concluded in the following twenty years. These included a broad 
definition of what constitutes an investment; the umbrella clause; guarantees of most-
favored nation, national, and fair and equitable treatment; a further injunction against 
arbitrary and discriminatory measures; a right to 'prompt, adequate, and effective' 
compensation in the event of direct and indirect expropriation; and, finally, the United 
States model treaty included an arbitration clause, although its text remained somewhat 
vague in comparison to later clauses. According to Alvarez, the US model treaty 
'revolutionized' the field and was 'instrumental in enabling the wave of investor-state 
arbitral disputes many years later'.874 Before the first investor-state claim was raised in 
                                                
874 Jose E. Alvarez, 'The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime', in Mahnoush H. Arsasnjani, Jacob 
Katz Cogan, Robert D. Sloane and Siegfried Wiessner (eds.), Looking to the Future: Essays on International 
Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), pp. 607-648, at 616. The text of 
the 1984 US Model BIT is available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_066871.pdf 
(accessed 12 May 2017). 
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1987, it was entirely unclear how the core BIT provisions should be interpreted. To give an 
example, one question was whether the arbitration clause, as such, should be understood as 
constituting the host state's standing expression of consent to submit disputes to arbitration, 
or whether the host state should give its consent to arbitration each time an investor 
invokes a BIT's arbitration clause. A basic principle of arbitration is that tribunals receive 
their jurisdiction from the consent of the disputing parties, but it was uncertain how this 
principle should be interpreted in the context of BITs. In the very first investment 
arbitration award, rendered in 1990 under the ICSID Convention, the tribunal held that the 
UK-Sri Lanka BIT's arbitration clause constituted a standing offer for investors to bring 
claims against the host state, with no additional expression of consent required from the 
latter. Sri Lanka did not raise the issue at the proceedings, and the AAPL v. Sri Lanka 
tribunal's approach has transformed into an uncontested dictum, although in 1990 'this 
[approach] was far from evident and remained unprecedented'.875 Lowenfeld, who was 
closely involved in the drafting of the ICSID Convention, notes that 'the possibility that a 
host state in a bilateral treaty could give its consent to arbitrate with investors from the 
other state without reference to a particular investment agreement or dispute' was not even 
addressed during the drafting process.876 
 
Sornarajah argues that AAPL v. Sri Lanka constituted the 'original sin' of investment 
arbitration, which paved the way for later expansions 'of the bases of jurisdiction' that go 
'well beyond what was originally intended by the parties to investment treaties'.877 In 
Sornarajah's account, the central cases in this respect have been Maffezini where the scope 
of the most-favored-nation obligation was extended to cover arbitration clauses in the host 
state's other BITs,878 Tokios Tokeles where Ukrainian nationals were considered as 
Lithuanian investors for the purposes of the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT,879 and Abaclat v. 
Argentina, the 'acme of aberrations' in Sornarajah's view, where the acquisition of 
Argentina's junk bonds through a foreign secondary market constituted an investment for 
the purposes of the relevant BIT, and where the number of claimants stood at 60 000, 
                                                
875 Joost Pauwelyn, 'Rational Design or Accidental Evolution? The Emergence of International Investment 
Law', in Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn and Jorge E. Viñuales (eds.), The Foundations of International 
Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 11-44, at 31. 
876 Andreas W. Lowenfeld, 'The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation', 38 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (2009), pp. 47-61, at 55. 
877 Sornarajah, Resistance and Change, supra note 23, pp. 136 and 138. 
878 Maffezini award, supra note 162. 
879 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004. 
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raising the prospect of future mass claims.880 Sornarajah also argues that the interpretations 
that tribunals have made of standard expropriation and fair and equitable treatment 
provisions reflect a similar type of expansionary trend. As to the former, he argues that as a 
result of the interpretations that tribunals made of expropriation provisions, states started to 
introduce restrictions and limitations in more recent BITs, which 'restricted the scope of 
expropriation' and reduced its significance as a ground of investor claims.881As a 
consequence, 'once the door of expropriation began closing', the 'viability' of investment 
arbitration required opening 'another door through the awakening of the, hitherto dormant, 
fair and equitable standard'.882 In other words, the FET standard served the purpose of 
holding states accountable for measures not otherwise caught by BITs, with the 
introduction of the doctrine of 'legitimate expectations', the 'most glaring example of 
expansionary activism', being central in this respect.883  
 
For Sornarajah, the central reason for the 'expansionary activism' that started with the 
AAPL v. Sri Lanka award was the 'institutional context' of investment arbitration, which 
favored 'inclination towards solutions geared to neoliberal norms that induced the course of 
decisions towards solutions acceptable to foreign business'.884 With 'institutional context', 
he refers not only to the institutions that administer investment arbitrations,885 but to the 
'global acceptance' of trade and investment liberalization as a recipe for economic growth, 
which took root from the early 1990s onward and facilitated the 'establishment of a 
neoliberal system of investment protection'.886 Sornarajah recognizes that in many cases 
arbitrators have dismissed investor claims and notes that the 'expansionary activism' of 
tribunals has been met with broad resistance, also within the investment arbitration 
community,887 but these counterforces may not necessarily succeed in bringing about 'the 
retreat of neoliberalism…because of its adaptive capacity and its ability to morph into 
                                                
880 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 4 August 2011; Sornarajah, Resistance and Change, supra note 23, p. 168. Sornarajah also 
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Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award, 31 October 2012. 
881 Sornarajah, supra note 23, p. 74 (Chapter 4 of the book deals with expropriation). 
882 Idem. 
883 Ibid., p. 248 (Chapter 5 of the book deals with the FET standard). 
884 Ibid., p. 389. 
885 Such as ICSID, which is one of the organizations of the World Bank Group and administers the highest 
number of investment arbitrations. 
886 Sornarajah, Resistance and Change, supra note 23, pp. 137-138. 
887 For example, Sornarajah refers to arbitrators who enhance the 'norms of power' and those who defend the 
'norms of justice'. Ibid., p. 28. 
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different forms when faced with criticism'.888 Hence, Sornarajah suggests that the only way 
in which states can resist neoliberalism as it expresses itself in arbitral practice is by 
denouncing their existing treaties: 'Wiping the slate clean seems to be the only possible 
way forward'.889  
 
If one looks at Sornarajah's argument from the proponents' perspective, it is unlikely to 
make much sense. In their view, arbitral tribunals are called upon to determine the balance 
of public and private interests in light of international investment protection standards. 
This basic mandate extends to all domestic policy across the three branches of government, 
and while one can debate about the soundness of individual decisions, the basic orientation 
of the regime reflects the will of the participatory states, as also corroborated by their 
modest reactions to the critique and hitherto case law. As to the 'expansive' interpretations 
of arbitral tribunals, they reflect how most investment treaties emphasize solely the 
investment protection function without making references to public regulatory functions, 
with tribunals correctly emphasizing the former in accordance with the applicable law. The 
regime is also capable of self-correction as other tribunals have taken a different approach 
than the tribunals on which Sornarajah relies when developing his argument. For example, 
unlike the Maffezini tribunal, the Plama tribunal held that the claimant investor could not 
rely on more favorable arbitration clauses found in the host state's other BITs because the 
contracting states clearly had no intention to allow this when concluding the relevant 
BIT.890 Moreover, the claim that arbitral tribunals only emphasize and protect investor 
interests to the exclusion of public interests is simply misleading in light of existing case 
law. The claims by Philip Morris against Australia and Uruguay concerning plain 
packaging of tobacco products are a case in point. Philip Morris Asia (domicile in Hong 
Kong) had acquired its Australian subsidiaries at a time when it was reasonably clear that 
the Australian government was going to adopt plain packaging measures requiring the 
removal of all brand insignia from tobacco products. The tribunal concluded that the 
initiation of the arbitration constituted 'an abuse of rights', as the acquisition of the 
Australian subsidiaries 'was carried out for the principal, if not sole, purpose of 
gaining…protection' under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT, and the tribunal held that the 
                                                
888 Ibid., p. 67. 
889 Ibid., p. 408. 
890 See Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 
February 2005, paras. 183-227. 
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claimant's claims were inadmissible.891 Similarly, in Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the tribunal 
noted that the 'responsibility for public health measures rests with the government and 
investment tribunals should pay great deference to governmental judgments of national 
needs in matters such as the protection of public health'.892 The tribunal dismissed the 
claimant's claims and ordered the claimant to bear Uruguay's legal costs as well as the 
costs of the arbitration.  
 
This testifies to the difficulties in using individual cases to make a broad argument about 
the purposes and implications of the regime. There are always cases that point to a 
different conclusion, and most arbitral awards are based on contested and fact-intensive 
circumstances that are open to varied interpretations. Perhaps Sornarajah's argument 
should be seen as a political intervention in investment law debates, the purpose of which 
is to point to the ambiguities of economic globalization and to raise discussion about the 
proper allocation of jurisdiction between domestic and international institutions and about 
the attendant model of state-market relations. Generally speaking, Sornarajah's assumption 
that 'wiping the slate clean' would promote 'notions of fairness and global justice' and bring 
about a law 'that takes human needs into account rather than caters for the human greed of 
a few' is understandable,893 but whether states would be more free and willing to protect, 
for example, the environment if the investment treaty regime were removed from the 
policy equation is an unsubstantiated hypothesis. This brings us to the regulatory chill 
argument, which is less ideological than Sornarajah's account, but similarly concerned 
about the impact that investment treaties have on domestic policy-making. An interesting 
fact is that New Zealand postponed the application of its plain packaging legislation until 
the Philip Morris v. Australia tribunal had dismissed the claimant's claims. This isolated 




                                                
891 See Philip Morris Asia Limited v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 17 December 2015, para. 588. 
892 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 8 July 2016, para. 399. 
893 Ibid., p. 76. 
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7.4. Regulatory Chill 
The above discussion showed that there is very little empirical research on the question 
whether legislators, policy-makers and state officials have knowledge about the investment 
treaty obligations to which their home states have committed. The regulatory chill 
argument assumes that state authorities know and understand the content of such 
obligations when they contemplate whether to adopt specific policy proposals. Some 
commentators have argued that this means that public officials, at all levels of government, 
'will take account of the possibility of a reaction on the part of a foreign investor' if a 
relevant BIT exists, and in this way 'investor interests will be internalized in the process of 
public decision-making'.894 In other words, the mere existence of BITs will discourage 
states from adopting or enforcing good faith 'regulatory measures because of a perceived or 
actual threat of investment arbitration'.895 Such impact is commonly known as 'regulatory 
chill' and the quotes suggest that it can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to 'a 
broad phenomenon whereby regulatory progress is dampened across all areas that impact 
foreign investors because government officials are aware of, and seriously concerned 
about, the risk of an investor-state dispute arising, and, second, as referring to 'the chilling 
of specific regulatory measures that have been proposed or adopted by governments'.896 As 
Tienhaara recognizes, the first type of regulatory chill 'would be quite difficult to measure' 
without 'detailed surveys or in-depth interviews with regulators',897 whereas the latter type 
of regulatory chill is much narrower and relates to situations where a state entity has 
specific knowledge about a claim that an investor aims to raise against a regulatory 
measure that he opposes. 
 
The regulatory chill debate is not limited to the investment treaty regime. Already in the 
1990s many political scientists asked whether 'countries might fail to raise environmental 
                                                
894 Martti Koskenniemi, 'It's not the Cases, It's the System', 18 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2017), 
pp. 343-353, at 351-352. 
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methodological questions that the narrower type of regulatory chill raises.  
897 Idem. 
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standards for fear of capital flight'.898 Interest groups were arguing that raising 
environmental standards weakens the competitiveness of domestic industries vis-à-vis 
economies with less stringent standards, whereas in the present context the concern relates 
to potential reactions by foreign investors. Similarly, and as will be discussed below, the 
debates in the early 2000s on the legitimacy of the WTO focused on the constraints that the 
world trade regime placed on the 'decisional capacities' of its member states,899 with the 
WTO bodies suddenly reviewing measures which had previously fallen 'within the 
universe of domestic economic regulation'.900 One specific concern was that national 
environmental protection laws were increasingly 'challenged as unfair trade barriers',901 
just as a high number of investor claims now challenge environmental laws and 
regulations.902 This suggests, again, that the regulatory chill debate, and the critique of the 
investment treaty regime in general, stem from the same tradition as the previous waves of 
resistance against economic globalization. 
 
The general problem with regulatory chill is that it is difficult to obtain evidence of 
something that has not happened. State officials and policy-makers will be less than eager 
to reveal if and when a policy proposal was buried for fear of investment arbitration.903 
There are studies that touch upon the regulatory chill issue in one or another way. For 
example, one recent study analyzed the question whether states have engaged in 
investment treaty reform as a reaction to BIT claims and pro-investor awards, and the 
author's main conclusion was that 'the impact of investment claims is considerably smaller 
than expected', whereas arbitrations ending in the claimant's favor have had a 'traceable 
influence' on the content of investment treaties.904 Howse has looked at the terms of 
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settlement in arbitrations that were settled before the merits stage, and he notes that the 
settlements 'for which public information was available, almost all appeared to involve 
either significant monetary relief for the investor…or significant adjustment of the 
regulatory framework to the benefit' of the claimant investors.905 The caveat here is that 
without detailed information it is impossible to tell whether the settlements concerned 
'legitimate' policy measures or whether they were settled because of perceived regulatory 
overreach on the part of the host state. There are also a few studies and investigative news 
reports that give direct support to the regulatory chill argument,906 as there are studies (or 
examples) of situations where states have adopted a measure, although an investor had 
notified that it will challenge the measure under an investment treaty.907 For example, it 
was reported that a Dubai real estate mogul was condemned to prison for acquiring a huge 
stretch of land from Egyptian officials for a fraction of the market value so as to build a 
luxury resort on the coast of the Red Sea. The land was declared forfeit by an Egyptian 
court, and immediately after the conviction the company (owned by the mogul) notified 
Egypt that it will raise a claim under the Egypt-UAE BIT, with the basic argument being 
that the deal was made in accordance with Egyptian law. Soon after, the case was settled 
and the investor's prison sentence abolished.908   
 
The proponents of the investment treaty regime rebut the regulatory chill argument in 
different ways. One commentator has argued that an increase in environmental legislation 
in Canada proves that NAFTA's Chapter 11 (dealing with investment protection) has had 
no impact on progressive policy-making in that field.909 Schill, in turn, argues that 
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'investment treaties neither obstruct nor chill state regulation that aims at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions',910 but his conclusion is based on an analysis of  a number of 
awards, rather than on situations where the threat of arbitration links with the withdrawal 
of a policy proposal.  
 
This very short discussion on regulatory chill shows that the relevant evidence is scant and 
impressionistic. It is intuitively plausible to assume that much of the 'chilling' takes place 
under the radar, with corporate lobbyists referring to all sorts of legal and political 
strategies if the host state adopts a less than desired policy change affecting high-value 
investments. But this type of background chilling in no way depends on investment 
treaties, as it is more or less a standard aspect of politics. More generally, the proponents 
could also point out that the very purpose of international law is to limit state action, with 
treaty-making being the most common tool in this respect. As Tietje and Baetens put it, 
'the essential thrust of international investment protection is to achieve some level of 
"chill", that is, to chill governments from treating foreign investors unfavorably'.911 This 
observation brings us back to the debate on the purposes and implications of the 
investment treaty regime. As repeatedly noted, the proponents argue that investment 
treaties and arbitration promote and enforce international protection standards, with 
tribunals' jurisdiction extending to all type of policy measures. In their view, the 'chilling 
effect' that investment treaties create is a welcomed development, because it compels host 
states to pay due consideration to the interests of foreign investors. The proponents could 
also support this argument with reference to cases where tribunals have paid (in their view 
at least) due respect to the relevant public interest, as it suggests that investment treaties 
chill less than the critics imply. 
 
At the risk of repeating myself, it seems clear that even if we have very little evidence of 
regulatory chill (or lack thereof), governments will often co-opt the preferences of foreign 
investors instead of domestic stakeholders, with a relevant investment treaty possibly 
playing some role in such decision. On the other hand, if investment treaties lead 
governments to further prioritize investor interests at the expense of other regulatory 
interests, the critics will again think that the only way in which this can be countered is by 
                                                
910 Stephan W. Schill, 'Do Investment Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation to Mitigate Climate 
Change?', 24 Journal of International Arbitration (2007), pp. 469-477, at 470. 
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exiting the investment treaty regime. I will return to this issue below, but a preliminary 
observation is that I am not in disagreement with the 'exit strategy' as such, because there is 
very little evidence that would corroborate the contention that investment treaties are 
important in the manner suggested by the proponents. However, I am less than convinced 
about the idea that exiting the regime would have a significant impact on the protection of 
the public goods over which the critics worry. 
 
The regulatory chill argument is also at the heart of the debate on the EU's external 
investment policy. The Commission has argued that the investment protection provisions 
of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)912 between Canada and 
the EU will ensure 'that the right to regulate for public policies is fully preserved', as in 
Article 8.9(1) CETA the parties 'reaffirm their right to regulate within their territories to 
achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, the 
environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or the promotion and 
protection of cultural diversity'.913 Article 8.9(2) CETA is also relevant as it provides that 
'the mere fact that a Party regulates, including through a modification to its laws, in a 
manner which negatively affects an investment or interferes with an investor's 
expectations, including its expectations of profits, does not amount to a breach of an 
obligation under this Section'. These two paragraphs are quite empty in content as they 
merely state the obvious: paragraph one provides that the investment protection provisions 
do not prevent the parties from adopting public interest measures, and although such 
provision is not typically included in member state BITs, no investment treaty has ever 
proscribed public interest measures. Paragraph two, in turn, states that if a measure affects 
an investment negatively, this does not, per se, constitute a breach of the investment 
protection obligations. In other words, a measure constitutes a breach of the investment 
protection obligations only if the relevant criteria are met. In yet other words, paragraph 
two creates the perception that an investor cannot raise a claim if (for example) his future 
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to compensate the investor therefor', emphasis added, footnoes omitted). CETA will enter into force 
(provisionally) before the end of 2017, but the investment protection chapter enters into force only after the 
agreement has been ratified by the parliaments of all EU member states. 
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profits diminish as a result of a measure, although such impact may well be part and parcel 
of a claim that allegedly constitutes a breach of the host state's investment protection 
obligations. Generally speaking, however, Article 8.9 CETA may have practical effect in 
the sense that it guides the interpretation of the other investment protection provisions to a 
direction that gives more emphasis to the relevant public interest. 
 
Article 8.10(1) CETA lays down the contracting states' investment protection obligations. 
It provides that the parties shall accord to investments 'fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security', and paragraph two specifies that a party breaches the fair and 
equitable treatment standard if a measure constitutes 'denial of justice', 'fundamental breach 
of due process', 'manifest arbitrariness', 'targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful 
grounds', or 'abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment'.914 
Paragraph four provides that when applying the FET obligation, CETA tribunals 'may take 
into account whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to induce a 
covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the investor 
relied in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but that the Party 
subsequently frustrated', whereas paragraph five provides that full protection and security 
'refers to the Party's obligations relating to the physical security of investors and covered 
investments'.915 The argument that CETA protects the parties' right to regulate is clearly 
misleading in the sense that the expression in Article 8.9(1) does not mean that investors 
cannot challenge measures that protect 'public health, safety, the environment or public 
morals, social or consumer protection or the promotion and protection of cultural 
diversity'. The real questions are whether such measures are likely to fill the criteria of 
what constitutes a breach of the FET obligation under Article 8.10(2) and to what extent 
the 'legitimate expectation' clause may affect the tribunal's analysis of the criteria in 
specific cases. Public interest measures that are adopted in accordance with due process of 
law are unlikely to lead to successful claims under CETA's investment protection rules, but 
the economic, environmental and technological uncertainties that relate to large-scale 
                                                
914 The parties also breach the fair and equitable treatment standard if a measure constitutes 'a breach of any 
further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation adopted by the Parties.' This 'adoption' refers to 
the ability of the CETA Joint Committee to adopt decisions on the 'content of the obligation to provide fair 
and equitable treatment' under paragraph 3 of Article 8.9.  
915 Paragraphs 6 of Article 8.10 provide that 'a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a separate 
international agreement does not establish a breach of this Article', and pararaph 7 provides that 'the fact that 
a measure breaches domestic law does not, in and of itself, establish a breach of this Article. In order to 
ascertain whether the measure breaches this Article, the Tribunal must consider whether a Party has acted 
inconsistently with the obligations in paragraph 1'. 
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investment projects, particularly in the extractive industries sector, may well lead to non-
frivolous claims that challenge measures whose sole purpose is to protect public values. 
The above example concerning the Talvivaara mine in Finland is a case in point. 
 
The idea that the CETA provisions are a step forward resembles the idea that the critique 
has already served its purpose as arbitral tribunals have reacted to the various signals that 
states have sent as a reaction to particular case outcomes, which finds support in the fact 
that most states have not reacted to the critique in any substantive way. In other words, and 
as Miles puts it, there might be 'a sense that even if the substantive law on investment 
protection has not yet changed dramatically, the wider environment in which it is operating 
has - whilst the importance of foreign investment protection is appreciated, tolerance for 
investment rules that operate so as to trump other interests has waned'.916 In yet other 
words, while 'virtually all known' investment arbitration cases have been raised under 'old-
generation' BITs containing vague protection standards,917 this should not give rise to 
concern as arbitral tribunals now provide leeway for host states to adopt legitimate public 
interest measures. Even if individual tribunals have gone rogue and provided expansive 
interpretations of central investment treaty provisions, the investment arbitration 
community, through doctrinal elaboration, ensures that the threat of interpretive overreach 
is gradually neutralized. The content of academic journals focusing on investment 
arbitration is largely doctrinal, which approach is facilitated by an increasing number of 
publicly available arbitral awards and funding by global law firms with an active 
investment arbitration practice. The increasing doctrinal effort is understood as providing a 
remedy against the vagueness of investment protection standards, such as fair and 
equitable treatment and indirect expropriation, with scholar-practitioners918 identifying and 
describing their core elements in ever more detail, which then allows the various 
stakeholders to understand what is fair and equitable treatment and what is not. In the 
words of Brower and Schill, 'growing doctrinal analysis' will 'prove that concepts relating 
to investors' rights…are not as vague and indeterminate as some argue',919 with a coherent 
                                                
916 Kate Miles, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Conflict, Convergence, and Future Directions', 
Bungenberg et al. (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law, supra note 723, pp. 274-308, at 
295 (emphasis added). 
917 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017, supra note 772, at xii. 
918 One report noted that 74 % of the editorial board members of key arbitration journals 'have a background 
in the arbitration industry'. Eberhardt and Olivet, Profiting from Injustice, supra note 781, p. 65. 
919 Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law, supra note 18, pp. 473-474. 
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body of law emerging from the initial uncertainty. Or, as the saying goes, 'good judgment 
comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgments'.  
 
Generally speaking, the narrative of progress, which undergirds both the Commission’s 
storyline on CETA and the idea that doctrinal analysis will enhance the legitimacy of the 
investment treaty regime is not entirely unconvincing. It is clear that frivolous investor 
claims have less chance of succeeding given the increased publicity of investment 
arbitration and the amendments made to investment treaties. Scholarly consensus over core 
aspects of standard treaty provisions may also decrease the uncertainties that stem from the 
decentralized and ad hoc structure of investment arbitration. One could also point to the 
fact that while an overwhelming majority of existing BITs are 'old-fashioned', tribunals are 
using public law analogies to fill gaps in investment treaties,920 which testifies that arbitral 
tribunals are both reacting to specific signals states are sending as well as engaging in self-
regulation as a result of the broader public and political debate. If the investment court 
system materializes at some point, the procedural shortcomings associated with the present 
regime - such as double hatting, lack of appellate review and lack of transparency - are by 
and large eliminated. However, whether this amounts to progress in the eyes of the critics 
is a different matter, and one that I will address below. 
 
As to the issue pro-investor bias, which straddles the critique, its existence will in large 
measure depend on the view one has of the purposes and implications of investment 
treaties. If the regime is understood to promote the rule of law, increase investment flows, 
and contribute to economic development, the argument about bias will seem quite strange, 
also because the very purpose of investment treaties is to take the perspective of the 
investor. On the other hand, if investment treaties and arbitration are perceived as 
undermining the public interest, the argument will have direct appeal because it confirms 
the critic's basic assumption. In other words, vaguely formulated treaty standards, lack of 
references to states' regulatory powers in many investment treaties, and the background of 
many arbitrators in private sector legal practice are all factors that relate to the issue of 
bias,921 but combining these factors to demonstrate its existence already assumes that 
arbitral tribunals should show more deference to domestic policy. Van Harten has noted 
                                                
920 For examples and discussion, see Roberts, 'Clash of Paradigms', supra note 641, pp. 45-94.  
921 On this last element, see Joost Pauwelyn, 'The Rule of Law without the Rule of Lawyers? Why 
Investment Arbitrators are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus', 109 American Journal of 
International Law (2015), pp. 761-805. 
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that his research on the question of bias 'lend[s] support to perceptions that the design of 
investment treaty arbitration does not support fair and independent adjudication of the 
boundaries of sovereign authority and of disputes involving public funds'.922 Statistical and 
empirical research on the issue of bias is fraught with difficult methodological questions, 
with one commentator noting that 'scholars generally acknowledge that definitively 
proving or disproving systemic bias in adjudication is, quite simply, impossible'.923  
 
The proponents have also taken issue with the question of bias by arguing, for example, 
that the highest priority for and the fundamental self-interest of arbitrators is to build a 
reputation of impartiality, with the 'crucial factor for appointment' being 'not the possible 
or real bias of an arbitrator' but 'rather his or her reputation for impartial and independent 
judgment'.924 As to the claim that arbitrators place investor interests above public interests, 
the proponents argue that such partisan approach would be harmful or even 'suicidal' for 
arbitrators, given the widespread and increasing public scrutiny of arbitral awards.925 These 
arguments are based on an idealized picture of a wise and impartial judge who transcends 
partisan motives through sheer will and applies the law objectively on the basis of the 
factual record. But arbitrators are mere mortals and 'bring policy preferences, their 
education, career background and their life experience to…arbitrations', and such factors 
will influence the choices they make when filling 'ambiguities and gaps' in the applicable 
law.926 Again, these arguments miss the critics' main point of contention, which stems from 
the fact that tribunals are able to review domestic policy. This basic authority alone creates 
a perception of 'pro-investor' bias in the eyes of many critics, and it is irrelevant whether or 
not the reasoning of tribunals is formally impeccable and based on a balanced reading of 
the factual record. Similarly, if empirical and statistical analyses of arbitral awards and 
arbitrator backgrounds can only provide hypotheses, it is unlikely that a 'data-driven 
                                                
922 Gus van Harten, 'Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment 
Treaty Arbitration', Osgoode CLPE Research Paper, No. 41/2012, the quote is from the abstract (emphasis 
added). 
923 Catherine A. Rogers, 'The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators', 12 Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law (2014), pp. 223-262, at 233. 
924 Brower and Schill, 'The Legitimacy of International Investment Law', supra note 18, pp. 491-492. 
925 Ibid., pp. 492-493. The word 'suicidal' is from Alec Stone Sweet, 'Arbitration and Judicialization', 1 Oñati 
Socio-Legal Series (2011), pp. 1-23, at 21. 
926 Michael Waibel and Yanhui Wu, 'Are Arbitrators Political? Evidence from International Investment 
Arbitration' (unpublished manuscript, January 2017), pp. 23-24. 
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approach'927 changes the perceptions that the critics and proponents have of the investment 
treaty regime.  
 
In one sense, it is not surprising that 'data-driven' scholarship is on the rise. Such approach 
reflects the current economic zeitgeist to which societal problems are more technical and 
less political, and the 'allure of the ostensibly neutrality of empirical research' will probably 
hold much sway with many financiers of academic research.928 This is not an argument 
against empirical and statistical scholarship, and those who do it willingly admit the 
attendant limitations and challenges.929 Rather, the point is that such evidence may well 
look like tinkering around the edges for the critics, if and when the results provide no 
conclusive answers either way or only point to 'patterns' in decision-making. If the critique 
of the investment treaty regime is about the underlying political stakes - who gets to 
decide, who benefits and who loses, whose values and interests receive recognition - no 
amount of data crunching can end the disagreement between the opposing sides.   
7.5. Conclusion 
As was the case with the arguments for the investment treaty regime, the arguments against 
the regime rely on individual case outcomes and anecdotal evidence, which are understood 
as demonstrating a systematic lack of deference to domestic policy-making on the part of 
arbitral tribunals. For some, this default approach suggests that arbitral tribunals are hostile 
toward non-economic values in general because of an ideological predisposition toward a 
neoliberal philosophy under which political intervention in the economy is considered 
largely unnecessary or even inimical. More generally, and as noted, if the critique of 
investment treaties and arbitration is political, it does not matter what the scant empirical 
evidence says. The critics are aiming to provide more latitude for governments to adopt 
public interest measures, and since investment treaties may constrain domestic policy-
making it is wiser to remove them from the equation. Whether or not this leads 
governments to protect and promote various public values is a different matter, but it does 
remove one potential obstacle. When defending the proposal for an investment court 
system (ICS), Trade Commissioner Malmström noted that 'there is a fundamental and 
                                                
927 The phrase is from Wolfgang Alschner, Joost Pauwelyn and Sergio Puig, 'The Data-Driven Future of 
International Economic Law', 20 Journal of International Economic Law (2017), pp. 217-231. 
928 Rogers, 'The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators', supra note 923, p. 233.  
929 See Alschner, Pauwelyn and Puig, 'Data-Driven Future', supra note 927, pp. 226-231. 
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widespread lack of trust by the public in the fairness and impartiality of the old ISDS 
model'. Yet investment protection remains 'an important part of the EU's investment 
policy', as EU investors have been 'the most frequent users of the existing system'. This 
meant that 'we, from the EU side, must take our responsibility to reform and modernize' 
the investment treaty regime.930 These arguments are based on the perception that the 
critique is legal-technical and that the legitimacy of investment treaties can be reformed 
through treaty reform. I return to Malmström's rhetoric shortly. 
 
The ICS proposal as well as the CETA investment protection provisions have received 
mixed reviews. On the business side, the worry is that the express reference to the 'right to 
regulate' as well as the specifications made to the FET standard could lead tribunals to 
excessively defer to regulatory measures that negatively affect investments.931 Conversely, 
the critics fail to see the wisdom of the proposal as it continues to provide special 
privileges to foreign investors in the absence of evidence proving the necessity of such 
privileges.932 Generally speaking, the Commission attempts to ensure that the reformed 
investment treaty regime defers to domestic policy-making to an extent that wipes away 
the twin-fear of regulatory chill and interpretive overreach on the part of arbitral tribunals. 
The proposals also seek to ensure that the new system is akin to a public court system 
where the parties no longer choose the judges, where transparency is the rule rather than 
the exception, and where an appellate body guarantees the emergence of a more coherent 
jurisprudence. Should the proposal move forward in the coming years, and should it 
gradually 'multilateralize', one could argue that this is a step forward in comparison to the 
existing investment treaty regime, which consists mostly of old-fashioned BITs. 
Malmström's use of the personal pronoun 'we' also implies that she is trying to convince 
the 'European public' that the Commission's efforts are premised on the existence of a 
collective purpose that guides the Commission's policy proposals and serves the interests 
of all EU citizens. The concluding chapter looks at this idea more closely by drawing an 
analogy to the previous debates on the legitimacy of the WTO as well as by providing 
some comments on the EU's future investment policy. 
                                                
930 Cecilia Malmström, 'Proposing an Investment Court System', 16 September 2015. Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/proposing-investment-court-
system_en (accessed 1 September 2017). 
931 See e.g. BusinessEurope, 'The Commission proposal on a new investment court system', BusinessEurope 
Note, 23 October 2015; Nikos Lavranos, 'The Shortcomings of the Proposal for an "International Court 
System" (ICS)', EFILABlog, 2 February 2016. 
932 Gus van Harten, 'ISDS in the Revised CETA: Positive Steps, But is it the "Gold Standard"?’, Investor-
State Arbitration Commentary Series No. 6, Centre for International Governance Innovation, 25 May 2016. 
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8. Conclusion 
The essence of the critical arguments is remarkably similar to the arguments raised in the 
previous debate concerning the legitimacy of the WTO, and the political agenda of the 
critics is strikingly similar with the agenda of the global justice movement that made 
headlines from the 1999 Seattle protests onward. Lang has provided a first-rate account 
and analysis of the debates concerning the world trade system around the turn of the 
millennium as well as of the preceding rise of neoliberal thinking. I will first provide a 
summary of Lang's account, after which I attempt to show how the reactions to the critique 
of investment arbitration follow a similar type of pattern as the reactions to the critique of 
the WTO. My suggestion is that the Commission's proposal for an investment court system 
and the Trade Commissioner's sentimental references to a collective purpose fail to 
understand what the critics of the investment treaty regime are trying to achieve. 
  
Lang defines neoliberal thinking as 'a turn away from an idea of politics as the creation, 
mobilization, and realization of the collective purposes of a political community, towards 
an idea of politics as the facilitation of individuals' pursuit of their own private goals and 
purposes'.933 In the economic domain this idea translates into a 'strong normative 
preference for…free and competitive markets, combined with strong private property 
rights' and the retreat of the state 'from a direct role in economic production through the 
privatization of state-owned industries and utilities, and sometimes the provision of social 
services'.934 In Lang's account, the rise of neoliberal thought had a profound impact on the 
way in which politics was understood in and around the WTO. The world trade regime 
came to be understood as the global political and economic marketplace where traders 
were protected from arbitrary exercises of public power, with the WTO legal framework 
'imagined as the embodiment of the rule of law in global trade governance, 
and…restructured in accordance with such rule of law values as neutrality, predictability, 
certainty, generality, and objectivity'.935 A corollary of this view was the 'delegitimization' 
of the notion 'that governments could intervene in the economy in the pursuit of collective 
social purposes', with the purported purpose of a measure transforming into a subjective 
and unpredictable yardstick, which could no longer be used to establish a measure's 
                                                
933 Andrew Lang, World Trade Law After Neoliberalism. Reimagining the Global Economic Order (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 1. 
934 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
935 Ibid., p. 6.  
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compliance with WTO law.936 Instead, 'technical bodies of knowledge...concerning 
appropriate and optimal regulation' of economic activity became the dominant method with 
which domestic measures were assessed, hiding from sight the fact that this method was 
premised on a particular vision of state-market relations.937  
 
This ideological shift also meant that domestic measures, previously perceived as 'part of 
the "normal" range of governmental action in the marketplace, undertaken for a clearly 
legitimate purpose',938 were increasingly challenged at the WTO as deviations of the new 
neoliberal normal. As a result, WTO bodies were asked to determine 'the legality of a 
variety of different regulatory measures having to do with public health, consumer 
protection, and environmental protection, among other matters of considerable political 
sensitivity'.939 With the ideological foundations of the WTO having shifted, the GATT 
panels rendered a string of decisions in which trade liberalization trumped other (and for 
many more important) public values. As a reaction, the critics made the basic argument 
that it should be left to the discretion of WTO members to determine how they organize 
state-market relations and 'for the WTO to pass judgment on the optimality or 
appropriateness of regulatory measures passed through legitimate domestic processes' was 
an 'illegitimate intrusion' into those processes.940 While Lang agrees with these criticisms 
in principle, he takes issue with the way in which the WTO dispute-settlement system has 
responded to the criticisms. In essence, Lang argues that the critique led to the 
'proceduralization' of WTO review in that the focus shifted from substantive review to the 
'quality' of the domestic institutional processes through which regulatory measures were 
adopted. This was meant to signal increasing deference to domestic policy-making on the 
part of WTO bodies. Lang problematizes this notion by arguing that this type of 
'procedural review' is de facto equally intrusive as substantive review, because the WTO 
bodies are not simply interested in due process questions but also analyzing the 
appropriateness of the scientific methodologies on the basis of which WTO members took 
the challenged regulatory decisions.  
 
                                                
936 Ibid., p. 7. 
937 Idem. 
938 Ibid., p. 17. 
939 Ibid., p. 314. See also Robert Howse, 'From Politics to Technocracy - and Back Again: the Fate of the 
Multilateral Trading Regime', 96 American Journal of International Law (2002), pp. 94-117, at 102 ff. 
940 Ibid., p. 8. 
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His broader point is that proposals that seek to ensure that non-economic public values are 
given more weight in and around the WTO regime are bound to fail unless the neoliberalist 
assumptions which form the ideational basis of the regime are brought into the open, 
recognized and challenged with a set of new assumptions. Lang notes that while 'the 
distributive, environmental, or social costs of international trade liberalization' have 
received relatively little attention within the WTO, this is not because such matters are 
considered unimportant, 'but because such matters are not considered appropriate topics of 
conversation given the limited purpose of international economic governance, as redefined 
within the neoliberal imagination'.941 Rather, these are matters that are 'more appropriately 
addressed at the domestic level, or in other venues and regimes of international 
governance'.942 As noted, Lang sees this mindset as stemming from the underlying 
neoliberal paradigm, and for him only by moving away from basic neoliberal assumptions 
can non-economic values receive broader recognition within the WTO. Hence, the WTO 
critics should focus more on redirecting the debate to 'the collective purposes of global 
trade governance' and less on the 'institutional and procedural structures' governing world 
trade.943  
 
This sounds very familiar. The critics of investment treaties are also arguing that arbitral 
tribunals intrude illegitimately into the domestic political process by determining the 
appropriateness of a wide variety of regulatory measures. Since domestic policy-making 
entails value choices, such decisions should be left to the discretion of domestic 
institutions rather than of arbitral tribunals. If Lang considers that institutional and 
procedural reforms are unlikely to lead to the kind of changes the WTO critics were 
seeking, the same concern is expressed by those who see the reform proposals of the 
investment treaty regime as not remedying its casting defect, namely, the ability of arbitral 
tribunals to review domestic policy measures in the first place. On a more general level, 
Lang's account of how an ideational change toward neoliberalism had systemic and 
concrete consequences for WTO decision-making resembles the ideational order under 
which the proponents of investment treaties and arbitration evaluate state-market relations. 
As repeatedly noted, the proponents understand that the role of arbitrators is to determine 
what is reasonably acceptable government conduct in a market economy. While arbitral 
                                                
941 Ibid., p. 10. 
942 Idem. 
943 Ibid., p. 11. 
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tribunals are increasingly taking account of the public interest, this does not mean that they 
defer to it in a manner that would appease the critics, even if the applicable protection 
standards become less indeterminate, because the critics are trying to ensure that the 
domestic polity gets back what shouldn't have been taken away in the first place, that is, its 
regulatory autonomy. In this light, the Commission's central reform proposals - 
safeguarding the right to regulate and the new investment court system - cannot lead to a 
fundamental attitudinal change in the mindset of the judges who interpret the 'next 
generation' investment protection provisions. Their task is still to provide a full review of 
domestic measures in light of the refined investment protection standards. 
 
Lang also notes that the more fundamental problem with the WTO reforms is that they 
hide from sight the fact that regulatory autonomy is 'itself something of an illusion in 
contemporary conditions'. He continues: 
 
'It is apparent that states' regulatory freedom is already constrained by inter-
national economic structures, and to a significant extent is subject to the logics 
of those structures. It is no longer possible to imagine a world in which 
sovereign states pursue regulatory policies and choices entirely free of the 
constraining and constitutive influences of the global economic structures in 
which they are embedded. Even in the absence of international economic law, 
states could not simply regulate freely without having regard to the potential 
reactions of foreign actors, both public and private - on which they may rely for 
investment, aid, and access to foreign markets for both capital and goods, and to 
whose coercive pressures they may in practice be subject. Moreover, states 
regulate in response to political and economic pressures which are themselves 
deeply shaped by the structure and operation of the global economy, and indeed 
of international economic law.'944  
 
In other words, the idea that states would be capable of determining for themselves the 
model of state-market relations according to their preferences is a pipedream. The 
proponents of the investment treaty regime would probably argue that Lang's description is 
both correct and normatively desirable. The benefits of economic globalization depend on 
                                                
944 Ibid., p. 344. 
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an open and global marketplace, and an ever deeper and broader economic integration 
process guarantees that the benefits continue to trickle-down. The propensity of host states 
to make policy on populist grounds necessitates a neutral dispute-settlement venue that 
pays due consideration to the economic interests of the investor (and of the host state as the 
case may be). Those with a more moderate view of the investment treaty regime would 
probably endorse Lang's description, but also think that the Commission's reform proposals 
are a step in the right direction, however modest their impact may be in light of the 
structural constraints imposed on domestic policy-making. The critics, in turn, would 
probably say that the only way forward is to wipe out the investment treaty regime so as to 
remove one external constraint from the domestic political process. In their view, it is 
impossible to create an investment protection mechanism that honors the 'sanctity' of the 
domestic political process, because the fundamental purpose of investment protection is to 
create an external review mechanism. Malmström's references to 'we' in the statement that 
defended the investment court system seem naïve in light of the distance that prevails 
between the Commission's rhetoric and the political concerns of the critics. In 
Malmström's view, the investment court system 'will…benefit investors…[and the 
proposed] changes will create the trust that is needed by the general public, while 
encouraging investment'.945 
 
The managerialism that undergirds this quote is familiar from other Commission 
documents dealing with investment protection. The documents create a sense that the 
Commission has come more than half way to meet the critics' concerns, and that debating 
the matter further is futile and counterproductive, and based on a dubious political agenda 
that finds no support in European public opinion - it's time to move forward! Lang's 
proposed solution to the legitimacy crisis of the WTO was the 'reformulation of a 
legitimating collective purpose to ground the work of the trade regime, and as a 
consequence the generation of a substantive and meaningful discussion of what that 
purpose should be in the light of contemporary global challenges and competing normative 
priorities'. In other words, the primary goal is to 'pursue precisely the mode of governance 
that neoliberal thought made more difficult to achieve - the exercise of public power in 
international trade governance in pursuit of a collectively defined legitimating purpose, 
and a form of governing which does not shy away from the experience of moral 
                                                
945 Malmström, 'Proposing an Investment Court System', supra note 930 (emphasis added). 
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responsibility for the full range of outcomes it produces'. Transposed to the present 
context, Lang's call for a collective purpose (upon which the debates on the investment 
treaty regime should be grounded) is something that the critics are also calling for, if in 
less explicit terms. It is not necessarily so that the critics are categorically against trade and 
investment liberalization per se, because these are abstract notions which are put into 
practice in different ways in different parts of the world. Rather, at least some of the 
critique may stem precisely from the loss of collective purpose that Lang describes. 
Economic rhetoric has permeated most aspects of social life, and moral and cultural 
meanings of community, work, and the marketplace have little room in public and political 
talk. Given this, it is not surprising that the sentiment that 'we' are no longer on the same 
boat is increasing also in western democracies, with the EU appearing as a distant and cold 
apparatus whose representatives claim to represent the European body politic without 
realizing their own privileged position within the 'ever closer union' and without 
appreciating the deep socio-economic, cultural, linguistic and political dividing lines that 
prevail in Europe. 
 
The discussion in Chapters 4 and 5 showed that the ECJ will have some leeway in deciding 
the Achmea case. In his Opinion, Advocate General Wathelet noted how the EU 
membership was divided over the question whether intra-EU BITs are compatible with EU 
law. Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands argued for compatibility, 
whereas eleven member states argued the opposite.946 The Advocate General noted that 
this division reflected the member states' different experiences of investment arbitration, 
with the first group having faced only a few or no investor claims and the second facing a 
much higher number of claims. He also observed that the purpose of intra-EU BITs is to 
'encourage and attract foreign investment', and referred to a string of arbitral awards where 
the tribunals had emphasized how investment arbitration is 'an indispensable guarantee that 
encourages and protects investments'.947 The preceding discussion has shown that the 
empirical evidence on the correlation between BITs and investment flows is scant and 
somewhat inconclusive, but the studies that were concluded before the sharp rise in the 
number of investment claims show that investment treaties were not relevant for 
investment decisions, apart from isolated cases, because investors were largely unaware of 
                                                
946 Case C-284/16, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, supra note 257, paras. 34-35. These were Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and 
Spain. 
947 Ibid., paras. 76-77. 
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the treaties' existence and potential until the attendant public and political debate became 
more widespread.948 Poulsen has also demonstrated how developing country officials in 
charge of investment treaty negotiations were 'neither aware of the costs' or of the fact that 
the treaties 'could lead to arbitration' in the first place.949 The Advocate General is of 
course entitled to his opinion but it reflects rather poorly the historical record, and also 
ignores the critique that centers on the procedural and substantive provisions of old-
fashioned BITs (including intra-EU BITs) under which investors continue to raise claims 
on a steady pace. The Advocate General framed the object and purpose of intra-EU BITs 
by pointing to their perceived necessity in the immediate post-Communist era when the 
formerly socialist states were still unfamiliar with the basic tenets of the rule of law. The 
Commission made this precise argument during the oral hearings, but the Advocate 
General dismissed it by arguing that if intra-EU BITs were only meant to remain in force 
until EU accession, the Commission should have ensured that the accession treaties had 
provided for the termination of intra-EU BITs.950 However, a more commonsensical 
argument is that the Commission failed to register entirely the scenario where investors 
challenge domestic measures that relate to the requirements of EU law. Given that EU law 
and BITs share a similar ethos in that they oppose anti-competitive conduct and promote 
market-oriented reforms, it would not be surprising if the Commission's staff failed to 
appreciate their potential threat to fundamental principles of EU law. Moreover, most 
intra-EU BITs were concluded well before 2000. For example, when Romania signed its 
association agreement in 1993, in which it was encouraged to conclude BITs, the overall 
number of BIT claims was less than ten, with most stakeholders being entirely unaware of 
the implications of investment treaties, as Poulsen's study convincingly demonstrates.  
 
In this light, the ECJ could send a signal of 'mutual trust' or collective purpose by declaring 
that intra-EU BITs are incompatible with the founding treaties. Since the economic 
arguments for investment treaties and arbitration are less than compelling, and since there 
is no evidence that foreign investors are treated arbitrarily within the EU, the Court could 
point out that intra-EU BITs no longer serve the purpose with which their conclusion was 
justified, and the different treatment they bring about has no other objective justification 
either. A finding that intra-EU BITs constitute prohibited discrimination would make it 
                                                
948 See Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy. The Politics of 
Investment Treaties in Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp.7-9. 
949 Ibid., p. 105 (quoting a Czech official). 
950 Case C-284/16, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, supra note 257, paras. 40-41. 
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unnecessary for the Court to address the other preliminary questions concerning its 
exclusive jurisdiction and the autonomy of EU law. Given that the Court will have to 
address those questions in relation to the Belgium's request for an opinion on the 
investment court system, the Court could take a deep breath and engage in a more 
comprehensive analysis of the pros and cons of investment treaties, and then provide an 
answer that relies (implicitly) on a political vision of the EU that takes more seriously the 
values upon which the Union claims to have built itself and that recognizes the 

















According to a recent report made under the leadership of research centers at Yale and 
Columbia University, Finland was ranked the 'greenest' country in the world.951 Finland’s 
top ranking was based on its 'commitment to achieve carbon-neutral society that does not 
exceed nature's carrying capacity by 2050'.952 An even more recent news story reported 
how an informal partnership between the Finnish government, Finnish MEPs, Finnish 
ministry officials, and unions representing Finnish industries had engaged in a lengthy and 
successful lobbying campaign so as to amend the Commission's proposal for a regulation 
on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions from land use, land use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) into the EU's 2030 climate and energy framework. The idea behind the 
LULUCF regulation was that all business sectors should contribute to the EU's 2030 
emission reduction target. Just before the European Parliament's (EP) vote on the 
regulation, an amendment proposal was put forward on the initiative of a Finnish MEP, 
which excluded references to how logging should be taken account of when country-
specific reduction targets are measured. The EP accepted the amendment proposal by a 
narrow margin, with the Finnish government seeing the vote as promoting the Finnish 
national interest. Promotion of the bioeconomy is a top priority of the Finnish government, 
and increasing logging is perceived as central to ensuring an adequate and steady supply of 
biomasses for the relevant domestic industries. Environmental organizations were less 
enthusiastic. In their view, increasing logging in the next ten to fifteen years means that 
Finland's carbon sink will shrink, as its forests absorb less emissions than previously. Since 
combatting climate change requires immediate and comprehensive action, the watered-
down version of the LULUCF regulation is perceived as a myopic special interest measure 
that sends an entirely wrong message to countries such as Brazil and Indonesia where the 
majority of the world's rainforests are located (and where illegal logging is a huge 
problem).  
 
The Finnish government also subsidizes energy-intensive industries and production of peat 
energy with hundreds of millions of euros annually, although there is undisputed empirical 
evidence that the former have no impact on the competitiveness of the beneficiary 
companies (the publicly stated aim of the aid), and although the combustion of peat creates 
                                                
951 A. Hsu et al., 2016 Environmental Performance Index (Yale University, 2016).  
952 See Finland Promotion Board, Finland in International Rankings and Comparisons (2017). 
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far more greenhouse gas emissions than coal.953 Likewise, in mid-April 2017, the Finnish 
branch of World Wide Fund for Nature announced that Finland's resource consumption in 
the first three and half months of 2017 had exceeded the earth's capacity to produce 
resources for the whole year of 2017. In other words, if other states' resource consumption 
would reach the same level as Finland's, humanity's ecological debt to earth, in respect of 
2017 alone, would start to accumulate from mid-April onward. At the global level, while 
climate scientists are warning that the earth's life-support systems are being damaged in 
ways that may threaten humanity's survival, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels, for 
example, show no sign of abating. A recent study estimated that global fossil fuel subsidies 
in 2015 amounted to $5.3 trillion, with coal subsidies accounting for about half of them.954 
If the existence of regulatory chill was difficult to substantiate in the context of investment 
treaties, the above anecdotes point that regulatory chill manifests itself in many shapes and 
forms. Academic arm-wrestling over the future of the investment treaty regime consumes 
resources and time, provides financial and travel opportunities to the debate's 
participants,955 but it is difficult to tell whether it has any relevance for the resolution of the 
concerns that animate the debate. If the discrepancy between the normative ideals of 
scholarship and social reality starts to feel too wide, and if those ideals nonetheless feel 
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